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ABSTRACT

While American policy makers needed three years after
World War II to recognize the importance of re-educating
German youth and to develop a consistent policy, a look at
Nuremberg reveals that American representatives in the field
started positive and constructive programs immediately after
the war.

American soldiers ignored non-fraternization, the

Army became heavily involved in helping German communities
survive, while the Youth Section of the Office of Military
Government was the first to focus on persuasion instead of
coercion in its re-education efforts.

It designed long range

programs to introduce young Germans to a democratic culture.
Official American policy simply confirmed the new direction
months later.

The Army introduced a completely new concept

of youth work, offering alternatives for those who refused to
join

traditional

requirements.

German

clubs

with

their

membership

It also provided almost all transport and

equipment for youth activities in the American zone.

Private

organizations and Washington's child feeding program reached
additional

German

youths.

In

spite

of

administrative

shortcomings and a constant shortage of personnel,

these

Americans were able to make significant contributions to
youth work and even schooling in Germany, although the effort
fell

short

of

institutional

recalcitrant Bavaria.

reform,

especially

in

With American power and support behind
xi
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them, progressive Germans in key positions adopted American
ideas and models for youth work and explored new ways of
integrating young Germans into the international community.
American

youth programs

and

the presence

of substantial

numbers of soldiers and civilians in Germany had a positive
and long lasting effect which went beyond immediate material
gains.

Many young Germans became acquainted with American

culture, ideas, and ideals.

Most of those who participated

in

the

exchange

programs

with

United

States

served

as

multipliers, introducing American concepts to German schools,
social work,

and even the churches.

American efforts in

youth work succeeded because their programs and the mere
presence

of

so

many

Americans

offered

different

and

attractive approaches without dictating them at a time when
most young Germans and open-minded members

of the

older

generation were looking for new ideas and alternatives to a
discredited ideology and lifestyle.

xii
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Special

INTRODUCTION

The United States developed a special relationship with
the Federal Republic of Germany during the first decade after
World

War

research

II.
in

The

this

relationship.

quantity

field

and quality

reflects

the

of

historical

importance

of

this

The analytical focus of most studies, however,

does not go beyond the political and institutional level,
discussing

the

various

Government

(OMGUS),

the

roles
High

the

Office

Commissioner

of
for

Military
Germany

(HICOG), or the European Recovery Program (ERP) played in the
creation of the Federal Republic.1 A few scholars assess the
cultural dimension of German-American relations, but do not
venture beyond the traditional topics such as theater or
literature.2

‘Jeffry Diefendorf et al., eds., (American Policy and
the Reconstruction of West Germany 1945-1955 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993)) and Michael Ermarth, ed.,
(America and the Shaping of German Society (Herndon, VA:
Berg, 1993)) represent the most recent research trends over
the last decade.
The former essay collection is dedicated
entirely to political history, whereas the latter includes
essays on culture, the economy, consumption, and everyday
life as well as personal accounts of American participants in
the occupation.
2Michael Ermarth, "The German Talks Back: Heinrich
Hauser and German Attitudes towards Americanization after
World War II," America and the Shaping of German Society, ed.
Michael Ermarth (Herndon, VA: Berg, 1993) 101-31; Hermann
Glaser, The Rubble Years: The Cultural Roots of Postwar
Germany 1945-1948 (New York: Paragon House, 1986) ; Ralph
Willett, The Americanization of Germany, 1945-1949 (New York
and London: Rout ledge, 1989) . I am only concerned here with
scholarly historical works.
1
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2
German youth after World War II has only very recently
received attention by the historical profession, apart from
the standard photos and accounts of American soldiers who
supplied children with candy and chewing gum.3 In the course
of the occupation Americans in Germany realized early on the
importance reaching out to the youth with their programs.
Bringing American ideas and ideals directly to young Germans
provided a feasible alternative to American institutional and
administrative reform attempts which encountered determined
resistance.

This study will seek to determine the range and

the results of American policy towards German youth on the
grassroots level between 1945 and 1955.
The topic involves a political and a social component.
In the realm of politics it will be necessary to follow the
policy making process in the United States and in Germany.4

3Hermann-Josef Rupieper (Die Wurzeln der vrestdeutschen
Nachkriegsdemokratie: Der amerikanische Beitrag 1945-1952
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993)) and Karl-Heinz Fiissl,
Die Umerziehung der Deutschen: Schule und Jugend unter den
Siegermachten des Zweiten Weltkriegs 1945-1955 (Paderborn:
Schoningh, 1994)) approach the subject from different angles,
but agree that American reorientation efforts towards German
youth important and much more successful than the Military
Government's
attempts
at
institutional
reform
and
denazification.
4In spite of a considerable number of accounts of
American policy in Germany I have not been able to find a
satisfactory general study of American policy formulation for
post-war Germany. Most works are concerned only with partial
aspects of the issue, some reveal a surprising lack of
accuracy in dealing with the decision making process in
Washington and the constantly changing administrative set-up
of Military Government during various stages of the
occupation.
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3
To

determine

the

impact

of

these

policies,

their

interpretation and implementation by Americans in charge of
everyday

operations

attention.

in

the

field

will

receive

special

On the social level the study will explore the

effects of American policies and policy implementation on
youth work in a community.
of every day

It will also examine the nature

contacts which young Germans

developed after the war.

and Americans

The main objective is to draw a

clearer picture of everyday relations at the grassroots and
compare them with the political arena, in which victors and
vanquished became partners in little less than a decade.
Until the 1960s the study of German-American relations
after the Second World War remained almost entirely in the
hands of American scholars.
those

who

prominent

participated
positions

in

A surprisingly large number of
the

published

American

their

occupation

evaluations

of

in
the

venture.5 Later scholars, many of whom had served in Germany
in

less

occupation

important

positions,

of Germany.

Almost

focused
all

of

on
them

the

military

agreed

that

American programs were not successful during the occupation.6

5See, for example, Lucius Clay, Decision in Germany (New
York: Doubleday and Company, 1950;
Hajo Holborn, ed.,
American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies
(Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947); Marshall
Knappen, And Call it Peace (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1947) .
6See, for example, Edward N. Peterson, The American
Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press, 1977) .
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4
John Gimbel's study of Marburg was the only case study among
the early publications and in many ways still serves as a
model for such an approach.7
When

OMGUS

documents were declassified

in the

late

1970s, interest in German-American relations after World War
II revived,

especially in Germany.

Historians have edited

and published important primary materials which dealt with
the American presence in Germany after 19458 and several case
studies have shed new light on various problems.9
Many of these scholars shared the skepticism of earlier
works.

Their accounts indicate that American re-education

and denazification efforts may not have been as successful as

7John Gimbel, A German Community under Occupation:
Marburg 1945-52 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961).
*For example Udo Winkel,ed., Niirnberg 1945-1949: Quellen
zur Nachkriegsgeschichte (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: Stadtarchiv,
1989) or Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller, eds., Lehrjahre
der CSU: Eine Nachkriegspartei im Spiegel vertraulicher
Berichte an die Amerikanische Militarregierung (Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1984). See also the publication of
a great number of documents in Vierteljahreshefte fiir
Zeitgeschichte.
Wolfgang
Eckart,
Amerikanische
Reformpolitik und
deutsche Tradition: Niirnberg, 1945-49: Nachkriegspolitik im
Spannungsfeld zwischen Neuordnungsvorstellungen, Notlage und
pragmatischer Krisenbewaltigung, Niirnberger Werkstiicke zur
Stadt-und
Landesgeschichte
42
(Niirnberg
[Nuremberg]:
Stadtarchiv, 1988); Elmar Ettle, Die Entnazifizierung in
Eichstadt: Probleme der politischen Sauberung nach 1945
(Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 1985); Hans Woller, Gesellschaft und
Politik in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone: Die Region
Ansbach
und
Fiirth,
Quellen
und
Darstellungen
zur
Zeitgeschichte, herausgegeben vom Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte
25 (Miinchen [Munich]: Oldenbourg, 1986).
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5
the occupiers had hoped them to be,10 but the most recent
studies tend to draw a more differentiated picture.

Winfried

Muller, for example, documents that even American efforts at
school

reform

unsuccessful.

in conservative

Bavaria were

not

While conservative Bavarians were

frustrate

American

efforts

structure

of

traditional

educators

were

different

school

their

primary schools,

able

to

types,

to

influence
to

completely

system,

the

curricula

teacher

able to

remodel

school

improve

entirely

the

American
for

the

training

for

and to support various groups of reform

minded teachers who had set out to change the traditionally
authoritarian classroom behavior of the teachers.11
l0James A. Tent (Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and
Denazification in American Occupied Germany (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1982)) finds that Germans
successfully resisted American efforts to reform the
educational and economic system.
Ettle confirms Lutz
Niethammer's earlier findings that German Spruchkammern,
courts and authorities were in fact reluctant to carry
through the process of denazification rigorously (Lutz
Niethammer, Die Mitlauferfabrik: Entnazifizierung am Beispiel
Bayerns (Berlin: Dietz, 1982)).
According to Peterson,
German society came to fit American expectations only after
they had given up their efforts to reform it.
Wolfgang
Eckart shows that American efforts to reform society and
politics soon gave way to an arrangement with the German
political elites that was based on pragmatism, not on
idealism on both sides.
“Woller, Fiissl, and Rupieper interpret OMGUS and HICOG
activities in such a manner.
For schools in Bavaria see
Winfried Muller, Schulpolitik in Bayern im Spannungsfeld von
Kultusbiirokratie und Besatzungsmacht, 1945-1949, Quellen und
Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte herausgegeben vom Institut
fiir Zeitgeschichte 36 (Miinchen [Munich] : Oldenbourg, 1995) .
See also Wolfgang Krieger, General Lucius D. Clay und die
amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1949, Forschungen und
Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 10 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987)
and Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John McCloy and
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6
Although

a

number

of

case

studies

on

the

post-war

situation in Germany are available, historians have barely
begun

to

Germans

explore

in the

the

interaction

communities.

between

The authors

Americans
of

these

and
case

studies have limited their approach mainly to the relations
between

local

administrations

Government officials.

and

American

Military

A number of scholars provide useful

insights into some aspects of everyday relations,
subject needs more detailed assessment.

but the

Gimbel points out

that the experiences of the social and political elites in
Germany with Americans were different from those of other
parts of society.
OMGUS

and

organizations

its

The wide range of youth programs which
successor

such

as

the

HICOG
churches

as

well

as

introduced

private

in German

communities provide ample material for the investigation of
American activities and their results on the political as
well as the non-political level at the grassroots.12
While early authors of the military occupation covered
the period from 1945 to 1954, most of the more recent studies
limit their time frame even more, concentrating either on the
four years of Military Government after the war, or on the
the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, Mass. and London:
Harvard University Press, 1991) .
I2Fussl provides a first model of what can be done
combining political history with a look at the grassroots.
See also Maria Hohn, "GIs, Veronikas and Lucky Strikes:
German Reactions to the American Military Presence in the
Rhineland-Palatinate
during the
1950s,"
diss.
U.
of
Pennsylvania, 1995.
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subsequent reign of the High Commissioners.

This enables the

authors to deal with their topics in depth,

but makes it

difficult to evaluate the impact of American policies and
programs on Germany, since HICOG continued the course which
OMGUS had charted and also did not modify its objectives.
This study therefore will return to the initial periodization
that treated OMGUS and HICOG as a unit.
The nature of the subject imposes a limit on the scope
of the study and makes a case study approach necessary.

The

city of Nuremberg in many ways reflected West German society
from the beginning of the American occupation in 1945.

The

city's

had

connection

with

the

National

Socialists

who

selected it to be the permanent site of their party rallies
and the stage for implementing their
1935, made it in the eyes
evil Germany.

in

of many the representative of an

The Allies

held the war crimes trials

new racial order

reenforced this image when they
in the city. Yet the situation in

Nuremberg as well as in the rest of Germany was far more
complicated than the appearance suggested.

The National

Socialists' dramatic gains there at the end of the 1920s were
undeniable, but the city had shown considerable resistance to
the Nazis before 1933, with the Social Democrats dominating
local

politics

until

the

Nazis

forced

them

out.13

Together with the surrounding region Nuremberg displays
a remarkably diverse social and political structure.
I3Eckart 30-48.
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8
a large population of industrial workers, as well as small
craft-oriented businesses, and served as administrative and
commercial center of the region,
hinterland.

with close ties to the

Nuremberg and the region also had to absorb

large numbers of refugees after 1945 and had to accommodate
American army units.

They remained in the city for five

decades and are still present in the region today.
Since a significant part of the study is concerned with
Alltagsgeschichte. oral history became an integral part of my
research.

After an initial wave of enthusiasm, historians

have become more cautious about the possibilities this new
source offers to the profession,

but for any project of

recent history which is concerned with social history and
individual attitudes,

there are no alternatives to using

interviews when they are available.14

l4For a good introduction to the problems, limits and
possibilities of oral history see Lutz Niethammer, ed.,
Lebenserfahrung und kollektives Gedachtnis: Die Praxis der
>Oral Historv<. 1985. Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the
Yellow Badge. Oxford, Pergamon Press 1992, is an outstanding
example for the creative and responsible use of oral history
and the possibilities it has to offer.
Locating interviewees is a major problem for the
practitioner of oral history.
Since Germans are generally
not as mobile as Americans, it has been possible to find many
interviewees in Nuremberg itself but I interviewed others in
communities as far away as Bremen. The city of Nuremberg has
conducted a number of oral history projects which I also
incorporated in this study
(City of Nuremberg,
ed.,
Erinnerungen aus der Stadtverwaltunq (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]:
Karl Frey,
1989)
and Siegfried Kett,
Das Niirnberqer
Kiinstlerhaus: Eine Stadtoeschichte von 1867-1992 (Niirnberg
[Nuremberg]: Verlag Niirnberger Presse, 1992)).
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The

oral

historian

distinguishes

himself

from

the

sociologist by relying less on a quantitative and more on a
qualitative

approach— without

information available.
involved

neglecting

the

statistical

Apart from locating people who were

in youth work at the time,

I attempted to find

people of both sexes who lived in different subdivisions and
in the surrounding region, represented different ages, and
reflected

the

Interviews

with

social

stratification

native

Nurembergers

within
as

well

the

city.

as

former

refugees helped to determine the experiences of insiders and
outsiders.

Apart from providing me with their recollections,

many of the

interviewees

also made available to me

valuable material as diaries and photographs.
with traditional sources

such

In conjunction

such as the city's records,

the

records of the Military Government and the High Commissioner
for Germany, newspapers, and archival records of the Lutheran
Church, the interviews added depth and a human dimension to
this study.

The interaction between the interviews and the

traditional sources turned out to be one of the most fruitful
features

of

my

research.

Archival

sources

helped

me

formulate my questions and verify the recollections of the
interviewees who provided personal details on written sources
or were able to recall important details on specific events.
The interviews often directed my attention to

issues and

sources which I was able to pursue in the archives.
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interviewees' experiences and perceptions form a vital part
of the story that is about to follow.
Since

"re-education,"

"democratization,"

and

"Americanization" appear frequently in the sources of the
time, in the interviews as well as in scholarly accounts, a
word about terminology is in order.

Not surprisingly, the

definitions and interpretations of these terms vary widely.
It is therefore necessary to present the reader with the way
I defined the terms for this study.
"Re-education" was used in two contexts before it became
one of the features of American policy in post-war Germany.
During

the

193 0s

psychotherapists

attempted

to

correct

neurotic behavior by trying to replace abnormal ideas with
new and healthy concepts.

In this way a therapist could lead

a patient back to the mainstream path from which he had
strayed.

Educators developed a similar concept, but for them

victims of accidents needed to re-learn the abilities which
they had forgotten.15

We will see that Americans applied

both concepts to the problem they were trying to solve in
Germany throughout the occupation with much

idealism and

sometimes even with missionary zeal.16 Although their views
of the roots of the problem may have differed,

those in

15Muller 113-114.
16Muller 111-113.
Tent (Mission) argues that this
missionary zeal lay at the heart of American educators'
attempts to reform the school system in their zone of
occupation.
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charge of the American re-education program agreed that the
Germans could and should be cured from their exaggerated
nationalism, militarism, chauvinism, and their inclination
towards totalitarianism.

In the long run young people were

the group most in need of re-education, not only because they
had only known National Socialist doctrines, but also because
they offered the best chances to achieve American goals,
since it is easier to change the outlook of a young person
than that of an adult.

To be successful,

the Americans'

concept of re-education went beyond schools and universities
in Germany, which John Dewey had identified as hotbeds of
reactionary ideas and exaggerated nationalism as early as
1915.

His book was republished in 1942, just in time to have

an impact on people who would be in charge of the German
educational system after the war.17 I define re-education as
the American effort to change the minds and attitudes of
young

people.

This

could

happen

by

means

of

official

programs to teach them the values of an open and democratic
society through schools, youth offices, youth organizations,
and the Army as well as by means of informal and formal
personal contacts between the occupiers and the occupied.
American efforts to "democratize" German society provide
a different challenge for the researcher.

Although the issue

170tto Schlander, "Der Einflufi von John Dewey und Hans
[sic!] Morgenthau auf die Formulierung der Re-educationspolitik," Umerziehung und Wiederaufbau: Die Bildungspolitik
der Besatzungmachte in Deutschland und dsterreich, ed.
Manfred Heinemann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981) 40-52.
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remained high on the agenda and played a prominent part in
official American rhetoric throughout the occupation,

the

occupiers never defined their concept of democratization.
Scholars still debate whether Americans simply equated their
own political and economic system with democracy and wanted
to establish very much the same in their zone of occupation
and ultimately in the Federal Republic, or if they intended
to teach Germans democracy based on a much broader concept,
in

which

hands-on-experience

principles of fair play,
practical

lessons

such

with

generally

recognized

respect for other opinions,
as

discussions

or

democratic procedures played a central role.

and

practicing
The

latter

approach would have taken Germany's own democratic traditions
into

account.

Looking

at American

efforts

of

teaching

democracy to the young generation will help to answer this
question.
Introducing democracy to the Germans was just one field
of

the

occupiers'

alleged

attempts

or

successes

"Americanize" the people under their control.

to

Germans and

Americans alike have used the term in many ways to describe
the material and ideological impact of the United States on
the

culture,

Republic.

politics,

and

the

economy

of

the

Federal

The common denominator in this usage seems to be

the assumption that Germans not just adopted American ideas
and concepts but rather exchanged at least parts of their own
culture

and traditions

for that of the occupiers.
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concept of Americanization, however, is not very helpful in
describing the situation in post-war Germany.

First,

it

neglects the diversity of the American political, cultural,
and educational landscape which is arguably the very essence
of American culture.

This study will show that in fact no

agency in the United States was able to develop a clear cut
'American' model for the re-education of the Germans which
could have served as the basis for American policy after the
war.

Consequently a great variety of ideas and concepts

about

education

government
Germany.
other

and youth

and private

work

agencies

coexisted
which

among American

were

operating

in

Furthermore, the necessity of cooperation with the

Allies

as

well

as

with

an

atomized

German

administrative structure made a flexible and highly pragmatic
approach on all sides imperative.

In addition to that, the

states, not the Federal government had been traditionally in
charge of formal education.

This constellation most probably

would have prevented the Americans from realizing many of
their goals, even if they had formulated just one program for
Germany.
If Americans had problems creating and pursuing one
consistent policy, the Germans had problems finding out what
'American' exactly meant.

Undoubtedly Hollywood did much to

disseminate a specific if not altogether accurate image of
the United States to the Germans, but wherever they met GIs
or other Americans, Germans had an opportunity to test their
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images

of

diversity

the

United

States

ultimately meant

and

her

people.

that Germans

from

American
all

social

groups and many political convictions could find something
attractive in American society, politics, and culture.
music,

for example,

In

the choices during the first post-war

decade ranged from Aaron Copeland and George Gershwin via Big
Bands and Jazz to Elvis Presley and Rock 'n Roll.

All three

music styles were and remained tremendously successful with
different

people

of

different

ages,

and

all

three

were

distinctively "American."
The "Americanization" concept poses yet another problem.
It assumes that two mutually exclusive monolithic cultural,
political,

and

antagonistic,

economic

giving

systems

Germans

only

existed
the

which

choice

remained
of

either

defending their old ways or adopting the new ones which the
occupiers introduced.

The model allows people to draw clear-

cut conclusions about American policies

in Germany which

either failed or succeeded, but it does not provide any room
for pragmatism, synthesis, or compromise.
scholars,

popular writers,

and

Not surprisingly,

ordinary people

operating

under these assumptions either found an Americanization of
Germany absolutely necessary
equally strong terms.

and good or

rejected

it in

Such a rigid definition of mutually

exclusive cultural, political, and economic concepts does not
reflect the necessities and possibilities for improvisation
in every day affairs in Germany after hostilities had ended.
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The political

and

ideological

vacuum which

the

complete

military and moral collapse of the Third Reich had created
opened

up

opportunities

for

individuals

as

well

administrations to explore new approaches to problems

as
in

which occupiers and occupied could combine old and new ideas
in flexible, creative ways.

This give and take— the very

essence

not

of

democracy— might

entirely

have

satisfied

either side, but in the long term both parties involved could
achieve much as long as they found ways to cooperate.18 The
following pages will tell how Americans and Germans who were
involved in youth work in the field quickly found pragmatic
and very fruitful ways of cooperation.
determined

Their actions at the

grassroots

ultimately

Washington's

formulation

and provided American authorities

policy

in Germany

early on with a practical and realistic re-education concept
which Military Government and the High Commission adopted as
a model for all of their dealings with the Germans.

,8This model of pragmatic interaction between occupiers
and occupied is by no means my own. Wolfgang Eckart argues
in his case study of Nuremberg that the dire post-war
situation forced German administrators and politicians as
well as the Americans to approach all issues pragmatically at
the cost of ideological and idealistic convictions on both
sides. Eckart seems to overlook that pragmatism is the very
essence of the American political culture.
Flexible
cooperation with the Germans did not mean that the occupiers
gave up their long-term goals of re-education, but simply
that they chose a different, more realistic, and ultimately
quite successful approach to reach them. In politics as well
as in youth work the form of the system was not important (as
long as it was democratic) , but rather the convictions of its
constituents.
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CHAPTER I
Preparations for an Occupation, 1942-45

Throughout the Second World War preparations for the
occupation of Germany did not have a high priority among
Washington

planners,

although

they

began

to

develop

blueprints almost immediately after hostilities officially
began in December 1941.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's

policy was to defeat the Axis Powers, which meant essentially
Germany, first.
country's

The President directed all of his and the

energy

towards

this

goal.

He

and

his

administration, however, did not develop a consistent long
range

policy

for

the

postwar

period.

Preparing

the

occupation of Germany remained rudimentary, because the White
House did not provide the necessary leadership.

Therefore

the different departments involved in planning were unable to
reconcile their objectives

and coordinate

their efforts.

Important parts of the American policy directive for the
occupation of Germany known as JCS 1067, hastily assembled in
the fall of 1944, when German defeat seemed imminent, derived
directly from Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau's
infamous and largely punitive blueprint for the country.
Morgenthau, however, dealt predominantly with economic and
political issues.

Reorienting the German population away

from extreme nationalism, racism, and militarism towards the
ideals of a democratic society did not figure prominently in
16
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the planning of any government agency in 1944, although the
concept of reeducating the Germans had been introduced in
early 1943.

All three Departments agreed on the necessity of

such a program, but its timing and its priority remained a
source of discussion.

Its punitive

economic provisions

notwithstanding JCS 1067 provided the basis for a positive
and

reconstructionist

approach

in

the

American

zone

of

occupation.
Between 1942 and 1944 the military had to create a civil
affairs

section

which

would

be

capable

of

taking

over

government functions in liberated and occupied areas and of
implementing Allied or American policies.

Military planners

had to operate in unknown territory and without much guidance
from

Washington,

but

they

succeeded

integrating a new organization
structure.

in

organizing

and

into the military command

Military government detachments accompanied the

tactical units in the cross channel invasion and provided
liaison between civilian agencies and the troops.

Their main

purpose

government

in

Germany,

however,

was

to

assume

functions on the local, state, and zone levels.
duties

consisted

of

denazification,

Their first

maintaining

or

reestablishing law and order, as well as starting the local
economies to provide the necessities for the occupiers and
the occupied.

Youth and educational affairs received only

marginal attention and resources.
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Preparing the Peace: No Guidance from the White House
Franklin

D.

Roosevelt

approached

planning

for

the

occupation of Germany in the same manner in which he had
orchestrated
consistent

New

program

depression,
problems

the

Deal.1

for

He

getting

had
his

never
nation

developed
out

but rather sought pragmatic solutions

arose.

The

President

disliked

of

a

the

as the

delegating

responsibilities and almost never took a firm stand on issues
that divided his subordinates.
for

a

lack

of

coordination

interagency rivalries.

His administration was known
and

a

surprising

amount

of

The President preferred informal and

personal communications to written accords which might limit
his freedom of action.

He believed that he could get along

well with Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Dictator, and would be
able to negotiate the terms for postwar Europe and Germany on
a personal and friendly basis.2
‘David Schoenbaum, "Deutschland in der amerikanischen
Nachkriegsplanung, " Westdeutschland 1945-1955: Unterwerfung,
Kontrolle, Integration, ed. LudoIf Herbst (Munchen [Munich]:
Oldenbourg, 1986) 33-34.
2John Lewis Gaddis, The Origins of the Cold War 19411947 (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972)
8-12; Gaddis is still one of the best accounts of American
foreign policy during the 1940s; Paul Y. Hammond ("Directives
for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy,"
American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies,
ed. Harold Stein (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press,
1963) 311-464) is the most authoritative and understandable
account of American policy making for post war Germany
between 1942 and 1945.
Since this dissertation does not deal with the Cold War
per se, but rather with American treatment of German youth,
the discussion between realists and revisionists is only of
marginal importance.
Both schools maintain that American
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Roosevelt's own rather negative experiences in Germany
as a schoolboy as well as the political developments between
1918 and 193 3 which led to the rise of Hitler held important
lessons for him.

He was convinced that leniency toward the

Germans was useless.

Although German forces had requested an

armistice at the end of World War I, Hitler and his political
allies had been able to take advantage of many Germans'
belief that their army actually had been undefeated in the
field, but had been stabbed in the back by democratic forces
at home.

Unconditional surrender of the German forces this

time would not only satisfy Stalin's never ending need for
reassurance, but would also demonstrate to the Germans that
they had really lost.3
The aftermath of the previous war also convinced the
President that another American retreat into isolationism
would be disastrous.

The United States would have to remain

actively involved in international affairs if it did not want
to

return

to

the

battlefields.

Roosevelt

envisioned

a

policy towards Germany changed due to the tensions between
the Soviet Union and the United States. The reader will see,
however, that American policy towards German youth remained
consistent throughout the ten years under discussion here.
3Gaddis 8-12; Hammond 355-57; James Tent (Mission 14)
and Edward N. Peterson (21) comment on FDR's negative
experiences
with
Germany;
Klaus-Dietmar
Henke
(Die
Amerikanische
Besetzung
Deutschlands,
Quellen
und
Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte herausgegeben vom Institut
fur Zeitgeschichte 27 (Munchen [Munich]: Oldenbourg, 1995)
53-69) provides an excellent summary of FDR's policy between
1941 and 1943.
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postwar world in which cooperation between the big powers
would assure peace.4
The President's third lesson from the past was that
without

a

healthy

economy

stability in the world.

there

be

no

political

The Great Depression had created an

atmosphere of despair which
helped radical

would

in Germany and in Japan had

and undemocratic

forces

into power.

The

United States would have to take up the responsibility and
assume world leadership in this realm as well.5
Roosevelt's views about postwar Germany were less clear.
The President did not think it appropriate to start planning
details of this occupation before the war was won.

He had

four reasons not to commit himself to any clear definition of
postwar policy.

First he considered it to be detrimental to

the war effort because it might burden the rather fragile
alliance among Britain,
States

with

the Soviet Union,

unnecessary

preoccupations

discussed once the war was over.

and the United
which

could

be

The conferences at Teheran

and Moscow in 1943 and even in Yalta as late as January 1945
had shown that the allies agreed on defeating and occupying
Germany,

but that

neither

discuss postwar policy.6

side was

ready

or

willing to

Second, Roosevelt did not want to

4Gaddis 8-12.
sGaddis 8-12.
6Hammond (315-17) on Moscow and Teheran,
and the President's general attitude.

(410) on Yalta
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formulate any policies which he would have to base on unknown
or constantly changing factors.

Nobody could foresee exactly

what the situation in Germany would be like at the time of
surrender.

The Army had assumed,

for example, that there

would be a central government and that the German economy
would still be functioning when hostilities ended.

Due to

the Americans' rapid gains after the invasion of France and
the German officers' attempt to dispose of Hitler in July of
1944,

this

possibility seemed to materialize,

remained in power.

but Hitler

The German counteroffensive during the

winter of 1944 made it clear that the Americans would have to
fight their way into Germany and that planning would have to
be based on completely different assumptions.
consistently
grounds.7

refused

to

discuss

issues

on

The President
such

shaky

The postponement strategy also was much in line

with Roosevelt's political philosophy.

He had shown during

the New Deal that he preferred to tackle problems when they
arose on a trial and error basis and indicated that he would
follow the same strategy in Germany.8 The public discussion
of the Morgenthau plan which he and Churchill had endorsed
during the Quebec conference in September 1944 finally showed
that a premature commitment on any postwar position could

7Hammond 398-400; Earl F. Ziemke, The US Army in the
Occupation of Germany 1944-1946, Army Historical Series
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States
Army, 1975) 100.
8Hammond 315, 324; Ziemke 12-18.
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cost Roosevelt votes which he needed in his bid for a fourth
term that year.9
The White House's refusal to take the lead in planning
for postwar Germany left a void that three departments tried
to fill.

The Department of State,

the Department of the

Treasury, and the War Department approached the issue with
different conceptions of their own role in the occupation as
well as of the role the Germans were to play in the future.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), however, a body that George
Marshall had created to coordinate and control different
military bureaus, would have to approve any policy statement,
since

they

were

directly

responsible

for

planning

and

carrying out operations in Europe.
First Designs: The State Department
The State Department was the logical choice for the
formulation of post war policy planning for Germany.

It had

a trained staff that was well acquainted with affairs in the
country

and

international
Germany.

was

in

the

best

ramifications

of

position
American

to

assess

activities

the
in

Secretary of State Cordell Hull, however, had grown

old and was unable to provide the energy and
necessary for the task.

leadership

He also did not have the close

personal ties to the President that would have given the
State Department's reconstruction plans some weight at the
White House or in the public.

Planning for postwar Germany

9Hammond 377-379; Ziemke 105.
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did not seem to enjoy a high priority within the Department,
either.

Hull left it in the hands of the Department's lower

ranks, who operated without much guidance or interference.10
State Department officials began their search for a
policy for postwar Germany in 1942.
start

that

they

would

base

reconstructionist approach.
occupied,

It was clear from the
their

policy

on

a

Germany would be defeated and

stern measures would be necessary to punish war

criminals and eliminate National Socialism, but ultimately
the

country

would

have

international community.

to

be

reintegrated

into

the

In the summer of that year State

Department officials started out with some brainstorming.
They

formed

the

General

Advisory

Committee

for

Postwar

Germany (GAC) to informally collect ideas and opinions from
educators, politicians and members of different departments
on how their general ideas could be implemented.11
Reeducating Germans was one

of

the topics

in these

meetings and the discussions of this issue left a lasting
impression on Archibald MacLeish, who attended them in his
function as

Librarian of Congress.

MacLeish,

who would

become Assistant Secretary of State in January 1945, had by
February

194 3 reached

the

conclusion

that a program

of

,0Schoenbaum (32-3 3) maintains that between the summer of
1943 and the fall of 1944 only about 6% of government
publications dealt with the German future in the broadest
sense.
"Tent, Mission 17-23.
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reeducating the Germans would be necessary as soon as the
process

of

finished.12

denazification

and

demilitarization

could

be

The aftermath of World War I had shown that

merely introducing a democratic political system would not be
enough to affect profound and lasting changes.
only

be

successfully

integrated

into

a

Germany could
peace-loving

international community if her citizens could be convinced
that militarism, racism, and National Socialism were bad and
if they would change their political and cultural outlook.
This meant that a reeducation program would have to play an
important role in the occupation and needed careful planning.
MacLeish did not have much information on the President's
position on the issue, but Roosevelt consistently made it
known that he did consider it possible for the Germans to
return to the family of civilized nations.

The Atlantic

Charter of 1941 made this possibility the basis of AngloAmerican
January

cooperation.
1943

Roosevelt

At
and

the

Casablanca

Winston

conference

Churchill

issued

in
a

statement that they wanted to destroy enemy philosophies, but
not peoples.13 To his dismay MacLeish also had become aware
12Scott Donaldson, Archibald MacLeish: An American Life
(Boston: Houghton Miflin, 1992) 379-383. Neither Donaldson
nor R.H. Winnick, the editor of his letters, (Letters of
Archibald MacLeish 1907 to 1982 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1983)) dedicate any space to the important role MacLeish
played in finding and formulating an American policy for
postwar Germany.
I3Roosevelt and Churchill maintained this attitude
throughout the war and also committed Stalin to this stance.
During the 1944 presidential campaign Roosevelt made clear
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in the GAC meetings that in February 1943 no agency was
planning

for

a

reeducation

program

or

working

on

the

formulation of an official policy statement in this realm.
Political

and

economic

issues

were

much

higher

on

the

agendas.14
By the summer of 1943 the State Department was satisfied
with the information it had gathered from the committee's
meetings and proceeded to a more formal stage of discussion.
It set up the Interdivisional Committee for Postwar Germany,
which consisted of specialists on that country from different
divisions of the State Department.15

Under David Harris it

developed the first official policy papers for organizing
postwar Germany, based on the reconstructionist approach.

In

March

to

1944

the

group

educational matters.

had

to

direct

its

attention

Prodded by his English counterpart, the

chief of the War Department's Civil Affairs Division (CAD),
General John Hilldring, asked the State Department to develop
a policy guideline

for the American military government.

that the Germans would have to pay a price for their
aggression, but he also indicated his willingness to readmit
the German people into the fellowship of law-abiding nations
if they showed that they deserved it. The final communique
of the Big Three in Yalta again stated that Germans were
expected to remain outlaws for quite some time, but that they
could hope to be reintegrated in the international community
after the elimination of Nazism and militarism.
I4Tent, Mission 17-23; the campaign speech is in Hammond
(394) , the communique at Yalta in Hammond (413); see Ziemke
(85) for the Atlantic Charter.
ISHammond 318.
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Proceedings of a joint committee of the Allies, the European
Advisory

Commission

(EAC), which

was

planning

for

the

occupation of Germany in England seemed to indicate that the
Americans might be the only ones who had not developed any
policy in this realm.

Harris' committee wrote a paper along

reconstructionist lines, but emphasized that education could
succeed only as part of an overall policy toward the Germans
that apparently included denazification, demilitarization and
cooperation

between

the

Allies.

The

committee

further

insisted that Germans not only would have to participate in
the process, but would have to initiate it and carry it out
on their own.

At that stage of the planning the committee

only considered reeducation to be "scholastic reform," which
clearly meant that all efforts should be directed towards the
German educational system.

Further work came to a standstill

because in August and September the Morgenthau Plan forced
the State Department to divert its attention and placed in
doubt the underlying approach on which it planned to build
its policy.16
The Morgenthau Plan
In

August

Morgenthau

1944

became

reconstructionist

Secretary
aware

approach.

of

of
the

He

the

Treasury

State

was

Henry

Department's

appalled

by

the

Department's leniency and immediately decided to develop his
own plan.

Morgenthau had always disliked and distrusted the

l6Tent, Mission 29; Fiissl 85.
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Germans.

Furthermore,

he was

in close contact with the

Jewish community and by the end of 1944 was not only fully
informed about the magnitude of Hitler's '•Final Solution",
but also deeply disturbed by the State Department's alleged
obstructionist course which had prevented many European Jews
from escaping to the United States.17 Although the Treasury
Department had no obvious role to play in policy formulation
for

postwar

Germany,

its

influence

was

considerable.

Morgenthau was a good friend and neighbor of the President in
New York.

His personal bond with Roosevelt made access to

the White House easy.

In addition to that, Roosevelt shared

Morgenthau's dislike of Germany and agreed that elimination
of

the

German

threat

would

require

drastic

measures.

Morgenthau became the most visible and vocal proponent of a
very different concept for treating postwar Germany.

He

envisioned a country that would be deprived of its industry
and divided into a number of weak agrarian states.18

I7Hammond 448; he seems to underestimate the influence of
events related to the Holocaust on Morgenthau's position,
especially his animosity towards the State Department.
Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut (American Refugee Policy
and European Jewry, 1933-1945, (Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1987), esp. chap. 9) argue that
German atrocities and the State Department's apparent
indifference to the plight of the Jews or even to making the
facts known to the public in 1943 deeply impressed and
angered the Secretary of the Treasury. Thomas Alan Schwartz
(17) provides a more balanced evaluation of Washington's
reaction to the Holocaust.
18Hammond 348-378; Peterson 37-39; Ziemke 102-105; Eugene
Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the
American Occupation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959) 6.
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Initially

Roosevelt was

official American policy.

ready

to

accept

it

as

the

Morgenthau had brought to the

President's attention the Handbook for Military Government in
Germany

that

the

Supreme

Expeditionary Forces
about to release.

(SHAEF)

Headquarters

of

the

Allied

under General Eisenhower was

The book instructed Military Government

officials to make sure that the economy and the bureaucracy
in occupied Germany would continue to function.

This policy

implied that the Germans would be treated leniently and would
not suffer any major inconveniences.

Roosevelt agreed with

Morgenthau that this was not what he had in mind.

The

Germans would have to pay the price for the misery they had
brought upon Europe and would have to feel that they had lost
the war.

The Americans therefore should shut down German

industry and remain aloof of internal German affairs, even if
it meant economic and social chaos and starvation.

The

President instructed the War Department to revise the book in
September

1944.

That

same

month

blueprint

official American policy,

he

made

when,

at

Morgenthau's
the

Quebec

conference, he initialled with Winston Churchill the document
which

came

to

be

known

as

the

Morgenthau

Plan.19

It

envisioned the complete deindustrialization of Germany and a
division of the country into several states.

Roosevelt,

l9United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States, Diplomatic Papers [hereinafter FRUS]:
The Conference at Quebec 1944 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1971) 390-91, 466-67.
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however, had not counted on the ensuing and largely negative
public

response

inconvenient

in

in

the

United

an

election

States,

year,

as

which
well

was
as

resistance from the State and War Departments.

very

strong

He quickly

distanced himself from the document, even though he continued
to see merit in Morgenthau's plan and avoided endorsing any
other policy proposal.
a

time

when

German

Morgenthau's plan nonetheless came at
collapse

seemed

imminent

and

SHAEF

urgently requested a directive for military government in
Germany.

The American policy directive, which came to be

known

JCS

as

1067,

incorporated

its

tone,

if

not

its

content.20
Morgenthau's position on the German economy was clear,
but he had not developed a plan for German youth.

He shared

the State Department's view that special attention should be
given

to

education.

"fundamental
institutions."

The

reorientation

Secretary
of

even

German

To accomplish that,

proposed

a

educational

schools would have to

remain closed until teachers, textbooks, and curricula were
purged of all negative influences.

Institutions of higher

education would remain closed longer, but students would have
the opportunity to study at universities abroad.
however,

did

not

discuss

the

issue

at

Morgenthau,

length,

which

is

understandable, since the new German agrarian society would

20Hammond
Davidson 6.

348-378;

Peterson

37-39;

Ziemke

102-105;
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not

require

a

specialists.

large

number

of

academically

trained

Furthermore, he did not regard the Germans as

capable of changing their minds.

The Secretary's ideas,

which he outlined in his book in greater detail,

indicate

that he thought that drastic educational reform in Germany
would be necessary to eliminate militarism and Nazi ideology.
He doubted, however, that even a stern program would ever be
able to cure German thought. Nevertheless his thinking did
not

challenge

the

State

Department's

more

constructive

approach towards education.21
The War Department
The War Department was the third agency in Washington
that became involved in making plans for postwar Germany,
since it was clear that army troops would be the
American representatives in Germany.
government

would

be

necessary

to

first

Some type of military
control

liberated

and

occupied areas as long as the fighting continued and to make
sure that military requirements were met.

Serious planning

for the formation of a military government began as early as
1940.

The

War

Department

based

its

planning

on

the

210tto Schlander, 11Der EinfluB von John Dewey und Hans
Morgenthau auf die amerikanische Re-educationspolitik,"
Umerziehung und Wiederaufbau:
Die Bildungspolitik der
Besatzungsmachte in Deutschland und Ost&rreich, ed. Manfred
Heinemann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981) 41-43. Schlander's
assessment of American policy is somewhat simplistic, but he
summarizes Morgenthau's views on German re-education well.
See also Tent, Mission 17; Hammond 385. The quote is from a
memorandum dated l Nov. 1944 in which Morgenthau accuses the
British of ignoring this issue which apparently he thought
was important.
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assumption

that

the military would

be

in charge

of all

civilian affairs only during hostilities and then would turn
over its military government responsibilities to civilian
authorities, presumably the Department of State.

This did

not mean, however, that the military in any way intended to
become involved in policy formulation.

On the contrary,

throughout the negotiations for a postwar policy statement,
the

military

neutrality.
would

tried

to maintain

a

position

of

absolute

It built up an administrative apparatus that

carry

Washington,

out
as

whatever

long

directives

as they could

be

would

come

from

implemented.

The

military's main goals therefore were practical and limited in
scope

and

content.

Military

government

would

have

to

maintain order, to control local authorities and to ensure
that military operations would not be hindered by civilians
in liberated or occupied areas.

Some of the traditional

mandates, however, already carried with them clear political
implications.

The military could

best

operate when

the

administration and the economy of the region it occupied were
reconstructed as fast as possible.

Traditional military

government doctrine instructed soldiers to take care of the
"welfare of the governed."
collide

with

other

These principles were bound to

requirements

military government for Germany.
for

example,

would

have

an

Washington

imposed

on

Dismissing Nazi officials,
immediate

impact

on

local

government functions, because most of the administrators were
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members of the Nazi party and could not be replaced easily.
But not dealing with the Nazis harshly would have serious
political

consequences

in

Germany

repercussions in the United States.

and

would

cause

It also took time to

realize that every military government action that relied on
any form of cooperation from the Germans would from the start
have

implications

Germany.

for

the political

and

social

life

in

This would make it difficult to change the course

of events once a long-range program could be agreed on in
Washington.22
Experiences

in North Africa

showed that sharing the

burden with civilian agencies during military operations was
not feasible.
aspects

of

The need for exclusive military control of all

government

functions

theater became painfully clear.

during

operations

in

a

The President's decision to

divide the responsibilities for government activities between
military

and

difficulties.

civilian

agencies

caused

considerable

General Eisenhower complained at one point

during the campaign that he had more trouble dealing with
competing American civilian agencies than with the enemy.23
22Hammond 319, 324-26; Henke 96-102; Eckart 220-278.
Eckart's is one of various studies which document that this
conflict actually became one of the major problems with which
MG detachments had to deal during the immediate aftermath of
the war.
“ Ziemke 14-15; Henke 95; see also William R. Swarm,
'•Impact of the Proconsular Experience on Civil Affairs
Organization and Doctrine," Americans as Proconsuls: United
States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952,
ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern
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The problems in Africa led the War Department on 1 March 1943
to create the civil Affairs Division (CAD) to control every
aspect of civilian affairs in occupied areas.
with

the

War

Department's

philosophy

Consistent

about

military

government, both Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Chief of
Staff George Marshall instructed the head of CAD, General
John Hilldring, to avoid taking part in policy formulation as
far as possible. CAD would organize the administrative and
logistical

apparatus

and

solicit

a

policy

statement

presumably from the state Department or the President as soon
as the military would find it necessary.24

In the realm of

postwar treatment of youth and education CAD followed these
orders and relied on the State Department's guidance.25
The fact that the Americans did not fight the war in
Europe alone and envisioned a joint occupation with Great
Britain and the Soviet Union further complicated formulating
a policy.

During 1942 the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of

Staff (CCS) created various committees in Washington and in
London

which

dealt

with

civilian

affairs

of

occupied

territories and therefore could become involved in policy
making.

Matters became worse when the three Allies decided

to establish a commission that would be responsible for a
joint post war policy formulation in November 1943 at the
Illinois University Press, 1984) 399-400.
24Hammond 320-321; Swarm 399-400; Peterson 31-34.
25See pp. 25-26 above.
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Moscow conference.

The European Advisory Commission was

based in London and represented by the State Department.
Washington now not only had to take the opinions of one more
ally into account, but also needed to take care of constant
friction between its own civilian and military agencies in
London.

In the end,

the commission had not been able to

agree to more than the boundaries of the zones the respective
Allies would occupy.

In the field of education and the

treatment of youth it repeatedly served as a catalyst that
CAD used to prod the State Department into action.26
JCS 1067
With many different committees and conflicting opinions
involved,
postwar

it is not surprising that American planners for
Germany

denominator.
policy

had

to

settle

for

the

smallest

common

They managed to agree only on a short term

statement when

German

defeat

seemed

imminent

and

Eisenhower insisted on obtaining guidance for the occupation
of Germany.27
Although

the

Morgenthau

Plan

did

not

occupy

President and the headlines for more than a few weeks,

the
it

became the basis of American policy in Germany between 1945
and 1947.

The Secretary of the Treasury wielded his greatest

influence

in

collapse

September

seemed

1944

at

a

time

when

imminent and SHAEF pressed

the

German

for a policy

26See pp. 25-2 6 above; Tent, Mission 30-31.
27Henke 104.
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statement.

The different departments, however, continued to

present the President with contradictory policy drafts.

When

German resistance stiffened in fall and winter, Roosevelt
created yet another committee to solve the problem.

The

Informal Policy Committee on Germany consisted of the state,
war, and treasury secretaries.

It initially based the new

policy directive in tone and content largely on Morgenthau's
plan, but during the next months the State Department managed
to

infuse

matters

it with changes

up

occupational
Roosevelt's

to

the

forces.
death

that would

discretion

of

the

leave a number of
commander

of

the

Truman approved the document after

in May

1945

as the basis for American

negotiations in the Allied Control Council.28
The directive's

impact was

limited

in several ways.

Since the British had not agreed to the statement, it could
go into effect only after the dissolution of SHAEF and would
be valid only for the American Zone of Occupation.

As long

as hostilities lasted, the Americans would have to follow the
CCS's Directive 551 which treated military government actions
from the standpoint of military feasibility.
British and American

This meant that

forces would try to return

life to

normal as quickly as possible.29
28Hammond 408-427; Henke 110-115; Peterson 37-44; Tent,
Mission 31-32; Ziemke 91-92, 106, 214.
29Ziemke 91-92, 106, 214.
It is important to emphasize
in this context that JCS 1067 was written as a stopgap
measure. Only events in Germany extended its life and Lucius
Clay certainly used it in ways not intended by the Treasury.
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JCS 1067 defined four basic objectives for the military
government in Germany.30 First, the Germans needed to become
aware that they had brought the destruction of their country
upon themselves and that suffering would be inevitable.
directive

also

made

clear

that

Germany

would

The

not

considered a liberated, but rather an occupied country.

be

This

provision ensured that military government in Germany would
enjoy absolute

authority.

The primary

objective

of the

occupation was "to prevent Germany from ever again becoming
a

threat

to

the

world."31

To

accomplish this

goal

the

Americans would denazify and demilitarize Germany and punish
all war criminals.

Military government would keep German

industry under close control, but the ultimate goal would be
"an eventual reconstruction of German political life on a
democratic basis."32
Even though the tone of the directive sounds harsh and
it was partially based on Morgenthau's ideas, the document

30JCS 1067 went through a number of revisions before it
reached the field and after. The eighth version became the
basis for American policy in the American zone after the
German surrender (for the History and various versions of JCS
1067 see Ziemke 214). Scholars disagree about the influence
Morgenthau actually had in drafting JCS 1067.
Ziemke's
interpretation that the tone of the directive was harsh, but
that its actual provisions were of a much less vituperative
nature than Morgenthau would have wished, seems to be the
most plausible explanation.
31James K. Pollock and James H. Meisel, eds., Germany
under Occupation: Illustrative Materials and Documents (Ann
Arbor: George Wahr, 1947) doc. X.
32Pollock and Meisel doc. X.
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reveals a consensus in some areas.

The State Department, for

example, at no time opposed denazification, demilitarization,
or the punishment of war criminals.

The provisions regarding

education reveal a constructive side of the directive.

JCS

1067 ordered all educational institutions temporarily closed.
Only all National Socialist educational facilities had to be
permanently closed.
could

continue

their

Schools opened under Allied authority
operations.

All

schools

would

be

reopened at the earliest possible time after the purge of
Nazi personnel, ideology and books.

The directive permitted

the American Military Governor to go ahead with an interim
school

program

until

the

Allied

Control

Council

would

formulate a general policy for Germany.33
One of the first objectives of Military Government would
be to assert control over the German educational system.
Section 14 b of the directive, however, was worded in such a
way that the Military Government's educational mission could
be interpreted to be far more than simply supervising or even
reforming schools and universities:
A coordinated system of control over German
education and an affirmative program of reorientation
will be established designed completely to eliminate
Nazi and militaristic doctrines and to encourage the
development of democratic ideas.34
33Pollock and Meisel doc. X. It would be interesting to
compare the texts of the various drafts to see at what stage
of the development sections may have been included in the
document, but for this study it is important that the
provision was included from the start.
^Pollock and Meisel doc. X.
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It

is

not

clear

who

drafted

this

section

of

the

directive, but Archibald MacLeish was certainly not unhappy
with

the

provision.

Upon

his

appointment

as

Assistant

Secretary of state in January 1945 he set out to make his
opinions

known.

Section

further planning

and

fourteen

provided

a

basis

for

implementation of policies directed

towards reeducating German youth in and out of schools in the
American Zone,

but Washington still had not been able to

formulate a long-range policy towards Germany.

At the time

of MacLeish's appointment the War Department's CAD was not
satisfied with the most recent State Department proposals on
education.

The

military

planners

thought

that

German

participation and responsibilities were overemphasized and
would nullify any chances for reform from the start.35
In view of the CAD's criticisms MacLeish returned to the
drawing board.

He resurrected the policy paper that David

Harris' Interdivisional Committee had drafted shortly before
Morgenthau interrupted its work.

MacLeish thought that it

formed a good basis for discussion, but that especially its
provisions for administering a reeducation program needed
additional

work.

CAD,

however,

advised MacLeish that

a

general policy statement was urgently needed, whereas the
Army's field manual for military government was providing
sufficient guidance for handling the educational system for
the time being.

To accomplish this goal, MacLeish returned

35Tent, Mission 30.
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to a suggestion he had made during the meetings of the German
Advisory Council two years earlier.

He invited a number of

specialists in education to Washington who in one way or
another were acquainted with the German educational system.
MacLeish

was

educators.

able

Staff

to

gather

a

number

of

outstanding

from the Departments of State and War

supplemented the committee.

It needed two meetings in May

1945 to agree on recommendations for a policy statement for
Germany.36
The

educators

first

weighed

States had in regard to Germany.

the options

the

United

The United States would not

be able to control Germany's industrial potential or the
Germans themselves in the long run because that would mean
either the complete annihilation of the German people or a
permanent occupation.
neither

option.

The

The American public would support
committee

argued

that

attempts

to

deindustrialize Germany would not eliminate the threat, since
the real problem lay in the people themselves.

The only

feasible policy would therefore have to focus on a change of
Germans' attitudes and social behavior.

Decision makers in

the United States and in Germany should direct all military,

36Tent, Mission 31-34; he erroneously assumes that the
meetings took place in May and June, but State Department
memoranda indicate that the committee met on May 12-13 and
again on May 28-29. This gave the Department a whole month
to have the document approved before the Potsdam conference.
For the memoranda see National Archives [Hereinafter NA] ,
Record Group [hereinafter RG] 59 Department of State, Central
Files 1945-49, 862.42/6-1345, Annex II.
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economic, political and social decisions towards that end.
Such a course of action would make an extensive reeducation
program

the

heart

of

American

policy

in Germany.

The

committee further suggested that such a program needed to go
hand in hand with the elimination of militarism and National
Socialism.

The recommendations departed from the traditional

understanding

that

reeducation

would

simply

follow

the

punitive phase of the occupation by making it a top priority.
The educators thought that the Americans should rely as far
as possible on German initiative to implement the programs on
the local, state and national levels.

To reintegrate Germany

into the international community, Germans should be permitted
to resume cultural activities with other countries as well.
MacLeish

adopted

the

committee's

recommendations

without

changes and began to lobby for incorporating it into the
American policy formulation at Potsdam.37
To

speed up

administration,

the

decision-making process

MacLeish

sidestepped

the

within

Informal

the

Policy

Committee for Germany, in which the Secretary of the Treasury
still

had

a voice,

administration for
however,

did

not

and circulated

the draft within

further consideration.
go

uncontested.

One

the

His position,
State

Department

official, for example, pointed out that the Morgenthau plan
indeed was a serious alternative for eliminating the German
threat forever.

More to the point, he suggested that the

37NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/6-1345.
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United States had other interests in Europe that would quite
possibly

conflict

Nevertheless,

the

with

reeducation

Department

of

plans
State

for

Germany.

accepted

the

committee's recommendations as the basis for its own longrange policy

for Germany.

During the first week of July

Hilldring, McCloy, and Secretary of War Patterson gave their
informal approval to the new directive.38
The

new

position

within

the

lower

echelons

of

the

administration could not accomplish anything yet, because it
needed the approval of the Secretary of State and ultimately
of the President.

Like JCS 1067, it could not be implemented

because any agreement the Allies would reach at the Potsdam
Conference in July would supersede it.

On 12 July MacLeish

therefore sent an telegram to Secretary of State James Byrnes
in Potsdam urging him to make the new American position the
basis for Allied policy.

The undersecretary's communication

deserves

it anticipated

notice

because

and outlined

the

course the State Department would finally come to follow in
Germany during the next decade and beyond.

In that document

MacLeish pointed out that the Allies had agreed to ensure
that Germany would never be a threat to the peace of the
world again,

but that

up to that date

there existed no

3iFRUS: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)
1945 (In Two Volumes) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1960) vol I, docs. 349, 350; Tent, Mission 37-38;
Hammond 431; Ftissl 86-89; see also an office memorandum dated
5 July 1945 which records McCloy's,
Hilldring's and
Patterson's informal approval (NA RG 59 Central Files 194549, 862.42/6-1345).
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definition of what concrete steps would be taken to convert
the agreement into a tangible plan.

He correctly stated that

there existed a policy vacuum, because no plans had been made
to go beyond the immediate war aims.

The Undersecretary

argued that in order to achieve the goal of permanently
preventing the Germans from waging another war, the United
States needed to be clear about its own and its allies'
objectives.
range

policy

It would further be necessary to develop a long
based

on

these

objectives.

MacLeish

then

outlined the committee's recommendations with its emphasis on
changing the German mind by reforming the educational system.
He admitted that short and long term policies could be at
odds at times (a clear reference to Morgenthau and JCS 1067) ,
but that the long range objectives should always be kept in
mind and ultimately should determine American policy.

The

Undersecretary went on to say that it was not enough to get
rid of attitudes,

but that Americans needed to fill the

vacuum with new ideals which they should draw from their own
history,

just as the Russians might try to influence the

Germans to become more sympathetic to their own ideas and
ideals.39
MacLeish's efforts were in vain.
Potsdam dedicated almost

all

of their

The participants at
time

to far more

concrete and immediate issues such as the German eastern
39Memoranduir., Central Secretariat to Secretary of State,
18 July 1945; FRUS: The Conference of Berlin, vol. II, doc.
855.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43
border, reparations, and a common allied administration.

The

final communique of the conference simply stated that Nazism
and militarism needed to be eliminated before democratic
ideas could take root.

Since it delegated more power to the

zonal commanders, MacLeish would be able to implement his
plan if he found enough support in Washington to make it
official American policy and the Military Governor would be
willing to implement it.40
It is not clear why the directive disappeared from the
agendas of the higher echelons in Washington during the next
months.

It seems to be plausible that Washington and Berlin

officials seriously believed that the Allied Control Council
would be able to function and take care of reeducation in all
of

Germany.

This

unnecessary.

would

make

an

American

directive

John McCloy discussed the issue with MacLeish

in a telephone conversation on July 5, 1945.

He thought that

it would be "highly desirable" for the United States to reach
an

agreement

with

the

other

Allies

on

this

subject.

Throughout 1945 and well into 1946, General Lucius D. Clay,
Deputy Commander of Military Government in Germany, was in
charge of setting up the Allied Control Council and making it
operational

in

Berlin.

Clay

had

faith

in

the

joint

administration of Germany by the four occupying powers and
consequently

wanted

to

defer

reeducation

*°FRUS: The Conference of Berlin,
Tent, Mission 39.

to

vol II,

the

doc.
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Control Council.

In addition to that, denazification and

punishment of war crimes as well as practical issues, such as
food, reconstructing basic social services and reparations,
seemed to be far more pressing.

The rather abstract ideas of

reeducating the Germans would have to wait until the other
matters were settled.

It appeared that MacLeish had not made

any

his suggestions in

headway

with

Washington

or

in

Berlin.41
In the contextof this study it
note

that

planners

reeducation policy

is equally important to

in Washington only
for schools

and

thought

about

a

their administration.

Even the most serious proponents of psychological change did
not go beyond administrative reforms.

People did not seem to

“ Memorandum on a telephone conversation between MacLeish
and John McCloy on 5 July 1945 which seemed to discourage
MacLeish considerably.
A handwritten comment on the
memorandum that recorded the conversation reads: "I guess I
won't send in another [draft] today. Cancel + Forget" (NA RG
59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/7-545).
Obviously he
changed his mind not long afterwards and decided to continue
the fight for his plan.
Fiissl argues that, according to
MacLeish, the State Department did not want to come forward
with a directive yet because it was not directly involved in
the operations in Germany.
This is implausible, because
MacLeish made this statement at the end of May 1945. Had he
really not had any interest in making his views official
policy, he would not have forwarded them to Byrnes at
Potsdam, which was six weeks after he had made the statement
Fiissl relates to. Fiissl also does not take into account the
agreement between the State and War Departments, according to
which the former would provide the policies for the latter's
organization.
For Clay's unwavering attempts to make the Control
Council work and treat Germany as an entity in 1945 and the
beginning of 1946 see Krieger 72-85, 101-104 and Jean Edward
Smith, ed., The Papers of Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945-49, 2
vols. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974) I: docs.
26, 122, 137.
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be aware that young Germans spent a lot of time away from
schools even when the system functioned.

MacLeish's advisory

commission carried the approach a step further and included
adult education and information control on its agenda for
reeducation, but only a small group in the field seemed to
recognize at that time that the young generation would need
more than just school reform.
In April 1945 the technical manual published for the
Welfare Division of Military Government dealt with the issue
in depth.

It described German youth work before and during

the Third Reich.

The authors of the manual concluded that

youth activities would become one of the most important tasks
of Military Government which would have to initiate its own
program for German youth.

The field manual for the Education

and Religious Affairs Division, published two months earlier,
however, did not advocate such a course at all.

The manual

instructed officers of this division not to encourage the
formation
purposes

of

youth

groups

of military

unless

government.

they
It

would

serve

did not take

the
into

consideration that young Germans had never known anything
else but Nazi ideology.
young

to

firsthand.

experience

At the same time most had been too
the

horrors

of

the

battlefields

The complete collapse of Nazi Germany would leave

them in a void that needed to be filled.

This meant that

this generation also offered a chance for American policy
makers because it would be most susceptible to the type of
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re-education MacLeish envisioned, but to achieve this goal
American policy makers would need to widen their approach
beyond the schools.

For the time being the Americans in

Washington and Europe focused exclusively on the educational
system and consequently assigned youth work to the agency
which also would be in charge of the educational system.

The

Education and Religious Affairs Branch within the Internal
Affairs and Communications (IA&C) Division became responsible
not only for the schools, but also for taking care of German
youth in the American zone of occupation.

Since for the time

being no policy other than controlling the educational system
was in place, much would depend on the quality of military
government and the first encounters between the American
troops and German civilians.42
Organizing Military Government
The War Department recognized early on the need for
organizing military governments for various countries.

This

meant that a huge number of qualified people had to be found,
recruited, and trained.
governments

during

and

The Army had administered military
after

the

Civil

War,

in

the

Philippines, and most recently in the Rhineland after World
War I.

The task that lay ahead, however, was not only larger

than any previous assignment, but also far more difficult.

42Charles Campbell (German Youth Activities and the
United States Army (Frankfurt/Main: Office of the Chief
Historian, European Command, 1947) 2) discusses the two field
manuals.
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The

occupation

training

of

personnel

functions

the Rhineland had shown
in

establishing

and

of a military government.

the

need

for

maintaining

the

The Judge Advocate

General therefore issued Field Manual 27-5 under the title
Military Government which had gone through some revisions by
December

1943.

The

manual

did

not

provide

any

policy

statements, but rather concentrated on the practical issues
of military government
guidelines

about

the

in general.
treatment

of

It established
the

population

some
and

recommended the retention of existing laws and customs. It
made no distinction between liberated countries and occupied
enemy territory.

The main objective of military government

units was support of the tactical operations and ensuring a
minimum of interference from the local populations.43
To

have

an

adequate

supply

of

trained

military

government personnel at hand, the War Department founded a
School of Military Government at the University of Virginia
in July 1942.

Most officers who attended this school were

Army regulars who would later serve in staff positions.44
When it became clear that the Army would bear the entire
responsibility for Military Government operations in Europe
and Asia, it expanded its educational activities for Military
Government officers in 1943.
officers

the Army

had to

To satisfy the demand for field
replenish

its

ranks

with

43Swarm 399.
44Henke 220; Ziemke 3-12.
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professional soldiers which it commissioned directly from
civilian life until 1943.
experienced

personnel

The Army's attempts to recruit

were

handicapped

from

the

start,

because it could only offer them field grade positions which
paid considerably less than what qualified people had come to
expect in their civilian careers.

Nevertheless it managed to

obtain about two thousand mature and rather dedicated civil
administrators,

some of whom came from education.

These

officers received a month of rigorous basic military and
military government training at Fort Custer, Michigan.

They

were then assigned to three additional months of training at
Civil

Affairs

Training

throughout the country.

Schools

attached

to

universities

By the end of 1943 as many as seven

hundred officers per month passed through the courses.

Apart

from becoming acquainted with the intricacies of the military
bureaucracy,

the officers

received

information

about

the

countries they were expected to serve in and went through
some basic language training.

Since nobody knew, however, in

which country or countries they would ultimately serve, the
training had to remain very general.
the

officers

outdated.

received,

Much of the information

especially

about

Germany,

was

Three months also proved to be too little time for

preparing the officers adequately for their jobs.

Although

they obtained some rudimentary knowledge of the different
countries'

histories,

cultures,

political

systems

and

languages, they were not prepared for the highly complex task
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of supervising local government that lay ahead of them.

A

serious handicap also was a lack of specialists to train them
in

specific

fields.

In addition,

important

up

to date

information almost never reached the schools, although it was
at hand.

The Army did not find it necessary to provide the

schools with information and experiences it was obtaining
during its operations in Europe.
courses in the spring of 1944.

The schools ended their

Officers were transferred to

Shrivenham, England, to continue their training overseas, to
receive their special assignments, and to be deployed after
the invasion.

The officers' patience and morale, however,

was severely tested overseas.

Training could not continue

due to the lack of teachers, space and teaching materials,
and the sudden influx of huge numbers of Military Government
officers

who

were

shipped

from

the

United

States

anticipation of quick deployment after the invasion.
of security concerns,
future

assignments

in

Because

SHAEF was unwilling to disclose the
of

the

units,

so

that

individual

assignments for Military Government detachments could not be
made before the invasion.

Once they joined their tactical

units in the field, Military Government detachments often
found themselves doing odd jobs until they could move to
their final destinations.45
45Henke 221-226; Tent, Mission 23-24; Ziemke 3-23; Harold
Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York:
Macmillan, 1947) 6-12; Harold Zink, The United States in
Germany (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1957) 5-26.
It is
interesting to note that Zink's assessment of the quality of
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When

the first Civilian Affairs Officers arrived at

England at the end of 1942, they found that the staffs were
not yet prepared for them.

Nobody was quite sure how to

integrate this relatively new task of the military into a
command

structure

which

was

in

flux

anyway

preparations for the Normandy invasion.

due

to

the

Civilian Affairs

initially became part of the American command in the European
theater, but with the creation of SHAEF and the appointment
of Eisenhower as its commander, planning responsibilities
were transferred to the Joint Command and Civilian Affairs
became G-5, Military Government (MG).

Planning for Germany

became the responsibility of the German Country Unit (GCU)
from February 1944 on.46
G-5

faced

a

formidable

task.

It had

to

create

a

military government organization within a very short period
of time.

Cooperation between British and American officers

proved to be more difficult than had been anticipated.

In

addition to

in

Germany

that,

itself

practical

made

structure necessary.

experiences

adjustments

in

in Italy

the

and

organizational

It was not until the end of 1945 that

the Americans were able to resolve their problems in this
field.

In December 1945 the Office of Military Government,

the training of MG officers was much kinder in 1947, when the
occupation was still going on and his own memory was still
fresh, than it was in 1957.
Political events as well as a
disillusion about American accomplishments in Germany after
the war may have changed his attitude.
46Ziemke 25-30, 81.
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U.S.

Zone

of Occupation

functions.
commands,

(OMGUS)

had taken

over

all

G-5

OMGUS was completely separated from tactical
but

remained

under

the

Commander-in-Chief's

authority.47
Reeducation received only marginal attention.

Just ten

officers were assigned to the Education and Religious Affairs
Branch of the U.S.
first

three

years

Group Council Commission.
of

the

receive division status
Military Governor.

occupation

the

During the

branch

and had no direct access

did

not

to the

MacLeish's efforts to make reeducation

the central task of the American occupation did not have any
impact on operations in the field during the first year of
the occupation.48
The

lack

of

a

clear-cut

policy

in

Washington,

differences of opinion between British and American policy
makers, as well as constantly changing assumptions about the
condition

Germany would

be

in after her

surrender,

made

defining a mission for military government and providing
specific instructions a daunting task for GCU throughout
1944.

The GCU was ready by August to distribute the handbook

which

Morgenthau

took

to

the

President.

Roosevelt's

objections delayed its distribution, although they did not
change its content in any significant way.

It remained the

47Ziemke chapters II, IV, VII, XXII-XXIV.
48Tent, Mission 3 6-37.
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only guide for Military Government until July 1945, since the
British did not accept the provisions of JCS 1067.
Coordination between civilian agencies and the military
remained a constant problem throughout the preparations for
the occupation of Germany in spite of the creation of CAD in
1943.

After their negative experiences in Africa the War

Department

and

SHAEF

were

reluctant

to

permit

contacts

between the military and civilian agencies,' although they
were necessary to coordinate Military Government actions with
long term objectives and policy making which the military had
explicitly delegated to civilian authorities.

The physical

separation between SHAEF and Washington as well as the fact
that

communications

communications

system

had

to

and had

go

through

to pass

a

cumbersome

several

clearance

hurdles further aggravated the situation.49
Since Civil Affairs staff officers could not communicate
directly with civilian agencies in Washington and also were
unwilling to concede the lead to the British,

they had to

rely on American resources available in England for writing
a handbook that would help their officers once they were in
Germany.

With little updated information about Washington

politics at hand and no guidance in form of a policy, they
based their Handbook for Military Government on FM 27-5 and
adapted it to conditions they were expecting to find
Germany.

in

Their instructions were in line with the little

49Hammond 318-322.
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information

Ambassador

Winant

received

from

the Working

Security Committee in Washington which Roosevelt had created
after

Moscow

negotiations

to

determine

of

the

the

European

American

position

Advisory

in

Committee.

the
The

Military Government detachments' main task initially was to
facilitate tactical troop operations.
that

the

military

would

be

When it became clearer

responsible

for

military

government also for a period after the end of hostilities,
the

detachments'

tasks

were

broadened.

In

July

1944

education and religion became additional responsibilities.
Apart from that, the book applied the general directions for
military government of FM 27-5 to the situation it expected
in Germany.

The manual

also was

in

line with military

government policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed on
in their directive CCS 551 late in May 1945.

As we have

seen, the handbook caused a considerable stir in Washington
and triggered the Morgenthau plan in September 1944, but it
survived

even

the

President's

surprisingly unharmed.

requests

to

revise

it

The War Department resented this

interference in its internal operations and therefore did not
pursue the issue diligently.

Since the manual was a joint

venture between British and Americans,
simply change it at its own convenience.

one side could not
The British never

agreed to the provisions of JCS 1067, so the manual remained
the basis of operations until the dissolution of SHAEF in
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July 1945, guiding officers in the field through the first
crucial phase of military government activities.50
The authors of the handbook did not regard youth as a
special problem and focused exclusively with the educational
system.

Since

the

instructions

the State

Department had

prepared for CAD never were sent because of the Morgenthau
episode, planners in London had even less to draw on in this
field than in others.

The handbook therefore provided some

general guidelines which sought to minimize American control
and interference.

The authors assumed that, especially in

such a delicate area, too much American interference would
alienate even the Germans who had not supported the Nazis and
whose responsibility it would be to rebuild and reform the
system.

Schools were to be closed only temporarily.

They

were to be reopened at the earliest possible moment to keep
young people away from black market or resistance activities,
to feed them, and to provide them with medical services if
necessary.51
Eisenhower's staff realized that the handbook needed
modifications.
National

JCS 1067 not only demanded the elimination of

Socialism

and

militarism

in

schools,

but

also

envisioned a comprehensive system of reeducation that went
beyond them.

The Americans' first experiences in Germany may

have convinced them as well that some ways had to be found to
50Hammond 355-357; Tent, Mission 23-28; Ziemke 83-91.
5lTent, Mission 25-28.
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occupy German youth when they were not in school.

On March

10, 1945 Eisenhower's Civil Affairs Adviser, Robert Murphy,
sent a revision of the handbook's education and religion
section to American headquarters in Europe, which broadened
the scope of

the Education Branches in the field. Apart from

supervising

the

educational

system,the

instructed educational officers

revised

to permit

manual

initiatives

of

youth organizations that would not be connected to schools
and to support the introduction of new pedagogical ideals.
The

new

handbook

actually

initiated

conflicts would be inevitable.

a process

in which

It permitted a revival of the

traditional German way of organizing youth, but it promoted
new departures in youth work at the same time.

The directive

also revealed that American staff planners from the start
pursued dual objectives towards German youth which aimed at
eliminating Nazism and militarism in the German educational
system,

and

at the

same time

laid the

foundation

for

a

constructive program of re-education.52
Setting
carrying out

up an organization that

would be capable of

the duties of a military government in Germany

was a difficult task that did not receive a high priority
before the invasion of France.

Since this would be the first

time that a military force actually would completely take

52Ambassador Murphy, London, to State Department, 10
March 1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 740.00119/3-1045,
quoted in Fiissl 98. Fiissl is the first scholar to make this
argument for the treatment of German youth.
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over

control

of

local,

state

and

a

central

planners in Europe had to start from scratch.

government,

They developed

an organization that was well suited to tactical support of
troops during operations, but proved to be inadequate for
Military Government activities after the end of hostilities.
When American troops set foot on German soil at the end of
1944,

Military

Government

detachments

accompanied

them,

prepared to take over local government for some time to come.
The

training

technical.

these

detachments

had

received

was

mostly

Their field manuals and instructions provided

them only with broad guidelines but in general stressed that
Germans should do the work and Americans would supervise it.
Due to problems of communication between Europe and America
and in part as a result of the nature of the binational
command structure, policy decisions in Washington had little
impact on the concrete planning for the occupation and would
not

be

in

occupation,

effect

during

the

first

two

when many crucial decisions

months

of

the

in regard to the

Germans would have to be made in the field.
Like
military

politicians
government

and

administrators

planners

initially

in

Washington,

focused

attention exclusively on the educational system.
practical reasons to do so.
personnel

to

do

more

than

their

They had

First, there would not be enough
supervise

school

activities.

Secondly, schools were best suited to keep young people off
the streets where they might cause trouble for the tactical
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troops.

Thirdly,

school

buildings

would

be

the

most

convenient places to administer services to young people,
such as health care or food.

Consequently the only necessary

action would have to be to purge schools and teachers of Nazi
ideology and textbooks.
would

encourage

Furthermore Military Government

administrative

reform

Organizing youth along democratic
picture

relatively

late

by

the

Germans.

principles entered

in the process.

Washington

the
and

European Headquarters neither envisioned nor desired direct
contacts between Americans and young Germans.
Once American troops occupied Germany, however, American
policy and its implementation towards youth never remained at
a

standstill.

continued

to

implement

its

In
press

Washington
for

policies

a
of

the

policy
a

Department
statement

comprehensive

reeducation of Germany's younger generation.

of

State

that

would

and

positive

In Germany

Military Government leaders faced the task of building an
Allied Control Council.

Redeployment to Japan and to the

United States after August 1945, as well as setting up a
functioning administration for the occupation forces and for
military government, became major concerns for Lucius D. Clay
and his staff.

At the same time Military Government would

have to take care of desolate economic, political and social
conditions in the American zone of occupation that nobody had
expected.

The rehabilitation of youth consequently received

scant attention and resources by the leading men in Germany,
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although

they

recognized

the

importance

of

the

task.

Nevertheless youth work became an important factor in the
communities

throughout

the American

zone

of

occupation.

Military Government officials in charge of education never
gave up

the fight.

In the end they received support from

some quite unexpected and not always welcome quarters.
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CHAPTER II
Becoming Acquainted; 1944-45

The initial phase of the American presence in Germany
taught valuable lessons to three groups: the occupiers, the
older generation of reform minded Germans, and to the younger
generation itself.

Initiatives for contacts with the German

population came from the over 1.5 million soldiers stationed
in Germany and encompassed far more than meeting Frauleins.
These initial contacts in many ways set the tone for future
relations and left lasting impressions on the German side.
The individual experiences with the American soldiers became
a crucial ingredient in the formation of attitudes toward
Americans, particularly for the younger generation and those
who became involved in youth work after the war.
Occupying Germany
The first months of the American occupation of Germany
were more difficult than the Americans had expected because
they had not anticipated dealing with a complete political
and

social

vacuum

destruction.

as

well

as

an

unimaginable

Military Government detachments

scale

of

in general

found the population docile, often eager to serve their new
masters.

There was

no resistance to

speak of once the

fighting was over.

The problems were the same all over

Germany:

fled the premises,

Nazis

had

often destroying

valuable town records before they abandoned their posts.
59
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Where fighting had been heavy, the infrastructure as well as
utilities were interrupted.

In almost all the bigger cities

looting took place before the Americans could reestablish
order.

As

long

as

the

fighting

lasted

in

Germany,

a

community could be confronted with different Army units and
Military Government detachments who might issue contradicting
orders.

At the same time the tactical troops and their

commanders,
Government

who were usually higher in rank than Military
officers,

pursued

their

own

objectives

which

sometimes were detrimental to the occupational objectives.
Looting by the troops initially was rather widespread.
however,

GIs,

seemed to be interested in souvenirs rather than

doing harm to the people.
By the end of 1944 Americans advanced
They found the same picture everywhere.

into Germany.

Civilians awaited

the end of hostilities in cellars, air raid shelters or in
the countryside.

Most of them simply waited for the ordeal

to be over and wanted it to pass quickly.

Usually heavy

artillery and intense air raids prepared the advance of the
Americans.

Then the tanks came

in and finally

infantry

cleaned up and advanced to the next community.1
Nuremberg had suffered greatly from repeated bombing
raids.

The British targeted the city as a whole, whereas the

Americans

focused

their

strategic

bombing

mainly

on

lZiemke 225-226; Klaus-Jorg Ruhl, Die Besatzer und die
Deutschen: Amerikanische Zone 1945-1948 (Diisseldorf: Droste,
1980) 7-53.
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Nuremberg's
station.

industry,

marshalling

yards,

and

the

train

By April 16, 1945 American forces had reached the

outskirts of the city, but even that late in the war, German
soldiers did their duty and defended the city.

Typically for

the National Socialists, their most prominent representative,
Julius Streicher had fled, but in a rare display of loyalty
to Hitler and probably with no illusions about the fate that
awaited them after the war,

the mayor and the Gauleiter

decided to participate and die in the city's last battle.
Fighting

lasted

for

five

days,

with

approximately

five

thousand German defenders, many of them too young, too old,
or too inexperienced to be effective and with hardly any
equipment left.

They faced almost ten times their number of

battle-hardened GIs on the American side who could count on
air support and artillery.

Fighting was bitter and fierce,

but by April 20 the Americans had broken German resistance.
They celebrated their victory on Hitler's last birthday at
the site of his party rallies.

The price for this final and

unnecessary bloodshed was the almost complete destruction of
everything in the inner city which the bombing raids had left
intact, not to mention a long list of casualties.
had become a heap of rubble.

Nuremberg

The remnants of the defending

forces marched off to the infamous Rhine valley prison camps.
Nevertheless, the civilian population felt relief that the
war was over for them.

Not quite three weeks after the
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battle of Nuremberg Germany surrendered and the occupation
officially began.2
First Encounters
The Second World War created misery and death all over
Europe.

The Germans had demonstrated that warfare could be

carried to a new level of destruction with their racial and
scorched earth policies in the Soviet Union.
encountered

fierce

resistance

all

the

way

Soviet troops
to

Berlin.

Governments in Moscow and Berlin intensified hatred and fear
with propaganda campaigns that preached nothing but hatred.
German atrocities during the preceding four years undoubtedly
contributed to a complete breakdown of any restraints by Red
Army soldiers and, when the Soviets finally fought their way
into Germany, turned into a nightmare for German civilians.
Atrocities occurred on all sides, but on the western front
the belligerents adhered far more to the rules of the Geneva
Convention than in the East.

American soldiers perceived

their German counterparts as troops doing a job and usually

2Karl
Kunze,
Der
Kampf
um
Nurnberg
(Nurnberg
[Nuremberg]: Verein fur Geschichte der Stadt Nurnberg, 1995)
provides an extremely detailed, but at times not well
organized account of the battle of Nuremberg. In his attempt
to do justice to the German side, he tends to overemphasize
American atrocities.
It
is
interesting to note that Kunze actually
participated in the final battle as a very young man.
He
later became a teacher and in this capacity was selected to
travel to the United States in the very first exchange group
under the auspices of the Fulbright program in 1952.
See
also Henke
(813-843)
for a detailed picture of the
disintegration of the Nazi party and its effects on the
German population.
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did not harbor any deep hatred for them.

There were attempts

on both sides to arrange for a modus vivendi at times when
the fronts were stalled, to take care of the wounded, or to
observe Christian holidays.

Initially GIs reacted strongly

to German atrocities they witnessed in concentration camps,
but the memories of most were surprisingly short.3
The
during

first
the

encounters

final

phase

between
of

Germans

the

underestimated in their significance.

war

and

Americans

should

not

be

No German knew what to

expect from the American soldiers.

Goebbels'

propaganda

machine had painted a gruesome picture of rape and looting.
Racial prejudices made many people especially apprehensive
about

African-American

troops.

The

soldiers'

behavior

3Lee Kennet, GI: The American Soldier in World War II
(New York: Warner, 1987) 155-162; Oliver Frederiksen (The
American
Military
Occupation
of
Germany
1945-1953
(Headquarters: United States Army, Europe [Heidelberg]:
United States Army, Historical Division, 1953) 130-132); also
Henke 244. Frederiksen, an official Army historian, stated
that Nazi atrocities initially had an impact on the soldiers'
behavior towards the Germans but that many GIs changed their
attitude almost immediately after the end of hostilities.
This very interesting fact has escaped the attention of some
scholars who deal with German-American grassroots relations
after the war. Wolfgang Eckart, for example, maintains that
American soldiers in general harbored strong anti-German
sentiments throughout the occupation without substantiating
his claim.
Ernst Volland and Heinz Krimmer, ed., Von Moskau nach
Berlin: Bilder des russischen Photographen Jewgeni Chaldej,
2nd rev. ed. (Berlin: Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1995)
is an impressive documentation of the fighting and suffering
on the Eastern front.
Norman M. Naimark (The Russians in
Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 19451949 (London, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1995) 69-141) approaches the behavior of
the Soviet soldiers when they reached Germany in a scholarly
way.
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towards civilians would set the tone for future relations
between the victors and the vanquished.

Young people who had

not known anything else but a Germany that was shut off from
the rest of the world by the National Socialists would be
especially impressed during their first encounters with a new
world.4
Some

Germans

had become

States as early as 1943.

acquainted with the

United

The soldiers of the Afrika Korps

who were captured by the Americans ended up in POW camps in
the

United

maintained

States.
strong

Those
Nazi

of

the

convictions

early
were

prisoners
able

to

who

obtain

control of the camp populations and to install a system of
military order which also maintained much of Nazi thought and
propaganda.

Anti-Nazis were usually segregated and sent into

special camps.
two

extremes

Americans failed to realize that between the
existed

a

large

number

of

prisoners

who

expressed nationalism but were not ardent followers of the
4Rolf Schorken (Jugend 1945: Politisches Denken und
Lebensgeschichte (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1994) 29-31) and
Ruhl (7-53) show that people in Germany were much less
apprehensive about an American occupation than they were
about falling into Soviet hands.
The fears towards the
Soviet armies were justified.
Apart from Naimark, Guido
Knopp (Das Ende 1945 - Der verdammte Krieg (Munchen [Munich]:
Bertelsmann,
1995)) presents a less scholarly account
containing photos, interviews, and documents from German and
Russian sources which draw a stark picture of the realities
in the East.
Knopp successfully strikes a balance between
the German racial warfare in the Soviet Union and the fate of
German refugees and civilians once the Red Army caught up
with them in 1944 and 1945. Eckart (122-123) emphasizes that
Germans only had Goebbels' propaganda as a source and as a
result were rather apprehensive about their first encounters
with American troops.
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National Socialists.

Initially the Army was only interested

in maintaining order and getting the German POWs to work,
mainly in agriculture.
made

attempts

to

make

It was not until 1945 that Americans
re-education

a

feature

in German

Camps.5
Germans in POW camps displayed considerable curiosity
about the United States and got to know America through their
work and their contacts with the local population.

Since

many of the camps were located in the South, the prisoners
became acquainted with a society in which African-Americans
were disfranchised and both races were strictly segregated.
Their experiences tended to reinforce the racial prejudices
many had come to accept in National Socialist doctrine.
men who were

exposed to American

racial

The

realities would

certainly find it difficult to perceive American re-education
and democratization programs in their camps as well as in
Germany as more than mere and insincere propaganda.6
A number of the German prisoners,

however,

did take

advantage of the chance to learn something new while they
were in the United States.

Willy Gensmantel, who had lived

in Nuremberg before enlisting in the German army and would
sArnold Krammer (Nazi Prisoners of War in America
(Chelsea: Scarborough, 1991)) is a very well illustrated and
documented account of the German POW experience in the United
States; see also Rafael Zagovec ("German Prisoners of War and
the
Homefront
in
Louisiana,
1943-46:
A
Cultural
Interpretation", M.A. Thesis, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, 1995) 179-256.
6Krammer 151; Zagovec 179-256; Fussl 66.
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return there after his release, was one of the veterans of
the African campaign.

He was not the typical POW.

Born in

1919, Gensmantel came from a working family and had been a
member of the trade union youth before 1933.

After he had

finished his apprenticeship, Gensmantel decided to volunteer
for the Reichsarbeitsdienst, the massive Nazi job program for
young Germans.
in the army.

After his service there Gensmantel enlisted
His motive for volunteering was that a worker

in Germany could not get full pay until he was twenty one
years old.7
The Americans
1943.

took Gensmantel prisoner

in Africa

in

He spent the next three years of his life in the

United States.

Initially he shared the fate of most German

prisoners and went to a number of camps in the South where he
worked in agriculture.

He decided that the best way to pass

the time without getting homesick was to participate in as
many camp activities as possible.

Gensmantel played in a

band, sang in a choir, became a member of a theater group,
and volunteered for kitchen work.8

7Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
Gensmantel was one of various leading trade union members
whom I was able to interview at the unions' headquarters
thanks to the efforts of Horst Klaus, a retired trade union
youth secretary, who has been working very hard to make the
trade unions' postwar history available to the younger
generation.
8Willy Gensmantel,
Krammer 50-78.

personal

interview,

10 Aug.
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These

activities

were

the

Gensmantel could find in his
commissioned
lives.

officers,

only

positive

captivity.

and enlisted

men

aspect

Officers,
lived

non

different

What he found most objectionable was that Americans

made it very clear to the prisoners that they regarded them
all as Nazis and made no attempt to differentiate between
those who served in the armed forces because they had no
choice, and those who had actually supported Hitler.

On the

contrary, it seemed to Gensmantel that the officers, without
whose support Hitler would not have been able to take over
the

reins

Officers,

of
for

Germany,

got the

better

end

example,always had enough

of

to eat

the

deal.

but never

bothered to share their food with the enlisted men who had to
work hard and got just 1200 calories per day.
recalled that

Gensmantel

the American Army did not react

kindly to

guards who became friendly with the prisoners.

He thought

that the Americans were Germany's

equal when it came to

punishing soldiers who deviated from the norm.9
Gensmantel spent time in various states throughout the
deep

South.

The

people

of

German

ancestry

especially

disappointed Gensmantel, because he found many ardent Nazi
supporters among them, but he also became aware of the evils
of a segregated society.

According to him, however, the low

9Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995;
Krammer (148-151) documents a wide range of attitudes towards
German prisoners which went from hatred to aiding POWs in
their escape attempts.
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status and discrimination of the African-Americans had its
advantages

for

the

German

prisoners.

Both

groups

were

exploited by the same masters, so many African-Americans did
not seem to have problems in helping the prisoners whenever
they could, above all by providing them with food.

Germans

who benefitted from this support tried to return the favors.
Whenever white persons became aware of the system, however,
they did everything to disrupt these ties.
After the first year Gensmantel was sent to a special
prison camp because he refused to work.

He and others sent

there argued that every German who worked

in the United

States freed an American for war duties that ultimately would
kill Germans.

Although his argument was consistent with the

Geneva convention,

the Americans did not like it.

Living

conditions in Camp Alva, Oklahoma, were considerably worse
than

anywhere

else.

His

situation

improved

when

he

volunteered for one of the re-education and democratization
courses which the Army offered to over 23,000 of the 370,000
German

prisoners

in

the

United

States

from

1945

on.

According to him, the Americans only accepted people in the
courses who had not been members in any Nazi organizations.
Since he had participated in the trade union youth, the Nazis
had excluded him from membership in the Hitler youth.

This

enabled him to take part in the program and stay on to the
end.

He witnessed that others were sent back to their camps

as soon as the Americans learned about their membership in
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party organizations.

Gensmantel

was

impressed with the

personalities and the professional instruction he received.
According to him, it was in those camps that he obtained the
foundation for his democratic convictions and the motivation
for his political activities in Germany.

He came back to

Germany convinced that the best way to make a German a good
democrat was to teach him disobedience.10
The Americans had instructed participants in the courses
to look for jobs either in the Counter Intelligence Corps, in
agriculture or in the public sector when they got home.

When

Gensmantel left the United States, American soldiers took
away everything he had.

He arrived at Nuremberg in May 1946,

weighing only 37 Kilos (about 80 American pounds).

Working

as an American agent was out of the question for him, so he
opted for the public sector.

Gensmantel immediately found a

job in a railroad yard and became an organizer for the trade
unions' youth work after just four weeks on the job.

At the

same time he began to build a youth section in the workers'

10Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995;
Krammer (219-227) provides additional details on Fort Eustis
and the re-education program; see also "Anti-Nazi PW
Returns," Office of Military Government for Germany, U.S.,
Weekly Information Bulletin [hereinafter OMGUS Information
Bulletin] no. 37, 15 Apr. 1946: 9. The bulletin served as a
link between headquarters and the field. It must have been
a vital and welcome source for the field officers because it
highlighted, summarized and interpreted the never ending flow
of orders.
The bulletin's section on German reactions to
American policies provided background information for those
Americans who did not speak German.
Headquarters also
included stories on detachment activities it considered
exemplary.
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sports club in Fiirth, Nuremberg's neighbor city.

He would

later become one of the most outspoken youth representatives
in Nuremberg.

The Nuremberg trade unions later appointed him

full time youth secretary.

His goal was to make the trade

unions a second home for young people,
offer them support.

because they could

He knew that the unions could count on

American help.11
Although Gensmantel's experiences were rather extreme in
some respects, most German prisoners returned to Germany with
an appreciation for the United States, its people, but also
its power.

The Army's re-education courses provided men like

Gensmantel, who were willing to listen to new ideas and had
a clean past, with an opportunity to rethink their political
and

social

participate

attitudes

and

in Germany's

motivated

them

reconstruction

to

along

actively
democratic

lines.
While

German

and American

soldiers

encountered each

other on the battlefields from 1943 on, it was not until the
late summer of 1944 that German civilians got to know the
Americans.

In August American troops established their first

bridgehead in Germany.
reception.

They got a surprisingly friendly

Once the immediate danger of the fighting was

“Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995. MG
headquarters informed its field officers about the purpose of
the program in April 1946 and instructed them to give the
Germans who had participated in it priority over any others
in the clearance process they had to go through when they
applied for a job in the public sector.
"Anti Nazi PW
Returns," OMGUS Information Bulletin no. 37, 15 Apr. 194 6: 9.
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over,

Germans

conquerors.

came

out

to

have

a

closer

look

at

the

They greeted GIs on the streets and permitted

their children to wave at them.12
Keeping their attitude towards German soldiers in mind,
it is not surprising that GIs quickly established contact
with the population once they entered Germany.
take

long

until

pictures

showing

Germans

It did not

and

American

soldiers celebrating the end of the war together reached
Washington.
that

Chief of Staff General Marshall informed SHAEF

Washington

did

not

look

kindly

upon these

events.

Eisenhower immediately issued orders that prohibited any form
of fraternization.13

The soldiers were not happy.

Arthur

Goodfriend, editor-in-chief of the Army's official newspaper,
the Stars and Stripes, conducted an unofficial opinion survey
among the troops shortly after the orders came out.

He found

that the soldiers in general were favorably impressed with
the

Germans.

"cleaner
[French]".

Some

and

damned

even

thought

sight

that

friendlier

the Germans
than

the

were
Frogs

Stars and Stripes described the situation in

Aachen:
1) German Civilians are giving Yanks the V-sign, the
glad hand, the free beer, big smiles and plenty of talk
about not being Nazis at heart, and hurray for
democracy.

12Ziemke 138-139; on September 14, 1944 the London Times
published an article under the headline "Germans Welcome the
Invaders" (quoted in Woller 57-58).
I3Henke 284-297; Ziemke 97-99.
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2) Some G.I.s and plenty of officers are returning the
smiles, flirting with the Frauleins, drinking the beer
and starting to think what nice folks the Germans really
are.
The headline admonished the readers not to "Get Chummy With
Gerry," but Goodfriend and other officers did not think that
the soldiers would obey the order for more than a month.14
The American occupation of Aachen and its surroundings
took place before the Battle of the Bulge and the discovery
of Nazi concentration camps in Germany.
region and overwhelmingly Catholic.

Aachen was a border

Some Americans thought

that it was not typical and justified their friendly behavior
towards the Germans there in this way.

One might assume that

the Battle of the Bulge, German atrocities, and the discovery
of

concentration

camps

might

have

changed

the

initial

friendly inclinations of American GIs once they arrived at
the heartland of Germany.

The region of Middle Franconia in

Bavaria seemed to be more representative of Nazi Germany.
The biggest community in the region was Nuremberg, infamous
for hosting the Nazi party rallies and for the antisemitic
laws of 19 35 which came to bear its name.
had been a Nazi

stronghold with Julius

Middle Franconia
Streicher as

its

Gauleiter until even the Nazi party could not tolerate his
excesses anymore.

Americans got there by April 1945, at a

time when Nazi atrocities in concentration camps were widely

I4Ziemke
142-143;
Davidson
(54-56)
documents
the
intensive campaign against fraternization in the Stars and
Stripes.
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publicized

among the troops.

The units

involved

in the

operations in that region had fought in the Battle of the
Bulge

and,

more

recently,

had

to

break

strong

German

resistance between Heilbronn and Crailsheim in Wiirttemberg
before they could enter Bavaria.

They had to fight their

last major battle in the ruins of the city.

Their behavior

towards the Germans could be expected to be less friendly
than that of the Americans who had come into Aachen.15
In Middle Franconia, just as everywhere else, the first
indication of the impending arrival of American troops was a
steady stream of German units and individual soldiers who
sought a last defensive position or tried to avoid being
captured.

It was obvious to everyone that this army was

completely

disintegrating.

Young

and

old

people

were

painfully aware of the sorry physical and mental condition of
most soldiers as they stole through forests in an attempt to
escape American troops and planes.16
If there was any fighting for villages or towns it did
not last long.
five days.
without

Even the city of Nuremberg held out for only

Often the Americans

having

to

fire

a

shot.

entered the communities
This

was

the

case

in

15Woller (27-44) provides an excellent overview of the
history of region between 1933 and 1945; for American troop
movements in the region during the last weeks of the war see
Woller 46.
16Georg Bergler, Zwischen Ende und Anfang: Die Erlebnisse
des Herrn Jedermann im Jahre Null (Nurnberg [Nuremberg]:
Frankenverlag, 1963) 88-93; Henke 958-964;
Woller 46;
Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995.
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Hersching,

near Munich.

H. Wisura,

an eighteen-year-old

refugee from the Sudetenland in 1945, was there and witnessed
the American occupation.

According to him, the Americans

came to town more as visitors than combat troops.
the population even welcomed them.
received Hershey chocolate.

All

Parts of

little children

In general Wisura thought that

the Americans were exceptionally well behaved, especially in
comparison with the French troops who were just across the
river and did not display the restraint and discipline of the
Americans.17
Middle Franconia was no exception.

As may be expected

from a defeated nation, Germans tried to please the victors.
The official history of the 42nd Division, which was involved
in the operations in the region, recorded the eagerness with
which the Germans tried to serve their new masters.

Tank

barriers disappeared in a matter of minutes, and many natives
offered to help the Americans move into their villages and
towns.

When the Germans were

ordered to

turn

in their

nH. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994. The events
during the initial phase of the Russian occupation are the
topic of numerous accounts published above all by German
refugee organizations. Knopp and Naimark are the latest and
most balanced accounts of the final months of the war in the
East; Henke (200, especially fn 191) and F. Roy Willis
(France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1967, revised and
expanded edition (Oxford, London: Oxford University Press,
1968) 32-33) provide information on the French and Soviet
troops'
behavior;
see
also
Clemens
Vollnhals,
"Die
Evangelische
Kirche
zwischen
Traditionswahrung
und
Neuorientierung," Von Stalingrad zur Wahrungsreform: Zur
Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland, eds. Martin
Broszat et al. (Mtinchen [Munich]: Oldenbourg, 1990) 153 .
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weapons, they brought guns, pistols, helmets, gas masks, Nazi
party

insignia

and

everything

else

they

incriminate them as a Nazi or a soldier.

thought

might

German behavior

went a step further than just fulfilling orders.

The Army

historian reported that the Germans displayed considerable
curiosity

and

friendliness

towards

the occupiers.

This

behavior stood in marked contrast to the attitude the Germans
displayed

towards

their

prisoner of war camps.

own

soldiers

who

marched

by

to

The civilians did not even seem to

notice their presence.18
The

behavior

of

the

American

soldiers

during

and

immediately after the fighting did much to disperse initial
apprehension.
Nuremberg,

A little village about forty miles away from

for example,

was hit by American planes

when

remnants of SS units fired at the advancing American troops.
The German civilians

certainly could not expect American

benevolence after the incident, but the story of a seventeenyear-old Hitler Youth leader in full uniform is symptomatic
of the GIs' attitude.

The young man was so absorbed with

firefighting and cleaning up the rubble that he did not
realize that an American tank had stopped right behind him.
When he became aware of the tank,

he allegedly made

an

awkward attempt to cover his insignia, fearing for his life.
He need not have worried, since, according to him, the tank's
trap door opened and a black soldier came out

laughing,

l8Woller 57.
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apparently delighted by the little prank he had just pulled
on the German.
recalled

that

Almost forty years after the event the man
the

American

had

reversed

years

of

Nazi

propaganda with one non-blow.19
The situation was the same throughout the region.

A

resident of Fiirth, a city adjacent to Nuremberg, recalled her
first experiences with the Americans.

Some children first

left a bunker once the fighting stopped and soon returned
with candy and chocolate.

Everybody in the bunker agreed,

the eyewitness reported, that the Americans could not be mad
at the Germans if they treated the children so well.20

On

the other end of Fiirth Hanns Bader, a sixteen-year-old Hitler
Youth

member,

indoctrination
prepare

him

had

been

camp

in

ordered
nearby

for subversive

to

report

Cadolzburg,

actions.

to

a

Nazi

supposedly

In one

to

of Fiirth's

suburbs he was unable to continue his journey because the
Americans had already occupied the road.

A German soldier

prevented him from trying to get through the lines and sent
him home, where his mother took away his uniform and hid it.

I9Woller 58. Apparently African-American combat troops
operated in and around Nuremberg.
Many Germans remembered
that Nazi propaganda had made them especially apprehensive
about the behavior of African American soldiers.
The
positive experiences of many Germans, however, provided a
stark contrast to Goebbels' indoctrination. We will see in
the course of the dissertation that especially encounters
with black Americans could do much to disperse racial
prejudices and to undermine the very foundations of Nazi
propaganda in young people.
20Woller 58.
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Bader recalled that the first encounter with Americans was
rather tense, but that the GIs behaved correctly and many of
them

spoke

German.

When Americans

found

out

about his

leadership position in the Hitler Youth, they took him to the
courthouse for questioning.

Bader could go after the session

and did not have to endure any physical or emotional abuse.
He recalled that the American who interrogated him turned out
to be a former citizen of Fiirth.

The city had a large and

quite wealthy Jewish community when Hitler took over Germany
in 1933 .

It is possible that a number of these Jews were

able to emigrate before Hitler went to war and decided to
embark on the complete destruction of the European Jews.

A

good number of emigres seemed to return as Allied soldiers to
their home country.
interpreters,

They not only provided vital services as

but many also seemed to have

developed an

interest in participating actively in reforming Germany.21
21Hanns Bader, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994. Henry
Kissinger is probably the most prominent member of this
group.
He was a member of an American military government
unit after the war and certainly visited Fiirth, where he was
born and spent the first years of his life. Many others may
have ended up in combat units or even may have volunteered to
participate in the occupation of their former home towns. It
made perfect sense for the army to rely on people who were
familiar with the region and the language.
I have not been
able, however, to substantiate these assumptions. A study of
the military's use of German emigres in combat units and in
the occupation of Germany is long overdue.
So far only the
Germans who were active in the Office of Strategic Services
in Washington have received some of the historians'
attention. Fiissl (62-66) bases his account of the Americans'
initial experiences with young Germans entirely on OSS
reports.
Although they undoubtedly
convey
accurate
information about individual cases,
they may not be
representative for the entire population.
A study on the
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Many Nurembergers had left the city before the Americans
arrived.

They had either been evacuated or bombed out, or

they simply had left before the last battle began.
they

were

Americans
represent

widely

dispersed,

their

first

Since

encounters with

took place under many different conditions and
the initial experiences

between

Germans

and

Americans in general quite well.
Helga Arnold, at the time twenty-one years old, had been
evacuatedfrom Nuremberg
Altmiihl valley,
remembered

that

to Pappenheim, a small town in the

where she
she

had

met the first American troops.She
apprehensions,

especially

about

African-American soldiers, but that nothing happened to the

field operations would be necessary to help evaluate the
reports.
In view of the past experiences and the very
pessimistic view most of the emigres had towards Germany, it
is not surprising that their reports seemed to have the
tendency to draw a very stark picture of the effects of Nazi
indoctrination on the population, which included youth. To
my knowledge nobody has examined the backgrounds of the men
who conducted the interviews and wrote these reports.
An
oral history project which Petra Marquardt-Bigman, an expert
on the OSS reports, is conducting for the German Historical
Institute is conducting at the moment (fall 199 6) may shed
more light on these questions. Fiissl (78-81) himself points
out that many emigres were understandably not at all
favorably inclined towards Germany.
It would have been
natural for them to look for evidence which reaffirmed their
attitudes. Arno Hamburger, for example, had experienced Nazi
discrimination against Jews in Nuremberg firsthand.
He
joined the British army in Palestine after he had been able
to escape from Nuremberg and Nazi prosecution. Hamburger did
not make it into Germany during the war, but returned to
Nuremberg immediately after the end of hostilities. He did
not find that the adults had changed at all. He did think,
however, that the young people might offer a chance for
changes and became involved in the Army's German Youth
Activities program later (Arno Hamburger, personal interview,
11 Aug. 1994) .
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civilian population.

Americans entered the house where she

was staying and searched it, but did not break anything.22
Friedrich Voigt, thirty-three years old in 1945, worked for
the telecommunications branch of the German postal services.
Together with his wife he had brought some furniture to the
little town of Wassertriidingen, about thirty miles away from
Nuremberg.

He managed to be there when the Americans came.

The inhabitants of this village decided to hoist white flags
which they had taken from a train American planes had just
destroyed when American troops approached the village.

Voigt

had thrown his uniform and rifle in a nearby river

long

before two white and three black Americans entered the house.
His

wife

greeted

them

in English

soldiers some fresh eggs.

and Voigt

offered

the

When they saw that he was smoking

a cigarette with French paper, they thought that he was a
displaced person and left cigarettes for him and chocolate
for his daughter.

The GIs returned after a few days for more

eggs and left more food.23
When fighting actually occurred, Germans in Franconia as
well as everywhere else, waited for its end in the basements
of their houses or in bunkers.
soldiers in these retreats.

Many met the first American

Heinz Fiegl, at the time fifteen

years old, was in Nuremberg during the battle.

He remembered

that he was a little worried about the safety of the women
22Helga Arnold, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995.
23Friedrich Voigt, personal interview, 26 July 1994.
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when the Americans came in, because he was alone with his
mother

and a female

friend

in the basement.

neighbors had gone to a public bunker.

All

other

Fiegl recalled that

one could tell that Americans were in the house,

because

their boots had rubber soles and could hardly be heard in
contrast

to

the

German

army

boots

with

leather

soles.

Initially the Fiegl's apprehensions seemed to come true.
two

soldiers

approached the women,

but

after

The

some tense

moments the Germans were able to change the GIs' intentions.
The Americans even became very friendly,
spoke the others'

language.

although nobody

First both soldiers unpacked

some chocolate for the Germans.

Then one of them went away,

while the other played with the neighbor's cat.

Soon the

second soldier returned with some food for the Germans and
then both left to continue the fight.24
Even those people who were very skeptical about the
Americans

or

suffered

damages

from

denazification

and

requisitions of their houses or property later, remembered
that the first troops they met behaved correctly.
Kohler,

for example,

Americans

came.

was twenty-five years old when the

Troops

searched

her

downstairs to look for German soldiers.
find any,

they left.

house,

small

a

American

house

and

came

When they did not

She recalled that the owner of the

shopkeeper,

soldiers.

Helga

They

recognized
had

actually

a

number

been

his

24Heinz Fiegl, personal interview, 6 July 1995.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of

the

Jewish

81
neighbors

before they had had to flee the Nazis

in the

thirties.25
Some adults were not afraid to show their relief and
happiness about the end of the war.

Women hugged the first

American soldiers they saw when they were allowed to leave
the bunkers after the end of hostilities.

Their behavior did

not meet the approval of the German men who witnessed it.26
The younger the Germans were at the time,
apprehensive they seemed to have been.

the less

Many of them had

their first encounters with Americans in the countryside,
where they had been evacuated to protect them from bombing
raids and fighting.

No fighting meant that Americans and the

children of their enemies could meet under more favorable
^Helga Kohler, personal interview, 13 July 1994.
She
was not the only person to observe this. The director of a
vocational school, for example, reported that he met an
American officer who spoke fluent German while looking for
hospital supplies immediately after the end of the fighting.
He struck up a conversation and found out that this officer
was the son of a Jewish toy shop owner who had emigrated to
the United States
in 1933
(Nuremberg City Archives
[hereinafter NCA] C36/I no. 322).
See also Hanns Bader,
personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994, for neighboring Fiirth. It
seems that many former Germans returned with Allied troops to
Germany, but so far there are no numbers at all to
corroborate the impressions of the German interviewees. Arno
Hamburger's experiences may not have been typical for most
emigres, but they illustrate well the strange ways in which
Germans found their way back into Germany. After the war he
found that his parents had miraculously survived the
Holocaust. Hamburger became an interpreter at the Nuremberg
trials. His parents convinced him not to leave Germany again
and so he became one of the few German Jews who actually
decided to return to Germany for good. (Arno Hamburger,
personal interview, 11 Aug. 1994).
26Reports of Rolf Goetzinger
Director Hehl; NCA C36/I no. 322.

and

Vocational
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circumstances.

Winfried Blumel,

for example,

was twelve

years old when he met the first American soldiers in Tirol,
Austria.

He was impressed with the stark contrast between

German and American troops at the end of the war.
remembered

German

troops

herding

what

Blumel

looked

like

concentration camp inmates passed his house just a few days
before the Americans arrived.
on

the

same

According

to

street
Blumel,

with

They entered the town exactly

their

the

guns

initial

ready

contacts

for

action.

usually

came

quickly between children and American soldiers, especially
African-American GIs.

The children usually were not afraid,

and Blumel thought that it was more a matter of mentality how
quickly one would leave the house and make contact.

The

children were interested above all in oranges, chocolates,
and the jeeps.27
Gerhard

Springer was

eight years old

in 194 5.

His

father was an engineer in a Nuremberg motorcycle factory.
Springer spent the last months of the war in Weissenbronn, a
little village between Nuremberg and Ansbach, about fifteen
miles away from Nuremberg.

He lived with the local butcher,

who was a World War I veteran, head of the fire brigade, and
in this function automatically the commander of the local
Volkssturm, Hitler's last attempt to mobilize old men and
children for the last battle.

Springer remembered the steady

stream of German soldiers walking through the woods.
^Winfried Blumel, personal interview, 28 July 1994.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

His

83
host parked a gas truck of an SS unit behind his house for a
while,

but these German troops just like all others just

passed through.28
Springer observed that the Americans made their presence
felt first with artillery which they directed towards a small
street junction behind the village.

Then an American tank

with four soldiers arrived to negotiate the surrender of the
village.

As soon as that was done,

a tank barrier the

villagers had been ordered to construct at the end of the
street disappeared within minutes.

The Americans arrived

with the Germans in the houses watching the scene from behind
the windows.

Soon the first Germans left their houses, but

the situation was still tense.

Finally Yugoslav displaced

persons who had worked in the fields for the villagers and
apparently had been treated well broke the ice.

They talked

to the soldiers and suddenly the atmosphere changed.

The GIs

descended from their vehicles to greet the population and to
distribute
vehicles.

candy.

The

children

inspected

the

American

Springer was impressed, because he never had been

able to get so close to any German unit and their equipment.
These combat troops left almost immediately.

The next day

Springer saw the first African-American soldiers who drove
ammunition trucks at breakneck speed through the village.29

28Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995.
29Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995.
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The villagers' initial experience ended on an unpleasant
note.

An American infantry unit marched in and ordered the

entire village population out into two barns where they had
to spend the night.

When they were allowed to return to the

village the next day, the soldiers had cut featherbeds in all
houses open and emptied all preserves they could find on
them.

Since these soldiers were not motorized,

Springer

suspected later that they either belonged to a unit that was
being punished or that they were displaced persons wearing
American uniforms.30
Springer apparently was one of relatively
people who witnessed negative actions by men
uniforms.

Two

years

after

the

war

few young

in American

Nuremberg's

school

superintendent Barthel had students write about their most
memorable experiences.

It is not surprising that most of the

students wrote about the war and the bombing of Nuremberg.
A number of the surviving essays, however, also deal with the
first encounters the children had with the occupiers.

One

girl, born in 1934, remembered the bombardment of the village
where she was living with her mother by American planes.
Soon after the attack the first American tanks appeared on
the street.

Their crews distributed candy and chocolate

while the mother was occupied until the night with helping
30Gerhard Springer, personal interview, l Aug. 1995.
Springer's assumption about the supposedly American troops is
probably correct.
The Americans had difficulties all over
their zone with displaced persons who committed crimes in
American uniforms (Ziemke 355-356).
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the farmers to control the fires the attacks had caused.
boy,

who was eight years old at the time,

American

artillery

severely

damaged

his

A

recorded that

family's

house.

Nevertheless he thought that the end of the war meant the
beginning of a "nice time", because the children received
lots of food from the Americans.
been

evacuated

experience.
came.

to

another

A nine year old boy who had

village

recorded

a

similar

After heavy artillery bombardments the Americans

People

left the cellars to watch the

occupying their village.

new rulers

American kindness seemed to help

children cope with the destruction of the fighting around
them and did much to counteract Goebbel's negative propaganda
of

impending rape

and

looting.

The boy wrote

that the

children went up to the Americans and got chocolate.
final

remark

adequately

sums

up

the

young

His

people's

experiences: "I had imagined that it would be much worse."31
Refugees

who

came

mainly

from

Silesia

and

the

Sudetenland made their acquaintance with Americans during
their flight from the Russians.
years

old

in 1945.

Russians in Breslau.

Johannes Wahner was sixteen

He and his mother had

escaped the

Just like Hanns Bader in Ftirth, Wahner

was ordered to present himself at a camp in the Riesengebirge

3INCA E10/1 no. 21, essay numbers 41, 20, and 12.
Numerous stories the Niirnberger Nachrichten collected for
special issues in 1985 (Trummerj ahre 1945-1950 [hereinafter
Trummerjahre]: 1-3) and 11 Nov. 1994 (Erinnerungen 19351945-1995 [hereinafter Erinnerungen]: 25-26) confirm the
information above.
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to get some military training.

When the men in charge of the

camp learned of Hitler's death, they obviously realized that
the war was all but over and sent the youngsters home.

Like

so many refugees, Wahner and his fatherless family spent much
time on trains without knowing where they were going.

They

went to Prague and finally ended up in the Sudeten mountains.
His

first

encounters

with

Americans

were

unpleasant.

American fighter pilots shot at anything that moved on the
streets at the end of the war.
on various occasions.

Wahner had tc dive for cover

He remembered that the planes were

flying so low that you could actually see the pilots' faces.
According to him, young people, who apparently often still
regarded the war as an exciting adventure as long as they did
not have

to confront death directly,

did not

take those

attacks very seriously or personally, whereas adults began to
harbor very negative feelings.
Wahner

met

Americans

for

the

first

time

when

they

occupied Mies, where his and his family's odyssey had ended
for the time being.

Influenced by the Nazi propaganda, he

and his family were initially afraid of the African-American
soldiers

who

came

and

searched

their

basement.

Wahner

recalled that the only place where he ever had seen black
people was the circus in Breslau,

Silesia's capital.

The

Czechs greeted the liberators enthusiastically.

GIs threw

candy and chocolate to them from their vehicles.

It did not

take the German children long to emulate the behavior of the
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Czechs and get their share of goodies.

Wahner was impressed

with the fitness and the size of the soldiers.

He recalled

that hunger and curiosity overcame any reservations he may
have had, so he went with other youngsters to the hotel the
Americans had requisitioned.
Frauleins.

The soldiers wanted to meet

Wahner and his friends were able to provide the

contacts and received chocolate in return.
there

was

no

fear

once

the

Germans

According to him,

realized

that

the

Americans looked the same and acted the same as everybody
else.

Language problems apparently were no barrier against

becoming acquainted.32
Since

African-American

soldiers

were

physically

different and had received much negative publicity by the
Nazi propaganda machine,
from the Germans.
behavior
Germany

of

Some people also remembered the deplorable

Moroccan

after

they attracted special attention

World

troops
War

I,

the
a

French
fact

had

that

deployed

Goebbels

extensively to instill fear in the German population.

in

used

Events

during the initial phase of the occupation, however, often
tended

to

reverse

the

apprehensions.

Even

today

black

soldiers have a special place in many German recollections.
One lady, at the time six years old, remembered the American
occupation of Buch, a small suburb of Nuremberg.

American

tanks stopped right in front of their house and two AfricanAmerican soldiers knocked at the door with their submachine
32Johannes Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995.
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guns ready.

The girl's mother opened the door, but panicked

and locked it again.
showed

better

The girl's father, a handicapped man,

judgement

and

let

the

soldiers

in.

The

children, impressed by Nazi propaganda that depicted black
Americans as cannibals and subhumans, were scared to death
and

remained

in

the

basement.

After

the

two

GIs

had

satisfied themselves, however, that no German soldiers were
hiding in the house, they relaxed and ordered coffee.

They

did not accept the Germans' coffee substitute made of roasted
barley,

but provided their own instant coffee which they

shared with their hosts.

After he had finished his coffee,

one of the GIs pulled a roll of drops out of his pocket which
he offered to the children in exchange for a kiss.

The

lady's younger sister was the first one to get the idea and
immediately complied.

Her older sister followed suit and was

rewarded in the same manner.

All these experiences left

lasting impressions on children and adolescents in the region
which they remembered vividly.

While in other regions of

Germany the war ended in a nightmare, their memories were
much

more

positive.

They

may

not

have

perceived

the

Americans as liberators, but the candy, the openness, and the
friendliness of many GIs made the beginning of the occupation
something positive, may be, even desirable.

Instead of bombs

and fear there was candy and peace.33

33"KuJ3 fur eine Rolle Drops," Trummerj ahre: 10.
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What Germans may not have realized at the time was that
these experiences bore special significance for the AfricanAmerican GIs who came from a segregated society and had to
fight the war against Hitler in a segregated army in which
they had to face many instances of discrimination.

Looking

at a white woman or being friendly to a white child could
have dire consequences even for a man in uniform in the Deep
South.

Going out with a German Fraulein or demanding a kiss

for some candy from a German child may have meant much more
for African-American
possibility

to

punished for it.

than for white GIs.

transgress

race

barriers

It provided a
without

being

The soldiers who were able to enjoy these

kinds of opportunities in Germany certainly formed a pool of
men that was very perceptive to the call of the civil rights
movement

of

the

fifties

at

home.

The

popularity

of

assignments to Europe among African-American troops showed
that they were certainly aware of these possibilities and the
lack of discrimination.34
^The role of African-Americans in the occupation of
Germany has not received the attention it deserves. American
historians recognized African-American discontent with
segregation and discrimination in the Armed forces.
It is
well established now that African-Americans clearly realized
the discrepancy between fighting oppression abroad and their
own misery at home.
Historians also found that a great
number of African-American GIs and officers, especially if
they were from the north, began to protest the strict
segregation and discrimination they found in training camps
and in Southern communities where most of the camps were
located.
While there exist excellent studies on the AfricanAmericans' experiences with discrimination and on the
integration of the armed forces, nobody has examined how the
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The rather good behavior of many American soldiers did
not mean that Germans got away completely unharmed.

One

little girl witnessed how four GIs entered their apartment
and threw beds and mattresses from her parents' sleeping room
on a truck in front of the house.

Everybody fled to the

basement with the exception of the grandfather.

At first the

family feared that the soldiers had also taken him along.
everybody's relief the damage was just material.
left him unharmed in the apartment.

To

The GIs had

It seemed that during

the combat phase every GI wanted to take home some souvenir.
For many Germans who happened to run into Americans during
the operational phase, "USA" quickly acquired a new meaning:
Uhrensammler Armee (watch collector army) or Uhren stehlen's
auch (they also steal watches) .3S
black soldiers' experiences overseas actually may have
influenced them in their further lives.
Richard Dalfiume,
Fighting two Fronts: Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces,
1939-1953 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969)
provides interesting and provocative insights into the
African American soldiers' experiences during World War II.
Morris J. MacGregor, Jr. (Integration of the Armed Forces
1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History,
1981) 17-57) is a scholalry account of the problem of race
relations during World War II. He mentioned the popularity
of assignments in Europe (214). William Gardner Smith made
these problems the topic of his novel Last of the Conquerors
(New York: Farar, Straus, and Company: 1948). Interestingly,
I became aware of the novel through a review of 1949 in one
of Nuremberg's newspapers.
35Essay by a Nuremberg elementary school student: "An
Experience which I will not forget;"
NCA E 10/1 no. 21,
essay no. 44; report of vocational school director Hehl; NCA
C36/I no. 322; Woller (57-59) detected the same pattern in
the region around Nuremberg; see also Ziemke 250-252,
"Uhrensammler unterwegs: Amerikaner interessierten sich fur
Wertgegenstande," Trummerjahre: 6.
The Germans' postwar
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There were, of course, American soldiers who did not
show any restraint or friendliness towards the Germans.

Rape

and serious looting as well as wanton destruction of property
did

occur.36

An

elderly

lady who was

not

at

all

well

disposed towards the occupiers reported that parts of the
troops quartered in her house displayed rather rude behavior
and

stole

whatever

they

could.

She

also

noted

that

occasionally the soldiers destroyed property for no reason.
The woman concluded, however, that she "was sorry to say that
German soldiers calmly admit that they had not behaved better
in enemy countries."

She paid special attention to African-

American GIs, observing that "niggers" camped on the former
party rally grounds, but that one "did not have to be afraid
of the 'Blacks.'"37

definition of USA is still very much a commonplace among the
people who experienced the American occupation.
If many
years of listening to stories in the family and among friends
in Germany are any indicator, the immense interest for
watches seemed to have been one of the few things GIs and
Russian soldiers had in common. The difference seems to have
been that Russians were more inclined to resort to violence
if they encountered resistance, whereas Americans just took
the items they wanted without harming anyone seriously.
Looting by American troops also usually did not last longer
than a few days.
36Woller states that during 1945 only about 1000 rapes
were reported in the entire region the Americans had
occupied. The Army prosecuted sex offenders of all races and
punished them severely. According to Woller (59-60), fortyfour soldiers were executed because of sex related crimes,
several hundred were sentenced to years of forced labor.
Henke (200-201) arrives at the same conclusions, although his
numbers are slightly higher.
37Diary entry of a lady 30 April 1945; NCA F5 no. 488.
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Nevertheless, Army headquarters and most white officers
throughout the war and in its aftermath alleged that AfricanAmerican

troops

lacked

the

discipline

of

their

white

counterparts.38 Among Germans rumors about African-American
savagery persisted.39 German authorities in Middle Franconia
seemed to corroborate these stories.

They complained to the

new masters in an official report that sexual transgressions
of GIs in the region had not become a serious problem during
the initial phase of the occupation,

but that some black

units which were stationed in the vicinity of Fiirth seemed to
be the notable exception to the rule.

The Germans reported

that African-American GIs banded together in groups of six to
eight men,

looted the houses and molested the women.

In

another village black GIs allegedly "...hunted women

and

girls whom they even dragged out of the houses."40
While black troops certainly had their share of criminal
elements in the armed forces,

their combat experience and

their position of occupiers of a society of Caucasian people
with an extremely racist leadership also may have instilled

38MacGregor 138-39.
39See, for example, Marianne Hassel, personal interview,
23 Aug. 1995.
Although her family had rather positive
experiences with African-Americans, she recalled the town
gossip and rumors which dealt with alleged or possible
African-American transgressions and behavior towards the
opposite sex.
40Woller 59.
It is not quite clear what the AfricanAmericans actually did.
The German miBbrauchen can mean
either "abuse" or "rape."
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a new sense of superiority in some African-American GIs or
units that could have resulted in some transgressions.

It

may well be, however, that other factors played a role in
determining the image of African-American troops as well.
Nazi propaganda had undoubtedly impressed many Germans enough
to

expect

soldiers.

that black GIs

would

behave worse

than white

This expectation made sure that African-American

behavior would come under much closer scrutiny than that of
white troops.

The American, especially the African-American,

code of conduct towards the opposite sex also was far more
open than anything Germans would find acceptable.
easily

lead

to

false

assumptions

and

This could

perceptions.

In

addition to that, Germans may have suffered from the same
fears and phantasies regarding the treatment of white women
that the white population in the Deep South harbored when
they had to confront the specter of free slaves before and
during the Civil War.

An observer in a little town in Baden,

for example, noted in his diary in April 1945 that reports
about rapes of German women

by African-American soldiers

"without exception" turned out to be

"all the results

of

unproven phantasies of overheated brains."41
Official

investigations brought to light interesting

facts regarding German views of African-American soldiers.
““Quoted in Henke 200, fn 192. Many of the interviewees
in Nuremberg made special references to Black soldiers and
the effects of Nazi propaganda in this respect.
See, for
example, Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995;
Marianne Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug. 1995.
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In October 1945 a survey conducted in the city of Giessen by
the

Military

Government's

revealed that

40 per cent

negative

views

occupation.

towards

Information

Control

Division

of the people asked had held
African-Americans

before

the

Only sixteen per cent said that they had a

favorable attitude before the Americans came.

The survey

indicated that many Germans revised their negative feelings
once they

actually came

in

contact with black soldiers.

Younger Germans with a better education seemed to be more
inclined to think that African-Americans were as respectable
citizens as white soldiers.
were

aware

of

the

Interestingly enough the Germans

inequality

and

often

discriminating

attitudes displayed by many white soldiers towards their
brothers in arms.

The survey concluded that

[t]he favorable shift in opinion was attributed by the
Germans largely to the striking impression which the
personal, human qualities of the Negro had made. Above
all.. .they had been impressed by the fact that the Negro
soldiers loved (German) children and got along so well
with them....
Other qualities frequently cited were
that the Negroes were "good natured," "friendly," "eager
to help," "decent." In addition, a few Germans had
changed their opinion because the Negroes had done them
no harm.
Investigators further reported that Germans considered white
soldiers

"more

disciplined
while

self-confident,"

regarding

women,"

African-Americans

restrained."

were

"better
but

"more

also

educated,"
"more

friendly,"

"more

reserved,"
but

"less

The pollsters even found one German who thought
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that African-Americans forgave more easily and acted less
like victors.42
On the whole the black and white combat troops behaved
surprisingly well and often displayed a benevolence that the
Germans had no reason to expect.
remarkable
Soviet

and

contrast

to the

French

soldiers

Their behavior stood in

experiences
when

they

Germans

had with

entered

Germany.

Although he was still fighting the remnants of the German
army, the average GI did not seem to think that all Germans
were Nazis or should be held responsible for Nazi crimes and
acted accordingly.43
Even Lutheran pastors, conservative and not afraid to
voice and display their strong nationalism,
nothing negative to say about the Americans.

initially had
Already during

the combat phase American soldiers showed a special deference
towards the representatives of the Lutheran Church who had
been active in the Confessing Church that had openly resisted
Hitler.

Julius Schieder, for example, a leading member of

42Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 16,
27 October 1945; NA RG 260 Records of United States
Occupation Headquarters, World War II, section A2, Records of
the Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone (OMGUS)
[hereinafter
OMGUS],
Information
Control
Division
[hereinafter ICD], Opinion Survey Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/2.
43None of the interviewees had anything negative to say
about the American combat troops they met in April and May of
1945. Apart from the above interviews see also Erinnerungen:
19-26. During the twenty five years I lived in the Nuremberg
region I did not meet a single civilian who had suffered any
serious crime committed by an American soldier during the
combat phase.
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the

Confessing

Church,

was

in

charge

congregations in and around Nuremberg.
end of hostilities
superiors
continued.
Schieder
correctly,

in

of

the

Lutheran

One week after the

in the region he could report to his

Munich that

the

work

in the

congregations

There was only minor damage to church property.
noted

that

American

soldiers

were

behaving

displaying a great respect toward the Church.

Houses of pastors were not requisitioned or were immediately
vacated by American troops.44

Two weeks

later he had a

44Landeskirchliches Archiv Nurnberg [Lutheran Church
Archives for the State of Bavaria, Nuremberg, hereinafter
LCA] Kreisdekan Nurnberg 6, Berichte aus dem Kirchenkreis:
Umsturz 1945; see also Woller 58-59.
Schieder talked frankly about his political convictions
to an information control officer in the summer of 1945.
According to the officer, Schieder said that he had almost
joined the National Socialists in 1923 because he subscribed
to many of Hitler's ideas, especially that of the need for
living space. Schieder also did not think that the Germans
had demonstrated a singular kind of barbarianism during the
preceding twelve years. He compared German behavior during
the war to British massacres in their colonies, to the Soviet
behavior in the east (apparently unconcerned about the laws
of cause and effect), and even to the American treatment of
German prisoners of war. Schieder did not consider himself
to be a democrat but rather indicated that he would prefer
the revival of an authoritarian state in Germany: "Somebody
should be able to give clear orders and they should be
followed". In view of the fact that Schieder belonged to the
group which had resisted Hitler and that almost fifty percent
of the Lutheran reverends in Nuremberg had belonged to the
Nazi party, Schieder's views probably represent the more
moderate views among the Lutheran clergy at the time.
(Military Government Detachment for Nuremberg,
Annual
Historical Report from 21 April 1945 to 20 June 1946, section
4 e. 3 and Appendix no. 1, Nurnberg 1945-1949 doc. 5) .
Vollnhals (113-168) is an excellent introduction to the
problems the protestant churches in Germany were facing and
the attempts of the leading men to solve them.
See
especially pp. 118-123 for the protestant clergy's attitudes
and the American reaction to them. For events in and around
Nuremberg see also Johannes Kiibel, Erinnerungen: Mensch und
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better idea of the events in his region.

According to him,

only two pastors displayed a negative attitude towards the
occupiers,

which

only

extensive grumbling.

in

one

case

manifested

itself

in

Schieder wrote that lives were lost

only occasionally and the Americans turned out to be very
humane.
combat

They provided first aid for civilians wounded during
activities

hospitals.

The

and

only

displaced persons.

transported
trouble

them

in his

to

the

district

nearest

came

from

Schieder reported to Munich that the

occupiers wanted church life to continue.45
When the Germans officially capitulated on 8 May 1945,
the

first

phase

of

successful conclusion.

the

American

occupation

came

to

a

Without being aware of it, American

soldiers soothed initial apprehensions and tore down some of
the racial fears and prejudices Hitler's propaganda had tried
to implant

in the minds

of the Germans.

The

soldiers'

behavior made it easier for many Germans, but especially for
young people, to accept their new occupiers and to cooperate
with

them.

It

also

raised

hopes

and

expectations

of

leniency, however, which official American policy was not
prepared to fulfill.

Christ,
Theologe,
Pfarrer und Kirchenmann
(VillingenSchwenningen: Martha Frommer, 1973) 113-114, 133-41.
45Report of 11 May 1945; LCA Kreisdekan Nurnberg
Berichte aus dem Kirchenkreis.
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CHAPTER III
Organizing the Occupation; 1945

During the first eight months after the war Americans
confronted a daunting task.

They were facing an extent of

destruction as well as social and political disarray which
they had not anticipated.
pay

attention

to

Americans immediately needed to

reestablishing

the

most

basic

social

services, such as functioning utilities or securing food as
quickly as possible to prevent the outbreak of diseases and
to assure the survival of the German population.

At the same

time, however, American military commanders had to deal with
several internal problems before they were able to devote
their entire attention to the occupation as such.

In view of

these basic necessities the part of the staff which dealt
with German re-education and especially with youth did not
enjoy

a

high

occupation.

priority

during

the

initial

phase

of

the

Nevertheless Clay's headquarters soon developed

directives which officially recognized the

importance of

youth work and provided the foundation for American youth
policy in Germany without any guidance from Washington.
Organizing an Effective Occupation Administration
In

May

1945

American

immediate goal in Germany.

troops

had

accomplished

the

Hitler's army was defeated and

the country completely occupied by Allied troops.
Japan, however, was not yet over.

The war in

It is symptomatic that

98
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General

Clay,

who

officially was

in

charge

of

American

Military Government in Germany, spent most of his time during
the first months after V-E day organizing the redeployment of
American troops either to Japan or to the United States. By
August troop strength in Europe was down from over three
million to 1.6 million soldiers.1
As

long

as

hostilities

in

the

Pacific

lasted,

redeployment was merely an organizational problem, but the
Japanese surrender in August 1945 created the public demand
in the United States and among the troops to demobilize at
once.

The Army's point system assigned priority to those

soldiers who had served longest, no matter where they served.
This created an immense amount of restructuration and flux at
the unit level which also caused considerable problems for
Military

Government

outfits.

The

constant

reshuffling,

together with the expectation to be home soon,
troop morale and discipline.

diminished

Replacements were hard to come

by and usually did not have the quality the fighting troops
had.2 Many capable MG officers left Germany when they came
up for redeployment at a time when their services would have
been most useful.

Some field detachments lost as much as 80

per cent of their original personnel to redeployment.

Since

the Army constantly had to adjust its expectations for troop

‘Ziemke 328-330; see also Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among
Warriors (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1964) 281-283.
2Ziemke 422-23; Henke 970-71; Murphy 281.
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strength

in

Germany

Military

Government

downwards,
strength

Clay

decided

accordingly.

to

reduce

He wanted

to

achieve his goal mainly by dismantling the Field Operation
units which were scheduled to relinquish all direct control
over German administrations by 31 December 1945.
not

interfere

rather

directly

supervise

in

local

the Germans

and

government

They would

anymore,

intervene

in

cases

but
of

emergency.3
The end of the war with Japan caused additional problems
for Military Government.

Many regular Army officers faced

the prospect of losing the rank they had acquired during the
war

if they remained with the tactical troops after the

hostilities.

Military Government offered a way to maintain

their rank and status.

In this way many division and branch

chiefs who had participated in the planning from the outset
suddenly had to work with superiors who usually did not have
any clear ideas about military government and often did not
display
duties.
field

any

interest

in

becoming

acquainted

with

their

These problems extended all the way down to the
detachments

and

resulted

in

a

very

uneven

interpretation of directives and a widely varying quality
within local MG units.4
While dealing with
additional

problems.

redeployment,
During

the

General

initial

Clay

phase

3Ziemke 404-406; Henke 983.
4Knappen 73-74.
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occupation, Military Government did not function efficiently.
Clay had

to

address

a number

of

issues

in this

realm.

Military Government detachments were

integrated into the

tactical

even

command

structure

which

under

circumstances was a cumbersome institution.

normal

Redeployment

made matters worse, as did the fact that many commanders of
tactical

units

were

professional

soldiers

who

at

best

assigned a very low priority to civilian tasks or at worst
frequently meddled in Military Government's affairs.
usually

outranked

MG

personnel

and

had

ready

They

access

to

resources which made the work of field detachments sometimes
impossible.

In addition to that, military districts did not

coincide with the Military Government detachments' areas of
jurisdiction.

This led to confusion, since MG detachments

often had to deal with more than one tactical command.

Since

commanders at that time enjoyed much discretion over their
own fiefdoms, MG units often were confronted with orders that
contradicted those in the neighboring districts or undermined
their own objectives.5
Clay recognized the

problem.

Since

he and General

Joseph T. McNarney, who replaced Eisenhower as Commander-inChief of the American troops in Europe in the fall of 1945,
wanted to turn the military's civilian duties over to the
State

Department

as

soon

as

possible,

they

created

an

independent command structure with its own communications
5Ziemke 206-207, 273-274, 312-314.
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channels.

The final version, which lasted from April 1946 to

June 1949, completely separated the Military Government units
from the tactical troops.

They were designated Office of

Military Government for Germany (United States)(OMGUS) from
December 1945 on and absorbed the functions and some of the
personnel

from

superfluous.

the

Army's

G-5

section

which

became

Tactical and Military Government units were

united only by the Commander-in-Chief who would also function
as

military

governor.

Clay

remained

deputy

military

governor, but in practice McNarney left him in charge of all
Military Government affairs.6
Clay's policy went further than simply separating the
two organizations.
longer

possible

From the end of the war on it was no
to

commission

officers

for

military

government duties, since it was anticipated that the State
Department soon would take over these tasks.
OMGUS had to rely on recruiting civilians
States.

As a result
in the United

This meant that important members of the staff had

to spend much precious time during 1945 in filling their
depleted ranks.

Since they were only authorized to offer one

year contracts and nobody knew how long the appointments
would

last,

many

potential

candidates

preferred

positions in a less troubled environment at home.

secure

Even those

who agreed to remain in Germany had to be discharged from the

6Ziemke 396-403 and charts on 309, 426; Henke 981-984;
Knappen 77-78.
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Army.

They

were

employed

as

civilians

under

conditions as new recruits from the United States.

the

same

This was

hardly an incentive to stay on.7
The decision to separate Military Government from the
tactical command and to give it a civilian status may have
been

necessary

from

an

administrative

standpoint,

but

together with the downsizing of the field units Clay deprived
his men early on of all resources they may have needed to
take an active part in local events.

Of course tactical

troops were still available in many communities, but their
cooperation depended either on the goodwill of the local post
commanders or on orders from headquarters which would be very
hard to obtain when only local or regional
involved.
between

affairs were

In spite of all admonitions from Clay, frictions
Military

Government

personnel,

which

became

increasingly civilian, and tactical troop commanders could
not be avoided.
having to help
Government

Professional soldiers sometimes resented
out civilians

representatives

in uniform,

often

while Military

displayed

considerable

contempt for military red tape, regulations, and professional
soldiers already during the war.

Throughout his tenure Clay

repeatedly had to remind his civilians in uniform that it was

7Henke 997-1003; Knappen 76; Murphy 282; Ziemke 424.
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wiser to ask local officers for help instead of demanding
their services.8
American officials faced another dilemma in Germany.
They did not have any detailed directives regarding their
conduct in the field.
The

situation

JCS 1067 only provided the framework.

became more

Conference in July 1945.

complicated

after

the

Potsdam

The Potsdam agreements delegated

many responsibilities to the Allied Control Council which was
yet to be installed.

During the following months Clay tried

hard to overcome all resistance he encountered— especially
from the French— and initiate policies that would be binding
for all of Germany.

This meant that local detachments had to

wait for specific instructions as long as Clay thought that
the

control

council would ultimately be able

to produce

policy guidelines for all of Germany.9
Clay had to deal with an additional problem in the
summer of 1945.

Fraternization in Aachen had caused a public

outcry in the United States in 1944 and stern admonitions
from Washington.

The negative press in the United States,

8Ziemke 441-442; Knappen's And Call it Peace provides an
excellent contemporary example of a civilian taking a very
critical view of the Army. I will discuss specific incidents
or actions that affected American youth activities in and
around Nuremberg in the course of the dissertation.
9Clay's
correspondence
with
the
War
and
State
Departments during 1945 and the first half of 1946 provides
ample evidence for his attempts to make the Allied Control
Council work for all of Germany.
Clay Papers Docs. 20 (9
July 1945), 39 (24 Sept. 1945), 109 (11 Apr. 1946), 136 (18
July 1946).
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together with JCS 1067 which ordered the Commander-in-Chief
of the American forces to "strongly discourage fraternization
with the German officials and population," induced the Army
to make sure that American soldiers would be ready for their
jobs once the war was over.10
Stars

and

Germans.

Stripes

warned

As we have seen above, the

its

readers

not

to

trust

the

The Aachen experience showed that GIs would quite

naturally abandon their caution and become friendly with the
Germans.

The

War

Department's

Morale

Services

printed a Pocket Guide to Germany for soldiers.

Division

To make sure

that the GIs did not misunderstand the guide's contents, the
Army had the following disclaimer glued on the cover:
This booklet is issued in the interest of informing you
about the country you occupy. Nothing contained herein
should
be considered
a relaxation of the NonFraternization Policy.
Keep Faith with the American Soldiers who have died to
eliminate the German Warmakers.
DO NOT FRATERNIZE
In spite of the stern warning the guide provided the soldiers
with contradictory information.
admonished
hostilities.

GIs

to

remain

On the one hand the authors

watchful

after

the

end

of

The Americans were in Germany to make sure that

the Germans would not again become a threat to the world.
Only after their task would be accomplished would the Germans
be able to return into the community of peace loving nations.
The authors did not paint a very favorable picture of German
history and the people.
10JCS 1067, par. 4.

According to them, Germany and the
Pollock and Meisel, eds.,
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POCKET

GUIDE

TO

This b ooklet is issued in the interest o f
informing you about the country you
occupy. N othing contained herein should
be considered a relaxation o f the Non
Fraternization Policy.

Keep fa ith w ith th e Am erican
soldiers w h o h ave d ied to elim in ate
the G erm an w a rm a k e rs .
DO N O T FRATERNIZE

3. Cover of U.S. Army's Pocket Guide to Germany (Source:
Ulsamer 67)
Germans

had

embarked on

a militaristic

and

expansionist

course ever since Bismarck had founded the new empire with
"blood and iron" in 1871.

The former SS soldiers and German

youth were two groups against whom the occupiers would have
to be especially alert.
has

been

carefully

The guide claimed that "German youth

and

thoroughly

educated

for
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conquest, killing and treachery."

At the same time, however,

the guide told GIs that Americans did not "like to kick
people when they are down."
would

Furthermore, German curiosity

lead to questions about the United States and the

customs at home.

As far as non-fraternization permitted the

Americans would be able to give the Germans a first taste of
the democratic and equal society at home.

Soldiers should

not try to convince Germans in discussions, but rather should
let their

behavior and pride speak

for themselves.

The

course of time and other influences (possibly a reference to
envisioned Military Government
effects.
to

actions)

would have

their

In an appendix the booklet contained a brief guide

conversational

together

with

Eisenhower

German.11

criticism

initially

distribution,

This
at

not

contradictory

home,
to

probably

authorize

message,
convinced

the

guide's

but by May 1945 every soldier had orders to

carry the booklet in his helmet liner.12
The Army Information Branch also participated in the
efforts to see that soldiers would not become involved with
Germans.
would

In May 1944 production for a film was underway that

tell

American

soldiers

more

Germany" once the fighting was over.

about

their

"Job

in

George Marshall and

uWilli Ulsamer (Bewegte Tage in einer kleinen Stadt vor
und nach dem Einmarsch der Amerikaner 1945: Ein Beitrag zur
Zeitgeschichte der Stadt Spalt (Spalt: [n.p.], 1987) 66-71)
provides a detailed description of the handbook's contents.
12Frederiksen 129-130.
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John McCloy approved it for showing to all troops in the
European theater in December 1944,

but the Battle of the

Bulge postponed its official release.

After the discovery of

Nazi

1945

concentration

decided

to

atrocities.
soldiers

camps

include

early

footage

The

final

in April

1945.

of

product

in

these
was

the

film makers

incredible
ready

for

German

American

The film further documents the

American attempts to impress GIs with their task.

It was

mandatory viewing for every American soldier in the European
Theater.13
In many ways Your Job in Germany seemed to follow the
example the pocket guide had set, only this time leaving out
the more conciliatory passages.
recent German history.

GIs first got a lesson on

Just as their pocket guide, the film

described all Germans as a people infected with the disease
of conquest from 1871 on, no -matter who their leaders were.
During phony peace periods her population was deceptively
peaceful, enjoying dances and fun with a glass of beer or
wine.

The film went on to explain that after World War I the

l3David Culbert ("American Film Policy in the Re
education of Germany after 1945," The Political Re-education
of Germany & her Allies after World War II, eds. Nicholas
Pronay and Keith Wilson (London, Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985)
175-176, 180-185) not only reconstructs the making of the
film, but also tells the very interesting story of its fate
in the hands of Hollywood tycoon Jack Warner. Warner was not
above selling this Army production as his own. He even
accepted awards for it without giving the original film
makers any credit or a share in the revenue. The following
information is taken from the film Your Job in Germany, U.S.
Army Information Branch, [Apr. 1945].
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Americans fell for the scam and withdrew.

In 1945 they would

do a better job which would make it unnecessary to fight the
Germans a third time.

The narrator admonished GIs not to

drop the guard they had needed while the fighting was still
going on.

Every German could be a potential enemy waiting

for his chance to rise again and continue where Hitler had
left off.
The film makers depicted young people as the greates
threat. Showing pictures of marching Hitler Youth and other
party associations, the narrator told GIs:
These are the most dangerous: German youth. Children,
when the Nazi party came into power. They know no other
system than the one that poisoned their minds. They are
soaked in it. Trained to win by cheating. Trained to
pick on the weak.
They have learned no free speech,
read no free press. They were brought up on straight
propaganda. Products of the worst educational crime of
the entire history of the world. Practically everything
you believe in, they have been trained to hate and
destroy.
They believe they were born to be masters,
that we are inferiors, designed to be their slaves.14
He reminded soldiers that they were not in Germany on an
educational mission, but rather to guard an entire people.
To do that would require a specific conduct.

They would

respect German property rights and customs. They would take
the people seriously, but they would not become friendly with
Germans.

Soldiers were told not to accept public or private

invitations.

14Your Job in Germany; see also Culbert's transcript of
the same passage (201) .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

110
Every German is a potential source of trouble;
therefore, there must be no fraternization with
any of the German people.
Fraternization means
making friends.
The German people are not our
friends.
You will not associate yourself with
German men, women or children.15
The

film closed with an impressive

sequence showing the

consequences of the war all over Europe and for American
soldiers.

Footage

shot

on

location

just weeks

earlier

reminded the soldiers of German atrocities and concentration
camps.

The film makers wanted to make sure that their lesson

would hit a raw nerve.16
The War Information Branch faithfully reflected JCS 1067
and public opinion in the United States,

but the men in

Germany were facing a very different reality.

As early as

May 1945 officers in the field arrived at the conclusion that
a ban on fraternization did not make any sense once the
hostilities
friendliness

were

over.

The

which American

public

officers

outcry

against

the

allegedly displayed

towards Hermann Goring, whom they permitted to retain his
insignia and to give interviews,

however,

made it almost

impossible for headquarters to advocate a more lenient course
in

May

and

June.

American

generals

therefore

found

themselves in the position of having to enforce a policy they

lsYour Job in Germany
16Culbert 181.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ill
regarded

as

senseless

and

unenforceable.

circumstances, the ban would not last long.

Under

The first breech

in the regulations came in regard to young children.
checking

with

George

Marshall

the

in Washington

After

Eisenhower,

decided to lift the fraternization ban for children in June.
According

to

him,

the

soldiers

in

general

observed

the

fraternization ban quite well, but "could not be stern and
harsh

with

young

children."

Eisenhower

thought

that

upholding the ban for young people might justify further
illegal contacts and ultimately would undermine the whole
nonfraternization effort.
exactly the same effect.

The partial lift,

however, had

The Army struggled for another four

weeks before it permitted American soldiers to engage in
conversation with adult Germans on the streets and in public
places.

Although

officially

the

permitted

order

only

was

formal

cautiously
contacts,

worded

the

and

soldiers

dubbed the new directive the "Fraternization Order" and acted
accordingly.

The non-fraternization policy lingered on, but

finally died in October 1945.17
17Ziemke 321-327.
He maintains that Eisenhower's
argument
reflected
a
rather
curious
myth
about
fraternization.
According to Ziemke, soldiers were not so
much interested in children, but in the opposite sex.
His
evidence consists
of court martial
cases tried
for
fraternization,
none
of
which
dealt
with
children.
Eisenhower's perception, however, may have been correct.
Children usually were the first ones to get in contact with
Americans soldiers.
It may be that officers, knowing the
attitude of their superiors, either sympathized with the
behavior of the soldiers in the field towards children or
found it impractical to prosecute a large number of GIs for
cases
of a rather innocent and beneficial kind of
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First Steps
In

the

relocation,

midst
and

a

of

the

administrative

complete

German

Government detachments went to work.
of

a

completely

shattered

reshuffling,

breakdown,

Military

They had to take care

economy,

of

several

million

displaced persons coming and going in all directions, and of
a

critical

shortage

of

housing.

In

many

cities

basic

utilities, such as water, electricity, or garbage disposal
did

not

function

spreading disease.

and

threatened

to

become

a

factor

Immediately after hostilities

in

ended,

looting by Germans, American troops, and displaced persons
was widespread.

The initial frenzy, however, soon abated on

the German side.

Americans repeatedly expressed surprise,

but

with

were pleased

German

docility

and readiness

to

cooperate.18
Young Germans did not become the security threat that
Americans had anticipated.

Those teenagers who were found to

fraternization which the soldiers initiated often even when
the shooting still was going on.
This interpretation does
not say that American soldiers were saints, but rather may
reflect the realities of the day more adequately. Becoming
involved with German adults may have been an altogether
different matter. For JCS 1067 see Pollock and Meisel, eds.,
Germany doc. X. Clay's "fraternization order" is in Smith
(ed.) doc. 22.
See also Edward B. James, The U.S. Armed
Forces German Youth Activities Program 1945-1955 (United
States Army, Europe: Historical Division, 1956) 4.
18ziemke 138-144, 206-208, 251-252, 354-355; Murphy 283.
Neither Gimbel in his A German Community under Occupation nor
Woller nor Eckhard find any German obstruction or resistance
by German administrators during the initial phase of the
occupation.
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be suspicious were taken in for questioning about possible
resistance activities which Goebbels had called werewolf.
Americans

usually

cooperation.

found

it

easy

to

coax

them

into

They seemed to be quite willing to betray their

comrades once they were convinced that somebody else had
already talked.

The Army quickly raided alleged or real

werewolf facilities without ever meeting any resistance.

The

raids occasionally revealed that from the start soldiers did
not take nonfraternization orders seriously.

The raiding

parties did not discover any major plots, but they did find
a number of GIs in compromising situations with the opposite
sex.19
The only serious security problem for the occupiers was
and remained the large number of displaced persons.

They

were hard to control because they enjoyed a special status,
the sympathetic ear of the press, and much public sympathy in
the United States.20
The food situation became the overriding problem during
the first three years of the occupation.

In 1945 Americans

observed that many fields had not been worked on even after
the fighting was over.

Young people had been drafted by the

Wehrmacht and either were dead or in POW camps.

Foreigners

who had been pressed into agricultural service by the Nazis
left the fields and their jobs and tried to get home as soon
19Ziemke 245-246; Fussl 58-67.
20ziemke 284-291, 356-358; Woller, 60-61.
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as

American

depleted

troops

the

came

horse

in.

The

supply.

Wehinaacht had

Americans

almost

considered

the

situation to be so serious that Eisenhower began to import
food from the United States to Germany in June.

In July he

issued orders that American trucks and drivers help bring in
the harvest of that year.

In the winter of 1945 Military

Government set up soup kitchens that passed out four and a
half million meals a month.
precarious

for

considerably

the

after

next

Still the situation remained

three

years

and

only

the currency reform in the

improved
summer of

1948.21
OMGUS and Education
All of the events in 1945 had a direct impact on the
development

of

American

re-education

entire occupation period and beyond.

efforts

during

the

The problems that Clay

was facing on all sides made re-education a minor issue which
would have to wait.

From the outset Major John Taylor, the

head

States Group

of the United

Religious
obstacles.

Affairs

Branch

and his

Council's

Education

and

staff faced tremendous

During the initial phase of the occupation OMGUS

organizers did not deem his branch important enough to give
it division status.

During 1945 Education and Religious

Affairs was not more than a section; in January 194 6 it was
promoted to branch level.

While this probably saved Taylor

the embarrassment of having to put up with a higher ranking
21ziemke 274-276, 346; Clay 263-281.
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regular

officer,

occasionally

had

it

had

direct

its
access

drawbacks.
to

Taylor

Clay

or

only

any

other

influential officers apart from the usual channels.

This

meant that his section was unable to secure sometimes even
essential things, such as transportation.

It was not until

spring and summer 1945 that Taylor received permission by
SHAEF headquarters to expand his staff from five American
officers to about fifty.

Even with this authorization in

hand he did not have the necessary clout to have the men who
originally had been assigned to the Education and Religious
Affairs Branch transferred back to his section.
The situation was even more desperate in the field.
When Germany officially surrendered in May 1945, detachments
in charge of states were supposed to have three full time
educational officers, smaller detachments no less than two.
In reality, however, no local Military Government detachment
had an officer assigned full time to education and only one
state detachment had one education

officer.

During the

following months demobilization and demoralization caused
many education specialists to return home after two years of
waiting in the wings without recognition or promotions.

This

depletion of ranks aggravated the situation to such an extent
that Taylor had to go to the United States to recruit more
personnel.

The one year limits and conditions in Germany did

not attract the outstanding educators Taylor had hoped for
during a time when opportunities opened up in the United
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States,

but he managed

to hire competent and

idealistic

people.

Due to complicated clearance procedures a number of

the recruits needed more than three months of their first one
year contracts to make it to Germany.22
While Taylor was in the United States he did not just
look

for

new

recruits.

He

also

participated

in

the

discussions of the State Department's Advisory Committee on
German Re-education in June 1945.
Frank

Graham,

prominent

educator

University of North Carolina,
which

became SWNCC

Administration
Secretary

of

269

the

Division's
War,

Robert

Secretary, John McCloy.

Taylor was present when
and

president

of

the

showed the policy statement
following

chief,

year to

General

Patterson,

and

the

Civil

Hilldring,
to

to

Assistant

It was Taylor who transmitted their

informal approval to the Department of State.23

This meant

that he knew the direction in which American policy would
ultimately go long before it became official almost a year
later.

Taylor was probably aware of MacLeish's efforts to

make the Advisory Committee's recommendations the base of
official American policy and must have been disappointed by
the lack of interest in this issue at the Potsdam conference.
It is safe to assume,

however,

that he did not need any

official directives to induce him to implement a policy of
positive action in the American zone.

He had personally

22Ziemke 277; Tent 46-50; Knappen 76.
mNA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/6-1345.
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contributed to its formulation and knew that it enjoyed the
support of the State and the War Departments.
Clay's decision to reduce Military Government personnel
drastically and to separate MG from tactical commands did not
seem to have the far reaching consequences for the Education
and

Religious

Affairs

Section

that

it

had

for

other

divisions, although it adversely affected the numbers of the
already understaffed educators.
the

approach

the

Advisory

Actually it was in line with

Committee

had

recommended

in

Washington, with the CAD's policy, and with SHAEF's Technical
Manual

of Education and Religious Affairs of 1944.

reduction made

it imperative

to leave the

The

initiative to

Germans and to operate merely as supervisors.24

24Fussl maintains that the separation of Army and OMGUS
robbed OMGUS of the possibility to start a meaningful youth
program of its own.
His analysis does not evaluate the
situation in 1945 correctly.
OMGUS as well as CAD in
Washington from the start expected the Germans to do the job.
They never included the Army's manpower and equipment in
their planning.
Hilldring, for example, explained in a
letter to an American teacher who had expressed his interest
in teaching the Germans in Germany that American policy was
and would be to let the Germans reeducate themselves under
American supervision (NA RG 59 State Department Central Files
1945-49, 862.42/10-1545). Military Government planners did
not recognize the merits of an independent American youth
program during the initial phase of the occupation. We will
see in the course of the dissertation that the Army's program
never enjoyed wholehearted support within Military Government
circles, but that in many ways the Army laid the foundation
for a completely new way of working with youth which had far
reaching consequences.
For the SHAEF manual see Tent,
Mission 45.
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Headquarters and German Youth
According to JCS 1067 and the agreement in Washington,
the

Education

focused

its

efforts towards German youth on the educational system.

The

first

the

task

and

Taylor

Religious

and

his

reopening of German schools.

Affairs

staff

Branch

had

to master

was

After hostilities had ended

Military Government officials had closed all schools that
were still functioning in accordance with Eisenhower's and
SHAEF directives.

The Army found, however, that it was in

its own interest to reopen schools at the earliest possible
moment.

Young people did not have anything to do and were

confronted with many temptations, such as black marketing.
Loitering could foster prostitution or criminal behavior.
Army commanders also felt that adolescents actually might
band

together and become

a serious

security threat

once

returning POWs might assume leadership of youth gangs on the
streets.

Schools would be the places to control them,

to

provide them with food and health care, and to channel their
energies away from criminal activities.25
Taylor and his staff had to work hard to comply with the
Army's wishes.

They faced tremendous obstacles.

Many school

buildings in German cities had been reduced to rubble.
they remained intact,

When

the Army had requisitioned them to

house the troops who were not inclined to give them up for
German

school children.

At the

same

time

the

American

^Ziemke 358.
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educators had to replace all old textbooks.

During the Third

Reich the Nazis had even used math books for instilling the
young generation with its ideology.
lack

of

printing

impossible.

presses

made

Paper shortages and the
the

undertaking

almost

Textbooks were finally printed on the presses of

the former official Nazi newspaper, the Volkischer Beobachter
which bombing raids had never taken out of commission.26
The biggest obstacle, however, was a serious shortage of
teachers.
the

Nazis.

A disproportionate number of teachers had joined
Of

course

there

National Socialists among them.
notorious example.
join the party.

existed

many

enthusiastic

Julius Streicher is the most

But many had had different reasons to
They were state officials and therefore

often faced considerable pressure during the Third Reich to
become a member of at least one of its teacher subsidiaries.
The denazification mechanism automatically disqualified large
numbers of teachers from returning to schools.

The Education

officers recognized the dilemma, but the public outcry in the
United States after Patton's infamous remarks regarding Nazi
party membership in the fall of 1945 made a lenient approach
impossible.

Taylor and his staff had to resort to drastic

measures to revive at least a semblance of schooling in spite
of the ongoing denazification process.

They commissioned

26Knappen 82-93 ; Ziemke 358-60.
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retired teachers.

Many women had found it less difficult to

escape Nazi organizations and could be employed.27
On l October 1945 elementary schools in the American
zone reopened.

Secondary education and universities followed

in the next months.
efforts.

Taylor was satisfied with his branch's

In December 1945 he thought that the negative phase

of the educators' mission, the denazification of the school
system, was almost over and that it was time to think about
a constructive program for German education.

He therefore

proposed to send a fact finding mission from the United
States to Germany as soon as possible.

Such a group of

educators would review the progress up to date and would
point out shortcomings of his branch's work.

Still,

the

Germans would have to do the work.28
The reopening of schools did not resolve a basic flaw of
the planning.

Concentrating entirely on the school system

would not take care of young people's free time.

Given the

shortage of classrooms, teachers, plus the fact that German
schools traditionally dismissed their students by noon, these
young

people

would

periods of time.

be

without

supervision

for

extended

Reopening the schools would only partly

achieve the Army's goal of keeping them occupied so that they
would not be tempted to get into illegal activities.

27Knappen 121-133; Tent 51-57; Ziemke 277.
28Tent 69-71.
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Educational Reform is not Enough
Americans soon realized that they had to do more than
just try to implement educational reform.

They had to find

ways to replace the Nazi ideas of a generation, which had
never known anything but Hitler youth organizations, with
democratic concepts.

New curricula and free tuition alone

would not be sufficient to get the job done.

Americans

correctly believed that little could be expected from parents
who had lost much control and authority over their children
over the previous twelve years.29
The first problem for the Americans was to keep young
people under control and occupied while the schools were
still closed.

The abolition of the Hitler Youth and its

affiliates created a void that needed to be filled.
quickly

enlisted

the

aid

of

the German

attempt to control young people.
July 1945 permitted religious

The Army

churches

in its

A theater directive of 7

groups

to engage

in youth

activities and to receive contributions for their support.30
Church leaders of the Lutheran Church in Bavaria were most
satisfied with the directive.

It gave the Churches a head

start over other youth organizations and did not interfere
with their own policy.

The Bavarian Church Council had

decided already at the end of May to advise the deans of the
29According to Fiissl (102-103) , modern research bears out
American assumptions about education patterns in German
families at that time.
30Campbell 3.
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different Bavarian church districts that they should not
attempt

to

find

new

ways

of

youth

work

outside

the

ecclesiastical framework.31
Probably aware that the churches would not be able to
take

care of all young people,

headquarters

ordered all

German communities under its control in July to prepare work
programs for children until schools could be reopened.

The

directive suggested cleaning of streets and public buildings,
agricultural work, gathering medicinal plants, and cleaning
and sorting building materials from the rubble for keeping
the children occupied.32
Since the Army regarded loitering youth as a serious
problem

that

could

lead

to

unrest,

the

issue

got

the

attention of the higher echelons of Military Government, in
spite of the rather inconspicuous position of John Taylor's
Education and Religious Affairs Branch.

On 10 August 1945

Robert Murphy informed the State Department that
The Deputy Military Governor [General Clay] has advised
the War Department that it is believed desirable to
establish movements in Germany which would encourage
youth in democratic ways of thinking and that the
restoration of the Boy Scout movement in Germany might
prove a real contribution. General Clay has suggested
that it might be well to ask the head of the Boy Scout
movement in the US if it would be possible for him to
supply a small group of trained Scout executives to

3IMinutes of a meeting of the Bavarian Church Council
from 31 May to 2 June 1945; LCA, Landeskirchenrat, Akten des
Landesjugendpfarrers VI, 1178a, vol III, 1940-45.
32Campbell 3.
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investigate possibilities here
establishment of Scout units.33

and

to

aid

in

the

Clay was obviously unaware that there had been a Boy Scout
movement in Germany before 1933.

Apparently he also did not

pay much attention to details,

such as the fact that Boy

Scouts

wore

military's.

uniforms

and

rank

insignia

not

unlike

the

Both were prohibited in Germany after the war.

Even Clay would have found it difficult to bring the right
kind of experts to Germany at that time.

It is therefore not

surprising that initially nothing came of the proposed fact
finding

mission.

The

memorandum

important departure in several ways.

nevertheless

marks

an

First, Clay recognized

the need for an educational program that took care of young
people when they were not at school.

For a professional

soldier and an American it was natural that he would think
about the Boy Scouts' organization and ideals.

Second, Clay

for the first time expressed the desire to bring experts to
Germany who would help the Germans to
motion.

set a program

in

Clay clearly embarked on a positive and constructive

approach from the start and tackled problems in a pragmatic
way.

It took over a year to realize his idea of an American

expert program,

but Clay had suggested a feasible way of

getting American expert help to Germans on the road to reform
and re-education.

33Telegram from Robert Murphy to State Dept. , 10 Aug.
1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.4081/8-1045.
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Generals
headquarters
suggestions.

in
in

the
Berlin

field
were

and
quick

Military

Government

to

to

react

Clay's

Lieutenant General Geoffrey Keyes, commander of

the Seventh Army's western military district, which comprised
Hesse and Wurttemberg-Baden, was the first to pick them up.
On 14 September he announced to his field commanders that he
expected them to take an active interest in organizing local
youth activities.

In lieu of a Military Government policy

directive, Keyes issued his own.

He pointed out that many

German youths remained idle and therefore became "susceptible
to organization by subversive agencies".

Keyes believed that

officers and enlisted men would
eagerly seize this opportunity to assist in the
regeneration of German youth through the medium of
acquainting them with the activities and interests
normal to youths of their own age in our country.
Woodcrafts and other interests which have been developed
by the Boy Scout and Girl Scout movements at home, as
well as athletics should...form the major interests in
our organized youth activities.
The general also strongly encouraged the troops to develop
their

own

ideas.

In

a

significant

departure

from

denazification practice, Keyes announced that he did not want
the

soldiers

to

"differentiate

between

children

of

Nazi

parents and anti-Nazi, since we are definitely interested in
the re-education of the Nazi youth."

The general thought
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that the Army chaplains should take an active part in the
program.34
Keyes' letter contained in a nucleus the basis for the
German Youth Activities Program the Army officially adopted
in April

1946.

It marked the first

time that American

military personnel officially were asked to do

something

positive for a part of the German population that went beyond
providing practical necessities.

The General recognized that

young people might be the best group to start a re-education
program,

and

he

insisted

on

National Socialist background.

incorporating

those

with

a

Interestingly enough Keyes

did not find it necessary to issue an order,

but rather

appealed to the units to go out and start programs on their
own initiative.
The directive did not sit well with MG officials who
realized that Keyes departed from the Military Government's
policy

to

make

reeductation.

the

Germans

responsible

for

their

own

Military Government officials also thought

that the use of Army chaplains for youth activities would
deprive the Army of their services.

While these arguments

certainly had merit, one may wonder why MG officials were so
concerned

about

these

off

duty

activities

of

American

soldiers which provided them with an alternative to black

^Headquarters Seventh Army, Western Military District,
14 Sept. 1945, letter from Geoffrey Keyes, Commanding General
to Corps, Division, Regional Military Government Commanders,
and Separate Unit Commanders, in Campbell 31-3 2, Appendix I.
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market activities or becoming involved with the opposite sex.
Military Government officials in Clay's headquarters seemed
to place policy concerns, protecting their own prerogatives,
and

matters

of

principle

higher

on

their

agendas

than

practical solutions to problems in the field.35
Possibly stimulated by the field commander's initiative,
Military Government acted as well.

On 21 September Major

General M.C. Stayer, John Taylor's Division Chief,

submitted

a "Directive for the Control of Youth Activities" to Clay.
Stayer was clearly in line with MacLeish's and the Education
Commission's thinking.

The directive bluntly stated that

[t]he children of Germany are probably the most
important raw material out of which a regenerated
Germany can be built.
Therefore a positive program
should be allowed to develop which will give German
youth opportunities to prepare for the eventual
reconstruction of German life on a democratic and
peaceful basis.36
Stayer's proposal picked up the Army's approach and went
beyond the educational system.

Traditional youth groups,

such as Boy and Girl scouts, YMCA and YWCA would be revived
under the supervision of denazified persons,
Government

officers

were

formation of new groups.

instructed

also

to

but Military
permit

the

They would exist "for purposes of

culture, religion and education" and should "cultivate the
ideals

of

fair play,

tolerance and honesty".

Political

35Campbell 6.
36Draft of Directive [handwritten], 21 Sept. 1945; NA RG
260 OMGUS, Education and Cultural Relations Division [herein
after E&CRD], Community Education Branch, Box 145, 5/296-2/6.
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activities were not deemed desirable.

Stayer had secured the

approval of the Army's G-5 Division (Civil Affairs) and then
presented the memo to the Group Control Council.

Apparently

the leading men assumed that the issue was important for Clay
and acted surprisingly fast.

The Legal,

Political,

and

Public Safety Divisions approved the directive within twenty
four hours.

Clay approved and signed it on 3 October 1945.37

On the same day Robert Murphy cabled the contents of the
directive to the State Department.

Murphy apparently needed

to justify the Military Government's new approach to policy
towards youth which expanded the traditional focus on formal
education.

He explained that

[f]ormal education, as such in the narrow sense of the
term, will only partially solve the tremendous problem
of what to do with defeated Germany's youth, to give
them hope, to form them into decent citizens, and, from
a very practical point of view, to keep them 'out of
mischief'" .38
Clay's new directive appeared in German on 28 October
1945.

It admonished American officers to make sure that no

youth organizations similar to Hitler youth or militaristic
organizations would resurface.
form

voluntary

groups

entertainment purposes.

for

Germans would be permitted to
cultural,

religious

or

The target group were boys and girls

37Memo, US Group Control Council, 26 Sep. 1945, with
Clay's signature and the date of the approval on it; NA RG
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 145, 5/2962 /8 .
38US Political Adviser for Germany to State Department,
dispatch 1047, 3 Oct. 1945; quoted in Fiissl 100.
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between ten and eighteen years.

These youth groups should

foster the development of democratic ideas, independence in
thought as well as ideals such as "inner decency, tolerance,
and honesty".

Military Government officers also were to take

care of forming youth committees which would initiate and
supervise

the youth organizations.

Only people who had gone

through denazification would be able to become involved in
youth work.
groups

had

The directive further stipulated that youth
to

have

a Military

Government

permit.

The

Americans would work through the committees to implement
their policies.

Youth groups were not permitted to become

involved in politics and would be severely punished if they
tried to revive or justify Nazi or militaristic ideas.
were

also

not

permitted to wear

paramilitary exercises.

uniforms

or

to

do

They
any

German authorities were responsible

to implement the directive and were instructed to send men
and women to the youth committees who represented different
interests,

such as welfare agencies,

health offices,

Churches and members of the economic community.

the

Germans

should also initiate parent and teacher associations which
were to assist the committees in an advisory function.

The

committees would review applications of youth groups and
forward them to the American authorities.

The directive

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

129
emphasized that youth work basically was a service rendered
to society which should not be paid.39
The

Germans

reacted

Government directive.

favorably

to

Since it only

the

new Military

talked about youth

organizations, it was in line with their traditional way of
bringing young people together in clubs or associations.
May

1946

over

approximately

2,500

240,000

youth
members.

groups

had

Marshall

formed
Knappen,

By
with

OMGUS

Religious Affairs Officer from 1945 to 1946, however, found
in

1947

that much remained to be done.

Especially the

Bavarians did not seem to show much enthusiasm for organizing
young people.

According to him, only the Army offered an

alternative by embarking on an altogether new terrain in
German youth work.

The soldiers did not require young people

to formally join an organization, but rather conducted their
activities on an informal basis.
everyone

regardless

activities.

of

social

Its programs were open to
background

or

previous

The next years would show if the Germans and

Military Government were willing to accept this new kind of
youth work.40
Soviet activities in Berlin actually opened up a third
field

of

American

youth

activities

in

1945.

Soviet

authorities had requisitioned about twenty houses all over
39Headquarters,
U.S.
Forces,
European
Theater
[hereinafter USFET] to Commanding Generals, 25 Oct. 1945,
Copy-Translation [German]; LCA, Personen CLXV, Dollinger 10.
40Knappen 139-140.
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Berlin which they transformed into community youth centers
under the supervision of the communist Free German Youth
before they permitted Americans to occupy their sector of the
city.

The Americans soon realized that closing the centers

in their sector would cause friction with Soviet authorities.
They therefore decided to continue them under a different
management.

Stars and Stripes reported on 20 December 1945

on page one about the youth centers.

Under the headline

"Youth Homes Added to Plan for Rehabilitating Germans" GIs
all over Germany were informed that the Berlin centers had
good attendance

records,

that the

school hours and were heated.
that

troop

activities

were open after

The paper further reported

participation had
possible.

rooms

made

It was

many

therefore

of

the

in

centers'

Berlin

that

Americans for the first time— and not altogether in a well
thought out plan— embarked on running youth centers which did
not belong to any specific youth group, but rather were open
to everyone.
compatible

It was obvious that such homes would be more
with

the

Army's

emerging

program

than

with

Military Government's policy, although in the case of Berlin
the local Education and Religious Affairs officer was in
charge of running the centers.

Stars and Stripes made sure

that the idea spread throughout the American zone.41
4IHoward W. Johnson, "United States Public Affairs
Activities in Germany 1945-1955," diss. Columbia University,
1956, 197 FN 7; "Youth Homes Added to Plan for Rehabilitating
Germans," Stars and Stripes [Altdorf] 20 Dec. 1945: 1. Fiissl
overlooks this very early American engagement in Berlin in
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During the first months of the occupation General Clay
had

do

dedicate

almost

all

of

his

time

to

creating

a

functioning administrative apparatus and dealing with the
chaos of redeployment.

He concentrated his resources and

manpower on helping Germans in his zone survive and restoring
order, leaving the staff assigned to education and youth work
with a constant shortage of men and resources.

Clay did

manage to stimulate his staff to think about the problem
which led to the formulation of a directive on youth work for
the American zone of occupation just four months after the
war ended.

After abolishing the Hitler Youth and all other

youth organizations

under Nazi

control,

they set out to

prevent the German youth leadership of the Third Reich from
regaining any influence in postwar Germany.

Their decision

to leave most of the work up to the Germans seemed to restore
the traditional German youth activities structure that had
existed before

193 3.

Grassroots activities

initiated by

tactical units, however, and an unexpected inheritance from
Soviet troops in the American sector of Berlin opened the way
for new approaches to German youth work.

his otherwise excellent Die Umerziehung der Deutschen which
focuses on events in Germany's capital.
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CHAPTER IV
Working in the Field: Nuremberg, 1945

As soon as Americans had taken over the responsibility
for Nuremberg in April 1945, they successfully set out on a
course of reconstruction.

In the midst of the struggle to

help people survive, the Nuremberg Detachment was unable to
dedicate much time or thought to youth.
Americans

managed

to

appoint

Nevertheless, the

competent

officials

and

established a solid base of cooperation which did not always
please the Germans, but helped them to survive.

In spite of

extremely difficult conditions Nuremberg's schools reopened
on schedule.

In its attempts to take care of young people

the city administration built on its progressive traditions
from the Weimar republic and took advantage of the political
vacuum to initiate its own, community oriented program.
The presence of a large number of tactical units in
Nuremberg was a mixed blessing.

On the one hand, generous

Army requisitions aggravated the difficult housing situation,
especially when large numbers of allied personnel came to
assist in the Nuremberg trials.

On the other hand the Army

helped Military Government and the city by providing the
facilities, the tools, and the logistic support for securing
the city population's survival.

In most cases GIs maintained

their generous and open attitude toward young Germans, often
helping them in their struggle to improve their lot.
132
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actions

contributed

to

awakening

the

young

generation's

curiosity and to creating a friendlier attitude towards the
United States.
Military Government in Action
Immediately after the American victory parade on 20
April 1945 the Military Government Detachment for Nuremberg,
E1B3, began its work.

Proclamation Number One issued by

Military Government officially introduced the new masters to
the citizens of Nuremberg.
that

the

Allied

soldiers

"victorious army,
militaristic

General Eisenhower made clear
under

his

command

but not as oppressors."

institutions

would

be

came

as

a

All Nazi and

destroyed

and

people

suspected of crimes would be imprisoned, tried, and, if found
guilty, severely punished.

The proclamation made American

officers the highest local authority which operated under
direct instructions from headquarters.
to

follow

all

orders

without

Germans were expected

hesitation

or

objections.

Eisenhower emphasized that any resistance would be broken
immediately
ordered

and without

schools

to

be

mercy.
closed

Proclamation Number
together

with

all

One

courts.

German administrators were admonished to appear at work and
to obey and execute all orders from Military Government.1
Detachment E1B3, which in the course of reorganization
changed

its designation to F-211,

started

its work with

•The German text of Proclamation No. 1 is reproduced in
its original version in Erinnerungenz 26.
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fifteen officers and ten enlisted men.

By July 1945 it

reached its peak strength with forty-five officers and fifty
enlisted men.

The Americans employed 260 Germans to help

with the task.

Between July and November these officers made

vital decisions that had long lasting effects on the city
long after most of the men had gone home.
On first sight and by their own judgement, the quality
of the men in charge of the Nuremberg detachment was not
impressive.

All of the commanding officers were career Army

soldiers who did not speak German, which meant that from the
start they had to rely on Germans to obtain most of their
information.

Finding capable interpreters was not an easy

task at a time when the great majority of Germans did not
speak any English at all.

Headquarters realized the problem.

It disseminated information on the German reaction to the
Americans or American policy from the second issue of its
weekly Information Bulletin on.

The information came from

surveys Military Government's intelligence section conducted.
Since the bulletin also contained condensed versions of the
latest

regulations

and

explained

occupation

policies

in

detail, Military Government officials in the field probably
consulted it frequently.2
2See, for example,- "Denazification and the Anti-Nazis,"
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 Division, USFET,
Reports and Information Branch, Weekly Information Bulletin
no. 1, 28 July 1945: 16.
The article was a summary of a
German opinion survey conducted by the intelligence section.
The problem with this source of information was that the
surveys may have provided good insights but were not
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Some detachments were lucky and had officers who were
able to communicate in German.

Apart from the commanding

officers many of these men became the most prominent and
respected American representatives.

To what extent the local

commanders were aware of these reports or took advantage of
these native speakers cannot be assessed.
detachments'

capacity

to

function

It seems that the

effectively

depended

largely on the ability of the commanding officers and luck in
having an adequate staff.

Finding and appointing capable

German

would

administrators

cooperate

with

who

the Americans

be

able

and

certainly was

willing

to

important

as

well.3
necessarily generally applicable, especially in view of
Germany's cultural and political diversity. What was true in
Catholic Munich and upper Bavaria, for example, could not
easily be applied to conditions in Protestant Franconia and
Nuremberg.
The surveys could only provide some general
guidelines. Nevertheless, MG headquarters and its successor,
the High Commissioner for Germany, must have considered it an
effective means of communication with the field officers.
Even though the publisher repeatedly changed names, the
Information Bulletin appeared first weekly and from December
1947 on bi-weekly until 1952, when the dissolution of the
field detachments rendered the bulletin superfluous.
3There is considerable disagreement about the quality of
Military Government personnel. Woller draws a very positive
picture of the detachments he investigated in Ansbach and
Ftirth. Zink (American Military Government in Germany 22-44)
came to the conclusion in 1947 that the Military Government
personnel in Germany performed quite well on the whole. Lutz
Niethammer
("Die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht zwischen
Verwaltungstradition und politischen Parteien in Bayern
1945," Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 15 (1967) 2:
153-211)
agreed to Zink's statement for the Bavarian
Detachments.
Henke (235-251) draws a generally positive
picture of Military Government detachment activities. Basing
his evaluation mostly on Karl-Heinz Bungenstab's study ("Die
Ausbildung der amerikanischen Militaroffiziere nach 1945,"
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The Nuremberg detachment did not seem to be blessed with
the outstanding personnel from which the nearby cities of
Fiirth

and

Ansbach

or

apparently benefitted.
for the

job.

the

Bavarian

capital

of

Munich

None of the soldiers had volunteered

Redeployment also

severely curtailed this

detachment's efficiency, as much as all the others, during
the first year of the occupation.
June

1946

Between April 1945 and

the Nuremberg detachment had three commanders.

Lieutenany Colonel Delbert Fuller headed the unit for just
the first four weeks of the occupation.

Army

inspectors

found him a tired man who was burnt out and ready to go home
to his wife.
July.

Colonel Charles H. Andrews succeeded Fuller in

Andrews did not have an outstanding personality, but

he had been an administrator for the Army and

a welfare

Jahrbuch fiir Amerikastudien 18 (1973) : 173-211) and on
Peterson's rather negative account of the Military Government
officers he interviewed in the 1960s, Eckart does not think
very much of the quality of the men in the Nuremberg
detachment, especially during the first year. Eckart simply
adopts Bungenstab's findings from the time after 1945 to the
situation in 1945.
Peterson's account, however, is highly
critical of American policy and of the two other detachments
he discusses, but does not find the Nuremberg detachment at
fault. Eckart seems to be unaware of the subtleties of this
argument.
Generally the historians' criticism or praise
often focuses on the ability of military government officers
to speak German, which undoubtedly was important for finding
the right people for restarting the political process or
taking care of denazification.
As we will see below,
however, the Nuremberg detachment did in 1945 exactly what it
had been trained to do regardless of the lack of language
specialists. With the exception of denazification, which was
not part of the original agenda in the form it acquired
during 1945, the detachment was able to get the city out of
the worst post war troubles surprisingly quickly and played
a crucial part in assuring the city's survival during the
next two winters.
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officer in civilian life.

He had gone through one of the

schools for Military Government in the United States in 1943
and spent some time in Shrivenham before he came via France
to Germany.

Like so many others Andrews was discharged when

Military Government actually would have needed his services
most.

In December 1945 his deputy commander,

Lieutenant

Colonel Carlisle Klise took over the job of commander.

Klise

had also gone through the Army's Military Government school
program and was highly disillusioned by it.

He recalled that

the Military Government instructors at Shrivenham had to use
fifty year old maps because the Army would not grant them
access to the latest intelligence and information it had
collected in its aerial bombing surveys.4
Although
turnover,
start.

the

Nuremberg

detachment

was

plagued

by

it actually pursued a consistent policy from the

All three commanders had gone through the Army's

training program

for Military Government

officers,

which

familiarized them with the reconstructionist and pragmatic
approach the Army had taught while JCS 1067 was composed in
Washington.

Eisenhower got the directive just in time for

the German surrender in May 1945.

It did not become official

American policy until July 1945 when the Allied combined
command ceased to exist.

This meant that during the first

three months of the occupation Military Government officers
in the field acted under orders to make the reconstruction
4Peterson 318-319; Eckart 148-149.
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and rehabilitation of the communities in which they operated
their priority.5
At the end of the war Germans were without local, state
or

a

central

government.

Since

the

traffic

and

communications systems also were completely paralyzed, the
detachments initially operated within a virtual vacuum.

As

we have seen above redeployment took much of General Clay's
time and energy during the initial phase of the occupation.
He

did

not

resolve

the

administrative

confusion

and

cumbersome chain of command of Military Government until the
end of 1945.

This situation threw the local detachments

5Eckart adopts Bungenstab's thesis that the lack of
political indoctrination of Military Government officers was
a serious mistake.
This thesis, however, overlooks that
ideological indoctrination at a time when Morgenthau still
had the ear of the President almost certainly would have
resulted in a far less positive attitude towards the Germans.
Morgenthau based his plans on the assumption of Germany's
collective guilt, so they almost certainly would not have
resulted in any positive steps towards reconstruction or
bringing anti-Nazis into power.
Since the Army would not
have agreed to such an approach for practical reasons,
Military Government officials from the start would have been
civilians, possibly well versed in politics, but without the
expertise and the equipment the Army was able to provide for
the physical survival of the Germans. Neither Peterson nor
Eckart take notice of the fact that the Army's pragmatic
approach, which it had consistently advocated in its manuals
and courses, actually aimed at rehabilitating Germany,
although this was done purely for practical reasons. As we
have seen above, even the President was unable to change the
course.
All field officers who had gone through Military
Government training therefore were programmed from the start
to set out on a course which would quickly help the Germans.
With the exception of Henke (986-87) historians generally
have overlooked the positive results of the Army's pragmatic
and reconstructionist approach for the German population.
Peterson realized that field detachments had a constructive
outlook which helped the
Germans,
but thought that
headquarters destroyed this approach quickly.
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almost entirely on their own resources and interpretations of
general directives.

It was bound to lead to discrepancies

between official Washington policy and American actions in
the communities.

Lacking specific guidance from their own

headquarters, field detachments had to rely on the general
instruction

they

Government schools,

had

received

at

the

Army's

on their field manuals,

officers' common sense.

Military

and on their

Klise had to learn the hard way that

Washington's expectations could be very different from the
instructions he had been given

in the United States and

England shortly after he assumed his duties in Nuremberg in
June 1945.
he

When John McCloy visited Nuremberg in the summer,

inquired

about

the activities

of Klise's

detachment.

Klise was happy to report the progress he and his men had
made in rehabilitating the city, but McCloy became enraged
and told him in no uncertain terms that he did not care about
reconstruction and the prevention of diseases, but wanted
Military Government to take care of demilitarization and
denaz ification.6
6Peterson 318-319; Eckart 149-150. It is interesting to
compare the detachment's reports of September and October
1945 with the annual report for the first year of the
occupation. While all mention denazification, it seems that
the
officers
who
wrote
the
first
reports
treated
denazification just as one of many issues. They also voiced
their concerns about the effect the denazification program
had on their reconstruction efforts.
The early reports
clearly show the detachment's interpretation of its mission
in Nuremberg. In September the author concluded his report
the following way: "In general [...] the rehabilitation and
rebuilding of the city of Nuremberg is being carried on with
remarkable speed, if one remembers that it was one of the
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McCloy was
priority.

not alone in making denazification a top

A new directive of the United States Forces of the

European Theater (USFET) from 7 July and Military Government
Law No. 8 of September, which regulated the denazification
process, added denazification to the agendas of Klise's and
all other filed detachments.7

In October the detachment

dutifully reported that "from the beginning denazification
was the priority job."

According to the report,

Military

Government had dismissed over two thousand city employees and
checked the rest of the city administration for their ties to
the Nazi party, but it seems that during the initial phase of
the occupation the professional soldiers handled the issue
pragmatically.8 The Nuremberg commanders received lists from
their superiors that contained all people who were to be
removed from their offices, but they tended to grant local

most destroyed cities in Europe."
The annual report
dedicates more space to denazification and lacks the
enthusiasm of the earlier papers; see Niirnberg 1945-49, I,
docs. 2 (Headquarters MG Nuremberg on 1.9.45: Survey of
Activities since Occupation) , 4 (MG Nuremberg, IV. The Fall
and Occupation, 7-11), 5 (Military Government Detachment for
Nuremberg, Annual Historical Report 21 April 1945 to 20 June
1946).
7Boyd
Dastrup
(Crusade
in
Nuremberg:
Military
Occupation, 1945-49 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985)
23-28) provides a useful summary of American denazification
policies.
8MG report, about Oct. 1945; Niirnberg 1945-1949, I, doc.
4.
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German administrators whom they trusted considerable leeway.9
Often

it was

not

the

local

dismissal of an official,
(CIC) units.

detachment

that

forced

the

but Counter Intelligence Corps

They were staffed by many German emigres and

seemed to have a different agenda.

They did not share the

training or the concerns of the field officers, but rather
were much more in line with Morgenthau's punitive ideas.
October

1945

the

situation

stabilized

and

many

of

By
the

appointees remained in office for the next years in spite of
repeated denazification efforts by the Americans.10
9Dastrup 33-36.
A longtime
member of
the city
administration recalled his experiences in 1988: He had been
a member of the Nazi party. In June of 1945 he found his name
in a list of people to be dismissed which the Americans
published in the official city bulletin.
Mr. K., however,
was
transferred
to
a different section within
the
administration, where he shared the room withthe newly
appointed director of the Nuremberg police, Stahl, a
politically clean social democrat whom the
Nazis had
dismissed. Stahl intervened on K.'s behalf arguing that he
was indispensable. When K's name appeared a second time in
the American lists, Nuremberg's second mayor Levie, who had
developed a cordial relationship with Military Government
officers, was able to maintain him in office. By the third
time, however, K. had to leave the administration. He started
working for the American Army. Since he was born in 1925, he
fell under the youth amnesty and returned to the city of
Nuremberg at the end of 1946 (NCA C104 no. 2, Interview K.,
29 Nov. 1988) . Another member of the city administration
recalled that her boss did not seem to take the whole issue
very seriously. He appeared every day at work with a smile
and asked if he was still employed or had been fired already
(Marga Guthmann, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1994).
10Eckart 159-161; Peterson 316-317; Triimmerjahre: 27-28;
see also Woller (95-110) who detects the same pattern for the
surrounding region. Lutz Niethammer's Die Mitlauferfabrik is
the best study on denazification in the American zone.
According to Eckart (238-248), city administrators of all
political convictions argued that administrators were
specialists who could not be replaced.
He shows that
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Germans and Youth Work
Theodor Marx in many ways typified the administrators on
whom the Americans relied to get the cities in the American
Zone functioning again.

Born in 1892, he served in World War

I, where he was wounded.
administration in 1916,

Marx entered the Nuremberg city
where he initially served in the

section for wounded veterans and surviving dependents.

In

1925 Marx was appointed vice director of Nuremberg's welfare
services.

He also became active

organizations

and

organizations.

devoted

much

in nationwide community
time

to

private

welfare

After the Nazi seizure of power Marx was

charged in a disciplinary court, but the city permitted him
to retire before the trial came to an end.
reactivated Marx in June 1945.

The Americans

By September he had become

director of Nuremberg's youth and welfare department, where
he remained until an accident in the Alps ended his life in
1958.

Marx shaped Nuremberg's youth policy more than any

other person in Nuremberg after the war, but his influence
went

far

beyond

the

city

boundaries.

He

resumed

his

activities in the Deutsche Stadtetag, the interest group of

American Military Government officials took these arguments
seriously
and often granted the desired exemptions,
undermining the denazification efforts of the special
branches.
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all larger German cities, where he became one of the chief
promoters of new approaches to youth activities.11
Marx faced a challenging task.

The war had not only

destroyed much of the living space in Nuremberg but also
drastically increased the number of young people who needed
help or got in trouble with the law.

To complicate things

further the youth administration's offices with all their
papers and documents had been destroyed, together with almost
all the dormitories the city had erected for young people who
came

from

the

surrounding

region

apprenticeships in the city's industries.

to

serve

their

The Americans had

requisitioned the one dormitory that was still intact.12
Not all was bad,

however.

Before the Third Reich,

Nuremberg had been one of the most progressive communities in
the field of youth work and youth welfare.

The idea for an

office which dedicated its time and resources entirely to
young people and took youth welfare out of the hands of
private organizations had been born in Nuremberg in 1910.
During the Weimar Republic the city considerably expanded its

llNCA C18/II no. 4508, Theodor Marx; see also "Dr. Marx
berufsmafiiger Stadtrat," [Dr. Marx Full Time City Council
Member] Niirnberger Nachrichten, 18 Jan. 1947: 5. As we will
see in the course of the dissertation, Marx developed his own
concepts in youth work, but also relied very much on American
ideas and material help in his attempts to restructure youth
activities in Nuremberg which he tried to make a model for
German communities.
12City of Nuremberg, ed., Die deutschen Stadte und ihre
Jugend: Niirnberg (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: [n.p.], 1950) 2.
Cited hereinafter as Die deutschen Stadte.
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services to young people.

In 1920 it opened the first office

which was dedicated entirely to taking care of the problems
of Nuremberg's young people.

Jugendpflege or youth work

became an integral part of welfare services.

Progressive men

in charge of youth welfare regarded it as an essential tool
for preventing

jeopardized young

people

from getting

in

conflict with the law.13
In December 1924 the German parliament passed the first
German

law

for

the

welfare

of

youth,

the

only

law the

Reichstag was able to pass unanimously before 1933 . For the
first time in German history the law assigned the state a
general responsibility for the upbringing of young people.
In view of the dire economic situation of Germany, however,
the newly introduced youth offices never were able to expand
their activities beyond welfare.
challenges.

Nuremberg faced additional

Instead of giving communities a free hand, the

Bavarian state government decided to assume control of the
entire youth sector.

This decision hampered the work of the

youth administration within the community and made innovative
and progressive programs almost impossible to realize.14
Hilter's rise to power in 1933 saw the complete demise
of independent youth work of the communities.

The only realm

13Erwin Stein, ed., Monographien deutscher Stadte:
Darstellung deutscher Stadte und ihrer Arbeit in Wirtschaft,
Finanzwesen, Hygiene, Sozialpolitik und Technik XXIII:
Niirnberg (Berlin: Deutscher Kommunalverlag, 1927) 273-277;
see also Die deutschen Stadte 1-2.
l4Die deutschen Stadte 1-2.
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in which the city was permitted to operate was youth welfare.
All other aspects of youth work became part of the Hitler
Youth.

Marx

clearly recognized

in 1945 that the city's

isolation immediately after the war, with no state or central
government at hand to intervene in welfare and youth affairs,
offered him the chance to reorganize the entire area of youth
work,

including the welfare system and social services as

well as youth care, without restraints from above.
193 3

he

had

been

a

prominent

advocate

communities responsible for youth work.

of

Before

making

the

The new situation

gave him the opportunity to put his plans into action.15
Youth work actually was reviving in the city.

The

Catholic and Protestant churches had taken advantage of their
right to organize immediately after the end of hostilities.
The

trade unions

and

the socialist Falken

began

to get

together again as soon as they were permitted to do so.
Nevertheless the start was slow.

In January 1946 a mere

7,400 young people had found their way back into seven of the
traditional youth

organizations whose

authorized in October.

formation

Clay had

The two churches initially had the

strongest following, but the trade unions soon caught up with
them.16

lSDie deutschen Stadte 1-2.
l6Nuremberg Military Government Detachment,
Annual
Historical Report from 21 Apr. 1945 to 20 June 1946, section
4.e.(2), Youth Activities; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 5.
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The October directive also mandated the initiation of
youth committees in which all youth organizations together
with different community representatives could learn to work
and solve their problems together on a democratic basis.

The

directive seems to have been in line with Marx's thinking.
Nuremberg's youth organizations also reacted positively to
the suggestion.

American policy did not seem to be in line

with the thinking of the Lutheran Church, however.

Church

leaders had met in Munich at the end of May 1945.

They

decided to explicitly instruct all deacons in the state that
they should not do anything that would deviate

from the

traditional youth activities of the church.17
The city's youth committee came together for the first
time

in January

1946.

Marx's

ideas

of the

committee's

structure and mission were initially identical with those of
the American educators.

He tried to foster close cooperation

between the city administration and the youth committee.
Youth organizations apparently accepted the experts' lead.
During

the

first

years,

for

example,

they

elected

the

director of the city's youth administration to the chair of
the committee.

It is important to note in this context,

however, that traditionally Germans organized in Vereine, or
clubs which dedicated themselves to a specific purpose such
17Direktive USFET zu Jugendbewegungen, 25 Oct. 1945; LCA
Personen CLXV Dollinger 10; minutes of the full meeting of
the State Church Council 31 May-2 June 1945; LCA Landeskirchenrat, Akten des Landesjugendpfarrers VI, 1178a 1940-45,
vol. Ill Jugendarbeit.
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as

sports,

hiking,

singing,

or even politics.

Military

Government officials as well as the Germans initially did not
take those young people into account who refused to organize
in any way.

These people had no way of participating in any

youth activities and therefore also had no voice

in the

committee during the initial phase of its existence.18
First Aid
Neither
priority

McCloy

in

occupation.

nor

Nuremberg

Klise
during

regarded
the

first

as

months

a high
of

the

McCloy and many people in Washington wanted to

see denazification carried through.
the

youth

Nuremberg

detachment

was,

The immediate concern of

and

for

remained, the city population's survival.

the

next

years

Denazification as

well as youth matters became additional burdens for field
detachments
Nuremberg

which
was

hampered

completely

their

more

paralyzed

and

important
even

the

tasks.
most

liDie deutschen Stadte 4; Nuremberg Military Government
Detachment, Annual Historical Report from 21 Apr. 1945 to 20
June 1946, section 4.e.(2), Youth Activities; Niirnberg 194549, I, doc. 5. In his report on Nuremberg's youth activities
of 1950 Marx states that the Nuremberg Youth Committee
actually preceded Military Government directives.
The
sources do not bear his claim out. Clay signed the directive
on 3 Oct. 1945 and it was published in German on the 28th of
the same month (A copy of the German version of the original
directive is in LCA Personen CLXV, Dollinger, 10) . Since the
city administration repeatedly reported to various American
offices that the Germans had initiated the youth committee in
Nuremberg, it seems plausible that city administrators and
youth leaders had come together on an informal basis and
agreed on a similar institution prior to the American
directive.
Even though, one of the early participants
remembered that the American influence on the committee's
policies
and
its
structure
was
considerable
(Willy
Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995).
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essential services had collapsed during the final battle.
The officers and enlisted men needed to revive a city that,
according to their own estimates, was 90 per cent destroyed
and had no water, gas, or electricity.

Military Government

had to fill the void the Nazi administrators had left behind.
At the same time the food situation within the city was
alarming.

The complete transportation breakdown cut the city

off from the surrounding region which normally provided the
supplies for its population.

Officers found supplies for

about ten days when they took stock in Nuremberg in May
1945.19
The
During

Nuremberg
the

summer

administration,

detachment
of

1945

immediately went
it

reinstalled

to

the

work.
city's

supervised the reopening of hospitals and

19Annual Historical Report from 21 Apr. 1945 to 20 June
1946, Nuremberg Military Government Detachment; Niirnberg
1945-49, I, doc. 5.
I agree with Peterson that field
officers regarded instructions from higher echelons, which
often reflected Washington's priorities, as a nuisance which
did not help with their tasks in the communities. Clay soon
realized that JCS 1067's economic provisions were completely
out of touch with realities in Germany. The economy had to
be revived to ensure at least a subsistence level that would
take care of paying for the American Zone's food imports
which so far were a part of the American occupation budget.
This is why he began to argue in favor of a limited
resumption of German industrial activities. See, for example
the year end speech Clay prepared for General McNarney, in
which
he
summarizes
his
position
and
the
Military
Government's achievements in 1945 (Clay Papers doc. 77) and
Krieger 98-101.
The Nuremberg Field Detachment's actions
were typical for the intial phase of the occupation in which
Army regulars were in charge
(Lutz Niethammer,
"Die
amerikanische Besatzungsmacht zwischen Verwaltungstradition
und politischen Parteien in Bayern 1945," Schriftenreihe der
Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeltgeschichte [hereinafter cited as
VJfZ] 2 (1967): 185-186).
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tried to make sure that food would be at hand.

American

engineers helped their German counterparts to rehabilitate
the utility works and the public transport system.

The

Germans got passes which permitted them to move freely in
spite of the curfew, vehicles, gasoline and even building
materials

that

certainly

no

otherwise
drawback

were

that

not

all

available.

three

It

commanders

was
were

professional soldiers who apparently got along well with the
tactical troop commanders.

Whenever German administrators

were unable to provide vital materials deemed necessary for
maintaining the population healthy and quiet, the Army helped
out.

Hospitals received penicillin for treating the German

venereal disease cases.
police with American

Military Government rearmed the

guns to reestablish

law and order.

American tank trucks provided parts of the population with
water and went out to the surrounding region to collect milk
to feed the children.

The transportation breakdown as well

as JCS 1067, which initially closed down German coal mines,
also prevented the city from obtaining the coal it would need
to keep its citizens from freezing during the winter.

In

accordance with Eisenhower's instructions American forces
provided transportation for bringing wood into the city.

In

Nuremberg they also made sufficient tools available to do the
job.

When the city could not get enough people to cut the

wood, the Military Government officer in charge of the action
simply requested and got several thousand prisoners of war to
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do the job, organized the necessary tools and picked the site
for

the

cutting.

The

Army's

wood

transports

continued

throughout the winter of 1945-46.20
German refugees from Eastern Germany and the Sudeten
mountains received the special attention of the occupiers.
In

view

of

the

acute

shortage

of

housing

the

city

of

Nuremberg had imposed a ban on returning Nurembergers if they
could not prove that they had a job and a place to stay, but
the Americans were not bound by those rules.
the

fighting

ended

they

began to

ship

Shortly after

large numbers

of

refugees whom they picked up in their trucks to Nuremberg
without even advising the administration of these shipments.
The city obviously was not pleased with the developments.

In

the course of the next months Military Government officials
tried their best to make the situation in the camps bearable
by providing bedding materials and other necessities for the
20The detachment's report of May 1945 describes the milk
action in Niirnberg 1945-1949, I, doc. 6a; see also the
detachment's various reports covering the time between April
1945 and June 1946; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, docs. 3,4,5.
"Tankwagen als Heifer in der Not: Menschen standen in langen
Schlangen an," ([Tank Trucks Helped in Emergencies: People
Stood in Long Lines] Triimmerjahre 1945-1950: 3) contains the
information on utilities from a German perspective.
Apart
from the annual report see Peterson (319-3 20) for the wood
cutting action. Peterson's eyewitness account is not quite
correct. Capt. Richard Mershon, who apparently became Civil
Affairs Officer some time in the summer of 1945, recalled in
an interview that he had to steal the tools.
The city
administration, however, maintained a record of the tools it
had received in 1945/46.
All of them had either come from
German captured stocks or from the local American Army units
who lent them to the city of Nuremberg. The city bought the
tools from the Army in Oct. 1947 (NCA C28 no. 43, 44; details
of the transports are in NCA C28 no. 39, Dec. 1945-May 1946).
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hopelessly overcrowded camps,
not easily forthcoming.

cooperation from the city was

The city did not pasteurize the milk

it provided for the camp until the refugees complained to the
Americans in June and refugee representatives reported in the
same month that without the help of the Americans they would
not have been able to disinfect the camp.

Four weeks later

the refugees once again had to appeal to the Americans.
Health inspectors had found that the toilets were completely
inadequate,

but the city only went

into action when the

Americans intervened.21
Initially nobody knew how long these refugees actually
were going to stay in Nuremberg.
Nuremberg

Militaryu

Government

Captain Mershon of the
detachment

informed

the

Germans in June that the city would not have to provide
additional space for the refugees since the Americans would
soon begin to return them to their homes.

In response to

this information about 800 expellees from the Sudeten sent a
petition to the American authorities in which they made clear
that they had actually not fled their homes, but rather had
been deported and come to Nuremberg on American trucks.

They

inquired when the political circumstances would enable them
to return home.

Lieutenant Callicott informed them in August

that he had forwarded their inquiry to the appropriate higher
authorities.

In the meantime the

city

reported to the

21Reports of 28 June, 2 July, 8 July 1945; NCA C25/I no.
1087; monthly report for Schafhof and WitschelstraBe, 23 June
1945; NCA C25/I no. 1086b.
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Bavarian Government's representative, the President of Middle
Franconia's regional government, that the Americans did not
return any of the refugees and did not even permit them to
leave the camps.

The author thought that "these people will

most probably remain in Germany in the foreseeable future."
Since most of the refugees either were women or children,
additional problems loomed large on the horizon.

With the

men absent the women would have to go to work, but nobody
knew what to do with the children.22
Struggle for a New Start: Reopening the Schools
In view of the more pressing tasks of
survival of the
Government
resources

city it is not surprising that Military

officials
as

assuring the

possible

only dedicated
to

youth,

but

as

little

the

Army

time

and

regarded

functioning schools as essential for getting young Germans
off the streets where they might get into trouble and cause
problems.

The Education and Religious Affairs Branch in

Berlin set l October 1945 as the deadline

for the field

detachments to reopen the first four grades of elementary
schools.

Eisenhower informed the Germans in August 1945 that

their schools and courts would be reopened "as soon as they
are cleansed from Nazi influences."

Eisenhower promised that

a judicial and an educational system which would be based on

“Reports, Welfare Office Nuremberg on the situation of
the refugees of 26 June, 5 July, 26 July, 15 Aug. 1945; NCA
C25/I no. 1087.
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"real

democratic

principles"

would

find

strong

American

support.23
Policy formulation and orders are one matter,
implementation is another.

their

The field officers in charge of

the task did not always carry out their orders in a way which
headquarters would have approved.
halfway

between

Nuremberg

and

In Eichstatt,

Munich,

for

a town

example,

the

education officer did not seem to care at all about his task.
He simply ordered that the schools be opened by the deadline.
When

the

German

school

superintendent

objected

because

denazification had eliminated most teachers, the officer told
him to employ housewives.

This was in line with the letter

of his directives, but certainly not with the spirit.

The

superintendent later recalled that the officer was not at all
inclined
problems.

to

offer

suggestions

or

to

listen

to

German

He brushed all legal or administrative objections

aside and was only interested in meeting the deadline he had
^Proclamation of General Eisenhower to the German people
in the American Zone of Occupation of 6 Aug. 1945, in
Amtsblatt der Militar-Regierung Deutschland, Niirnberg no. 23,
15 Aug. 1945: 1 (reproduction in Nurnberger Nachrichten,
special
issue,
40
Jahre
Bundesrepublik
Deutschland:
Wiederaufbau 1945-49: 5) . It should be noted here that this
proclamation addressed the Germans in the second person,
"Ihr", instead of the formal and customary "Sie". Germans,
especially the members of the middle class, regarded the use
of the second person as a serious offense which clearly
demonstrated a lack of respect towards the person addressed
in such a way. Although headquarters may not have been aware
of the difference, the authors of the German version of the
proclamation demonstrated in this way that the Americans not
only came as victors, but that they also had lost their
respect for all Germans and had no intention of meeting them
on equal terms.
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gotten from headquarters.

His only help consisted in a car

and gasoline for the German administrator.
opened,

he

convened

the

teachers

and

When the schools
told

them

in

no

uncertain terms that he considered them all as Nazis and
would not help them in any way even if regulations permitted
him to do so.

In spite of his apparent lack of interest and

documented hostility towards the Germans the officer remained
with Military Government in the region for the next four
years, but was hardly seen in Eichstatt.24
The situation in Nuremberg was similar in some respects,
but had much better results.

Education and religion did not

seem to enjoy a high priority even for a major city like
Nuremberg.
Religious
vacant.

In May 1945 the position of the Education and
Affairs

Officer

in

detachment

B-211

remained

Subsequent reports indicate that the Monuments and

Fine Arts Section, which was established after May, also was
taking care of schools and the Churches.

First reports from

the field show, however, that the officer in charge of this
section had to devote much of his time to the enormous art
treasures

stored

in Nuremberg,

some

of which had to

be

returned to their original locations in Poland, the Soviet

24Peterson 312-313. As we have seen above, Education and
Religious Affairs Branch had no officers who could devote
their full time and attention to education.
It is most
likely that the officer in charge of Eichstatt had been
ordered to take on the opening of schools as an additional
duty on which he was not inclined to waste any more time than
absolutely necessary. His anti-German feelings only worsened
a potentially bad situation.
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Union and in Austria.
activities.

He therefore had to limit his other

His only action in the religious and education

realm consisted of a meeting with church leaders in April
1945.

He ordered them to resume their activities and to

register with Military Government.25
In

the

reorganization

course
and

of

the

city

denazification

administration's

Military

Government

appointed the new superintendent for schools in Nuremberg,
Dr. Hans Raab, on 25 May.
and

served

as

Raab had been an English teacher

interpreter

for

the

city

administration.

Former school director Otto Barthel joined him as head of
elementary schools in June.26

“The telephone directory of the Nuremberg detachment
from May 1945 shows that there was an office and a telephone
reserved for the education and religious affairs officer, but
that nobody was in charge of the office at the time.
Detachment reports from April 1945 list education and
religious affairs under the arts section. It seems that Lt.
Col. James Barnett, the detachment's deputy commander, who
remained in Nuremberg until 1948, early on took an interest
in education and religious affairs and may have taken over
the duties of the position when it was vacant.
Niirnberg
1945-49, I, docs. 5 (Nuremberg Detachment Annual report 20
Apr. 1945 to 21 June 1945) , 6a (Summary Det. E1B3 Functional
Work in Nuremberg on 22.4.1945), 6b (Summary Det. E1B3
Functional Work in Nuremberg on 23.4.1945); information on
Barnett is in Eckart 125. Nuremberg seemed to be harder hit
than smaller communities, but basically had to deal with the
same problems. See Muller (55-100) for a general assessment
of the school situation in Bavaria at the time.
26Dastrup
55-56;
Nuremberg
Military
Government
Detachment, Annual Historical Report from 21 Apr. 1945 to 20
June 1946; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 5; monthly report of the
Lord Mayor of Nuremberg for June 1945; Niirnberg 1945-49, I,
doc. 99a.
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Finding and reconstructing classrooms became the first
obstacle Germans and Military Government had to overcome for
the reopening of schools.

Just as the rest of the city,

school buildings had suffered considerably during the war.
Looters did not spare public buildings in April.

They took

everything from furniture to electrical appliances from the
schools the war had left intact.

American troops, refugees

or parts of the city administration moved into the buildings
that could still be used.

Since no other facilities were

available, butchers and milk distributors had to open their
shops in some school houses.27
The city took stock

in June

1945:

fifty-six of the

existing 123 school buildings in Nuremberg were completely
destroyed.

Another twenty could not be repaired in the

foreseeable future.

The administration thought that twenty-

four buildings could be restored fairly easily, provided that
it could obtain the necessary materials.
buildings

had

escaped

any

damage.

buildings had been elementary schools.

Only two smaller

Seventy-two

of

the

Twenty-one of those

were considered to be repairable within the time limit.28

^"Metzgerei zog ins Schulhaus: Kinder bekamen nur
diirftigen 'Betreuungsunterricht'," [Butcher Shop Moved into
School: Children Received only Meager 'Maintenance Lessons']
Triimmerj ahre: 31.
28Monthly report of the Lord Mayor of Nuremberg for June
1945; Niirnberg 1945-1949, I, doc. 99a; Nuremberg Military
Government Detachment, Annual Historical Report from 21 Apr.
1945 to 20 June 1946, section 3e; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc.
5.
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Since the schools were closed, the city administration
ordered all teachers to participate in the rehabilitation of
Nuremberg's school houses from May on.

A number of teachers

who

and

had

not

survived

denazification

returned to the schools
summer.

were

dismissed

in construction crews during the

Military Government helped where it could.

It tried

to clear school buildings the Army had requisitioned for
housing soldiers.

By May 1946 the Army had returned to the

Germans most of the ten school buildings it had occupied.

To

facilitate the acquisition of materials Military Government
opened a dump for captured German materials on the Nazis'
former rally grounds.

The Germans could pick up whatever

materials they needed.
bucket,

however,

This help was only a drop in the

because

everybody

needed the materials.

Utility companies or hospitals certainly had priority status.
The city reported that a lack of building materials prevented
even the most urgent repairs.
Nuremberg

had

about

one

buildings

ready,

less

than

number.

These

rooms

had

elementary school children.

Two days before the deadline

hundred
one
to

rooms

in

twenty-nine

tenth of the peace
accommodate

almost

time

24,000

Only a part of them had windows,

so there would be problems as soon as temperatures began to
fall in October.29
29Monthly report of the Lord Mayor of Nuremberg for Sept.
1945; Niirnberg 1945-1949, I, doc. 100; Nuremberg Military
Government Detachment, Annual Historical Report 21 Apr. 1945
to 20 June 1946, sections 3.e and 9.d.4.(l); Niirnberg 194549, I, doc. 5; see also a report of 7 July 1945 in the
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Nuremberg also had to deal with the serious shortage of
textbooks

and

teaching

materials.

The

Education

and

Religious Affairs Branch in Berlin had been able to produce
a considerable number of books,
enough to satisfy the demand.

but they were not nearly

Once more each detachment had

to rely on its own resources.

In the case of Eichstatt

nothing happened at all in this respect.
luckier.

Although

the

number

of

Nurembergers were

textbooks

remained

a

constant worry for the next three years, the field officers
did their best to help out.
October,

for

example,

the

When the schools opened in
Americans

had

organized

from

Magdeburg in the Soviet Zone math books which had been used
there before 1933 .30
Nuremberg faced an equally difficult task in finding
teachers for the children.

Since teachers were entrusted

with the future citizens of Germany,
Military

Government

was

particularly

it was
eager

logical that
to

profession of all Nazi and militaristic influences.

rid

the

German

Church and city officials, however, argued for leniency, and
above all for an evaluation of each individual case, not a
Bayerischer Tag, a MG information bulletin for the Bavarian
population,
about the conditions in Nuremberg.
The
reconstruction work of the Nuremberg teachers apparently
found its way into the report as an example that should be
emulated by other Bavarian communities (Nurnberg 1945-49, I,
doc. 9a).
30Triimmerjahre: 31. Raab acknowledged American efforts
during the next years, especially the support of a Major
Morell, but found that MG only enjoyed limited success in its
attempts to provide new textbooks (NCA C3 6/I no. 324) .
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blanket wave of dismissals based on party membership.

On

July

of

19,

1945

Raab

sent

a

"Memorandum

Administrative and Teaching Personnel"

of

Removal

to the Americans.

According to him, all German officials, including the proven
enemies

of

the

Nazi

regime,

asked

Military

Government

officials to discriminate between the real criminals and
those

party

members

"inoffensive."

who

had

been

"non-aggressive"

and

He wrote that not entering the Nazi Party or

one of its affiliations could have serious consequences for
members of the civil service which ranged from dismissal all
the way to the deportation to a concentration camp.

Raab

proposed that those Nazi members who had not harmed anybody
or had entered the party under pressure should be retained
and be "subject to an adequate period of probation," possibly
accompanied by salary cuts.

He also suggested that the whole

procedure could be handled much better
consulted
dismissals.

German

authorities

before

if the Americans
they

decided

on

Echoing a wide spread conviction among leading

Nurembergers, Raab predicted dire consequences for the future
relations between the Germans and the occupiers and even for
world peace

if Military Government did not moderate

its

denazification policy.31
31Raab's own summary and conclusion of the memorandum is
in Nurnberg, 1945-49, I, doc. 10c.
Eckart (112, FN 12)
evaluates additional parts of it.
Raab himself discussed
text and impact of his memorandum for the city chronicler in
1948 (NCA C36/I no. 324). Eckart (112-121) shows that Raab's
allegations were far from correct.
It had been possible
throughout the Third Reich in Nuremberg to remain in the city
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In August the city repeated its plea with the Americans.
In his monthly report Martin Treu,

an old and respected

Social Democratic leader whom the Americans had appointed
Lord

Mayor

in

July,

downplayed

the

importance

teachers' involvement in Nazi organizations.

of

the

According to

him, the Americans should regard membership in lesser Nazi
organizations as a sign of evasion or even camouflage of
anti-Nazi feelings rather than active participation.
insisted that an
indispensable.

individual evaluation
The

American

Treu

of each case was

denazification

policy

was

leaving many older teachers without pensions at a time and
age when they could not be expected to change professions.
Treu further argued that the American directives also were
draining

the

city of

the

experienced

specialists

it

so

urgently needed in those difficult times.32

administration without becoming a party member, since even
the Nazi Lord Mayor to a surprisingly large extent accepted
the administrators' argument which they would use for the
Americans again: civil servants were apolitical specialists.
This does not imply, however, that many of them were not
attracted to the Nazis who had incorporated many nationalist
and conservative ideas into their program.
Even Nazi
antisemitism was not unwelcome to many (Eckart 72-74).
Schieder severely criticized the American denazification
policy as well. He thought that it should be carried out on
an individual basis.
If the Americans continued their
course, they would cause communism and even renazification of
the people. (Nuremberg Military Government Detachment, Annual
Historical Report 21 Apr. 1945 to 20 June 1946, Appendix No.
1; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 5)
32Die Situation der Lehrer, monthly report of the Lord
Mayor for Aug. 1945; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 99b.
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Nuremberg officials,

like those in other communities

under American control, did not get the desired response.

By

August 1945 the Americans had dismissed ninety-six teachers.
Two days before the schools opened the number had swollen to
160, compared to 139 teachers who could start working.

The

city had little hope that Military Government would permit
more than 50% of the remaining forty-one teachers who were
still under investigation to return to the classrooms.33
The

Nuremberg

detachment

tried

harder

than

their

counterpart in Eichstatt to remedy the situation along the
lines permitted by headquarters.

In good American tradition

the officers looked for practical and quick solutions.

They

began to train substitute teachers without any regard for
German

civil

prerequisites.

service

regulations

or

educational

Only those could apply who had never been

members of the Nazi party or its affiliations.

The new

teachers got their training in crash courses which lasted
eight to twelve weeks in 1945.

The city did not find the

crash program in any way adequate.

Lord Mayor Treu thought

that many of the new teachers accepted the post only out of
economic

considerations

inclinations

without

or capabilities.

however, proved him wrong.

having

the

necessary

The long term experience,

Many of those who went through

33Die Situation der Lehrer, monthly report of the Lord
Mayor for Aug. 1945; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 99b.
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the courses remained in the profession in spite of prejudices
and obstacles they had to overcome as outsiders.34
Raab's and Treu's attitude towards denazification brings
an important difference between German and American educators
to light.

The Germans maintained that schools were part of

a body of civil servants who, as apolitical experts, had to
do their duty regardless of the political environment to
which they had to adapt.

They simply had to be reprogrammed,

that is, made acquainted with the new rules and they would
function adequately.

It was in line with this thinking that

Raab convened his teachers once a week not only to discuss
practical questions, but also to familiarize them with the
new ideology.
with

Teachers listened to presentations dealing

"educational

goals,

democracy

fundamental ideas about the curriculum."

and

school,

and

Americans did not

share this "apolitical" interpretation of the German civil
service, and especially teachers.

No matter where they stood

on Germany's future, they agreed that German schools had been
crucial during the Third Reich and earlier in disseminating
militarism, antisemitism, and Nazi ideology.

Those who did

not regard Germans as capable of being reeducated wanted the
34Die Situation der Lehrer, monthly report of the Lord
Mayor for Aug. 1945; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 99b; "Lehrer
mit reiner Weste: Schulhelfer absolvieren ihre Ausbildung in
einem Schnellverfahren," [Teachers with a White Vest: School
Helpers Receive Training in a Hurry] Triimmerj ahre: 31;
"Nothelfer in Schulen: Kurs von zwolf Wochen fur ErsatzPadagogen," [Emergency Helpers in Schools: Twelve Week
Courses for Substitute-Educators] 40 Jahre Bundesrepublik:
15; Dastrup 56.
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Nazis to be punished and the schools closed with no further
action afterwards; those in favor of rehabilitation regarded
denazification as the essential first step towards reform.
JCS 1067 as well as Eisenhower's directives reflected this
common denominator.
courts which

the

Schools were as important as the law

Nazis

had corrupted.

A

look

at

Nazi

textbooks, which even treated math problems in militaristic
terms, confirmed the Americans' view.

If Raab had assessed

the teaching profession's involvement in National Socialist
propaganda realistically,

he might have realized that his

interpretation of the teachers as apolitical servants did not
hold.

Americans could not accept the rather cosmetic changes

he was proposing.
fact,

however,

The occupiers initially neglected the

that they would not be able to carry out

structural reform without convincing German educators about
the validity of their views and rather different attitudes
towards

the goals

and meaning of education.

Ultimately

democratic values and less authoritarian teaching methods
might be more important for re-education than the reform of
the educational

system itself,

but the success of either

approach depended on the Americans' ability to break up old
patterns of thinking and teaching.
GIs and Germans
Nuremberg's city administration continued to function
with almost
contact

no

with

interruption and was
American

Military

in

close

Government

and

daily

officials.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

165
Ordinary men, women and children, however, were more likely
to make their acquaintance with the occupiers on the streets
or in their apartments.

During the immediate postwar period

practically all Nurembergers had to face American soldiers in
one way or another.

Germans had to deal with Americans who

searched or even requisitioned their apartments and houses
after the fighting ended.

Since schools did not open until

October, German children and adolescents had much time to
spend for organizing food, becoming familiar with the new
situation and with the occupiers as well.35
Hans Eckstein, born in 1913, had worked in the supply
department of a unit throughout the war.

He was one of the

many German soldiers who resolved not to fall into Russian

35Gimbel (A German Community) was the first scholar who
examined this aspect of the American occupation. Ziemke also
dedicates much space to the development of German-American
grassroots relations. The more recent German case studies by
Eckart and Woller, however, almost entirely ignore this
issue.
While Eckart is mainly concerned with the American
influence on Nuremberg's city administration, he occasionally
ventures into the realm of opinion and perceptions of the
population in general.
He argues, for example, that the
withdrawal of Military Government from active management of
German affairs in many ways removed it from the German
population. According to him, this permitted special branch
activities, above all denazification, to penetrate German
society and perceptions much more profoundly than Military
Government actions (160-162) . While this interpretation may
have its merits, Eckart never bothers to test it.
He also
does not take into account the presence of many thousand
American soldiers in Nuremberg who certainly contributed in
one way or another to the German perception of Americans in
the city.
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hands.36

In

May

1945

he

escaped

the

Russians

captured him and began to march towards the west.

who

had

During the

first few days of his journey he became responsible for a
small group of refugees, consisting of civilians and soldiers
like

himself

who

all wanted

controlled by the Americans.

to

make

it

to

the

region

When they had finally reached

their destination, the group dispersed.

Since Eckstein was

still in uniform, he decided that it would be best to give
himself up to an American soldier.

He marched in the next

village and shook hands with the first GI he encountered,
making it clear that he considered the war to be over for
him.

The GI did not seem to have any apprehensions, but

rather gave Eckstein part of his rations and sent him to the
local courthouse for further processing without any guard.
Before he entered the courthouse, Eckstein, who had worked in
the development

section of a car

factory

before

he was

drafted, helped an American to adjust the engine of a German
truck.

He waited with a number of other German soldiers for

an American officer who, according to rumors, could provide
them with discharge papers that would return the soldiers
officially to civilian life.

Eckstein was able to obtain the

coveted paper ahead of everyone else because the American NCO
who accompanied the officer had been the man who had had
36Henke (674-693) provides a detailed account of the
attempts of German soldiers and civilians to make it to the
American lines. Of course not all Germans were lucky, but on
occasion American troops provided considerable assistance to
their undertaking.
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trouble with the truck.

He recognized Eckstein, and after a

short conversation with the officer, the German obtained his
release paper and was allowed to leave.
Eckstein continued his journey towards Nuremberg.
the way he made his

discharge

paper available to

On

other

soldiers who managed to get their discharges by simply having
a local teacher copy it for them.

Since the paper stated

that he was from Nuremberg, he did not have problems with
American patrols.

On the contrary,

Eckstein was able to

fetch a ride on a German bus driven by a former SS-man and an
American soldier.

In a typical display of American behavior

at the time, the GI did not stop for Eckstein, but rather for
a German lady with a child who needed a ride.

Eckstein was

able to sneak up on the roof of the bus.

At the

American road block

the Americans

discovered him.

next
They

inquired about his destination and he was permitted to ride
inside,

much to the chagrin of the driver.

When the GI

became aware that the driver and Eckstein did not like each
other, he made it a point in taking Eckstein directly to his
house in Nuremberg,

where he arrived on 27 May 1945,

his

wedding anniversary.37
Friedrich Voigt also decided that he needed to return to
Nuremberg after the end of hostilities.

In his village

Americans ordered all former soldiers to register at the town
hall, but just like others Voigt preferred to wait and see
37Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995.
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what happened.

Those who did register were taken to France,

where they would have to work for the next years.

Armed just

with his official telecommunications identification card and
fresh

eggs,

he

walked
did

back
not

to

Nuremberg

permit

Germans

regulations

which

communities

in which they were staying.

in
to

spite
leave

of
the

Voigt knew the

region very well, but even when he met American patrols, he
presented his ID together with the eggs and continued his
journey unmolested.

GIs even provided him with cigarettes.

He thought that African-American

soldiers generally were

friendlier than their white counterparts.
Once in Nuremberg, Voigt immediately reported back to
work.

Since his skills as a telephone repairman were in

urgent demand, his superiors simply ignored the fact that he
was not eligible for work because he had not been officially
discharged.

Voigt

remained

on

his

job

without

interruptions until he retired over thirty years

any

later.38

Heiko Kistner, eighteen years old in 1945, fought the
war beyond the cease fire.

Russians took him prisoner two

38Friedrich Voigt, personal interview, 26 July 1994.
Americans usually seemed to have ordered German soldiers to
appear in uniform at the courthouses.
Those who did often
marched into prison camps, but GIs did not seem to be overly
worried about netting all former soldiers of the Wehrmacht.
Those who did not appear usually seemed to have been left
alone. See "Soldaten verwohnen 'Blondy' mit Schleckereien:
Die kleine Waltraud vergafl bald alle Warnungen vor den
Feinden - Ihr Bruder beneidete sie sehr," [Soldiers Spoil
'Blondy' with Goodies:
Little Waltraud Soon Forgot All
Warnings about the Enemy - Her Brother Envied Her a Lot]
Triimmerj ahre: 10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

169
days after the official German surrender.
his way back to

the west as well.

He managed to find

Kistnerdid not have any

problem findinga job as a messenger for

an American unit in

Oettingen, about forty miles south of Nuremberg, where he had
located his family.

He decided to enlist American help for

his return trip to Nuremberg.

In his spare time Kistner

worked for a farmer who paid him with homemade schnapps.
African-American

soldiers

commodity for gasoline.
provide for the
the

were

happy

to

exchange

this

As soon as Kistner had enough to

trip and pay the driver, he was able to move

family back to

Nuremberg

in

fall of 1945.

Kistner

recalled that he got along with the African-Americans "very
well."39
Everywhere American soldiers searched houses for Nazi
materials and hidden soldiers immediately after the end of
hostilities,
objects.

but

often

also

took

along

other

desirable

A seventeen-year-old girl discovered her favorite

stuffed animal in a jeep on her way home from work.

Although

GIs were standing nearby she ran to the jeep and took her
tiger back without any interference.

The GIs apparently were

more interested the opposite sex than in keeping their war
trophies.
shouts.

The girl walked away accompanied by whistles and
When Americans searched her apartment for a second

time, one soldier decided to take along one of the two eggs
the girl and her mother still had.

The girl took the egg out

39Heiko Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994.
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of his hand and put it back in its place.

The Americans left

the dwelling without any further incidents.40
Marianne Hassel, at the time twelve years old, recalled
a similar incident.
Schwabisch Hall,

Her first contact with Americans was in

a small town in Wiirttemberg.

African-

American soldiers searched their house, but did not display
any hostility.

On the contrary, she found a black soldier in

the kitchen who had picked up her little sister and carried
her around.

Another GI, however, had taken her recorder.

In

spite of her fear Ms. Hassel decided to negotiate with the
soldier and was able to persuade him to return the recorder
to her.

During the next months Americans repeatedly left

food at her house or gave the children chocolate,
family

remained

reserved

towards

the

but her

occupiers.

She

overheard adults discussing rumors of rape or venting their
disapproval

of

German

girls

and

ladies

going

American soldiers, especially African-Americans.

out

with

Although

she had a number of encounters with GIs, Hassel never got to
know them by name or got into closer contact with them.41
Once again the

refugees had their

experiences with Americans.

own very

special

Johannes Wahner's family resumed

their odyssey shortly after hostilities ended.

They joined

40" 'Maunzerle'
als
Kiihlerfigur:
Madchen
entdeckte
Lieblingsstofftier am Jeep," ["Maunzerle" as Radiator Mascot:
Girl Discovered Favorite Stuffed Animal in Jeep] Triimmerjahre: 3.
41Marianne Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug. 1995.
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the thousands of people whom the Czechs expelled from their
homes.

Apparently anticipating the Potsdam agreement that

this operation had to be carried out as humanely as possible,
American trucks and troops came to the region to pick the
Germans up and bring them to Germany.

Many of the refugees

had been able to save some of their belongings and gathered
them at the assembly points.
charge

of the

transports

Wahner remembered that GIs in

actually prevented

Czechs

stripping the Germans of their last belongings.

from

From Mies

they went directly to Nuremberg and found themselves in a
camp that during the war had served as air defense command in
a Nuremberg suburb.

In June 1945 alone the city became

responsible for several thousand refugees in this way.

As we

have seen above, the refugees had to rely on Americans to
receive some of the necessities of life and help from the
Nurembergers.42
The

refugees

soon

seemed

relationship with the occupiers.

to

develop

a

special

Just four weeks after the

GErman surrender African-American soldiers blasted a hole in
the wall surrounding a German refugee camp, apparently to be
able to visit their girlfriends undisturbed.
representatives

notified

Nuremberg's

The refugees'

city

administration

which in turn alerted Millitary Government.

The following

42Johannes Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995; for
a brief history of the camp see Knud Willenberg, Rudolf Groh,
Schafhof- ein Stadtteil im Abseits? (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]:
Korn und Berg, 1993) 19.
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day Lieutenant Callicott inspected the scene.

He became

especially concerned about the contacts between children and
African-American troops.

Callicott, who was in charge of the

local detachment's youth section, was unhappy about refugee
children begging for food when the GIs were having lunch or
dinner.

The city tried to do something and reported a month

later that it had stopped those activities.
and his

friends,

however,

Johannes Wahner

continued their visits

of the

American kitchens in spite of the admonitions, because they
provided them with food they needed to survive.
recalled

that

black

soldiers

maintained

their

Wahner
goodwill

towards young people and shared their food with them.

If the

children were lucky and spotted an African-American cook,
they could be sure that he would save some food for them.
The city officials also could not stop American soldiers from
visiting the camp.
American visits

During the next months reports about

from annoyed camp

inhabitants

repeatedly

reached the city administration.43
Not all American GIs were so well disposed towards young
Germans.

Gerhard Knochlein,

recalled

that

not

all

seventeen years old in 1945,

attempts

to

conversation with GIs were successful.

begin

a

friendly

He and a friend had

begun to talk to an American soldier at the entrance of a
requisitioned house when suddenly another soldier showed up
43Reports by welfare office 28 June, 29 June, 25 July, 28
July, 4 Sept., 6 Sept. 1945; NCA C25/I no. 1087; Johannes
Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995.
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and began beating Knochlein's friend without warning.
two Germans

decided to

retreat rapidly

adversity.

Ironically

the

incident

The

in view of such

took

place

at

the

building which later on became the home of the Nuremberg
Post's largest and best equipped youth center.44
Wahner, his brother, and his friends also found out the
hard way that not every American was well disposed towards
young

Germans.

According

to

him,

white

GIs

generally

preferred throwing their leftovers in the trash to giving
them to the children.

When one of them caught Wahner's

brother picking raisins from a container with leftovers, he
decided to dip the boy's head in the unappetizing slop.

A

little later, a Mexican-American soldier invited Wahner and
a friend to pick up laundry from a requisitioned house.

The

two soon found themselves thrown down the stairs and locked
up with a native Nuremberger in the basement of the house.
They discovered a large collection of German arms there, but
were more interested in boxes with tuna cans stored in the
room.

All three boys ate until they were sick.

pay a price for the delicacies, however.
American

opened the door.

They had to

In the evening the

All three boys had to run a

gauntlet made up of GIs before they made it back to freedom.
The Germans learned quickly to stay away from this kind of
company.45
“^Gerhard Knochlein, personal interview, 24 July 1994.
4SJohannes Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995.
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Even those who kept their distance from the occupiers at
times could not help being surprised.

In Nuremberg the lady

who had recorded the rude American behavior in April confided
to her diary in May that she had given some juice and dessert
to her neighbors who in return presented her with little
boxes of American coffee.
enthused.

We

haven't

She went on to say that
had

something this

"we are

wonderful

for

decades.1,46
Some of the Germans who were offended by the Americans'
contacts with the opposite sex decided to resort to more
drastic actions to show their disapproval.

In September 1945

Military Government's Intelligence Division reported that
relations between GIs and German Frauleins "have been more
than some young Germans, particularly returning P[risoners
of] W[ar]
example,

have been able to stand."
posters

went

up

which

not

In Heidelberg,
only

denounced

for
the

fraternization in very drastic terms, but also threatened the
German girls involved with dire consequences.

In and around

Nuremberg flyers appeared which expressed the hope that the
girlfriends of African-American soldiers would have "black
and

white

speckled

children."

The

poem

that

followed

described women who went out with GIs in the worst possible
way.

Make-up, improper dresses as well as smoking American

“^Diary of an elderly lady, 5 May 1945; NCA F5 no. 488.
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cigarettes

seemed

to

be

trademarks

of

this

kind

of

betrayal.47
The authors of the report noted that German officials
could not agree on what the posters actually meant.

German

girls reacted to them on an entirely individual basis.

Those

from "good" (middle class?) backgrounds at least understood
the German men's motives and respected them by not going out
with Americans, even when they were employed by the Army or
Military Government.

They also pointed out, however, that

going out with an American

soldier was very attractive,

because GIs were easy going and did not have marriage in
mind.

The

girls

revealed

that

many

families

actually

supported liaisons with Americans because of the material
benefits.

The young women, whose names and addresses were

made public on the posters, had nothing but contempt for the
GErman purists.

Military Government investigators reported

that "German women thus pilloried poutingly indicated their
determination

to

carry

on

now

with

even

greater

enthusiasm.1,48
47United States Group Control Council [hereinafter
USGCC], Information Control Service, ICIS #12, week ending 29
September 1945: 9; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion Survey
Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/2; the Nuremberg flyer is in Henke
(199). According to him (198-200), this phenomenon occurred
throughout the American zone.
48USGCC, Information Control Services, ICIS #12, week
ending 29 September 1945: 10; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion
Survey Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/2. Henke 199 also points out
that a number of the women attacked in this way justified
their behavior with equal creativity. Liselotte Arnold, who
worked for the Americans from 1945 to the sixties,
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The ladies did not have to worry too much about the
threats.

Nobody would touch them as long as they were with

their boyfriends.

Some neighbors certainly kept their moral

reservations to themselves because they also benefitted from
the

generosity

friends.49

of

the

GIs

who

came

to

see

their girl

In addition to that, the Americans were eager to

maintain law and order, especially in regard to men who might
form a threat to the security interests of the occupiers.
Counter

Intelligence

officers

kept

a

close

eye

on male

teenagers who followed ladies fraternizing with Americans.
In

Heidelberg a twenty year

released from a POW camp,

old man

who

had

just been

was the first to be tried for

attacking a fraternizing girl.

He had watched her talking to

a GI at the train station, then attacked her and tried to cut
off her hair.

Since this was the first case of this kind on

trial, the American judge set a precedent and found a unique
justification for his sentence.

Since it would have taken

the girl nine months to regrow her hair if the young man had

corroborated this information. According to her, girls from
reputable families could work for the occupiers, but should
not date American GIs. Serious relationships, however, were
generally accepted (Lieselotte Arnold, personal interview, 18
Aug. 1995; see also Helga Kohler, personal interview, 13 July
1994).
49When asked if the neighbors did not object to the
relations between African-American soldiers and German girls
in his neighborhood, Friedrich Voigt pointed out that the
generosity of the GIs certainly served to appease any hard
feelings the neighbors may have had (Friedrich Voigt,
personal interview, 26 July 1994).
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succeeded,

the

offender

would

spend

the

same

time

in

prison.
Fraternization

was

not

the

only

irritation in some German circles.

issue

that

led to

Army requisitions from

the start became a bone of contention in German communities.
Nurembergers, for example, lost control of their opera house
which had escaped the bombing.
traditional

German

repertoire,

Apart
the

from enjoying the

Americans

used

the

building as a club, a boxing arena, a movie theater, and as
a stage for their own shows.

The Army permitted German

functions twice a week, but continued operation of the club.
German

actors

had to put

up with

sometimes

rather rude

behavior or at least an informality they were not accustomed
to.

On the positive side the Americans often provided the

artists with food and other luxury items.51
In spite of widespread destruction and the influx of
refugees,

the

Americans

initially

did

restraint in requisitioning buildings.
targeted mainly Nazi property,

not

exercise

any

Although the Army

it also expanded into many

private dwellings with no apparent connection to the Nazis.
Usually

the

occupants

of the buildings

were given short

notice and were not allowed to take anything but the most
necessary items along.

The situation in Nuremberg became

50Henke 199-200.
s,"Gejohle empfing Kiinstler: Junge Sangerin muBte sich an
US-Sitten gewohnen," [Hooting welcomed Artists: Young Singer
had to Get Used to US-Behavior] Triimmerjahre: 38.
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even

more

unpleasant

in

the

fall

of

1945

because

the

Americans needed room for the Allied personnel participating
in the Nuremberg

trials.

Erlenstegen,

a rather wealthy

Nuremberg suburb with nice houses which had escaped much of
the destruction,

became their prime target.

House owners

found themselves and the people they were accommodating out
in

the

streets.

Some

of

the

new

occupants

permitted

landlords to return to their houses to retrieve additional
items or to use their gardens, but many others did not.

The

issue remained a much resented feature of the occupation in
Nuremberg and in other cities of the American zone for almost
a decade.52
Having the house requisitioned, or at least sharing it
with Americans during the initial phase of the occupation,
could result

in

not

entirely

undesired

consequences

sometimes even led to unexpected displays of goodwill.

and
One

family found food which the American occupants had left for

52Eckart 170, fn 64; "Amerikanerin enttauscht: Sie wollte
Goring hangen sehen," [American Lady Disappointed:
She
Wanted to See Goring Hang] Triimmerjahre: 34; Helga Kohler,
personal interview, 13 July 1994.
Ms. Kohler lived in
Erlenstegen and was well acquainted with a number of people
who had to give their houses up for the Americans.
John
Gimbel
(A German
Community
54-57)
detected
similar
difficulties in the city of Marburg. Not everybody, however,
regarded the requisitions as unjustified.
Two of my
interviewees, obviously not members of the middle class,
thought that American policy hit just the right people in
suburbia who had supported Hitler and complained bitterly in
spite of the fact that their property was still intact and
they got rent for the requisitioned properties.
(Hans
Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995; Friedrich Voigt,
personal interview, 28 July 1994)
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them when they temporarily returned to their apartment to get
items they needed.

Another family had to put up with an

American officer who showed considerable reserve towards the
Germans in whose house he was living.

Significantly it was

the young people who were able to break the ice.

The boys of

the family thought that it would be a nice gesture to give
the soldier a little present for Santa Claus' day in November
1945.

Apparently impressed by their kindness, the soldier

opened up and began to provide the children with chocolate,
chewing gum, oranges, and many other things.

The children

found out that he had a German grandmother who seemed to have
told him much about the way she had celebrated Christmas.
The officer began to inquire what one would need to make the
upcoming

holiday

a

typical

German

one.

Much

to

the

astonishment of the Germans, he began to organize the things
he had heard about.

The family,

including the American,

feasted on a goose their benefactor had requisitioned in the
countryside and a barrel of beer on Christmas eve of 1945.53
"Chewing gum" or "Hershey's Chocolate" became household
names for German children who also learned to appreciate
American oranges.
the phenomenon.

Even the Stars and Stripes took notice of
Side by side with a story about the very

53"Wohltater brachte eine Gans: Die guten Taten von
"Laddy" an einer Familie," [Benefactor Brought a Goose:
'Laddy's' Good Deeds for a Family] Triimmerjahre: 7. Marianne
Hassel's family in Schwabisch Hall also benefitted from food
the Americans who lived in their house left for the family
(Marianne Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug. 1995).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

180
bleak Christmas Germans were facing in Frankfurt in 1945 the
paper printed a cartoon which depicted two American soldiers.
One

of them

had

children

sitting on

both

arms

and his

shoulders who obviously enjoyed his company while the other
was running from an angry mob of youngsters.
read:

"Out of Chewing Gum again, Bill?"

The caption

Just a few days

later another cartoon captured the conversation of two German
women commenting that GIs were replacing nannies in their
neighborhood.

The background showed a smiling and obviously

good-natured American sentry at a car pool playing with
children.54
Providing children with chewing gum and candy was just
one facet in the relations which GIs and young Germans began
to develop in 1945.
behavior

of

the

Boys and girls often found the casual

soldiers

attractive.

We

have

already

discussed the little boy who had to wait for Americans to be
able to get hands-on experiences with military equipment.55
Another lady recalled her astonishment when she watched for
the first time how an American soldier did his sentry duty in
front

of

a

former

German

military

installation.

She

remembered vividly the contrast between the behavior of the
German sentries

and that of the Americans.

Whereas the

54Stars and Stripes [Altdorf], 3 Dec. 1945: 2.
In the
interviews I conducted the GIs' generosity was one of the
most frequent associations German interviewees had when I
asked them about their first encounters with Americans.
55Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995.
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Germans always displayed the Prussian drill and discipline,
the American leaned his rifle in a corner, organized himself
a chair,

and put his feet with

officers

who

passed

could

not

boots on a desk.
disturb

the

Even

soldier's

tranquility and utterly unmilitary manners.56
In

the

long

run

the

most

important

asset

of

many

American soldiers was their uncomplicated and casual behavior
which helped to build bridges to the young Germans.

As early

as June 1945 GIs began to teach German children American
games, such as baseball, basketball or American football.

In

the Bremen enclave the soldiers pioneered the work which
general Keyes recommended to the commanders in his district.
Under the headline "Germany Hears 'Play Ball' as Yanks teach
U.S. Games" Stars and Stripes reported in November that many
German children were learning American games thanks to the
willingness of American soldiers to teach them.

The GIs

probably had no idea that they were actually introducing an
entirely new concept of youth work to Germany.

Their open

house policy would have a lasting impact not only on the
children who participated in the programs, but also on people
who were thinking about new ways of taking care of the large
part of the younger generation which refused to participate
in any new form of youth organization.
Stripes reported the first numbers.

In December Stars and
22,000 German boys and

girls were taking part in the soldiers' programs under the
56Marga Guthmann, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1994.
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guidance of Military Government education officers and Army
chaplains.57
Old Demons Die Hard
Although many German children and adolescents did not
seem to have any problems in befriending American soldiers
and seem to have been impressed with the behavior of the
occupiers,

they still had to deal with the legacy of the

previous

twelve

burdened

them

years.
with

difficult to digest.

The

war

experiences

had
most

would

and
find

Many teenagers had participated in

the fighting in one form or another.
unconditional

adults

many

A great number of them had lost their

homes and their families.

defeat,

uprooted

surrender,

The
and

complete military
the

occupation

by

foreign troops as well as the Allies' efforts to acquaint the
Germans with Nazi atrocities had shattered their belief in
the greatness of the Fiihrer and the superiority of Germany.58
The American Group Control Council's Information Control
Section

which

later was

integrated

into OMGUS

dedicated

57Campbell 4-5; Stars and Stripes, 16 Nov. 1945: 3, 8
Dec. 45: 2. It is interesting to note that many of the most
successful basketball clubs during the nineteen sixties and
seventies actually did not come from big cities, but rather
from towns with large army bases, such as Heidelberg,
Bamberg, Rosenheim etc. When I learned to play basketball in
the seventies, our older coaches and trainers, who had been
teenagers after the war, once in a while talked about their
trips to basketball games on American Army trucks.
It only
became clear to me in the course of my research that the
basketball program of my home town probably had its roots in
the postwar Army programs.
58Schorken, 7-54.
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several

surveys

to youth

in

1945.

It examined the re

education potential of German teachers and the situation in
schools after their reopening in October.

In August 1945 the

researchers

tried to find out more about young people's

attitudes.

The secret final report of the survey revealed

that many young Germans were living in a world of internal
conflicts and contradictions.

On the one hand, they accepted

the fact that old ways needed to make room for new ideas and
systems; on the other, they were unable to shed the ideas
which they had learned under Hitler.

Apparently their first

encounters with Americans had positive effects.

A majority

of the young people thought that Germans were not better than
Americans.

Significantly they still regarded Germany as

their undisputed homeland in which they wanted to live, but,
according to the survey,

the United States was the next

country after Germany that attracted them.

Anti-communism

was a striking feature in young people's attitudes.

The

Soviet Union proved to be the country they disliked most.
Although

an

overwhelming

majority

considered

National

Socialism to have been a good idea that had been poorly
executed, they recognized that that system certainly would
not return to Germany and assumed that it would be replaced
with a democratic system in the American zone of occupation.
Almost half of the boys and girls thought that Germany would
need another Fiihrer to emerge from her present crisis.

For

the time being, however, political problems seemed to occupy
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a

rather

challenges

low

spot

the

on

their

struggle

for

agendas,

compared

survival

offered.

to

the
An

overwhelming majority considered the lack of food their most
pressing problem.59
Undoubtedly much to the relief of American officers, the
pollsters neither found any danger of a continuing threat
based on Nazi ideology or organizations nor a hatred towards
the Western Allies.
willingly

had

On the contrary, young Germans quite

thrown their

old

replaced it with the Americans.

leadership

overboard and

Intelligence officers made

clear, however, that for them the rest of the picture offered
little ground for optimism.
Anti-Nazi and pro-American lip service, however, should
not be construed as evidence that those youth are now
young democrats - they are still totalitarian youth in
search of a new leadership.
They now echo what they
consider to be the official view of their current
masters.
In a sense, the very manner in which they
quickly pick up and express democratic and pro-American
views reveals their attitude of implicit and uncritical
submission to authority, ingrained by Nazi education and
German tradition....
Untrained in democratic action,
many of these youths presume that American leaders will
now solve their problems in an authoritarian fashion...
without the youth themselves having to do any more than
obey orders and profess adherence to the official creed.
Moreover, the fact that these youth have doffed one
coat and put on another does not mean that they have
changed their basic character, and quickly discarded
59USGCC, Information Control Service, ICIS #7, week
ending 24 Aug. 1945: 7-14; NA RG
260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion
Surveys Branch, Box 157 5/234-2/2. Only a limited number of
the surveys survived in the branch records.
The titles of
all others are in the Index to the Information Control
Review, 14 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion Surveys
Branch, Box 158,
5/234-2/5. Eckart(181-220) also identifies
the daily struggle for survival as the major concern in
Nuremberg in 1945.
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those Germanic and Nazi traits that have caused trouble
in the past and may cause trouble in the future: hyper
nationalism,
subservience and blind obedience to
superiors plus domineering over inferiors [a point not
covered
in
this
survey!],
lack
of
personal
responsibility for group action , undue reliance upon
state authority, excessive admiration for power, lack of
respect for individuals' rights as against group values,
political fanaticism, uncritical mass thinking, etc.60
In December another intelligence report summed up the
situation of German youth and American policy at the end of
1945.

According

to

the

researchers,

a

lot

of

German

community leaders were worried about their young people whom
they found to be in a state of utter confusion over ideas and
ideals.

Many of them could not find jobs, training, or even

go to school, since secondary schools were still not open.
The report pointed out that some Germans illegally had begun
to form youth organizations to help these young people, among
them the churches and political parties.

The authors briefly

discussed the USFET directive which had led to the creation
of the Kreis Youth Committees.

Their main point of criticism

was that the directive had as its objective only keeping
German youth out of trouble, instead of approaching the task
of "denazifying their minds."

As far as execution of the

directive was concerned, there was much room for improvement.
The pollsters maintained that the prohibition of political
activities
educating

from
German

the

start

youth,

stifled

since

any

people

attempts

were

afraid

at
to

re
go

60USGCC, Information Control Services, ICIS #7, Week
Ending 24 Aug. 1945: 7-8; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion
Survey Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

188
against American

directives.

They

further

cooperation between Military Government
troops did not function very well.

thought that

and the tactical

Frequent shuffling of

units, redeployment, the lack of German speaking personnel
and indoor facilities, as well as the reliance on volunteers
instead

of

assigned officers,

made

the

tactical

troops'

program hard to realize, given the enormity of the task.

The

pollsters also found that some soldiers still did not want to
become involved in activities to help people at whom they had
been

shooting

just

a few months

earlier,

although they

allegedly liked to give children candy.
According to the authors, one of the largest obstacles
to better results was the lack of a clear cut overall policy
and directives that would guide units in the field.

Such a

policy would ensure greater uniformity and less insecurity on
the side of American officials.
American

interpretations

of

the

The pollsters found that
youth

directive

varied

considerably and led to much confusion and frustration on all
sides

at the

end of 1945.

As

far as the Germans were

concerned, the pollsters reported that the churches had taken
advantage of their preferred position and organized youth on
a decentralized basis.

According to their sources,

YMCA

leaders were being trained and plans were made to provide
Germans with the opportunity to meet Americans on a different
basis than that of fraternization with soldiers.
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ICD submitted its own evaluation of the state of mind of
German youth in the conclusion of the report.
features already mentioned,

the authors

Apart from the

found that young

people largely rejected the idea of collective guilt and
still thought that National Socialism basically was a good
idea.

The Germans suspected that their present hardships

were much more of a punishment than the result of the war
Hitler had brought upon Europe.

The report also found that

young persons displayed a remarkable lack of compassion for
the victims of the Nazis at home or abroad.

On a more

positive note the researchers stated that, while completely
rejecting the Soviet Union, young Germans appeared to have
open minds for ideas emanating from Great Britain or the
United States.61
Although the report confirmed that the Nazis had been
able to deeply implant their ideology in the minds of the
younger generation,
hopeless.

its authors did not consider the case

On the contrary, their main point of criticism

about American occupation policy was that the United States
had not yet embarked on any positive re-education efforts.
This clearly

implied that the researchers

considered the

young people in the American zone of occupation capable of
escaping the old German traits of militarism, blind obedience
and racism.

Although the boys'

and

girls'

motives

for

6iOMGUS, Information Control Intelligence Summary no. 23,
15 Dec. 1945: 1-7; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion Research
Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/3.
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fraternizing with Americans were far from idealistic,

the

pollsters apparently thought that this was a chance Military
Government should not let slip.

The doors were open for a

more encompassing re-education effort.
The first months of the American occupation were crucial
for setting the tone for the future.

Military Government in

the communities was unable to dedicate many resources to
youth work during the initial phase of the occupation, but
rather had to concentrate on restarting the city's life by
reconstructing utilities,

reopening the vital connections

with the hinterland on which Nuremberg depended for food, and
by providing the city with fuel for the winter.

American

officials followed a pragmatic course and rendered generous
help in the form of experts, equipment, and transport.
did

not

even

let

Washington's

denazification

interfere too much with their work.

They

program

Schools and education

were the only notable exception to this rule.

In spite of

strong German objections, education officers weeded out most
Nazis from schools and youth organizations during the first
months

after the war.

This made the difficult

task of

reopening schools at the earliest possible moment even harder
to

accomplish.

Nevertheless,

most children

streets and into schools by October 1945.
field

detachments

did

much

to

alleviate

got

off the

Once again the
the

situation

although field officers could not dedicate much time to youth
work.

They managed to appoint capable administrators for
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schools and for youth work in Nuremberg who reestablished a
progressive

youth

activities

into

office

youth

with

work

a

apart

mandate

to

expand

its

from administering

the

traditional welfare programs.

Germans and Americans found

that

in

they

shared

many

ideas

this

field

and

quickly

established a functioning youth committee in the city which
initially tried to revive and coordinate youth activities
along the traditional pre-193 3 lines.
The most radical departure in dealing with youth in the
field

came

from

uncomplicated
behavior stood

American

and— despite

soldiers.
their

Their

casual,

uniforms— very

civilian

in marked contrast to the experiences and

drill young Germans had seen and experienced in the Hitler
Youth.

Without knowing it American GIs opened the door to an

entirely new approach to youth work for many young Germans
when

they

children.

began

to

introduce

American

games

to

German

Taking stock at the end of 1945, the Americans

realized, however, that they had to do much more to provide
the

guidance

necessary

for

eliminating

replacing them with new ideals.

old

ideas

and

Many young Germans clearly

understood that they needed to reorient their lives, but they
still did not know where to go.

During the next years the

seeds that the occupiers had sown would have to receive a lot
of American water and nurturing in order to germinate.
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CHAPTER V
Washington. 1946-48; A New Policy Emerges

Between

1946

and

1948

it

became

clear

constellation was emerging in world politics.

that

a new

The United

States and the Soviet Union became increasingly involved in
controversies which soon resulted in the creation of two huge
power blocks that defined the Cold War for the next forty
years.

At first glance American policy did not show any

signs of vitality or direction during the one and a half
years

after

the

end

of

the

war

in

Europe.

The

rapid

succession of secretaries of state between 1945 and 1947
apparently reflected this lack of direction.

It would be

wrong to assume, however, that nothing of importance happened
during this lull in American diplomatic activity.

Behind the

scenes American diplomats and politicians were trying hard to
evaluate the new state of the world and to come to terms with
the role the United States should play in it.1
George Kennan's long telegram, dispatched from Moscow in
February 1946, marked the beginning of a new departure in
American foreign policy although it would take over a year to
become official.

President Truman based his new approach of

containing the Soviet influence in Europe and wherever else
it might threaten American interests on Kennan's analysis.
‘Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson, The American Secretaries of
State and Their Diplomacy Ser. XVI (New York: Cooper Square,
1972) 25-26.
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Revisionist historians argue that American policy makers
wanted to rebuild Western Germany as a bulwark against Soviet
aggression.

According to this

interpretation,

the fight

against the Nazis and for reform in Germany became the victim
of the Cold War.

In spite of growing concerns over Soviet

actions and motives, however, the problem of Germany remained
on the agenda.

The concept of totalitarianism linked the two

forms of undemocratic regimes together.

If anything, the

additional threat of communism provided a strong motive for
many

Americans

to

proceed

with

the

re-education

of the

Germans at an accelerated speed.2
Since Roosevelt had consistently blocked all attempts to
develop a long range American policy

statement regarding

Germany, the Truman administration had to start from scratch.
After the unconditional surrender in May 1945 Americans took
their time to assess the situation there and to develop a
comprehensive policy.

While still trying to make the Allied

Control Council work through its representative in Berlin,
2John Lewis Gaddis (Strategies of Containment: A
Critical Appraisal of Postwar American Security Policy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) chapters I, II) deals
with Kennan and the Truman administration. Although Kennan's
argument was far more sophisticated than described here, it
basically arrived at the same conclusion and had the same
consequences for the situation in Germany. For a recent and
thoughtful appraisal of the American Cold War historiography
see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History,"
Diplomatic History 17 (1993): 1-16.
In Germany the
discussion for a long time remained fixed on the allegedly
punitive American policy symbolized by the Morgenthau plan
and the alleged sudden change of American policy towards the
Germans from 1947 on. A good German summary is in Fiissl 1517.
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Washington embarked on a number of fact-finding missions to
survey what was happening in Germany,
American zone of occupation.

or at least in the

It was not until January 1947

that Military Government in Berlin finally got a binding
directive for German youth.
Truman rather quickly began to pay attention to the
problem

of

German

re-education.3

Henry

Morgenthau's

dismissal before the Potsdam Conference made clear from the
start that
regain

the President wanted the

its

prerogative

in

foreign

State Department to
policy

planning

and

formulation.

As we have seen above, the group that promoted

re-education

of

the

Germans

as

a

central

objective

of

American policy was unable to get the ear of either Secretary
of

State

Byrnes

or

the

President

during

the

Potsdam

Conference, but at least they had been able to present their
views to the highest echelons without being blocked by the
Treasury.

Free

from

outside

interferences,

the

State

Department staff could resurrect its plan for re-educating

30f course any general account of the Truman years would
not be complete without discussing the Truman Doctrine, the
Berlin Blockade, the Marshall Plan, or NATO.
Nevertheless
one wonders why one of the largest attempts to reform an
entire people with vast amounts of American money and
manpower usually does not even seem to merit mention in a
footnote. One of the most recent examples of this trend is
Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman: A Life (Columbia and
London: University of Missouri Press, 1994) 246-267.
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the Germans with the ultimate goal of re-integrating Germany
in the international community.4
Alarmed by negative publicity Military Government got in
the American press especially with regard to denazification,
Truman decided to send a special envoy to Germany to assess
the situation.

In the fall of 1945 Byron Price travelled to

Germany to study the relationship between the victors and the
vanquished

firsthand.

In December the President's

submitted his report to the White House.

envoy

Price addressed a

number of issues: he criticized the denazification process
and suggested that Military Government be transferred to the
State Department as quickly as possible.

As far as young

Germans were concerned, he thought that they needed far more
attention than Americans had given them so far.

According to

him, the Nazi ideology and membership in the Hitler Youth had
made a lasting impression on the younger generation.

The

United States could only hope to counter this brainwashing
with an extensive youth program which was only at its very
modest beginnings in the American zone of occupation at that
time.

Apparently the White House thought that the report

could do something to set the record straight and released it
to the press, which commented favorably on Price's findings.5
“Ferrell
186-87;
see also pp.
Morgenthau's dismissal see Henke 116.

40-43

above;

for

sThe Department of the Army sent the report and the
press comments on to General Clay in Berlin who deemed them
important enough to disseminate the information to the field
detachments. "The Price Report," OMGUS Information Bulletin
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Truman seemed to be especially concerned with Price's
discussion of German youth.

To find out more about the

specific problems of young Germans, the President decided to
send Bishop Bernard J. Sheil of Chicago to Germany to conduct
a survey.

Sheil was well known in Washington.

As the head

of the Catholic youth organizations in the United States, he
had already served as expert counsel on youth questions for
the

Roosevelt

administration.

In Mid-december

1945

the

bishop went to Germany to investigate the problems German
youth was

facing in all four zones of occupation and to

become acquainted with the different approaches of the other
three occupying powers.
weeks

and

optimistic

returned

to

report.

He remained in Germany for four
the

Sheil

United

States

acknowledged

with

that

a

rather

there

were

serious problems, but according to him, these problems had
their roots in the social and economic destruction of the
war, not in Nazi ideology.

Contrary to the assumption of

collective guilt on which American policy had so far been
based, Sheil thought that Hitler and his henchmen had only
been able to brainwash a small part of the young Germans.
Still, much would depend on the action of the occupiers who
would have to work hard to bring German youth into the fold
of a democratic and peace loving community.
denazification,
efforts

which

in his

at democratization

eyes

and

Sheil criticized

severely

re-education.

hampered
Just

no. 21, 15 Dec. 1945: 23; see also Fiissl 111.
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Price,

Sheil advocated an extensive and long-range

program for Germany.

youth

The bishop recommended that Americans

pay special attention to the selection and training of youth
leaders.

MG officials should look to the well developed

youth activities of the churches as fine examples for such
work.

To bring Germans out of their isolation it would be

necessary to initiate international exchange programs with
the United States and to publish youth magazines which would
disseminate new ideas.
1946.

Truman got Sheil's report in January

Apparently the President approved the recommendations.

In February

the War

Department

forwarded

the

report

to

General Clay.6
OMGUS reacted quickly, but not very positively to the
Bishop's report.

John Taylor did not agree with many of

Sheil's specific recommendations.

Taylor only liked the

Bishop's proposal to open club houses

and youth hostels.

According to the chief of the Education Branch, all other
recommendations were either unfeasible at the time or not in
accordance with current OMGUS policies.7
clear that

he

was

not

denazification process
report.

He thought

happy
in his

with

the

Clay also
criticism

made

of

the

own official reply to

the

that the Bishop was too

focused

on

Christian religion as the only way of saving young Germans.
6Fussl 110.
7Memo from John Taylor, Chief Ed. Section, OMGUS, 5 Mar.
1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br. , Box
147, 5/296-3/16.
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Nevertheless, the Military Governor agreed with Sheil that
youth was important and that an extensive program would be
necessary to re-educate them, but took no further action.8
Apart

from

re-education,

the

churches

also

became

involved in the question of humanitarian aid to Germany.
Sending relief supplies to Germany became an issue soon after
the war.

Apparently unaware of Eisenhower's policy not to

grant entry permits to Americans into the American zone of
occupation, Truman had authorized L.W. Goebel, the President
of the American Evangelical and Reformed Church to travel to
Germany

on

a

fact

finding mission.

It took

the

State

Department a week to clarify the matter, but in September
1945 Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed the
White House that of course the President had the right to
override any decisions of his military staff and in fact had
done so in Goebel's case, who should be free to go.9
To obtain a clearer picture of the situation and to find
ways to start a relief program, Truman dispatched another
personal mission to Germany in January 1946.

It consisted of

representatives of private relief agencies who were to decide
what they would be able to do to diminish the misery in the
8Report to President Truman of Bishop Sheil's Visit to
Germany in Dec. 1945 and Jan. 1946; Clay to Washington, 11
Mar. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br.,
BOX 138, 5/295-2/7.
’Memo from Matthew Connelly, Secretary to the President
to Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, 7 Sept. 1945;
reply Acheson to Connelly, 14 Sept. 1945; NA RG 59 Central
Files 1945-49, 862.404/9-745.
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country.

They did not receive a warm welcome from Clay, but

upon their return Truman himself took action.

On 13 February

1946 he created the Committee of Relief Agencies Licensed to
Operate

in Germany

institution

not

(CRALOG) .

only

Over

provided

the next years

vital

food

and

this

clothing

supplies, but, led by the example of the American Friends
Services

Committee,

CRALOG

members

also

became

actively

involved in social programs for young Germans in the American
zone and Berlin.10
Clay's cool reception of the committee was due to the
fact that additional agencies only complicated his problems.
If they had their way, he would have to house and feed more
American civilians over whose work he would have no control.
In addition, the general never deviated from his conviction
that

the

Germans

rehabilitation.

should
Help

be

responsible

would be welcomed

for
as

Germans wanted it and would be in charge of it.

their

long

own

as

the

Clay wanted

to avoid any attempts by outsiders to patronize them.

Many

weeks passed before the relief agencies were able to overcome
OMGUS resistance and administrative hurdles.11
The arrival of CRALOG agencies in Germany was one of the
smaller problems the Deputy Military Governor was facing.

An

10James F. Tent, "Simple Gifts: The American Friends
Services Committee and the Establishment of Neighborhood
Centers in Post-1945 Germany," Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 2
(1989) 1: 64-82. The following chapter will deal in detail
with the Friends' and CRALOG activities.
"Tent, "Simple Gifts" 69.
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important issue in Washington was the definition of the roles
which the War and State Departments would play during the
further occupation of Germany.

Clay had based his decision

to separate Military Government and tactical troops in 1945
on the assumption that this would be the first step towards
transferring
Department.

the

former's

responsibilities

to

the

State

Releasing personnel from the Army and rehiring

them as civilians was another step in the same direction.
When the Patton scandal and denazification caused negative
headlines

in

the

United

States

in

the

fall

of

1945,

Eisenhower and Clay decided that it was high time to let the
State

Department

Government.

assume

responsibility

for

Military

Although they initially were able to convince

President Truman that it was "not a job for soldiers," they
finally had to give up their hope for a quick withdrawal of
the Army from these duties.

The ensuing discussions in 1945

and 1946 ended in an agreement between the State, War, and
Navy

Departments

in

April

that

reaffirmed

the

State

Department's policy-making prerogative, while continuing the
War Department's role in carrying them out.12
This
however.

agreement

did

not

ensure

smooth

cooperation,

In order to develop a specific policy directive for

German youth, for example, State Department officials needed
to gather data on the situation in Germany.

Bishop Sheil and

Byron Price had undoubtedly provided some useful insights,
I2Henke 997-1004.
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but Eugene Anderson, in charge of Germany and Austria in the
Department's division for occupied areas, found it useful to
learn as much as possible from the field.

The administrative

setup

obstacle

proved

undertaking.

to

be

a

considerable

to

this

A meeting between Anderson and Hilldring, who

was about to leave his CAD position to become a member of the
State Department in February 1946, dealt exclusively with the
cooperation between the two departments in the fields of
information
complained

control,
that

the

religion,
Army

and

simply

education.
did

not

Anderson

provide

his

department with much information about conditions in Germany.
Without such information writing a useful policy was out of
the question.13
Although Anderson had to develop a policy that took the
specific situation in Germany into consideration, he acted in
a much broader context with its roots in the 193 0s.

To make

Roosevelt's good neighbor policy with Latin America more
effective,

the

State

Department

had

created

a

special

Division of Cultural Relations which developed an extensive
exchange program between Latin American countries and the
United States.14

This first program was so successful that

l3Fiissl 111.
14J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of U.S.
Cultural Diplomacy, Cultural Relations Programs of the U.S.
Department of State Historical Studies 2, International
Information and Cultural Series 110 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Dept, of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
1976).
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educators and politicians thought about expanding it to other
countries after World War II.

Senator William Fulbright

solved the problem of financing such an endeavor in a unique
way.

Many countries needed the surplus material American

armed forces had used and left behind.

Bringing the material

back to the United States would be too costly and would
burden the American economy.

Another way of getting rid of

the material was to sell it to the countries where it was.
They usually had suffered from war damage and needed the
materials.

Since they usually were not able to convert their

currencies into dollars, Fulbright thought that it would be
a better idea to invest the profits of sales of military
surplus in trust funds in these countries.
be used in two ways:

The funds could

First, they could pay for the stay of

American students abroad.

Second, they would provide the

money for financing the journeys of foreign students to the
United States.

The Senator's rationale for bringing foreign

persons to the United States was straightforward:
My belief in the program is based on the assumption that
when foreigners come to our shores what they see will be
good.
In spite of our occasional strange aberrations,
I believe that America is a great country, that its
virtues outweigh its faults. If the people of the world
can understand us, they will throw in their lots with
u s .15
Fulbright received strong support from the Department of
State and American educators.

The Institute of International

l5Tristram Coffin, Senator Fulbright: Portrait of a
Public Philosopher (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1966) 84-87
(the quote is on 86); Kellermann 173.
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Education and the State Department cosponsored a conference
with university professors from all over the United States to
discuss the possibilities of expanding the American cultural
exchange activities which the United States had initiated
with

Latin

America

to

other

countries.

The

delegates

discussed practical problems they had encountered so far with
the exchange programs.
supported

the

They also officially recommended and

expansion

of

the

existing

programs.

The

educators promised to support US information policy abroad
with all means at their disposal and endorsed the bills by
Fulbright and Bloom that would provide financial support for
such an expansion.

These bills became the famous Public Law

584 a little later and provided the basis for one of most
successful efforts to promote goodwill towards the United
States through first hand information and experience in the
United States.
the

Apparently the delegates were confident that

bills would pass,

because

they immediately began to

tackle the practical problems which the expansion of the
exchanges would bring.16
The Fulbright Act was the culmination of a sustained
effort by the Department of State to expand its information
activities after the war.

In December 1944 Roosevelt created

l6Abstract of the Proceedings of the Conference of
Foreign Student Problems and Policies, called by the
Institute of International Education and the Department of
State, Chicago, 111. 29 Apr. to 1 May 1946; NA RG 84 Foreign
Service Posts, Munich Consulate General, General Records,
842.
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the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Public and
Cultural Affairs to which he appointed Archibald MacLeish.
When

MacLeish

Within

the

left,

William

Department,

Benton took

the

Office

over

of

his

post.

International

Information and Cultural Affairs emerged to coordinate the
Department's efforts in this field.
defined

its mission.

By December 1945 it had

Its main task was to maintain and

service sixty information centers the State Department had
established

all

over

the

world

and

to

supply

American

diplomats with documents and all other available information
and

materials

Department

of

about
State

life

in

would

the

United

supplement

States.

the

The

traditional

diplomats with public affairs officers whose sole task was to
provide information about the United States.

The office

also began to develop a program of documentary and newsreel
films about the United States.

Finally, the State Department

also would establish its own world wide short wave radio
broadcast

program

which

came

to

be

known

as

Voice

of

America.17
During trips to various parts of the world in 1947 a
considerable number of members of Congress experienced first
hand that people in many countries,

not just the former

enemies, did not have a clear picture of the United States.

l7Henry Pilgert, The History of the Development of
Information
Services Through
Information
Centers and
Documentary Films ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the U.S. High
Commissioner for Germany, Historical Division, 1951) 1-2.
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Their

experiences

President

signed

led

to

the

in January

Smith-Mundt

1948.

Act

The Act

which the

considerably

broadened Fulbright's initial objective by establishing the
United

States

Information

educational exchange service.
during the following

Service

in

addition

to

an

Substantial appropriations

fiscal years document that Congress

indeed saw an urgent necessity for these programs.

The

emerging Cold War probably provided sufficient justification
for

these

new

expenditures.

By April

1948

sixty-eight

centers were operating in all corners of the globe such as
Ankara, Warsaw, Cairo,

and Bangkok.

Latin America had an

additional twenty-eight centers, established on the basis of
the 1938

act which had provided the basis

for the good

neighbor policy.18
Germany, however, did not appear on the initial list of
countries that would benefit from the new programs.

For the

time being the United States still had to come up with a
policy that would outline re-education in the American zone.
Nevertheless, the State Department made it clear as early as
June 1945 that it intended to encourage cultural contacts
between carefully selected Germans and other countries at the
l8Pilgert, Information Centers 2-3; for the details of
the program in April 1948 see list of educational materials
sent to US Information Libraries and Cultural Centers, 8 Apr.
1948; NA RG 84 Consulate General Munich, General Records, Box
26, 842 Education Dispatches 1948; more information on the
Smith-Mundt Act and its predecessor of 1938 is in a dispatch
from Dept, of State to Consul General, Munich, 27 Jan. 1948;
NA RG 84 Consulate General Munich, General Records, Box 26,
842 Student Exchange 1948.
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earliest possible moment.

It wanted to avoid yet another

isolation of Germany from the rest of the world after the
Nazis had interrupted almost all cultural contacts for twelve
years.19
To formulate this policy Anderson may not have been able
to count on direct information from Germany, but advice from
fellow Americans abounded.

The topic of re-educating the

Germans seemed to intrigue many Americans.

In the course of

1946 numerous letters from all over the country reached the
State Department.

They offered a wide range of suggestions

which differed considerably in tone, content, and quality.
Vera

Petschek,

for

example,

originally from Czechoslovakia.

was

a

naturalized

citizen

She had been able to witness

events in Germany and Europe firsthand before she came to the
United States in 1941 from Central Europe.

She wrote the

Department

necessity

on

5

February

1946

about

the

supplying Germans with reading materials.

of

State Department

officials were not above taking advice from the population.
Hans Speyer,
Europe,

then the chief of the division for occupied

reacted promptly.

Five days after Petschek had

written her letter, he invited her for further elaboration of
the proposal.

Most of the correspondence,

however, never

received more than a brief reply.20
^Secretary's Staff Committee, Long Range Policy for
German Re-education, 13 Jun. 1945; NA RG 59 Central Files
1945-49, 862.42/6-1345.
20NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/2-546.
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Another American, Edward Hascall, had just returned from
Germany, where he had been MG education officer in a small
town in Upper Franconia.

Hascall reported in a letter he

directed to Archibald MacLeish, who was then representing the
US in the founding procedures of UNESCO, that the Americans
had just finished weeding out the Nazis in time for opening
the schools in October 1945, but that many of the teachers
they had selected were young and needed further guidance.

He

felt that the Americans apparently were forgetting about the
re-education of the Germans and suggested that the United
Nations should arrange for educators to go to Germany to
support the Germans with the task because they were "quite
helpless"

if left to their own resources.

Hascall felt

strongly about re-education and probably represented well the
views of his fellow officers who were still struggling in
Germany.

He concluded:

It is important that those children who are just
beginning in school have a different start than did
their older brothers and sisters; and, although the
older brothers and sisters seem far from help, we must
try to bring them back.
We are not trying now; not
nearly hard enough.
Are we quitters? Do we turn our
backs to a job half done?21
The

State

Department's

disappointed Hascall.

initial

answer

must

have

Two months after he had sent his

letter, Anderson informed him briefly and in a very formal
fashion that his idea was unfeasible since Germany was still

21Edward O. Hascall to Archibald MacLeish, 25 Feb. 1945;
NA RG 59 central Files 1945-49, 862.42/2-2546.
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under four power control and the UN did not have anything to
do with the problem.

Hascall, however, apparently was not

satisfied with the answer.

In May he replied to Anderson's

note and seems to have reiterated his ideas of the necessity
of a cultural exchange.
Department's interest.

This time he aroused the State
In June Anderson inquired whether

Hascall knew of any evidence that the American people, as
well as college and university professors, would welcome a
plan that would send German educators to the United States
for one or two years.22
In his search for information Anderson also engaged the
Department's intelligence section.
he got a preliminary report.

By the end of March 1946

As far as youth was concerned,

its author first described the desolate situation for young
people in postwar Germany.

They did not have nearly enough

school hours or materials.

Their teachers were overworked

and their homes either devastated or overcrowded.

In view of

those conditions it would be good for Americans to focus
their special attention on extra-curricular activities.

The

author had more in mind than the sports program the Army had
started

just

a few months

earlier.

He

envisioned that

outside institutions would have to come to the rescue of
schools by providing young people with information about

^Eugene Anderson to Edward O. Hascall, 22 Apr. 1946; NA
RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/2-2546; Eugene Anderson
to Edward O. Hascall, 11 June 1946; NA RG 59 Central Files
1945-49, 862.42/6-1146.
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international affairs and foreign countries.

Young people

also should have the opportunity to participate in cultural
activities.

In one important aspect the report did not

provide any fresh ideas.

It was not the author's aim to

develop a new and positive approach to dealing with German
youth.

Just as with the Army's disease and unrest formula,

he justified such a program with the argument that it was in
the interest of maintaining the security of the armed forces
to keep young Germans off the streets and out of trouble.
According to him, extra-curricular activities provided the
best way to do just that.

The report found a lack of almost

everything necessary for youth activities in Germany.
were no suitable leaders.

There

The author further argued that MG

had composed youth committees in such a way that they could
do little to help young people.
sports facilities were available.
the whole range of youth work:

Not enough club houses and
His recommendations swept
young Germans should have

sufficient equipment for their sports activities, but also
should have arts and crafts materials as well as libraries at
their

disposal.

Recreational

facilities

and

activities

should be guided by qualified youth leaders who would be
trained by skilled American teachers and social workers.
International contacts also would be advisable.23

^"Notes on the Problem of American Aid to Education in
Post-War Germany," Frederick F. Burkhardt, Office of Research
and Intelligence to Eugene Anderson, 28 Mar. 1946; NA RG 59
Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/3-2846.
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By April
report

1946 Anderson was ready for a preliminary

to his

superiors.

Contrary

to

Taylor's and

his

staff's thinking and actions in 1945 he advocated a two-fold
approach to German re-education which would greatly expand
American responsibilities and activities in Germany.
Americans

should

try

to

eliminate

First,

militarism

authoritarianism from the German character,

and

and then they

should try to reform the institutions that promoted these
attitudes,

a clear reference to school reform.

Obviously

Anderson rejected the notion that there would be any capable
Germans available who could be trusted with the task.

He

suggested that reaching these goals would require a massive
effort which could only be sustained with the help of private
institutions.

In

line with MacLeish's

and the Advisory

Committee's previous recommendations on re-education,

but

borrowing more from psychiatry than from educational ideas,
he thought that it would be necessary to explain to the
Germans what the Americans were trying to do with them so
that they would be able to adapt to the new conditions.
Clearly a cure for the disease could only be prescribed by
the doctor and required the cooperation— but not the input—
of

the

patient.

Anderson

went

on

to

develop

a

very

sophisticated system of committees in the United States that
would address each German weakness,
experts
Germans".

to

Germany

to

discuss

the

find a cure and send
cure

with

"selected

He estimated that about 250 experts would have to
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go to Germany on such a mission in the following fiscal year
and reported that the War Department's CAD had requested that
funds for these experts be included in the War Department's
budget.

In addition to the experts Americans would have to

use all resources available such as films, radio programs,
books, and magazines to help the Germans in the process of
recuperation.

Anderson finally informed his superiors that

he was working with the Department's intelligence section on
"a list of weaknesses in the German character which we might
try to overcome."24
Although this draft probably did not reach the State
Department's

highest

echelons

and

obviously

was

never

implemented in this form, it contained a number of thoughts
and suggestions on which Anderson, who became one of the
chief architects of American re-education policy, continued
to build.

First, Anderson thought that in fact all Germans

possessed a militaristic and authoritarian mind, but at the
same time he was convinced that massive outside intervention
could change that.

Second, he clearly realized that the task

was so big that it would require resources in personnel,
material, and expertise which the American government could
not muster alone.

Anderson introduced all the ingredients

which would become part of the American reorientation effort:

24Memorandum from Eugene Anderson to Messrs. Leverich and
Speyer (for Hilldring), 5 Apr. 1946; NA RG 59, Central Files
1945-49, 862.42/4-546; see also Tent (Mission 256) for a very
brief summary of the memorandum.
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Visiting experts,

information and education centers which

offered literature,

practical help,

as well as extensive

documentary film collections with the necessary projectors.
Anderson also seems to have assumed from the start that the
policy should not be directed towards all Germans but should
rather target an elite which then could serve as multipliers.
A few days later Anderson added another dimension to
his plan.
Advisory

In yet another memo he suggested reviving the
Committee

on German

Re-education.

The primary

purpose of this revival would be to discuss the feasibility
of bringing carefully selected German leaders and students to
the United States whom private organizations would sponsor.
Anderson pointed to the Federal Council of Churches' plan to
bring Martin Niemoller, a pastor who had resisted Hitler and
spent time in concentration camps, to the United States.

He

suspected that other organizations soon would follow suit and
that the State Department needed to be prepared.
clearly

favored

such an

exchange,

but wanted

Anderson
to

gather

information and support with regard to American and German
public opinion as well as the possible costs involved in such
a

program.

The

committee

would

be

ideally

suited

for

recruiting the private sector as well as coordinating private
with

government

activities.

According

to

him,
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foundations had already set aside substantial sums for the
revival of cultural relations with Germany.25
Other events in the first half of 1946 helped Anderson
to get closer to his goals.

Early in the year the Americans

had sent an education mission which consisted of a number of
high ranking educators

from the United States

to Japan.

General MacArthur highly commended the mission for its work
and thought that its recommendations would be very useful for
reforming the Japanese school system.

American educators had

suggested a similar mission to Germany as early as the summer
of 1945,

but had not received a positive reply.26

In the

spring of the following year and with the success of the
mission to Japan to back them, they tried again.27
This
favorably.

time

the

State

and

War

Departments

reacted

Clay had no objections, but insisted that such a

mission had to be very small.

Initially the State Department

^Memorandum Eugene Anderson to Messrs: Leverich and
Speyer, 9 Apr. 1946; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49,
862.42/4-946; also Tent, Mission 257.
26Williard E. Givens, Executive Secretary, National
Education Association of the United States to Henry Stimson,
Secretary of War, 14 Jun. 1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 194549, 862.42/6-2845. The War Department referred his request
for a mission to State, but informed Givens that at that time
travel to and from Germany was restricted to the "absolute
essential minimum."
^William Carr, Assistant Secretary of the National
Education Association of the United States to David Harris,
Dept, of State, 6 May 1946; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49,
862.42/5-646; letter from Friends Committee on National
Legislation to Secretary of State, James Byrnes, 3 May 1946
and Anderson's reply of 21 May; NA RG 59 Central Files 194549, 862.42/5-346.
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wanted to have only highly qualified educators who would not
only be familiar with German education but also with its
political system.28

At the same time,

however,

the State

Department had to satisfy political demands at home.

The

educators had to represent a number of organizations, various
educational branches,
States.

As

a result

Reinhold Niebuhr,
German

and different regions of the United
only one

of

the

mission

members,

had been involved in the formulation of

re-education

policy

from

the

start.

The

State

Department tried to make up for this deficiency by sending
Anderson along with the delegation as its liaison officer.
A second mission member, T.V. Smith, was familiar with the
German situation.

The others were competent educators whose

judgment could be valuable although they were not thoroughly
acquainted

with

the

Department gave all

conditions

in

mission members

Germany.
a

brief

The

State

orientation

session in Washington before the mission left for Germany
with George Zook,

the president of the National Education

Association, as chair.29

28Memo from H. Speier to E. Anderson, 14 May 194 6; NA RG
59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/5-1446.
29Tent Mission, 112-115. The State Department could not
accommodate every prominent educator.
Stephen Duggan, the
director of the Institute of International Education at the
time, for example, apparently had found out about plans for
the mission and offered to go to Germany.
Henry Leverich,
Anderson's colleague in the Occupied Areas Division,
diplomatically referred him to the War Department and out of
the way (NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/7-146).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

215
Before the Department officially invited the educators
to participate in a mission to Germany in July, it was able
to obtain a directive from the State War Navy Coordinating
Committee (SWNCC) which outlined the goals of American re
education.

While it did not mention youth specifically, the

statement paved the way for later directives which would deal
exclusively with the topic.

SWNCC 269/5 stated that the re

education of the German people was an integral part of a
comprehensive

American

program.

influential positions was

Eliminating

Nazis

from

the necessary precondition

for

starting any positive steps towards rehabilitating Germany.
SWNCC 269/5 further explained that Americans needed to teach
the Germans

respect

and tolerance.

They would

have

to

instill in the individuals a sense of their rights as well as
their responsibilities and the desire for searching the truth
in order to serve justice.

The directive explicitly stated

that Americans would rely on German manpower and resources to
the widest possible extent.

To achieve their goals

the

Americans would have to overcome the isolation which National
Socialism and the war had caused.

International cultural

contacts

the

would

help

to

assimilate

Germans

into

the

community of nations.30

30State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Long Range
Policy Statement for Germany, Policy Statement no. 269/5, 5
June 1946; printed in United States, Department of State,
Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents, European and
Commonwealth Series 9 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1950) 541-42.
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Apart from the general directive the State Department
provided

the mission

with

its

inarching orders

in

July.

Clearly bearing Anderson's mark, the Department directed the
attention of the mission members to everything it believed
was wrong.

It criticized Military Government for failing to

secure competent personnel and its educators for focusing
their

efforts

mainly

on

administrative questions.

material

reconstruction

and

Concentrating entirely on formal

education had neglected to instill the Germans with positive
values and especially had not yet built up youth work along
democratic principles.

The mission would therefore face a

threefold task:
(1) [S]tating a philosophic approach to the problem,
pointing out the defects of our present program, and
indicating the main lines of our future effort; (2)
arousing US [sic] interest in and persuading qualified
people to offer their services to the program; (3)
influencing US officials in Germany to accept necessary
changes in the present program, without the strain on
relations between Washington and the theater which would
occur if far-reaching proposals originated here without
the benefits of the mission's recommendation.31
Zook and his colleagues spent August and September 1946
collecting information from a great variety of sources.

Clay

received their final report at the end of September.

The

mission

members

directed

the

first

part of

their

paper

clearly more towards the public, politicians, and educators
in the United States than to the Military Governor.

Their

310ffice Memorandum, US Government, 8 July 1946: German
Educational Mission; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49,
740.00119/7-846, quoted in Fiissl 111-112.
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report described the widespread destruction and the lack of
nearly all materials of importance for a good educational
system.

According to the mission,

the war not only had

wrought havoc to educational facilities,
educators and the population in general.

but also to the

Millions of refugee

and expellee women and children, and the imprisonment of most
able bodied men further exacerbated the situation.

Largely

agreeing with SWNCC 269/5 the mission members called for an
all encompassing re-education effort.

The Americans' major

challenge would be to introduce democracy to a country with
a rigid caste system and to a people whose majority did not
display any interest in such a political system.
effort

also

material

would

situation

take

care

which

of

could

the
only

Germans'
be

Such an
desperate

ameliorated

permitting the Germans to resume industrial production.

by
The

educators explained that Americans had taken on a special
obligation towards their former enemies and the world when
they agreed to become one of the occupying powers and assume
complete control over Germany.

Clay certainly concurred with

the educators' statement that people who had to live below
the recognized level of subsistence did not make good targets
for any democratization effort.

The mission members did not

question any of the principles that underlay Clay's policies,
especially denazification, which the Law for Liberation from
National

Socialism

and

Militarism

had

delegated

to

the

Germans under American control and on which the Allies had
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agreed in Potsdam.

On the contrary, they commended Military

Government for the work it had done.
The mission nevertheless took up a number of issues
which

it thought

needed

improvement.

The German

school

system was the most important part of the education package
the Americans addressed.
however,

the rigid

According to the mission members,

caste

system and political

apathy

Germany needed to be addressed on many different

in

levels.

Reform of the school system would be necessary, but at the
same time the mission found that the system did have its
merits.

They wanted to preserve Germany's "high standard of

literacy and its excellence in trades and professions."
Americans also should recognize that German educators had
made significant strides towards democratizing the system
during the Weimar Republic.

Educators would have to retain

the valuable sides of the system,
promote drastic reforms.
degree

of

equality

but should continue to

The main goal should be a higher
which

opportunities for everyone.

meant

equal

educational

The mission found Clay's policy

to return most responsibilities to the Germans to be correct,
but recommended that Americans should maintain their veto
power and ultimate authority.32

nReport of the United States Education Mission to
Germany [hereinafter Education Mission], the Department of
State European Series 16 (Washington:
Government Printing
Office, 1946): 1-32 (the quote is on 19).
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The report reveals the Americans' attempts to find a
compromise between the American and the German educational
systems.

Based

above

all

on

John

Dewey's

educational

philosphy, American educators understood their mission to be
more than just the teaching of academic subjects.

Dewey

defined education as an important means of providing young
people a basic academic training but also with the essentials
of an egalitarian and democratic society.
American

children

of all

classes

As

a result,

and races went

through

twelve years of comprehensive schooling under the same roof,
with

the

notable

exception

of

the

remained segregated until the 1960s.
the academic requirements
after high school.
in Germany,

South,

where

schools

Colleges took care of

for the more advanced students

This philosphy differed sharply from that

where children, teachers,

and parents had to

choose between very different types of schools at an early
stage of their childrens' education.

While schooling was

compulsory and resulted in an extremely high literacy rate,
only a tiny elite was admitted to a variety of secondary
schools
training.

which

provided

Only

those

highly
students

advanced
who made

and

theoretical

it through

its

rigorous curriculum and passed the comprehensive final exams
after twelve years would be allowed to attend universities.
The great majority of the students continued with a very
basic eight year education which lead to an apprenticeship
directly to the job market.

Some of those who were deemed
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more gifted went to still another type of middle school from
which they graduated after ten years with some basics in
clerical

training

which

enabled

apprenticeships in these fields.

them

to

apply

for

Dewey was highly critical

of this system because more often than not it did not work
according

to

abilities— as German

educators

claimed— but

served to maintain class stratification.

School fees and the

selection

schools

process

for

the

secondary

made

them

fortresses of the middle class, while members of the working
class had to be content with basic education.

Nevertheless

German educators could point out that this stratified system
had worked very well in the past, providing universities with
the intellectual elite they needed for research on one end of
the

educational

stratum

and

industry

with

skilled

and

young

Germans

was

unskilled workers on the other.33
As

far

concerned,

the

state

of mind

of

the mission found the situation to be far from

hopeless.
demanded

as

The report conceded that the Third Reich had
a

special

commitment

from

young

people.

The

33This paragraph provides only a very rough sketch of the
two educational systems and philosophies.
For more detail
see Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education
(ed.), Between Elite and Mass Education: Education in the
Federal Republic of Germany (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1983) 11-18, 26-35; Muller 138-175.
I do not
agree with his interpretation of the Zook report as the
recommendation to introduce the American school system in
Germany. The report acknowledged the German system's merit,
but also correctly insisted that its basic flaws, above all
its function to maintain a rigid class system, needed to be
changed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

221
complete collapse and occupation of Germany had left them
bewildered,

confused

and

hopeless.

But,

the

authors

continued,
there is more residual health among the German youth,
despite these difficulties, than outside or casual
observers might suspect....
Despite difficulties of
every kind, spiritual and physical, the youth of the
nation exhibit a widespread eagerness to participate
creatively in rebuilding their nation, in making contact
with the outside world after years of isolation, and in
reconstructing their own broken world of ideals and
loyalties. There is, therefore, no reason to despair of
the fruitfulness of the task of reorientation upon which
we are embarked.34
Since most of the school children could not attend school for
more than twenty hours per week, the Americans should pay
special

attention

activities.

Here

to

extracurricular

youth

the mission members

again

groups
referred

and
to

German tradition, which, according to them, had been healthy
and anti-authoritarian before Hitler incorporated all of the
youth groups in the Hitler Youth.

That tradition could serve

as a basis for reviving youth work, but here as everywhere
else young people lacked almost all essentials: they did not
have food,
report

transportation,

considered

the

another severe handicap.
suggestions

from July,

lack

clubhouses or equipment.
of responsible

The

leadership

as

In line with the State Department's
the

mission

suggested

that

youth

should become more involved and responsible for their own
affairs.

The report also found that adults dominated the

youth committees and tended to use them for controlling and
34Education Mission: 3.
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registering youth groups instead of supporting them.

It

would therefore be necessary to make yet another attempt to
involve young Germans in managing their own affairs.

MG

should consider introducing youth councils which would be
free of adult supervision prevalent in the youth committees.
The mission pointed out that it regarded leadership training
in Germany as essential and recommended bringing in American
specialists on a short term basis for the purpose.

The

Army's assistance program could become a considerable help
for American policy in Germany, provided that the Army would
be able to supply it with sufficient and adequate personnel.
The

Germans

objectives

also
of

would

the

have

program,

to

and

be
the

informed
Army

and

about
MG

the

should

maintain close liaison at the top level.35
The mission found another advantage in the presence of
American

the

first

dependents of American soldiers had arrived there.

This

would

troops

not

only

in

Germany.

provide

In

American

April

1946

children

and

families

stationed in Germany with excellent opportunities to serve as
ambassadors for their country and the American way of living,
but

their

examples
mission's
contacts

schools

could

also

serve

as

laboratories

for progressive German educators.

and

Although the

optimism and idealism regarding German-American
on

this

level

in

the

long

run

proved

35Education Mission: 33-36.
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disappointing, it led to a number of interesting experiments
during the next years.36
The report finally admonished its readers to consider
the re-education of the Germans as a goal that needed to have
the highest priority.

This would make

it necessary

in

Germany to elevate the Education and Religious Affairs Branch
to division status and at least to double its personnel.

The

mission criticized MG for not even filling all positions
which the table of organization permitted.

In the United

States it would be necessary to pool all available resources.
Washington

would

have

to

incorporate

the

services

and

contributions of private institutions and individuals into
its efforts.
On

their

journey

throughout

the American

zone,

the

mission members also had detected a desire by many Germans to
come to the United States on an exchange basis.
recommended such a program.

They highly

It would bring Germans out of

their isolation and at the same time would provide them with
the best hands-on experience in the democratic process.

A

permanent advisory committee would be able to assist the
government in decisions regarding German reorientation and
could help coordinate the private and the government sector.
Zook and the mission members appealed to all Americans that

ztEducation Mission: 28; Frederiksen (119-128) provides
detailed information about the first years of the American
military communities in Germany.
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there could be

"no turning back in our support of that

program so vital to the enduring peace of the world."37
Anderson could be satisfied with these recommendations
and the publicity this high calibre delegation received back
home.

Whereas the mission dealt with reorientation in the

broadest

terms,

however,

the

four weeks

in Germany

had

convinced him that extracurricular youth work would be the
real testing ground for American efforts.

According to his

own analysis, the generation between twenty-five and fortyfive years would
education process.

not be able to participate

in the re

Those who had survived the carnage of the

previous six years were either in POW camps or politically
discredited because of their participation in the Nazi state.
One could therefore observe that old people who had not been
tainted by the Nazis took over political responsibilities.
Anderson observed that on the other side of the spectrum
stood the young generation.

According to him, the old people

refused to entrust this generation with power and authority.
He argued that older Germans thought that the Nazis had
succeeded in indoctrinating the youth and had stripped it of
all moral values, an attitude Anderson did not share at all.
He predicted that the exclusion of young people from the

37Education Mission: 46-50; see also Henry Kellermann,
Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy:
The Educational Exchange Program Between the United Sates and
Germany 1945-1954, International and Cultural Information
Series 114 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1978) 23-25.
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political

process

would

hurt

the

American

reorientation

effort because the Germans prevented their own youth from
finding and trying out new ideals.
promote
egoism

a tendency
and

make

indoctrination.

towards

young

This constellation would

a withdrawal

people

towards

susceptible

to

extreme

one

sided

Since the Germans obviously were incapable

of finding a solution to the problem by themselves, Anderson
concluded once more that it would be necessary to intensify
all American reorientation efforts.
only

avenue

SWNCC

269/5

left

Taking advantage of the

open

for

direct

American

involvement, Anderson suggested that a broad exchange program
of persons and materials would be vital for achieving this
goal.

It would

offer young people the orientation they

needed.38
Anderson received strong and articulate support from
Undersecretary of State, William Benton.

In October 1946

Benton advocated sending several thousand "carefully selected
German students annually" to the United States.

According to

him, such an expenditure would be far more productive than
spending the money on economic rehabilitation or the military
occupation of Germany and would help eliminate the root of
the German problem.
measures,

If they decided

to

introduce

such

Americans "would be approaching a major disease

with the surgeon's knife instead of a scalpel."
thought that

sending

experts

to Germany

on

Benton also
re-education

38Fussl 113-114; Tent, Mission 258-59.
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missions

was

an

excellent

idea.

According

to him,

the

Americans should not limit their efforts to schools,

but

should further encourage youth activities in Germany at all
levels.39
Benton's statement immediately followed James Byrnes'
famous Stuttgart speech in which the Secretary of State had
announced to Germany and to the world that the United States
was

going

to

change

its course.

Frustrated

by

Soviet

obstruction at the Paris conference of foreign ministers and
urged

by

Clay

to

counter

the massive

Soviet

propaganda

efforts with a constructive proposal of the United States,
the Secretary of State went to Stuttgart in September 1946 to
deliver a speech which Germans and foreign observers alike
immediately recognized as a turning point of American policy.
For the first

time since the end of the

war, a leading

politician of

the

talk about

Germans,

former allies

but rather to them.

did not

the

Byrnes did not announce a

softening of American policy in Germany.

He also did not

withdraw from any of the provisions President Truman had
agreed

to

in

Potsdam.

The

difference

from

previous

announcements lay in the Secretary's statement that it was
time

for

the

Germans

to start

their way

back

into

the

community of nations and that a united Germany would soon
have to be able to make its own decisions.

He commented that

39,lWilliam Benton reports to James Byrnes," Press
Release, 12 Oct. 1946; NA RG 84 Munich Consulate General,
Classified General Records, Box 2, 842 Student Exchange.
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the recent merger of the British and the American zones and
the invitation to the other occupying powers to follow suit
was the first step in a more constructive direction.

Byrnes

also made clear that the United States did not expect Europe
to

recover

without

the help

of Germany's

industry.

He

officially laid to rest the ghost of a permanent agrarian
state

which

Government

had

arisen

published

JCS

anew
1067

in

Germany

just

six

when

Military

months

earlier,

although it was outdated and had never been a serious option
in American
Germans

policy.

that

the

Cloaked
Americans

responsibilities as occupiers,

in a stern warning to the
would

not

shirk

their

he made clear to Germany,

Europe, and the Soviets that the Americans would stay.

In

his conclusion Byrnes offered American help to the Germans on
their way back into the community of "free and peaceloving
nations of the world". German reactions were immediate and
positive.

The Germans in the western zones knew now that

they would be able to start the physical and psychological
reconstruction

with

American help

and

be

protected

from

Soviet aggression.40
The continuity and strength of anti-Soviet feelings is
certainly the most impressive evidence that Americans did not
have to make any concessions to the Germans to win them over
40Address delivered in Stuttgart, 6 Sept. 1946 (the full
text can be found in Department of State Information Bulletin
15 (Sep. 1946): 496-501 and in Germany 3-8); see also Clay
78-82; Davidson (145-156) describes the West German reactions
to the speech.
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to their camp in the emerging Cold War.
influential Americans argued this way.
with

the

education

mission

to

Of course some

Following his trip

Germany,

the

theologian

Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, proposed in an article in Time
that the United States would have to enlist the Germans in
the impending struggle with the Soviet Union.
Germans against communism,
Germans had

however,

Enlisting

was not the problem.

invaded the Soviet Union in 1941.

National

Socialists were certainly among the most reliable opponents
of

communism.

Socialism,

It

was

militarism,

German

aggressiveness,

National

and racism that had inflicted two

catastrophic wars in three decades.

This is why the State

Department was not happy with Niebuhr's proposal.

Hilldring,

by then Assistant Secretary of State, noted that Niebuhr had
forgotten that the basis for the re-education program was not
the

fight

against

communism,

but

rather

the

attempt

to

replace National Socialism and militarism with democratic
values.

Since Soviet propaganda and actions in its zone of

occupation only offered a different brand of totalitarianism,
Hilldring found that developing an extensive re-education
program which especially targeted youth in the west should be
one of the State Department's top priorities.41
Clay's insistence that JCS 1067 was a solid basis for
his

actions

officials

and his

participate

refusal

to

let Military

in the policy

Government

formulation process,

41Fussl 119.
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however, did not help the State Department in its attempts to
assess the situation and needs in Germany and incorporate
them in a new general directive.
apparatus

also

prevented

The cumbersome committee

the

Department

from

quickly

formulating more specific guidelines for youth activities.
In August 1946, however, the first obstacle fell.
frustrated

with

four

power

negotiations,

Apparently

Clay

finally

signalled his willingness to accept a new directive for the
American zone of occupation.
concerned,
sufficient.

he

thought

that

As far as re-education was
a

broad

statement

would

be

SWNCC 269/5 would serve well as the implementing

directive for OMGUS headquarters.

Apparently he wanted to

give his officers in Germany as much leeway as possible.42
On the surface the Department of State accepted Clay's
wishes,

but

between

August

1946

and

directive underwent constant revisions.
example,

January

1947

the

In October,

for

apparently riding on Benson's support,

the State

Department succeeded in integrating the exchange of persons
and materials between the American zone and the United States
in the directive.

Initially this exchange was to take place

only between the United States and the American Zone.

In

1947, however, the Americans expanded the program, permitting
Germans to travel to other European countries and experts
from those countries to come to their zone of occupation.

42Clay to War Dept.,
Papers, doc. 157, 187.

16 Sep.

46 and 25 Jan.

47; Clay

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

230
The ninth version of the directive, issued in January 1947,
exclusively dealt with the reorientation of German youth.

It

became the basis of American policy until the official end of
the American High Commission in 1955.43
SWNCC 269/9
facing in 1947.

assessed the problems German youth were
The authors of the directive seemed to base

their evaluation almost entirely on the findings of the OMGUS
intelligence section of the previous December.

First, they

described the consequences of Hitler's policy and the war for
young

people.

In

line

with

the

field report

and

with

Anderson's thinking, they identified the main problem as the
youth's
ideology.

search

for a new Fiihrer instead of

a different

The directive confirmed the course of American

policy in the field, but it introduced a new dimension to the
efforts.

According to the authors, Military Government had

completely neglected the large numbers of those who refused
to join any organizations.

In general it drew a dire picture

of the present status of American efforts and German youth:
[t]o what an extent the spiritual and political
reorientation of German youth has made headway is
doubtful.
The sometimes enthusiastic response to
efforts made in that direction has always come only from
a small minority. The great majority of German youth is
described as distrustful,
apathetic to political
questions if not outright cynical, and altogether
uncertain as to where to fix its wavering loyalty.

43SWNCC 269/8, 269/10, 269/11 reflect the development of
the exchange program; they are in Germany 611-14; SWNCC 289/9
is the main youth activities directive; it can be found in
Germany 578-583.
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SWNCC 2 69/9 concluded by identifying nine objectives
that Americans would need to target to help young people to
get back on the right track:
a. To substitute Nazi and militarist thought by a new
set of values compatible with democratic ideals and
essential to social progress.
b.
To protect German youth against undesirable
political influences and to provide for the adjustment
of Nazi youth in order to facilitate their political
rehabilitation and their absorption by the community.
c. To provide German youth with new moral, social, and
political incentives so as to invite their active
participation in the reconstruction of their country and
to overcome their indifference of hostility to community
affairs, their intolerance and lack of initiative.
d. To foster youth groups as a means of control, as a
means of facilitating reorientation, and as a means of
self-expression.
e. To permit youth groups to operate in connection with
adult civic groups, including political parties, in
order to further civic education and to prevent
clandestine or subversive activities by uncontrolled
political groups.
f. To reduce the danger of mass loafing and delinquency
by enhancing the social usefulness of youth through work
projects and intensified vocational training.
g. To promote and to perpetuate community interest in
youth and youth activities and to secure cooperation of
youth with the community.
h.

To rejuvenate existing political and civic bodies.

i.
To overcome the isolation of German youth by
resuming contacts between German youth and youth outside
Germany.
Although the directive often simply legalized policies
and objectives MG detachments had already pursued before
April

1946,

position.

it

also

officially

clarified

the

American

Simply eliminating the old evils, for example, was
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no longer enough.
other ideals.

Americans would have to replace them with

The directive for the first time ominously

mentioned that not just Nazi influences would be unwelcome in
the American zone.

The fight against National Socialism

slowly began to become more inclusive by applying the more
general concept of totalitarianism,
give up their original goal.
youth

amnesty

into

but Americans did not

The directive also took Clay's

account

and

made

clear

that

the

rehabilitation of former Hitler youth was not only possible,
but highly desirable.

The most important message of the

directive seemed to be that Americans had to succeed

in

integrating and reconciling young Germans with the emerging
political and social system.

Contacts with the rest of the

world would certainly further this progress considerably by
exposing Germans to other democracies

and widening their

horizons in general.
The

directive

suggestions

for its

also

provided

implementation.

detailed

practical

Military Government

officials were to "advise" local authorities on what to do
with the young people who were living in their communities.
MG would have to make sure that youth organizations would be
free of former Nazi activists.

All youth activities would be

based on experiencing the democratic process first-hand by
voting and granting fundamental rights such as freedom of
expression, tolerance, and cooperation to everyone.
administrators would

have

to

cooperate

to

make

German
hands-on
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experience

in

community

affairs

under

their

guidance

available to young people, especially in the field of youth
work.

The

training.

Americans

also

emphasized

youth

leadership

As far as the rehabilitation of Nazi youth was

concerned, the directive made clear that the Germans would
have to develop special programs for this group, but that
their attempts at reintegration should not have any punitive
character.

Finally Military Government would be responsible

for creating a wide variety of opportunities for German and
non-German youth to become reacquainted with each other.44
1947 brought the final turnaround of Washington's policy
in Germany.

The

first indication of a change came with

former President Herbert Hoover's mission to Germany during
the harsh winter of 1946/47 to assess the food situation.
With the constant haggling over the enormous amounts American
taxpayers had to come up with to feed the Germans in their
zone of occupation, President Truman needed to investigate
the matter.

Hoover was the ideal man for the job.

He had

directed the American relief efforts for Belgium during World
War I, he was familiar with the problems in Europe after
World War II and his integrity was beyond reproach.

Hoover

had visited other countries in Europe earlier that year and
had reported back to Washington that the situation there was
serious, but that nobody in Western Europe would be starving.
His report on Germany,

however,

sounded an alarming note.

“ SWNCC 2 69/9; Germany 578-83.
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Hoover

found

widespread

undernourishment

which

affected

especially the young and the old.

Hoover proposed that 10

million

available

tons

authorities

of

in

food

be

Germany

made

immediately.

The

to

American

far

reaching

economical suggestions Hoover made so that Germans would be
able to pay for their own food did much to change public
opinion about reparations
United

States.

Still

and deindustrialization

more

especially young people

important

and children,

for
was

the
the

in the
Germans,

fact that

Hoover immediately set out to save Germans from starvation.
His interest in the plight of children resulted in a special
program which from April 1947 on provided additional calories
for every child in the American zone.

Germans gratefully

named the program after its founder.45
In March 1947 George Kennan published his X-article in
Foreign Affairs which brought wide attention and recognition
of his containment theory.

Just three months later, George

Marshall, who had just replaced Byrnes as Secretary of State,
delivered his address at Harvard University which outlined
the American support program for Europe and became known as
the Marshall Plan.
be

able

remained,

to

Marshall recognized that Europe would not

recover

how

the

without
Germans

Germany,
could

but

come

the

back

question
into

45Davidson 158-161; Ruhl 184-86.
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international

arena

without

becoming

a

menace

to the

international community again.46
The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive that replaced JCS
1067 to govern general American policy in Germany over two
years after V-E day revealed the
tried

to

provide

the

answer

changes in attitude and

tothe

question.

The new

guidelines differed considerably from JCS 1067 in various
respects.

Whereas before the Americans had held out the hope

of Germany's reintegration in the community of nations in the
distant future,

in 1947 the time had come.

Germans would

join the international community as quickly as possible.

JCS

1067 had emphasized the negative aspects of American policy,
such

as

de-industrialization,

demilitarization

and

denazification.

Not surprisingly the new directive,

1779,

the

reflected

certainly

was

reconstructionist

delighted

to find that

JCS

approach.

Clay

Washington

finally

agreed with his point of view that a functioning economy
would

serve

Germany.
decision

as

integral

for

a democratic

and

peaceful

He may have been more surprised about Washington's
to

dramatically.
general

a pillar

that
part

elevate

the

importance

of

re-education

The authors of the directive admonished the
re-education
of

policies

of the

intended

democratic form of government."

46Tent (Mission 282)
American policy in 1947.

Germans had
to

help

to

be "an

develop

a

Clay should regard it as one

provides an excellent summary of
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of his most urgent duties to coordinate these efforts with
the

other

occupying

powers.

Military

Government

would

encourage Germans further to develop their own initiatives
and would support the development of international cultural
relations

in every respect,

but Americans were

far

from

abandoning all of their original objectives in Germany.

Clay

would have to "continue to effect the complete elimination of
all

National

Socialist,

militaristic

and

aggressively

nationalistic influences, practices and teachings from the
German educational system."

Although the time had come for

reintegrating the Germans into the international community,
it

could

only

happen

if

the

old

demons

remained

under

control.47
In view of the increasing emphasis on extra-curricular
activities it is hard to understand why the authors of the
directive

limited

their

instructions

entirely

to

formal

education.

JCS 1779 admonished the American educators in

Germany

"encourage

to

and

assist"

the

Germans

in

the

development of educational methods, curricula, materials and
even

schools.

Germany

should

democratic educational system."

end

up

with

a

"healthy,

It is not clear from the

directive whether American policy planners considered formal
education as the most important task of Military Government,
or whether they were satisfied with the provisions in SWNCC

47The full text of JCS 1079 is in Germany 33-41; see also
Tent, Mission 282-83.
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269 and simply filled the void the previous directive had
left, just as Clay had suggested.

At any rate the planners

in Washington had finally succeeded in providing Military
Government with new guidelines for the Germans.

It remains

to be seen what effect these guidelines and policy statements
actually had in Germany.

Military Government planning and

actions in the American zone of occupation as well as the
youth activities in a community will answer that question.
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CHAPTER VI
OMGUSt Reorientation. 1946-48

The fact that Washington needed almost two years to
provide

Military

Government

in

Germany

with

specific

guidelines concerning youth did not mean that Americans in
the field remained idle.

On the contrary,

Washington's

inactivity provided the men and women of Military Government
youth operations in Germany with opportunities to develop
their own ideas about re-educating young Germans in their
zone of occupation.

Undeterred by a lack of recognition

within OMGUS and administrative chaos, the field officers
successfully developed their own objectives.
needed time

to be accepted by

Their decisions

the higher echelons,

but

ultimately the youth officers determined American policy in
their field.

Private agencies as well as the tactical troops

stationed in Germany provided additional vital support.
Headquarters. Clay, and Re-education
In 1946 the men and women who were charged with the re
education of German youth could not hope to achieve much
without

adequate

recognition

and

organization.

immediate superiors, John Taylor and R.T. Alexander,

Their
were

completely absorbed in their struggle with German authorities
about denazification, school reform and university matters
and did not pay much attention to other issues from the
beginning.

Their long and hard struggle with recalcitrant
238
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German educators who simply did not seem to be willing to
compromise on anything probably made it inevitable that they
did not look beyond these three issues.
that the youth activities

experts

developing

The

alternatives.

They did not realize

in their section were

youth

experts

created

an

organizational structure based on German experiences with
American innovations which many Germans and Americans found
satisfactory.

While their superiors were trying to achieve

re-education
controls,

by

the

means

youth

of

activities

flexible alternative which
successful,

structural

reform

branch

and

developed

tight
a

more

in the long run proved to be

but it had to wait almost two years until it

found support within OMGUS for its concept of reorientation.
Various factors contributed to the delay.

The lack of

status of the Education and Religious Affairs Section within
OMGUS

reflected

the

general enjoyed

low priority

which

reorientation

in

in the thoughts of General Clay and his

immediate staff in Berlin.
recommendations

in

1946

Despite the Zook Commission's
to

elevate

the

Education

and

Religious Affairs Branch to Division status and to increase
the number of people who were involved in re-education, Clay
did not pay

any

more

attention to

John

Taylor and

his

section.

Throughout 1946 it had to suffer several cuts in

spite

the

of

strength.

fact

that

it

never

had

reached

its

full

Clay was determined to save the American taxpayer

as much money

as

possible

by keeping

the

staff
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apparatus at the absolute minimum.
considered

phasing

out

education

For a while he even
and

religious

affairs

completely.1
Sending Germans to the United States is a case in point.
Although

Clay

had

endorsed

the

Zook

Commission's

recommendation to send Germans to the United States in 1946,
OMGUS needed two years to implement the program.

OMGUS field

officers had pushed for such a program long before SWNCC
269/8 officially permitted it.2
be a bottleneck.
German

economy

Berlin, however, proved to

Clay from the start made clear that the
would

not

be

required for such a program.

able

to

provide

the

Any appropriations

funds

for the

exchange of persons would have to be charged to the future
export

proceeds

from

German

industry.

In

view

of

the

difficult position of the German economy in January 1947,
Clay naturally was reluctant to charge an account which did
not yet have a positive balance and might not have one in the
foreseeable future.
bare

survival

of

Having his hands full with securing the
the Germans

under

his care during

the

extremely cold winter of 1946/47, Clay also did not want to
divert

his

energies

regarded as not vital.

and

resources

to

anything

that

he

Since nobody could predict how long

the crisis would last, it was only logical for him to oppose
any expansion of non-essential items.

In case the German

‘Tent, Mission 259-60.
2For the details see chapter XII.
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economy would not come through, the American taxpayer would
ultimately have to pay the bill.

Clay was resolved to keep

it as small as possible, but even if he had not faced the
economic problems in his zone, he probably would not have
approved a government sponsored program.

In line with his

Republican convictions he argued that Mthe German student
sent to the United States at government expense would be less
effective on his return than if his visit was financed with
private funds."3
In view of headquarters' reluctance to extend any aid to
re-education

efforts,

officers

in

the

needed.

In July

it

field had
1946,

is
to

not

surprising

fight

for example,

that

youth

for everything they
Hans Thomsen,

youth

officer in Bavaria, complained to Munich headquarters that
OMGBY had

failed to assign him a vehicle on a permanent

basis, although he needed to be in the field about 80% of the
time and also had to attend youth meetings at nights and on
weekends.4
Press criticism of the educators' in the United States
for not sufficiently denazifying higher education,

paired

3Memo from Clay to [Daniel] Noce [Washington, CAD], 31
Jan. 1947; Clay Papers doc. 190; see also Tent 265-67.
Whereas Tent thinks that Clay only paid lip service to the
exchange program, I believe that he did not want to obstruct
the program, but rather based his actions on his conviction
that the government should not finance such endeavors.
4Memo
from Hans
Thomsen
to Office
of
Military
Government,
Bavaria
[hereinafter OMGBY]
re. : Improper
transportation impedes youth activities work; NA RG 2 60
OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 40, 10/43-3/22.
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with the Germans'

insistence that the Americans were too

strict in that field, certainly did not endear the section to
Clay, who did not like criticism.

To make matters worse, his

chief educators did not seem to be able to make any progress
towards

school

reform.

Especially

in

Bavaria

they

encountered determined resistance throughout 1946 and 1947.
Alois Hundhammer became minister for cultural and educational
affairs in Bavaria in January 1947.

The educators became

involved in an increasingly bitter but ultimately hopeless
battle with conservative politicians— above all the obstinate
Hundhammer— which one historian adequately described as a
Kulturkampf.

The difficulties with authorities in Munich,

however, overshadowed the successes American educators could
claim

even

in

Bavaria

as

well

as

in other

areas

under

American control, most notably in Bremen and Hesse, where
many reforms and projects were underway which progressive
Germans either supported or initiated.5
5Tent, Mission 74-253; Kellermann 30-31. Tent dedicates
considerably more space to the difficulties in Bavaria than
to the successes the Americans had in Bremen, Berlin, and
Hesse, although he mentions them.
Winfried Muller argues
that American ideas and efforts had a positive impact even in
Bavaria, which was and remained the only state in the Federal
Republic in which the Americans were unable to score any
success in the field of educational reform.
Muller finds
that Americans in Bavaria were actively involved in the
physical reconstruction of the schools and scored successes
in revising schoolbooks and curricula. Like all other states
Bavaria added social studies to its curricula, for example,
although Bavaria indeed was the only state in which Americans
were unable to initiate or support serious reform attempts.
For a contemporary assessment of the situation in the 1940s
see Henry Pilgert, The West German Educational System: With
Special Reference to the Politics and Programs of the Office

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

243
Alexander more than once came to feel that he did not
enjoy the support of his own boss.

Clay and his

chief

educator at best often did not maintain good communications.
When

Alexander

publicly

announced,

for

example,

that

Hundhammer would be dismissed, Clay issued a statement from
Berlin that he was considering the matter, but had not yet
made a decision.

Hundhammer stayed in office, which clearly

undermined Alexander's authority and credibility.

At worst

the two men had completely different attitudes towards the
task Americans had to fulfill in the educational sector.

The

chief

his

educator,

for

example,

made

no

bones

about

disappointment over Clay's decision not to ask Congress for
funds for the exchange program.

He thought that Clay's

decision would deliver a devastating blow to the American re
education effort.

Clay thwarted all his efforts to bring

American university professors to Germany in 1947.

Clay and

of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany ([Bad Godesberg]:
Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1952).
Interestingly, Bremen, Hesse and West Berlin, which
developed the most progressive school reform plans after the
war, remained at the vanguard of the reform movement.
The
polarization between these three states on the one hand and
Bavaria as the conservative bastion on the other remained a
constant in West Germany's school reform plans for the next
fifty years. During my own tenure as student representative
for Middle Franconia at a Bavarian Gymnasium in the 1970s, I
witnessed that Bavaria was the last state to reform the last
two years of the secondary schools. The modifications were
minimal compared to other states. Munich never permitted and
even outlawed statewide high school student organizations.
It also never made any serious attempts at integrating the
different school tracks.
Hesse and Berlin supported
statewide student representation and tried to create an
integrated Gesamtschule.
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Alexander also violently disagreed about the feasibility of
creating a "Free University" in Berlin.

The educator thought

that the Germans were not yet ripe for such an undertaking.
He was unable to agree with the Military Governor on the
procedure of setting the university up when Clay made up his
mind.

This led to the virtual exclusion of Alexander from

the project.6
Alexander's

lack

of

administrative

aggravated the position of his section,

skills

further

since this type of

reorientation had never been tried before, Americans did not
have any precedents to build on.

Programs needed time and

creative administrators to develop, especially in view of the
complicated and cumbersome administrative apparatus that was
operating in Germany.

The American visiting experts program

illustrates the difficulties involved.

Both Eugene Anderson

and the Education and Religious Affairs Branch began to lobby
for a program of bringing American experts into Germany to
help with the re-education effort, but Clay dragged his feet.
He preferred

to

incorporate experts as

staff

into OMGUS

rather than having to deal with short term visits which would
cause a range of logistical problems and from which the
Germans
unlikely

in his opinion would not benefit.
ally

conclusion,

in

Hundhammer,

who

arrived

He
at

found
the

even if for very different reasons.

program in 1946 seemed to bear Clay out.

an

same

A pilot

Alexander did not

6Tent, Mission 267-72, 286-299.
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seem to be able to take care of the organizational side of
the project.

By 1947 OMGUS was able to overcome the Military

Governor's reservations, but in that year only fifty experts
in different fields of expertise ranging from agriculture to
education made it to the American zone, with mixed results.
The next year the number increased to 82.

It was not until

the last year of the occupation and after a thorough reform
of the OMGUS

administration that the number of

persons began to grow dramatically.
came to Germany.

exchange

In 1949 over 150 experts

The High Commission continued the program.7

The bureaucratic tangle went beyond the boundaries of
the Education and Religious Affairs Branch in Berlin.

The

exchange of persons and cultural materials initially became
an administrator's nightmare.

Clay's decision not to ask

Congress for more appropriations for re-education in 1947
came after Washington officials had led private organizations
to believe that the government would bear a part of the
burden.

An

appeal

Education and others

by

the

Institute

to American

of

International

institutions

of

higher

learning had been surprisingly successful in the spring of
1947, but Washington was only able to get SWNCC 269/8 and
269/10
persons

in place to officially authorize the exchanges of
and

material.

OMGUS

had

not

found

a

way

to

coordinate the different divisions involved in the program.
Germans needed to be selected and screened for possible Nazi
7Tent, Mission 262-64.
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activities by intelligence,

obtaining their travel documents

required another division.

Furthermore OMGUS could only

provide support for them to the boundaries of the American
zone.

Since Clay's decision not to ask for re-education

funds

had

excluded

the

government

from

journeys, private sponsors had to step in.

financing

the

As a result few

people, among them one student from Bavaria, made it to the
United States in 1947.8
By 1947 it was clear that the Education and Religious
Affairs Branch would only be able to carry out any meaningful
reorientation program if it could improve its status as well
as the organizational framework in which it operated.

SWNCC

269 and later JCS 1079 officially made reorienting Germans a
top priority of Military Government,
could

not

be convinced

of

the

but as long as Clay

necessity,

nothing

would

change.
Help for the educators came from an unlikely quarter.
In May 1947 the Bureau of the Budget in Washington sent a
task force to Germany.

The primary target of the group was

an investigation of the organizational setup of the armed
forces, but Washington also instructed them to examine the
bureaucratic structure of OMGUS to find ways in which the
American taxpayer might be able to save money.
recommendations

led

to

cuts

in

personnel

Usually such

and

a tighter

8Tent, Mission 266-68, 302; see Kellermann (31-32) for
the role the Dept, of State played in developing the program.
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organization.

The task force did exactly that

fields of OMGUS operations.

in other

In the case of the Educational

and Religious Affairs Branch the task force also advocated
greater efficiency, but actually resulted in strengthening
the troubled branch.

The men were impressed with the effort

and degree of cooperation that existed between Americans and
Germans

in

this

field.

With

full

support

from

their

superiors in Washington the task force pointed out to Clay
that his emphasis on economic and financial matters certainly
was necessary, but that he needed to include 11the stimulation
of a democratic culture"

in his program if he wanted to

assure long term success.

In view of the importance of the

reorientation task, they informed Clay that he would need an
adviser for education and cultural affairs.

This adviser

would have to bring the re-education activities which were
scattered over various divisions under one umbrella.

The

task force argued that the education branch would be the
right

place

for

such

a move,

but

that

in view

of

the

importance of its mission it would have to have division
status to assure direct access to the Military Governor.9
The timing was fortunate.

Clay, who had been promoted

to Commander-in-Chief and Military Governor in March, needed
to find a new head for the Education and Religious Affairs
Branch.

At

the

same

time

CAD

signalled

to

him

that

Washington would appoint a cultural adviser on its own if
9Tent, Mission 282-286.
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Clay did not take the initiative soon.

Reorganizing the

branch and elevating its status might help him to bring in an
outstanding educator in spite of the negative press the
educators had received in the United States.

For the first

time Education and Religious Affairs did not suffer from any
cuts while other divisions had to accept drastic reductions
in

the

reorganization

which

followed

the

task

force's

recommendations.10
Exempting the Branch from budget and personnel cuts was
the first step into a brighter future.

Clay immediately set

out to find a man who would be able to help him solve the
administrative

problems

and would

be

competent successor for John Taylor.
President

of

Indiana

University,

was

able to

recruit

Herman Wells,
one

of

the

a

then
most

competent educational administrators in the United States at
the time.

Wells had served the United States during and

after World War Two on various important missions and was
urgently needed at Indiana, but prodded by urgent messages
from Clay and the War Department, the university decided to
let him go for a brief time to resolve the most pressing
problems in Berlin.11
10Tent, Mission 282-286.
nTent, Mission 299-300; Kellermann 32-33; Herman B.
Wells,
Being
Lucky:
Reminiscences
and
Reflections
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980)301-303; for the
various stages of OMGUS reorganization in 1947/48 see Josef
Henke and Klaus Oldenhage, "Office of Military Government for
Germany
(US),"
OMGUS
Handbuch:
Die
Amerikanische
Militarregierung in Deutschland 1945-1949, ed. Christoph
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Wells came to Germany in November 1947 and lost no time
reorganizing the American re-education effort within the
grander scheme of streamlining OMGUS.
was done.

By March 1948 Wells

He succeeded in elevating Religious Affairs Branch

to Division Status and made it the only part of Military
Government which actually expanded.

Formal education now was

just one of several branches within the new Education and
Cultural Relations Division.

His first innovation was the

establishment of a Cultural Exchange Branch which would be
responsible

for coordinating

all

efforts

in this

realm.

Wells thought that the exchange program would have to be a
cornerstone of American reorientation and democratization.
Without it all American efforts would ultimately fail.

At

the same time he also gave Group Activities and its chief,
Lawrence Norrie,

equal standing with the other branches.

Since Norrie came from the American YMCA in 1946, he had
given special attention to youth work from the beginning.
His promotion meant that youth activities would play a much
greater role in official American policy in Germany in the
future.12
Reorganizing the branch was just one of the tasks Wells
had

to

tackle

during

his

stay

in

Germany.

Since

he

Weisz,
Quellen
und
Darstellungen
zur
Zeitgeschichte
herausgegeben vom Institut fur Zeitgeschichte 35 (Miinchen
[Munich] Oldenbourg, 1994) 57-76.
12Tent, Mission 302; Kellermann 33-34; see Weisz,
(69) for the personnel roster of the new division.
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considered the exchange programs essential, he paid special
attention to developing an intricate network of committees on
both

sides

of

the

different parties

Atlantic

and

which

interests

could

involved

coordinate

the

in the effort.

Wells was able to enlist the financial backing of various
foundations in the endeavor.

He demonstrated his continuing

interest in the German exchange program by becoming the chair
of the Commission of Occupied Areas in the United States
which functioned as the supervising and advisory body for the
entire exchange effort.

By the end of his tenure in Germany

Wells had taken care of the administrative weaknesses of the
exchange

apparatus.

Among

other

accomplishments he had

reduced the clearing and documentation process from nine
months to ten days.

He also was able to persuade Clay that

the exchange was actually a good idea and that Germans would
not encounter hostility on American campuses.

As a result

the number of exchangees increased from 81 persons in 1947 to
354 in 1948.

Two-thirds of the latter group were German

students going to the United States.

Americans had taken the

first step towards reviving and strengthening the cultural
ties between the two countries which they hoped would result
in a stronger democratic orientation on parts of the German
intellectual elite in the long run.13
When Alonzo Grace, former Commissioner of Education in
Connecticut,

assumed

the post of

Education and

Cultural

13Tent, Mission 302-303; Kellermann 34.
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Relations Division Chief in Berlin in the fall of 1948 on
Wells' recommendation, the stage was set officially for a new
phase of American reorientation policy and with it, American
youth work.

A look at the youth section's work reveals that

Wells simply had to re-organize and re-orient headquarters
along

the

lines

the

youth

activities

following almost from its inception.
dedicated

Americans

and

Germans

branch

had

been

The tremendous work of
in

this

field

quickly

overcame the negative phase of American policy and replaced
it with a concept which became the model

for all future

efforts in American re-education long before policy makers in
Berlin and Washington had sorted out their problems.
officers

not

only

recognized

early

on

the

need

Youth
for

a

constructive reorientation program, but also implemented it
at a time when they had enough authority to introduce new
programs against resistance of some German officials.

Even

more importantly, they relied on an approach of cooperation
and encouragement.

Youth activities were the only field in

which Americans actually made use of the tactical troops'
resources in manpower and material.
Establishing a Framework for Youth Activities
American education experts dedicated almost all of their
efforts to the reopening of schools and the problems related
to this

issue during the

first year of

the occupation,

although OMGUS headquarters soon realized the need to expand
its activities beyond the schools.

Following the philosophy
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that the Germans should be in charge of their own affairs
under American supervision, the directive of October 1945
permitted young

people

to

form their

own

youth

groups,

provided they adhered to democratic principles and did not
exclude members based on race, religion, or socio-economic
status.

Based on this policy Germans began to organize

themselves.
Military

At the same time the youth committees which

Government

officials

had

activities at the county level.

installed

began

their

The committees were to

operate on a volunteer basis and to consist mainly of German
officials who in one way or another were interested in youth
work.14
OMGUS Education and Religious Affairs youth officers
from the start left no doubt that they intended to embark on
a positive program at the earliest possible moment.

Two of

its representatives from Bavaria reported that the keynote of
their zonewide monthly meeting in December 1945 was "the
positive reconstruction of German cultural life."
same

conference

their

superiors

informed

them

At the
that

cooperation between tactical troops and Military Government
officials could do much to achieve that goal.

They portrayed

a sports program at Karlsruhe which the local tactical unit

14See pp. 127-129 above.
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and the field detachment sponsored together as a model for
the entire American zone.15
Members of the Education and Religious Affairs Branch in
Bavaria met in February 1946 to discuss the progress of their
programs, but youth activities only appeared at the bottom of
the agenda.

At that time headquarters could do no more than

inform its officers in the field that there was progress in
formulating

directives

concerning

youth

activities

and

teacher education.16
Two months after the meeting OMGUS
changes

of

activities.

the

regulations

that

issued the first

governed

German

youth

In line with Clay's general policy to permit the

Germans activities on the state level, the new guidelines of
April 1946 laid down the basis for the formation of statewide
youth committees which would represent all youth of a state.
These "Land Youth Committees" would be formed by the existing
Kreis Youth Committees.
different

youth

groups

They had to bring together the
and

coordinate

their

efforts

to

provide the young people in a state with adequate leisure
time activities.

The state committees also would represent

the youth organizations' and Kreis committees' interests to
the states'

youth authorities.

The

state ministries

in

15OMGBY, Intelligence Division [hereinafter ID], After
Action Report, Dec. 1945: 20; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Historical
Reports, Box 50, 10/76-3/11.
l60MGBY, ID, weekly report no. 39, 31 Jan.-7 Feb. 1946:
25; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Box 169, 10/85-3/6
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charge of youth were advised to establish liaison with the
Land youth committees and to support them.

Franz-Joseph

Strauss, one of the West Germany's most prominent post-war
politicians from Bavaria, started his career in this capacity
in the Munich ministry for Culture and Education in May 1946.
In

addition

to

their

representative

duties

the

Land

committees had to process applications for statewide youth
organizations.

Military

Government

would

continue

to

supervise and issue licenses.17
Headquarters did not only issue new directives, but also
made sure that the field officers knew what direction Berlin
wanted

them

announced

to

to

take.

its

The

readers

OMGUS

that

Information

Americans

would

Bulletin
provide

"Another Chance for German Youth: Through Carefully Planned
and Guided Leisure Time Activities Germany's Youngsters May
Soon Find 'The Road Back.'"

The author dedicated a special

box on the first page of the article to impress his readers
with the importance of doing their jobs along positive lines:
[t]o deny the possibility of a decent, peaceful future,
in which the abilities of
all may be employed
constructively, is to smother the aspirations of youth
and to reap the consequences in lawless and possibly
dangerous political behavior.
The

article went on

to describe the initiativesMilitary

Government officials had developedso far in the field.

It

170ffice of Military Government for Germany (U.S.),
Change 1 to Title 8, Education and Religious Affairs, 1 Apr.
1946; NA RG 84 Munich Consulate General, Misc. Records
840. IB; see also Fiissl 123-24.
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also informed its readers that international Christian youth
organizations, among them the YMCA and the American Friends,
were about to resume their activities in Germany as well.
Most of the space and photos of the article dealt with the
still informal youth program of the tactical troops in the
American zone of occupation.18
Not only Military Government members were impressed with
the GIs' success.

Headquarters of the United States Forces,

European Theater (USFET) in Germany had already taken steps
to recognize and support the GIs' attempts to teach young
Germans American games officially.

General McNarney seized

the opportunity which the soldiers' own initiative offered to
keep them and German youth out of trouble by transforming
their informal and voluntary activities into an extensive
Army program.

On 15 April 1946, just a few days after OMGUS

had issued the changes in its regulations, headquarters USFET
defined the role which both OMGUS and tactical troops should
play in the American re-education effort.

The disease and

unrest formula still provided the basis for the military's
efforts.
tactical

McNarney
units'

stated

that

youth activities

OMGUS

programs

had proven

and

the

their value

during the past months by diminishing juvenile delinquency
and should therefore be extended "by all practical means".

I8"Another Chance for German Youth: Through Carefully
Planned and Guided Leisure Time Activities Germany's
Youngsters May Soon Find "The Road Back," OMGUS Information
Bulletin, No. 38, 22 Apr. 1946: 5-9.
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The directive established that close cooperation between
Military

Government

officials

and

tactical

essential to ensure maximum efficiency.
recreational

facilities,

equipment,

commands

was

Since the Army had

and personnel at

its

disposal and the Germans were in dire need of them, it would
concentrate its efforts in this area.

As far as OMGUS was

concerned, the directive established for the first time that
qualified officers or civilians would dedicate their full
time to the

implementation of OMGUS youth directives

headquarters as well as on the Land levels.

at

On the tactical

level McNarney instructed the commands of all branches of the
armed

forces

in

Germany

to

assign

"mature,

officers full time to youth activities.

qualified"

They would be in

charge of maintaining liaison with the appropriate Military
Government authorities and Land Youth Committees and to help
them correct any deficiencies and implement their programs.
The

directive

instructed

unit

commanders

to

survey

the

recreational facilities the Army had requisitioned and make
them available at least part time to German youth committees.
Furthermore the units would stop requisitioning recreational
equipment from the German economy.

The Army could release

items which it did not need from captured German stocks or
which GIs did not use to German youth groups.

Qualified Army

personnel further should actively support young Germans if
they were invited to do so.
policy,

the directive

To educate GIs about the new

set one hour

per month aside
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instructing them accordingly.

The directive finally defined

the different spheres of operation for OMGUS and tactical
units.

Military Government continued to be in charge of

developing American policy and all aspects of appointing and
supervising German officials and youth groups.

Tactical

units would dedicate their efforts to the actual field work:
they would assess the needs of youth groups and share with
them the facilities necessary to implement American policies.
Only six months after the non-fraternization policy had died,
the generals wanted to encourage GIs to participate in the
youth

program.

considerably:

The

Army

would

expand

its

activities

it would help German youth groups establish

youth centers, which would include reading rooms.
would

also

competing

make

suitable

in sports,

films

available.

young Germans

The Army

Apart

from

should also have the

opportunity to attend informal trade and handicraft classes.
Tactical units could further assist them in reconstruction
and

rehabilitation

hostels.

projects

of

youth

centers

and

youth

The directive also encouraged soldiers to sponsor

meetings in which young Germans would be able to learn about
other democratic countries.

To make sure that the tactical

units complied with regulations, the directive established
mandatory monthly reports.19

19Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, 15 Apr.
1946, AG-353.8 GCT-AGO, subject: Army Assistance to German
Youth Activities, US Zone; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/8.
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OMGUS officials had mixed feelings about the Army's
capabilities to carry out such a program.

A preliminary

report in February 1947 by Alvin Fritz, chief of the OMGUS
Youth Activities Section, stated that it was too early to
judge the program's success, but that American GIs had done
a remarkable job in "winning the trust and goodwill" of many
young people and adults.

Fritz thought that in spite of

shortcomings within the program and a considerable lack of
cooperation between OMGUS and Army field officers, "a very
satisfactory contribution has been made

in assisting the

German youth."20
The
remained

main problem
outside

for

of their

OMGUS

officials was

jurisdiction.

that

GYA

Throughout

the

existence of OMGUS, youth officers recognized the merit of
the program, but constantly complained about lack of interest
by the highest Army echelons, about unqualified officers in
the field, but above all, about a lack of cooperation and
support for their own objectives.

According to Military

Government officials, all the problems could be solved by
giving them control over the program and additional personnel
to do so.21
20OMGBY Evaluation of GYA, 27 Feb. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 42, 10/44-1/4.
2IMinutes of Conference on GYA objectives, 25 June 1947
in Berlin; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br.,
Box 140, 5/295-3/3; report of CAD Seminar for Bavaria, Sept.
1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box
140, 5/295-3/1; E&CRD to General Clay, memo re.: Youth
Activities, 5 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
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Other decisions by OMGUS headquarters made clear that
Americans did not regard young Germans as incorrigibles or
fanatics.

On the contrary, young Germans were the first ones

whom the occupiers officially began to release from having to
accept

responsibility

for

Germany's

Nazi

past.

The

denazification law of March 1946 did not require prosecution
of anybody under eighteen years of age.
still contained punitive clauses.

Nevertheless it

Members of the Hitler

youth who had been part of that organization for more than
four years and had been automatically absorbed into the Nazi
party after that could neither attend universities nor become
teachers.22
Some German authorities began to take up the cause of
their young people.
Affairs

and

In May the Hessian Minister of Cultural

Education,

for

example,

inquired

with

the

American Military Government in Wiesbaden whether it might
not be justifiable to permit former Hitler Youth leaders who
had proven themselves as members of the new youth groups to
occupy leading positions within these groups.

The minister

Education Br. , Box 152, 5/337-1/5; memo re.: Youth Activities
by Louis Miniclier, OMGBY, 26 Apr. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 37, 10/43-2/1.
22Fiissl (115) comments on the age limits of the law; for
a detailed description of the effects the law on persons who
wanted to study and were born after 1 Jan. 1919 see Proposal
for the Readmission of Excluded German Youth to Educational
Institutions from Vaughn DeLong, Chief of Education and
Religious Affairs Branch, OMG Hesse, to Director, OMGUS
IA&CD, 15 May 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/1.
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reported that a survey conducted by his office revealed that
young Germans themselves did not regard leadership in the
lower echelons of the Hitler Youth as a grave handicap to
their work,

provided that they were willing and able to

cooperate in a free, responsible, and democratic manner, were
good comrades, and were elected.

The Minister thought that

the young generation had been drawn to the Nazis without
really knowing what they were doing and would definitely
receive a big moral boost if the Americans granted them some
leeway.23
The Minister found open ears and an able advocate for
his ideas in American offices.

Apparently based on similar

communications as well as on his own convictions,
DeLong,

Vaughn

chief of Hesse's Education and Religious Affairs

Branch, had already worked out a detailed proposal which he
directed

to

John

Taylor.

He

strongly

argued

for

the

rehabilitation of German youth, which, according to him, the
denazification law made impossible for a considerable number
of

young

people.

DeLong

continued

that

especially

the

intelligent and capable part of the youth suffered because
they had believed in an idealistic cause and therefore joined
the party after they had proven their leadership qualities in
the

Hitler

Youth.

Quoting

evidence

from

the

OMGUS

^Memorandum, Minister of Cultural and Educational
Affairs for Greater Hesse to Military Government Education
Branch, Wiesbaden, 8 May 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/1.
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Information Bulletin,

he argued that the party often had

registered these young people automatically and that they
otherwise had been under enormous moral pressure to join.
DeLong noted that the current negative policy deprived a
large part of the younger generation of the possibility to
become respectable members of German society and led to a
huge degree of hopelessness among them.

He found that German

churches and worldly authorities alike were justified in
their deep concern about this state of affairs.

If not

offered some way to enter society as respectable members,
these young people in the long run would cause considerable
trouble and would be lost for the democratic cause.

DeLong

therefore advocated that American authorities should think
over their approach and give all youth born after 1918 who
had

not

been

involved

in Nazi

crimes

a

new

chance

displaying and granting "unqualified forgiveness".
people

should

reorientation

receive

the chance

to

participate

process

and should

be

allowed

by

Young
in

to

the

assume

leadership positions once they had demonstrated that they
were

willing

and

ableto

operate

within

a

democratic

framework.
DeLong

thought

that

the

unconditional

amnesty

he

proposed was just the first step for rehabilitating young
Germans.

He provided a long list with specific suggestions

he thought were essential for converting German youth into
committed democrats.

Instead of aiming at administrative
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reforms, DeLong suggested that it would be essential to reach
out for the minds of young Germans.

This would necessitate

a positive program of extra-curricular activities, courses in
democracy at schools, changing teacher-student relations from
an

authoritarian

style

to

one

of

cooperation,

establishment of Parent Teacher Councils.

and

the

To achieve this

goal American experts would have to be brought in and young
teachers and teacher trainees would need special orientation
courses.

The memorandum emphasized that all these measures

should have a positive and constructive character and should
replace the negative policies in place up to that date.24
It is not clear to what extent the paper from Hesse
influenced General Clay's decision to grant youth the general
pardon DeLong had requested, but on 2 July he could register
with

satisfaction

the

Deputy

Governor's

announcement

to

German politicians that OMGUS would grant a general amnesty
to all people born after January 1919.

Just as DeLong had

advocated, only those who had participated in crimes would
not be included.25

24Proposal for the Re-admission of Excluded German Youth
to Educational Institutions from Vaughn DeLong, General Chief
of E&RA Branch OMG Hesse to Director, OMGUS IA&CD, Public
Health and Welfare Branch, Education Section, 7 May 1946; NA
RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/3371/1 .

^Press Release, OMGUS, Public Relations Office, 2 July
1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box
152, 5/337-1/1.
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Gathering Information
Certainly encouraged by the recent turns of events,
officers in charge of youth activities travelled to their
first zone-wide conference in Berlin in July 1946.
not come unprepared.

They did

Apart from their own observations they

could rely on a steady, but somewhat small and not always
reliable, stream of information about German youth which the
Intelligence
gathering.

and

Information

Control

Divisions

were

These divisions were probing youth problems,

young people's attitudes, and their reaction to Americans and
their programs throughout the American zone since August
1945, but the information was not always reliable.
general made a conscious attempt to base
representative samples.

ICD in

its surveys on

Based on a survey of 134 young

Germans, ICD researchers found in May 1946 that the children
did not express much hostility towards Americans and thought
that the economic situation was better in the British and the
American zones than in the other two.
pollsters,

all of the children were

According to the
fully

aware of the

failure of Nazism, but more than a third still harbored Nazi
ideas.

Many others

chauvinism which
Socialist

displayed an extreme nationalism or

apparently

doctrine.

OMGUS

came very
personnel

close
could

to National
read

in the

Information Bulletin, in which ICD disseminated its findings,
that German youth was "The Big Problem in Germany."

The

article also included a set of samples taken from the essays
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on which the division had based the survey.

Only one out of

the fourteen samples clearly expressed the hope that Germany
would become a peaceful and democratic nation.

Judging from

this source, Military Government officials certainly had to
act

quickly

and

with

full

force

to

re-educate

young

Germans.26
The

Intelligence Division's

reliable.

reports were not always

Those which dealt with German youth conveyed

contradictory

information.

One

of

ICD's

"special

sociological investigators", for example, conveyed a report
from Bavaria to headquarters which published it in February
1946.

He

investigated the attitudes of young people

Miesbach, a little town in upper Bavaria.
setting,

in

The picturesque

combined with the rather strange behavior of the

inhabitants of the community,

apparently appealed to the

intelligence officer who based his report entirely on his own
observations

and

arrived

at

surprising

conclusions.

According to him, young people in Miesbach did not display
much concern about their future or the future of Germany.
Regardless of their social status or background they showed
a remarkable lack of interest in politics.

Almost all of the

youth in Miesbach did not seem to have liked joining the
Hitler youth.

Those who did were

activities

sports

and

or by the

attracted by outdoor

possibility

26"The Big Problem in Germany,"
Bulletin, no. 40, 6 May 1946: 12-15.

OMGUS

of

gaining

Information
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prestige.

The investigator did not find any ideological

indoctrination
seemed

to

in Miesbach's youth.

have

confidence

in

their

definite ideas about their careers.

Almost all of them
own

future

and

had

If one was to believe

the report, promiscuity was widespread and often tolerated by
adults.

The town continued to have a rigid social cast

structure in which each person had his or her assigned roles.
The investigator stated that girls of civil servant families,
for example, "generally do watercolors and play the piano,
and develop romantic crushes on young officers," while the
daughters

of unskilled workers

either married or

"maids, barmaids, and prostitutes."

became

Their brothers roamed

the streets and coffeehouses, went to the movies and listened
to jazz.

Their main goal in life was to move up to the ranks

of skilled workers, but, the author noted, "they usually fail
because of lack of steadiness."

Although he did not bring it

up in the narrative of his report, the intelligence officer
concluded

that young Germans

"remarkable

unanimity"

in

in Miesbach demonstrated

their

opinions

of

a

Americans.

According to him, these young people thought that Americans
listened to jazz

and mostly were

"lazy,

weak,

likeable,

superficial, and undisciplined.1,27
The report had several flaws.

The author not only chose

a region which researchers then and today would hardly have

^ICIS 3.0, 9 Feb. 1946: 6-9; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
Opinion Survey Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/3.
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found to be representative for German or even Bavarian youth.
Miesbach in almost all respects represented the exception to
the rule.

The town had not suffered extensive war damage and

did not house any refugees.

The author also assessed mores

and habits of all social classes in a town with no industry
to speak of and probably a very small number of middle class
families.

Disseminating fairly sensational information about

sexual behavior of young people,

which probably was more

noteworthy for its rarity rather than serving as a rule, may
well have attracted more readers,

but it also helped to

spread a somewhat problematical picture of young Germans.
Since most of the Intelligence Division's members were German
native speakers,

the author of this report must not have

taken his mission very seriously.

Possibly his lack of a

sense for realities— a hallmark of German academic thinking—
survived

emigration.

Since

disseminated the report,

headquarters

printed

and

distorted information reached an

audience which did not speak German and had to rely on these
reports.
Findings

from

other

intelligence

contradicted the Miesbach report.
seemed to be more realistic.

officers

clearly

The picture they painted

Kurt H. Ehlers, apparently a

naturalized American citizen who operated as intelligence
team chief in Bavaria,
1946

that

German

for example, reported in September

youth

were

in

dire

need

of

American

assistance if they wanted to face the future with some hope.
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In the long run young people would need better housing, jobs
and vocational training.

Before the Germans could reach this

goal, however, Ehlers thought that Americans would have to do
something to keep them off the streets and to occupy their
minds

constructively.

He

suggested

co-educational

club

facilities which should contain libraries and educational
movies; they should also encourage theatrical and literature
groups under adequate leadership.

Since ICD personnel were

best acquainted with the local conditions, Ehlers proposed
that they could expand their roles as mere observers and
secure the cooperation of local groups.
that

OMGUS

could

employ

ICD

Ehlers also thought

specialists

profitably

as

discussion leaders in summer camps which he wanted to provide
free of charge to young people.28
Eric Feiler, chief of the Intelligence Section of the
Nuremberg Detachment, also did not concur with the Miesbach
report.

Feiler

thought

that

the

situation

was

rather

desperate for young people, but they also were open to new
ideas to fill the void the complete military defeat and moral
collapse of the Nazis had left.

He provided headquarters for

Bavaria with detailed summaries of answers to questions he
had received,
survey.

apparently in preparation of another youth

Feiler called the two German administrators

in

Nuremberg who could be expected to know the situation best,
28Memo from Kurt H. Ehlers, US Civilian, Team Chief to
Chief of Intelligence OMGBY, 16 Sept. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
OMGBY Predecessor Intelligence, Box 111 10/87-3/14.
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Theodor Marx, who was in charge of the city's welfare and
youth affairs, and Karl Maly, the director of the Nuremberg
youth

office.

Feiler

also

tapped

the

leaders

of

the

Nuremberg churches' youth activities as well as leading local
politicians and the head of the school administration.

He

verified their information within his own detachment before
conveying

it

to

Munich.

In

information to headquarters.

April

other

field

officers

he

sent

his

Feiler noted that he should

have more time for this kind of work.
and

1947

to

It would enable him

obtain

more

reliable

information.29
Organizing Field Work
OMGUS youth activities officers apparently stepped up
their efforts in gathering data from the field in preparation
for their first zone wide conference in July 1946.
representatives

from

all

states

under

American

OMGUS
control

convened in Berlin to discuss and coordinate their work.

Two

thirds of those present did not have any military rank, among
them Richard Alexander, then acting chief of the Education
and Religious Affairs Section in Berlin, and Hayes Beall, the
OMGUS Youth Activities chief.

This first meeting mainly

served as a sounding board and an exchange of ideas.

29Memo from Eric Feiler, Team Chief, Intelligence
Section, Nuremberg Detachment OMGBY, Information Control
Division, to Chief of Intelligence, OMGBY, 25 Apr. 1946; NA
RG 260 OMBGY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12.
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From the outset the delegates seemed to have assumed
that the negative phase of the American occupation was over.
They did not find it necessary to include issues such as
denazification

and

demilitarization

on

their

agenda

and

concentrated on what could be done to rehabilitate young
Germans.

All conference participants agreed that they were

facing a challenging task and that they would not be able to
reach their goals by issuing orders.

In view of the recent

youth amnesty they decided to define "youth" as broadly as
the directive had done.

This meant that young adults would

also become targets of parts of their program.
One of the most important tasks of the conference was to
assess the practical needs of young Germans.

Malnourishment,

as well as the lack of equipment and buildings for young
people, surfaced as the most pressing problems, but to solve
them the youth officers also had to fight within their own
administration for more recognition.
seemed to be worst.

Conditions in Bavaria

The members of the Bavarian delegation

reported that OMGBY only recently had appointed a full time
youth officer and therefore lagged behind the other states in
the development

of youth

activities.

For

this

reason

Bavaria had not yet completed the creation of the youth
committees
policies.

through

which

OMGUS

hoped

to

carry

out

its

Hans P. Thomsen reported that Bavarian authorities

did not show the least interest in youth work, but that the
formation of the Land Youth Committee in May had improved the
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situation.

The Bavarian government in Munich supported it

with money and office space.

Thomsen urged youth officers to

spend as much time as possible in the field to support the
youth committees throughout the American zone against the
German bureaucrats.

The participants agreed that German

government bodies would have to provide material support to
the

recently

established

committees,

but

should

not

be

allowed to exercise any control over their work.
Since the committees were the backbone of the Military
Government efforts, the officers spent much time discussing
the possibilities for improving them.

They found that one of

the most serious problems was to find qualified youth workers
to staff the committees which for the most part consisted of
older people.
Baden

had

American authorities in Hesse and Wurttemberg-

already

initiated

youth

leadership

training

programs to remedy the situation.
As far as practical youth work was concerned, the youth
committees seemed to function adequately.

They had helped to

organize considerable numbers of youth organizations much
along the traditional lines.

Most of young Germans joined

sport clubs, although the churches at that time maintained
the largest membership numbers.

OMGUS officers recognized

the contributions which the tactical units had made so far
in the field by providing young people with facilities and
equipment.

Many of the conference participants reported that

the tactical troops were rendering excellent services, but

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

271
also detected
remedy.

shortcomings which the Army would have to

They were skeptical about the Army's ability to

carry such a long term program through and to cooperate with
OMGUS.

In addition they noted that the Army had not yet

revised its orientation practices to win more GIs over to
working in the program.
depict

Germans

and

The occupation handbook continued to
especially

German

youth

as

the

incorrigible enemy and the soldiers still saw Your Job in
Germany when they reported for duty in Germany.

Nevertheless

the conference participants welcomed the help the Army would
be able to render.
An

important

goal

of the

Berlin conference was

establish liaison with other divisions
work.

ICD,

for

example, had

two

to

involved in youth

youth

magazines

in

circulation, but could not expand these activities due to the
paper shortage.

The film institute in Munich reported that

only a limited number of educational films were available.
Some of the films from the United States were not exactly
useful

for youth work,

while others

could

not be shown

because the available projectors could not handle them.

So

far the only alternative would be German educational films.
A member of the welfare division briefed the officers on the
situation of youth

welfare before 193 3

problems the German

welfare authorities were

time.

andthe practical
facing at the

The most pressing of those were unemployment and

homeless young people.
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Five months

after Truman had

initiated

conference members took up the issue again.

CRALOG,

the

Since qualified

help was so hard to find within Germany, the field officers
strongly recommended that OMGUS invite American voluntary
agencies to participate in the task and to send American
specialists to Germany.30
Although the Berlin conference basically had served only
as

an

orientation

session,

it

bore

its

fruits.

The

discussions of this conference apparently needed quite some
time to get Clay's attention, but eventually the military
governor

responded

indoctrination.
relations

the

criticism

on

the

troops'

In October he personally launched a public

campaign

tactical units.

to

on behalf

of

German

youth

among the

Under the headline "'Fanatical' Nazi Youth

Secretly Laughed at Hitler, Clay Asserts," Stars and Stripes
carried an interview with the Military Governor in October
1946.

Clay laid the previous description of German youth,

which the Army and the Washington had tried to impress upon
their soldiers in Germany, officially to rest.

He maintained

that young Germans had not liked the drill and militaristic
aspects of the Hitler Youth, but rather had joined because it
gave

them

activities.

the

opportunity

Whereas

to

the Army

engage

in

many

exciting

information materials had

depicted young people as the ones most affected by Nazi
30Minutes of Conference of Regional Youth Activities
Section Personnel Berlin 2-3 July 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 120 5/293-1/7.
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doctrine, and therefore the most dangerous after the war,
Clay now stated that these young people knew from their own
experiences that militarism led to disaster.

According to

him, the democratic leadership of Germany was quite old and
tired and would have to be replenished with "some new blood."
German youth were vigorous and they offered "the greatest
hope

for

restoring

Germany

as

a peaceful

nation

along

democratic lines."31
To make sure that the soldiers received the new message
the Army replaced its old warning signs about Germans and the
dangers

of

fraternization

with

new

admonitions

everywhere in its military installations.

posted

Some of the older

catchwords survived, but now they had a different meaning.
Just as in 1945 posters reminded soldiers that they had an
important mission and needed to do their jobs well if they
wanted to justify the sacrifices of their fallen comrades in
two wars and if they wanted to avoid a third war.
however,

their

admonished

to

job

description

"shun

perverted

poster made clear what that meant.
with decent youth...

had

changed.

fraternization."

This time,
GIs

were

Another

It told GIs to "associate

not V.D pickups."

The posters were

designed to encourage soldiers to go out and permit young
Germans show them that "not everything German is bad."

Army

personnel should try to become acquainted with the young
people's language, their arts and crafts, and their sports.
3lStars and Stripes 24 Oct. 1946: 1.
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GIs now had two jobs to do: They had to carry out their
duties well, but the Army also expected them to participate
fully

in a

"positive

program

for the rehabilitation

of

Germany.1,32
The conference also had immediate results for youth
officers in the field.

Headquarters realized that providing

them with background information about German youth work
before, during, and after the Third Reich was as essential
for tackling the problems of the present as giving them
guidelines for their work in the communities.

Consequently

it published a brief brochure explaining youth activities in
Germany.
before

Apart from a history of youth activities in Germany
1945,

the

booklet

activities to date.
Americans had

shown

also

summarized

the

American

Its authors emphasized the interest
in German youth from the

start

and

described the development of OMGUS and Army policies and
programs.

According to them, one of the main difficulties

for the occupiers was to find and train capable German youth
leaders and to provide German youth groups with all the
materials they urgently needed for their work.
molded

the

various

ideas

discussed

during

conference into six long range objectives.

The pamphlet
the

previous

The title of

their publication already indicated that the section was not
content with preventing youth from getting into trouble, but

32Posters issued by the US Army [1946]; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Group Activities Branch, Box 43, 10/44-1/9.
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.STEER CLEAR OF THE

BLACKMARKET

FRATERNIZATION

nc

NAflONAl AM CNVCI

? SHUN PERVERTED

AMERICANS ARE

CITIZENS
7. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD,
Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
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8. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD,
Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

277

R E L I G I O N IS
INTERNATIONAL

GO TO CHURCH
1
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WITH DECENT
YOUTH. . .
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9. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD,
Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
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10. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD,
Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
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OBS
HIGHEST PERFORMANCE
I- OF YOUR PRIMARY
MILITARY ASSIGNMENT...
t

f
§

FULL PARTICIPATION
IN POSITIVE PROGRAM
FOR THE REHABILITATION
OF GERMANY
I

11. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 2 60 OMGBY, E&CRD,
Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
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MILITARY GOVERNMENT
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REHABILITATE GERMANY
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12. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD,
Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
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JSERMAN
IS BAD
LET GERMAN YOUTH
SHOW YOU SOME OF
THE GOOD....

$uc£tf 'tfteiA. ARTS andCRAFTS
£eaAu tfafc LANGUAGE
to u t tfte d SPORTS TOO.

13. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD,
Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
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rather aimed at "Giving Youth New Goals."

The title also

revealed that the youth section had no intention of doing the
work for the Germans.

Young people in the American zone

would have to reach the goals by themselves.
only offer advice and recommendations.

Americans would
Youth leadership

training programs formed the top objective, followed by the
expansion of activities as well as facilities and equipment.
Americans would help to provide suitable youth literature as
well as radio programs and films.

International travel and

exchanges would bring the "best influences" from the outside
world back into Germany.

Finally,

youth should organize

voluntary labor services for constructing or rehabilitating
their own facilities, a topic the officers had discussed in
Berlin as well.33
Apart from providing the field officers with practical
and necessary ideas which were remarkably free of ideological
content,

the booklet also appeared just

in time for the

arrival of the Zook Commission and Eugene Anderson.
field

officers

homework.

and

their

section

chief

had

done

The
their

The mission's final report shows that the mission

members were impressed with the work OMGUS was doing in this
field.

The educators from the United States wholeheartedly

endorsed the youth section's objectives.

33Giving Youth New Goals: A Report of the Youth
Activities Section Education and Religious Affairs Branch,
Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education
Branch, Box 145 5/296-2/6.
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The mission's support prompted a favorable reaction from
Clay, but did not lead to any significant changes.

OMGUS

headquarters commented on the report's recommendations in
October

1946.

As far as youth work was

concerned,

parties involved agreed that much needed to be done.

all

There

also existed a consensus about the way the Americans should
tackle the problem.

OMGUS headquarters pointed out that its

divisions already were carrying out many of the mission's
recommendations.

Clay officially also found strong words of

support for the idea of letting Germans go to the United
States as well as bringing American experts into Germany to
help with the re-education efforts.

Contrary to the spirit

of the mission's recommendation, however, he argued that he
did not see the need for an expansion of this sector of
Military Government,
present level.

but rather wanted to keep it at its

The Military Governor also did not follow the

mission's demand for upgrading the Education section within
his command structure.

Education and Religious Affairs, and

with it the youth section, had to wait until other needs were
taken care of.34
Clay's response mentioned an additional re-education
initiative OMGUS was just introducing in Germany.

As early

as July 1945 ICD had begun to open the American libraries in

MDraft, Comment on Report of U.S. Education Mission to
Germany, OMGUS to Director, CAD, War Department, Washington:
20-23, 37-38; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br.,
Box 36 10/43-1/9.
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various

cities

for the

use

of

the German public.

The

immediate goal was to counter German notions of the "American
cultural retardation" by introducing Germans to American art,
literature,

and science.

The Americans also regarded the

libraries as an opportunity to fill the gaps in literature,
but also in psychology, sociology, or even in the sciences
which the Nazis had opened.

By the end of 1945 ICD had

established information centers in three cities.

Eight more

were to follow in the course of the following year.

These

centers formed the nucleus of the Amerika House program which
in the course of the next years would expand into many larger
cities in the western zones and in Berlin's American sector.
It would eventually be able to reach out even to the smallest
communities

in the American zone

in the form of reading

rooms, film programs and mobile libraries, or book mobiles.
While they did not target young people specifically, they
also developed programs and offered books for them.35
In spite of Clay's apparent reluctance to assign re
education

a higher place

in his

administration

and his

35Draft, Comment on Report of U.S. Education Mission to
Germany, OMGUS to Director, CAD, War Department, Washington:
34; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36,
10/43-1/9; History, Information Control Division, Office of
Military Government for Germany (U.S.), 8 May 1945-30 June
1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ICD, Information Centers Branch, Box
335 5/318-3/5; "US Information Centers," OMGUS Information
Bulletin, no. 55, 19 Aug. 1946: 11-12; United States
Information Centers: General Information, 17 Aug. 1946; Facts
About the United States Information Centers in Germany (For
Visiting Delegation of Educators) [no date, October 1946?];
NA RG 260 OMGBY, ICD, Information Centers Branch, Box 313,
5/314-3/18.
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priorities,

the youth section

pressed

ahead.

Early

in

October 1946 the men and women in charge of youth activities
met in Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

This time they widened the

scope of their considerations considerably.
officer

They invited the

in charge of the Army's German youth activities

program.

Well before they knew anything about the new

directive from Washington, the conference organizers decided
to bring representatives from the British and the French
Zones to Garmisch for an exchange of ideas and information on
their respective policies and activities.

Another first was

the participation of German representatives in some sessions
of the conference.
the

participants

With their objectives in place this time,
concentrated

entirely

on

the

practical

problems they were facing.36
On the whole the picture looked encouraging.

In the

American zone the Land youth committees were in place and
functioning.

Throughout the zone Military Government had

been able to help the Germans establish leadership schools
which

the

state governments

recalcitrant Bavaria.
a

number

of

difficulties
shortage.

youth
in

supported even

in otherwise

They also had successfully introduced
publications,

maintaining

them

but

encountered

because

of

the

major
paper

The officers reported that youth groups in many

36OMGUS, IA&CD, Education and Religious Affairs Br.,
Summary of Military Government Conference on German Youth
Activities 9-11 October 1946 in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Hotel
Wotumpka; cited hereinafter as Garmisch Conference; NA RG 260
OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/9.
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cities and counties began to see the merits of cooperation in
the youth committees, but wanted to pursue their own goals
without interference from officials or the local governments.
They

came

together

in

their

own

organizations,

the

Jugendringe or Youth Rings which often tried to take over the
functions of the youth committees, the Jugendausschiisse, in
which

adults

encourage

still

these

had

a

dominant

activities

members

voice.
of

To

youth

further

activities

sections throughout the zone reported that they were making
progress in organizing young people and setting up leadership
training
could

courses.

report

The Bavarian delegation,

that

it

had

opened

four

for example,

youth

leadership

training centers in Bavaria under the auspices of the State
Youth

Committee.

OMGBY had secured the

Ministry for Food and Agriculture,

support of the

an important asset in

times of scarcity and food stamps.37
Other

divisions

representatives,

for

had

not

example,

been
had

idle

made

either.

sure

that

ICD
radio

stations devoted eight hours per week to youth programs and
provided youth leaders with ample opportunity to be on the
air.38
The youth officers at the conference also learned that
ICD had launched a film program directed specifically at the
younger generation which, according to its representatives,
37Garmisch Conference 1-4, 16-17.
38Garmisch Conference 16-17.
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showed much promise.

Once again the idea for the program had

come from the field.

Shortly after the first conference on

youth activities in July the youth activities officer of a
detachment in Bavaria suggested to headguarters that German
youth needed something more than classroom instruction in the
field of education.

He thought that young Germans would

probably be quite receptive to US motion pictures and modern
American

music.

As

usual

the

mills

of

the

OMGUS

administration ground slowly, but four weeks after he had
sent his memorandum the youth officer received an invitation
to spend three days in Munich to discuss the details of his
proposal and OMGUS policies.

Military Government actually

had an official policy regarding films for Germans in place
since May 1946.

Clay, who had to settle the dispute over who

was in charge of the program, decided that ICD would be in
charge of producing educational films and their contents.
E&CRD would take over the responsibilities for distributing
the films to individuals and institutions.

By July they were

ready to make movies available to youth activities.39
In spite of the encouraging news, obstacles remained.
A number of participants complained about considerable lack
of

communication and

support within OMGUS.

Furthermore

39Memo from Paterson, Det. G 228, Ansbach to OMGBY,
Munich, 16 Jul. 1946; Headquarters, OMBGY to Patterson, 15
Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br. , Box
40, 10/43-3/22; directive from Military Governor, 22 May
1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Field Operations Division [hereinafter
FOD], Records of the Resident Liaison and Security Office at
Nuernberg [hereinafter Det. B-211], Box 1419, 9/126-3/8.
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German bureaucrats were making life difficult by attempting
to get youth activities under their control.

Apart from

their isolation within OMGUS, the youth officers felt that
they needed to find a way to contact the American public.
Without the support of Americans back home they would not be
able to carry their objectives through.
list

that

German

youth

publications

ICD added to the
so

far

had

been

disappointing in their re-educational value.40
The Army's program
throughout 1946.

(GYA)

received

special attention

The Garmisch conference was just a part of

a series of meetings between Military Government officers,
Army representatives and German youth officials.

In June

1946 the three groups in charge of youth work in Bavaria had
met to achieve a greater degree of cooperation.
Government officials were eager to make

Military

sure that their

agency would not be degraded to become a mere supplier for
German youth groups.

At the same time they insisted that

they should have exclusive control over the distribution of
all equipment which the Army could make available to German
youth.

Germans would receive all captured enemy materials

with no strings attached.

As far as youth centers were

concerned, GYA officers pointed out that youth groups had a
difficult time to hold on to their homes when pressured by
German authorities once the Army released them to them.

40Garmisch Conference 2, 21-22.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The

289
only solution would be for the Army to retain control of the
facilities and make them available to all youth groups.41
Apparently OMGUS representatives felt uneasy about their
coalition with soldiers in re-educating German children.

The

numbers the Army provided during the Garmisch conference were
impressive.
throughout

The officer in charge of GYA reported that
the

American

zone

more

than

15,000

American

personnel had contacted nearly 290,000 children since April.
The ensuing discussion brought to light that, even though the
directives

provided

information,
Military

for

contacts

Government
a

liaison

and

of

participating

in GYA.

exchange

in the field needed to be
representatives

establishment

the

training

also

program

for

closer.

suggested
Army

of

the

personnel

The very success and size of the

program caused some apprehensions.

Some officers felt that

the Army was acting too independently and charged it with
deviating from the official policy of leaving the actual
activities in German hands.

Another OMGUS representative

argued that GYA claimed and received all the credit for
actions his section had planned and initiated when they had
merely asked the Army for help.
that the Army's
parties

did

A third critic pointed out

approach to children through sports

nothing

for

Americans were pursuing.

the

long

range

objectives

and
the

All the GYA representative could do

410MGBY, Weekly Report no. 59, 20-27 Jun. 1946, "Youth
Activities;" NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br.,
Box 143, 5/296-1/17.
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was to reaffirm the Army's willingness to lend a hand to the
agencies

which

activities.

were

"primarily

responsible"

for

youth

He explained that the Army was most experienced

in the realm of sports and had the necessary equipment and
facilities, so it was only natural that it mainly offered
children these kinds of activities.

The GYA officer added

that suggestions for improvements would be most welcome.42
The conference revealed that it was hard to coordinate
two organizations working in the same field.

Between August

and October 1946 OMGUS and Army representatives repeatedly
met to discuss their respective roles in German youth work.
The Army adhered to its traditional views that it should
leave policy making to civilian authorities and therefore did
not contest OMGUS prerogatives in this field.
also

agreed

objectives.

that

the

Army

would

have

to

Both sides
change

its

Instead of simply trying to keep children and

GIs out of trouble, GYA would have to participate in the
American re-education effort.

This meant that GYA would have

to offer a more sophisticated program for young Germans.

The

key question was whether the Army would be allowed to take up
a more active role in developing

its own initiatives or

should only provide assistance to German youth organizations
who

asked

for it.

The Army command

favored the former

solution, but OMGUS and Clay insisted that GYA should not try
to compete with, or replace German youth organizations and
42Garmisch Conference 14-15, 22.
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should only supplement already existing German programs.
Both sides finally agreed that the Army should be able to
initiate its own programs, but should try to turn them over
to the Germans as soon as they would be ready.
Government

officials

discussion

groups

with

suggested
the

conducting

youngsters

to

Military

forums

and

train them

in

democratic procedure.43
The resulting directive of October 1946 tried to satisfy
all sides involved.

Obviously based on the successes of the

youth centers the Army had inherited from the Soviets in
Berlin, the directive also permitted USFET to requisition
buildings

for youth groups

communities.
subordinate

in the

vicinity of

military

It authorized GYA to hire German employees in
positions

and

American

dependents

who

permitted to come to the theater from April 1946 on.

were
This

meant that headquarters officially did not permit the Army to
develop its own program, but provided it with all the tools
and resources to do so if the Germans did not take advantage
of the resources the units were required to offer.44
The directive came at an unfortunate time.

The Army was

in the middle of a complete reorganization of its troops in
Germany.

In June 1947 headquarters had to issue an extensive

43Minutes of Conference on Army Assistance to German
Youth Activities Held at Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European
Theater, 7-9 Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9.
44Jones 14-17.
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order to the commanders of the newly formed military posts
which admonished them that the new administrative structure
did not free American officers and enlisted men in any way
from their obligations to assist young Germans.

To make sure

that

headquarters

units

complied

with

their

duties,

introduced a system of weekly consolidated reports.45
In spite of the difficulties the Army made the best of
the October directive.

In January 1947 headquarters provided

its posts with detailed procedures for obtaining films.

At

that time youth officers could choose from sixteen American
feature

films

such as The Gold Rush,

Madame

Curie,

Abe

Lincoln in Illinois, or Young Tom Edison, which young people
would be able to see for a moderate fee.

They had four

German films, five films from allied or neutral countries,
and twenty-one American documentary films at their disposal.
German documentaries

and

fairy tale films which

ICD had

approved completed the list.46
Another

order

from

June

clearly

indicated

that

headquarters was doing everything it could to get American
soldiers and civilians involved in the program.

It reminded

commanding generals that the November directive authorized
^Responsibility for German Youth Activities, AG 353.8
GOT-AGO, HQ European Command, 5 June 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1428, 9/12-2/16.
^Headquarters US Forces, European Theater to Commanding
Generals, 23 Jan. 1947, subject: Procedure for Obtaining
Motion Picture Films or the German Youth Activities Program
from Information Control Units; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B211, Box 1428, 9/122-2/16.
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soldiers to use up to four hours of their weekly training
time for working with youth in manual arts.

The authors of

the directive made clear that they considered the program to
be very important.

Using the four hours for working with

young Germans could be "of limitless value both to the troops
themselves and to the occupation forces' efforts for the re
education of Germany."47
The

Army

relations.

also

recognized the

need

for good

public

A EUCOM directive of May 1947 instructed GYA

officers to do everything they could to keep the program in
the public eye.

They were encouraged to inform the German

and American press not only in Germany,

but also in the

United States, and to provide the Army Pictorial Services
with photos and motion pictures about their activities.

AFN

was instructed to cover GYA activities with live broadcasts
if possible.48
Apparently headquarters did not need to worry about lack
of enthusiasm.

Early in 1948 GYA operated 295 youth centers

in the American zone and in Berlin.

Between September 1947

and April 1948 attendance at GYA activities peaked at almost
700,000

children

in December and dropped

below

360,000.

Almost 420,000 German children attended over 27,000 meetings
47Headquarters, European Command to Commanding Generals,
18 June 1947, subject: Use of Training Time for Group
Activities in Manual Arts Installations; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1428, 9/122-2/16.
48EUCOM Directive, 22 May 1947; NA RG 260, OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 141, 5/295-3/7.
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in April 1948.
their

389 officers and enlisted men supervised

activities

military

full time.

volunteers,

volunteers,

and

1,056

620

They were

American

German

and

civilians

assisted by 589
Allied

civilian

employed

by

the

Army.49
The number of participants only provided part of the
picture.

After the first year of GYA operations, ICD decided

to explore the reaction of German adults to the program.
According to its survey, a majority of all Germans in the
American zone had actually heard of GYA.

The pollsters found

that over 80% of the Germans interviewed would permit their
children to participate in GYA activities.
had

heard

about

indicated that
activities.

the

program,

their children

however,

Even of those who
only

actually had

about

10%

attended any

Interestingly, those whose children had taken

part in some GYA program had a much better opinion of the
Army's efforts than those who had just heard about it.
authors

of the

report did not

think

that

such

The

a small

percentage, which, according to them, still translated into
hundreds of thousands of children, would actually hurt the
program,

as long as GYA successfully implemented its re

education goals.

In this realm the findings were promising.

German adults seemed to understand clearly that the program
was

designed

to

introduce

their

children

to

democratic

49Monthly Report of the Deputy Commander in Chief, EUCOM,
31 May 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br.,
Box 37, 10/43-2/3.
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14. Army Assistance to German Youth Activities, 1947-48
(Source: Monthly Report of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief,
EUCOM, 31 May 1948. NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities
Br., BOX 37, 10/43-2/3)
principles

and thought that

it did.

At the

same time,

however, the survey revealed that the Germans appreciated GYA
for its practical results: only the well educated of those
whose children participated in the program let them go with
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the specific purpose of learning more about democracy or the
American way of life.

Most of the others mainly sent their

children because GYA kept them away from the streets and gave
them something meaningful to do during their abundant free
time.50
In April 1947 the Army polled its soldiers to find out
about their participation and their opinions of GYA.

At the

same time ICD conducted a survey about the program with young
Germans.

The Army's findings were not surprising.

Most of

the GIs and officers surveyed had heard about the program and
thought that GYA was a good idea for which it would be
worthwhile to volunteer.

A majority of the GIs found that

GYA could teach them something about the Germans as well as
the young Germans about democracy and the United States.
is

the

case

with

any

volunteer

effort,

only

a

As

small

percentage of soldiers and their officers sacrificed their
time and energies
enlisted GIs and
program.

as volunteers.

Only about 6% of the

15% of officers had taken part

Soldiers who

spoke some German,

in the

who had

done

volunteer work in the US, and who had a rather favorable

50Office of the Director of Information Control, Opinion
Survey Unit, Report Number 46, Army Aid to German Youth
Activities Evaluated by German Adults, 19 Feb. 1947; NA RG
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 142, 5/2961/1 .
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attitude

of

young male Germans,

tended

to

render

their

services more willingly than others.51
The survey on young people is remarkable insofar as it
shows that young Germans were much more cautious in their
answers than their parents.

The deep trauma of the war and

their experiences with the Hitler Youth had made young people
suspicious.

A very large number of them preferred not to

answer most of the questions.

As far as participation in the

Army's youth program was concerned, the survey confirmed the
results of the adult survey.

Only about 10% of children

surveyed in Kassel, Munich, Heidelberg, and Frankfurt said
that they had ever attended GYA activities.

Their main

motivation for participating in the program was the food
which the Americans usually offered.

Re-education or the

desire to learn something about the United States did not
seem to attract much attention in view of the very harsh
realities young people in the American zone were facing at
the time.52
In

spite

of

the

impressive

numbers

and

the

rather

positive evaluation of GYA by adults not even one year after

5lHeadquarters, US Army, Troop Education and Information
Group, Soldier's Opinion Concerning the Army's Assistance to
the German Youth Program in the European Command, 15 June
1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box
144, 5/296-2/1.
520ffice of the Director of Information Control, Opinion
Survey Unit, Report Number 56, German Children Appraise the
Youth Program, 26 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director,
Box 17, 10/110-1/13.
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its initiation, this highly visible part of the American re
education efforts for youth attracted criticism.

In May 1947

the New York Times reported "U.S. Program for German Youth
Reaches Only Small Percentage: 85% of 1,000 Polled in Cities
Do Not Take Part - Candy and Food Are Found to Be Chief Lure
For Those Who Do."
received

The author of the article obviously had

a copy of the

faithfully— but
background
readers.

without

ICD report
any

on German

further

knowledge— forwarded

the

youth

and

investigation

or

information

to

his

As a result the public got a rather distorted

picture of American youth activities in Germany.

The Times

correspondent was not aware of the fact that the report
actually dealt with only a part of American re-education
efforts,

namely GYA.

A short

investigation with Norman

Himes, OMGUS Education Officer, did not seem to clarify the
issue.

The Times merely reported that Himes thought it just

natural in view of the dire situation in Germany that young
Germans

considered

food

to

be

extremely

important

and

defended GYA as a rather new program which had made some
progress.53
Vice

Consul

Robert Beghtol

of the Munich

Consulate

General composed a report to the State Department along the
same lines, criticizing the Army's efforts in no uncertain
53"U.S. Program for German Youth Reaches Only Small
Percentage: 85% of 1,000 Polled in Cities Do Not Take Part Candy and Food Are Found to Be Chief Lure For Those Who Do,"
The New York Times, 29 May 1947: 4; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 145, 5/296-2/7.
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terms.

Robert

Murphy,

Clay's

liaison

with

the

State

Department in Berlin, wrote to James Wilkinson, Beghtol's
superior officer in Munich, that Clay regarded the report as
"unfair."

Just

like

the

Times,

Beghtol

had

completely

ignored OMGUS re-education efforts and simply had focused on
the Munich GYA activities and the German response.

Clay

thought that the Army was making a "praiseworthy contribution
... for which all Americans should be grateful —
other purpose

than to help."

Murphy also

it has no

explained to

Wilkinson that OMGUS did not appreciate sending this kind of
internal information to Washington instead of headquarters in
Berlin where constructive criticism would always be welcome.
He thought that Beghtol's efforts to gather information on
the youth program were laudable but limited in value because
the Vice Consul relied only on the personal information he
had been able to gather in the city and could not provide an
accurate picture of the general situation in the American
zone.

Murphy

observation

advised

to

the

Wilkinson

local

to

military

take

this

kind

authorities

in

of
the

future.54
Clay's response did not stop with a reprimand of the
vice consul.

In August the general dispatched a personal

message to the War Department in which he explained in detail

^American Consulate General, Munich, to Secretary of
State, Washington, 2 June 1947, dispatch no. 653; Murphy to
Wilkinson, 12 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
Education Br., Box 145, 5/296-2/7.
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OMGUS policies.

Clay took special care to defend GYA against

the attacks in the press and by Beghtol.

He thought it

unfortunate that the ICD report did not explain the purpose
of the Army program which,

according to him,

was a mere

auxiliary in the overall American effort of re-education.
Obviously hurt by the negative publicity Clay found it
surprising how many people think that the GYA program is
our youth program for Germany. It is equally surprising
how little credit the Army is getting for its
willingness to be a good neighbor and to share its
facilities with German youth.55
Clay's vehement defense of the youth activities under
his command did not mean that he was blind to the pitfalls of
the program or unwilling to listen to constructive criticism.
In response to a critical memorandum to Berlin, the Internal
Affairs

Division suggested that

Clay

should render

more

public support to youth activities in general and should make
sure that the commanding officers selected capable men as
youth

officers.

The

Division

further

recommended

that

"professionally trained" youth officers should be appointed
to all OMGUS Land offices.
tactical

Clay would have to remind his

commands that they were not competing with

the

Germans, but rather should assist them in their activities.56

55Clay to Dept, of War, 24 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/5.
56Memorandum from Internal Affairs and Communications
Division to General Clay, 5 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/5.
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While most of the points of discussion in 1946 dealt
with matters of improving the program which OMGUS had already
in place, participants in conferences also tried to confront
more fundamental issues.

Since the youth program was without

question extremely important in the re-education of Germany
because of its potential for producing social changes and
instilling an understanding of democracy, Abe Vinik from OMG
Hesse wondered at the Garmisch conference whether the youth
activities section was pursuing the right course.
to

him,

the

Americans

organizing youth,

so

focused

entirely

organizational

Simply introducing new features

structure

of

youth

activities

Germany might not be enough to change the minds
younger

on

Clearly the officer had spotted a

weak point in the project.
the

had

but had neglected their actual target,

young people themselves.

to

far

According

generation.

Vinik proposed

that youth

in

of the
officers

should not discuss these problems isolated from the other
issues German society was facing and should bring in parties
from all parts of Military Government as well as from German
society to try to find an integral solution which Americans
and Germans could implement.

The conference participants

agreed that more was indeed necessary, but Vinik must have
been

disappointed

with

the

response.

Apart

from

some

practical proposals to remedy this deficiency, such as the
initiation of discussion groups or bringing in experts to
help with problems, the members of the conference did not
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respond in any way to his proposal.

In October 1946 the time

had not come for profound changes in a program which was
barely one year old.57
Although OMGUS representatives always emphasized that
Germans

should

be

responsible

for

carrying

out

youth

activities and had even invited some Germans to Garmisch, the
minutes of the conference reveal that OMGUS personnel were
not ready to turn the responsibility over to the Germans.
They clearly felt these activities were a vital part of the
American re-education effort in which the occupiers had to
set the parameters of action.

The conference was the first

step, however, towards giving Germans a bigger voice in youth
affairs and to open up a dialogue on a zone-wide basis which
apparently was

already taking place

Americans

several

in

states.

between

Germans

Nevertheless,

and

OMGUS

representatives made clear that the Germans would have to
develop their own initiatives within the framework they had
established.
With the parameters in place, OMGUS officials tried hard
during the next year and a half to initiate a dialogue with
German officials.

The annual report for 1947/48 noted that

German-American conferences in September and November 1947
were most successful.

In the earlier of the two both sides

agreed that the democratization of youth groups had made
considerable progress, but that both, Germans and Americans
57Garmisch Conference 5-6.
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were neglecting the German mind over their attempts to reform
the

system.

The

Germans

who

attended

the

conferences

appreciated the lack of ideological indoctrination and in
general

seemed

counterparts.

to

share

They

the

certainly

goals

of

belonged

their
to

a

American
group

of

progressive educators who were eager to establish a dialogue
and to promote new ideas.58
One problem Germans and Military Government shared was
the Army's GYA program.
interfering

with

their

Both sides agreed that GIs were
own

arrangements

by

introducing programs the Germans had not asked for.

actively
They did

not recognize at the time that this unwelcome intrusion in
the traditional settings actually was opening new horizons in
youth work.

The problem with the approach of OMGUS officials

to remain in the background was that it gave Germans the
opportunity to simply continue their traditional concepts of
youth work which largely neglected those who were unwilling
to organize or forced them to join a youth group if they
wanted to pursue their interests.

GYA offered an alternative

model of youth work open to everyone for young people as well
as for progressive educators.59

58OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., German Youth
Between Yesterday and Tomorrow: 1 April 1947-30 April 1948,
3-4, hereinafter cited as German Youth 47-48; NA RG 260
OMGBY, ID, BOX 189, 10/51-3/9.
S9German Youth 47-48 3-4.
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Some
policies.

Americans

recognized

this

shortcoming

in

MG

James R. Wilkinson, for example, American Consul

General in Munich, informed Washington in November 1946 about
the progress of American youth work in Bavaria.

He pointed

out that growing membership numbers in youth organizations
indicated some progress, but he thought that neither OMGUS
nor the Army had yet been able to overcome the inability of
the Germans to understand— let alone adopt— the democratic
principles inherent in American youth work, which was open to
everyone, did not adhere to specific ideologies, and did not
depend on a tightly knit, well organized and hierarchical
structure of command.

Wilkinson warned that Americans would

not succeed in their reorientation efforts if they failed to
add their own democratic concept of youth work to their
agenda.60
Youth activities officers met again in January 1947.
Apart from the usual consideration of issues concerning the
field work in the American zone and cooperation with GYA, the
major issue on the agenda was the development of new field
directives

which

would

comply

with

SWNCC

269/9.

The

conference clearly demonstrated that OMGUS youth officers had
anticipated many of the policies and did not hesitate to
adapt the directives from Washington to their own needs and
prerogatives.

Under the able guidance of Lawrence Norrie,

“Political Report, American Consulate General, Munich to
Secretary of State, Washington, 5 Nov. 1946; NA RG 59 Central
Files 1945-49, ‘862.489/11-546.
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the director of the Group Activities Branch, the discussions
revealed that Washington was actually lagging about nine
months

behind

the

decision

making

process

in

Germany.

Washington policy makers, for example, reiterated the disease
and unrest formula as the only basis for action long after
„ American officials in Germany had thrown it overboard and
adopted a clear cut positive long range re-education policy
regardless of the physical conditions in the American zone.61
In April 1947 OMGUS published its annual report on youth
activities

for the

second

year of the occupation.

The

authors maintained that April 1946 had brought a definite
reorientation of American policy in Germany.

According to

them, youth officials had completed the eradication of Nazi
and militaristic organizations and could begin to embark on
a more constructive program during their

second year of

activities.

This included the formation of the Land Youth

Committees,

a

dramatic

increase

of

the

Kreis

Youth

Committees, and attempts to raise the number of young people
who joined youth groups, but the report continued that these
measures were just a beginning.

Although life in Germany had

somewhat returned to more normal levels and the shock of the
defeat was wearing off, young people in the American zone
still suffered from a lack of almost everything they needed
for organizing and participating in youth activities.

A

6lMinutes of Youth Activities Conference, Berlin, 6-7
February 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education
Br., Box 120, 5/293-1/7.
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leadership program was in place and operating well, but the
authors thought that it would take years to provide the young
people in their zone with an adequate number of trained youth
leaders.

In spite of these shortcomings the Youth Activities

Section could report that, apart from some isolated cases,
young Germans had decided to stay away from any large scale
subversive activities.62
Youth experts also had to deal with some setbacks.

In

spite of specific provisions by SWNCC 269/5 the authors noted
that fewer than fifteen youth leaders, almost all of them
older persons, had been able to go abroad.

The situation was

similar

Germany.

for

foreign

experts

coming

to

Youth

activities officers were clearly irritated by the fact that
they had to be content with a very limited number of visitors
while it seemed that American businessmen could come to the
American zone almost at will to exploit the situation.
report

concluded

that

the

previous

year

had

The

brought

significant advances in the creation of a healthy exterior
structure for youth activities, but that the process of a
"democratic reorientation of German youth" had hardly begun.
American objectives for the following year should therefore
concentrate

on

"the

re-awakening

of

certain

moral

and

spiritual forces among German youth" and educating youth
leaders who would clearly recognize the mistakes of the past
62Report on German Youth, Second Year of the Occupation,
1 Apr. 1946-31 March 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
Education Br., Box 145 5/296-2/6.
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and

would

be

willing

democratic lines.
young

to

youth

work

along

To achieve these goals, changes in the

peoples' physical

desirable.

reconstruct

German

environment

authorities

would

would

certainly

have

to

be

furnish

sufficient funding for youth work and permit school reform in
their states.

The authors of the report concurred with

Clay's basic tenet that ultimately only the improvement of
the economic and political landscape in Germany as well as in
the world could lead to a standard of living which would
enable the people to set their interests beyond the immediate
needs of bare survival.63
The material side, however, was just one part of German
reconstruction.
German

youth

American youth officials were convinced that

would

benefit tremendously

from

increasing

contacts with the outside world and went to great lengths to
overcome the spiritual isolation of Germany during the Third
Reich.

In January 1947 Berlin introduced a program which

would help young Germans find a pen pal in the United States.
Students of all ages could contact the US Office of Education
on an individual basis, whereas the National Social Welfare
Assembly would take care of group correspondence.

During the

next twelve months about 10,000 children made use of this
official
directly.

route,

others

approached

youth

organizations

The churches provided an additional avenue for

“Report on German Youth, Second Year of the Occupation,
1 Apr. 1946-31 March 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
Education Br., Box 145, 5/296-2/6; German Youth 47-48 32-34.
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establishing contacts.

GYA caught on to the idea a year

after the Military Government initiative had started.

When

GYA officers investigated if their children would be able to
participate,

Lawrence

"appreciated

the

Norrie

effort,"

but

informed
that

he

them

that

he

considered

an

additional program unfeasible since the volunteer agencies
involved could barely handle the existing volume of letters
they received.

He therefore asked the Army not to rely on

OMGUS channels, but rather use its own.64
In spite of some apparent organizational pitfalls, the
American decision to permit contacts between young Germans
and people abroad certainly helped to overcome the isolation
of the previous years.

Official and unofficial contacts with

Americans satisfied a real need and desire and provided young
Germans for the first time with the opportunity to learn
first hand about their peers in other countries.

Many took

advantage of the opportunity.
The young generation's interest in opening up to the
world also manifested itself in a dramatic rise in the number
of people who participated in youth organizations.

By March

“OMGUS Press Release, 23 Jan. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/13; German
Youth 47-48 30; Commanding General, EUCOM, to Lawrence
Norrie, OMGUS, E&CRD, 18 Apr. 1948; Norrie to Commanding
General, EUCOM, 3 May 1948; NA RG 260 E&CRD, Community
Education Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/13. The correspondence of my
father— 16 years old in 1947— with Lutheran reverends as well
as with lay persons of congregations all over the United
States documents well the possibilities church connections
offered.
All of his correspondence started as a thank you
note for material help.
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1948 more than 1.2 million young people had joined youth
organizations, an increase of one hundred per cent.

Trade

unions and sports groups enjoyed the most dramatic growth.65
Summer camps became one of the most important aspects of
their

activities.

They

were

generally

regarded

as

an

excellent way of getting young people out of the destroyed
cities into a healthy environment.
Army,

Military Government, the

and American YMCA representatives developed an all

encompassing

program

to

make

summer

part

not

only

recreational, but also re-educational events.66
The American YMCA had done pioneer work in this field
already in 1946.

The Army had provided the tent materials.

Supplies from the United States made sure that the young
people would be able
established

the

representatives

to get additional

pattern
had not

leadership in 1946.

for

the

calories.

future,

been overly

but

American

impressed with

encourage

them

to

camp

According to them, adults took complete

control of the camps the German YMCA had organized.
people expected to

This

Young

be taken care of and adults did not
take

over

any responsibilities.

The

Americans were not aware that not all camps operated in the
same way.

The Falcons' Republics, for example, reemerged in

1946 as well.
socialist

These large tent cities, organized by the

Falcons,

functioned

entirely

as

democratic

65German Youth 47-48 11-21.
66German Youth 47-48 21-24.
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institutions in which young people got hands on experiences
with

the

procedures

and

learned

to

take

over

responsibilities.67 Compared to the church oriented groups,
however,

the

Falcons

only made

a small minority

of the

overall summer camp population.68
The Americans were resolved to improve the situation in
the following year.

D.A. Davis, president of the World's

Committee

contacted

of

YMCA,

Lawrence

Norrie,

whom

he

apparently knew well from his previous job with the American
YMCA, to develop an all encompassing plan for making summer
camps in 1947 not only a material, but also a re-educational
success.

During the following months Norrie called several

conferences
leadership

to coordinate the Army's material
training

summer camps.

and

practical

guides

for

help

with

organizing

Norrie emphasized that American authorities

needed to take special care of unorganized young people whom
the organized groups tended to neglect.69
67It needs to be stressed here that the Falcons were
close to the Social Democratic party and did not subscribe to
any of the doctrines which came from Moscow. They based all
their proceedings on Western democratic principles.
^Memorandum Edward T. Ladd, Youth and Sports Office
OMGUS Bremen to Chief, Civil Government Division, 19 Aug.
1946; Memorandum on Trip by Sgt. Tracy Strong to German Youth
Camps, U.S. Zone, 30 July to 3 Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-1/25; for the
Falcon Republics see Willy ProlB, personal interview, 4 Aug.
1994.
69D .A . Davis, World's Committee of the YMCA, Geneva to
Lawrence Norrie, OMGUS, 10 Feb. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-1/25; summary of
Military Government conference on German Youth Activities
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As usual Military Government provided the necessary
guidance to youth groups in the form of bringing an American
expert, Elmar Ott from the American Camping Association, to
Germany.

During his six months stay Ott not only examined

the situation, but also conducted leadership

seminars and

participated actively in camps throughout the American zone.
Most of the camping equipment either came from former German
Wehrmacht stocks which the Army released to the Land Youth
Committees, or from Army surplus materials.

The Army also

provided much needed assistance in transporting young people
to their destinations.

The food for the camps came in part

from Herbert Hoover's program as well as from the agencies
organized in CRALOG.

According to American sources, friendly

German

their

farmers

did

share

in securing the

caloric

supplies.70
In spite of some initial organizational problems, the
camps were a great success.

The undernourished participants

gained weight dramatically, but Military Government's main
objective of providing an additional avenue for reorientation
did not seem to function very well.

Ott reported that in the

camps he visited food became the focal point for many of the
young participants.

According to OMGUS personnel, most of

the organizers failed to transform the camps into communities

Camping Program, 18-19 March 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/14.
10German Youth 47-48 21-24, 31.
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in which the campers actively participated.

Nevertheless,

the officers spotted some young people who showed promise for
becoming future leaders and lauded Elmar Ott for introducing
Germans to the concept of making camping an educational as
well as a recreational affair.71
The camping program revealed that many problems remained
the same.

In spite of Military Government's efforts to

provide leadership training, it could not keep up with the
increasing demand.

The annual report for 1947/48 made it

once more a point that it would certainly help the American
reorientation effort to send German youth leaders to the
United

States

where

they

would

have the

opportunity

to

observe and learn different approaches to youth work first
hand.

The youth activities section maintained that young

Germans

were

barely

starting

reorientation efforts.

to

respond

to

American

OMGUS youth officers thought that

many older Germans did not help at all by trying to use youth
organizations

to

disseminate

ideological agendas.

their

own

political

or

One of the most serious shortcomings

was that many youth groups did not base their proceedings on
democratic principles.

They also had a tendency to exclude

anybody from their activities who was not a member.72
In

view

leadership

of

these

training

rather

discouraging

observations

in Germany and in the United

71German Youth 47-48 21-24, 31.
72German Youth 47-48 32-34.
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became a vital issue.

To secure the necessary funds and

their long term objectives, Military Government— undoubtedly
with the support of Herman Wells— successfully approached the
Rockefeller Foundation for support.

The foundation promised

to provide the necessary finances for leadership schools in
Germany.

It was also prepared to send American experts to

Germany and to sponsor the journeys of six German youth
leaders to the United States where they would be able to
study youth work for six months.73
In spite of this considerable support, the program had
to overcome additional hardships in 1948.

Currency reform

initially wiped out many existing funds and put schools in
jeopardy.
Bavaria,

Raymond Spahn, in charge of youth activities in
for

example,

urgently requested

money

from his

branch chief to assure the survival of a leadership school.
Spahn argued that without support from this source, which he
estimated to be about 3,500 Marks per month, the school would
have to close.

This would defeat "the primary function of

this section as well as the occupation mission in Bavaria."74
OMGUS

officials

were

beginning

to

reevaluate

general approach to youth activities as well.

their

Whereas before

1948 only the revival of youth groups on a democratic basis
73Minutes of the 15th Conference on MG Youth Activities,
8-9 Apr. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education
Br., BOX 136, 5/291-1/19.
74Memo from Raymond Spahn to Chief of Education Br., 1
July 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box
37, 10/43-2/1.
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had received attention,

youth officers recognized in 1948

that a large segment of young Germans were not and would not
be affected

by the traditional German

youth

activities.

Cooperative community planning for these youths would be
necessary.

As a first step to reaching out to these young

people OMGUS

planned to render special

support to youth

groups which would be open to all young people,

not just

particular interests.75
OMGUS received help from private organizations who also
began to operate on an increasingly large scale in Germany
from

1946 on.

American

Friends

After Truman's
were

the

initiation of CRALOG

first

to

arrive

in

the

Germany.

Together with other American agencies they soon developed an
extensive program for helping Germans survive.

In June 1946

the Council of American Remittances to Europe (CARE) signed
an agreement with Clay, which permitted Americans to send
food parcels directly to Germany.

Initially CARE purchased

three million surplus ration packages from the Army which
American citizens could buy for friends
Germany.

or relatives

in

Due to its tremendous success, but also in response

to the scarcity in Europe and especially in Germany, CARE
expanded its operations in the course of 1947.

In January it

began to offer a variety of parcel types which not only
consisted of food, but also of wool blankets with thread.
The patterns for transforming these blankets into clothes
lsGerman Youth 47-48 32-34.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

315
were available upon request in Germany.

From June on Germans

could also receive fabric for making their garments.

The

great majority of CARE parcels went to the three western
zones of Germany and to Berlin.

The first parcels arrived in

August, just in time for helping Germans through one of the
most severe winters they ever had to face.

By April 1947

CARE had delivered nearly one million food parcels,

two

thirds of the total for Europe, to German families.76
CARE was not the only American relief operation
Germany.

CRALOG

reached

an

agreement

with

in

Military

Government in June 1946 and began to make supplies available
for

feeding Germans.

German

children,

70%

of whom the

Americans found to be undernourished, were a special target
group.

The

agreement

stipulated

that Germans

were

not

allowed to donate anything to CRALOG or to the Red Cross to
avoid

any

discrimination.

During

its

first

year

of

operations CRALOG delivered about eleven thousand tons of
food as well as three and a half thousand tons of clothing to
Germany.

Most of the help came from various denominational

76Military Government of Germany, Monthly Report of the
Military Governor [Hereinafter OMGUS, Monthly Report], no.
12, 1-30 Jun. 1946: 25-26; "CARE Program," OMGUS Information
Bulletin, no. 56, 26 Aug. 1946: 16-17; "Cooperative for
American Remittances for Europe," OMGUS Information Bulletin,
no. 89, 21 April 1947: 5-6, 10. The city of Bremen's and the
German government's official celebration of the fiftieth
anniversary of the arrival of the first CARE parcels at the
port documents well the importance of this help not only for
the physical well being of the German population, but also
its psychological impact (This Week in Germany, 19 July 1996:
8 ).
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groups

in

the

United States

and went

organizations of the two major churches.
set about one fifth

to

the

relief

Theorganizations

of the food aside to feed children

at

dedicated much

to

schools.77
Although

they

of their resources

welfare efforts, many organizations actively promoted youth
work.

In June 1947, for example, John R. Mott, President of

the World's Committee of the YMCA, visited the three western
zones

and

opened

Frankfurt.

the first

YMCA sponsored

The YWCA followed suit.

center

in

American and Swedish

representatives operated in Berlin, where they opened a youth
center, and Stuttgart.78 The Friends
youth work
approach.

in Frankfurt,

but

also became active in

they followed

a different

They were the first group which recognized that

traditional

German

youth

activities would not

substantial number of young people.
Weatherford,

the

American

reach

a

In May 1946 Willis. D.

Friends'

Service

Committee's

commissioner for Europe therefore approached Clay directly
with various proposals to remedy the situation.

He suggested

the opening of conference centers where German professionals
who were

involved

in youth work would

be

able to

come

together and develop their own strategies "in a democratic
manner"

and the establishment of neighborhood centers which

^OMGUS, Monthly Report, no. 12, 1-30 Jun. 1946: 17.; no.
26, 1-31 Aug. 1947: 37-38.
78OMGUS, Monthly Report,
German Youth 31.

no.

24,

1-30 Jun.

1947:
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would take care of young people much in the way Hull House
did in Chicago.

The idea for the establishment of these

centers originated with Hertha Kraus, a German emigree, who
had been one of the most influential German social workers
during the Weimar Republic.

Her philosophy and actions

actually were very similar to those Jane Addams was pursuing
in Chicago at the same time.

After Hitler's rise to power

she was forced to leave, took a teaching appointment in the
United States, but did not lose interest in her home country.
She actually proposed the idea of neighborhood centers in
postwar Germany as early as 1943 to the AFSC.79
Since resources for constructing such a center were not
available in Germany, the Friends had organized all of their
materials elsewhere.

Trucks loaded with everything necessary

for the buildings were waiting in France for OMGUS approval,
but the Quakers needed much patience in spite of the general
consensus about the necessity of such a center in Frankfurt.
They were facing the several dilemmas.

In May 1946 Clay was

still not inclined to permit American civilians to work in
the

American

zone.

Since

he

also

insisted

that

all

initiatives had to come from the Germans, the Friends had to
find a way to comply with this policy.

It was not until

March of 1947 that Military Government headquarters approved
the Friends' plan after the Lord Mayor and the city's youth

79Tent, "Simple Gifts" 66-75; see also German Youth 47-48
32.
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council

had

officially

specific sector.

requested

American

help

in

this

During the following year the Friends added

centers in Darmstadt and in Berlin.80
The three centers which the Friends ran actually were
the first projects which consciously dealt with the issue of
unorganized German youth.

OMGUS officials only recognized

the problem much later, while the Army never became involved
with the theoretical implications of its activities, although
the GYA centers often did exactly what the Quakers were doing
with their enterprises: they provided a place where all young
people would be able to get together and become actively
involved with each other and with helping their surrounding
community.
Religious groups such as the Friends not only provided
the personnel to organize relief and places to stay to young
Germans.

They also tried to learn more about the situation

in Germany and were among the first to send men and women to
the American

zone of occupation

wherever they could.

whose

task was

to

help

Jews, Catholics, and Protestants had

already sent envoys to Germany in July 1946 to facilitate
communications between Military Government and the different
denominations as well as with the outside world.81

In 1947

the World Council of Churches had three representatives in
80Tent, "Simple Gifts" 66-75; also German Youth 47-48 32.
8IOMGUS,
Minutes of Conference of Regional Youth
Activities Section Personnel, Berlin 2-3 July 1946: 7; NA RG
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Box 120, 5/293-1/7.
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Germany to assist with youth work.

Their assignments ranged

from assisting in camping and training of youth leadership
and supervising emerging Boys' Towns.

One of the three,

Chester P. Baird, went to Nuremberg to help the youth pastor
in charge of Bavaria, Martin Helbich, to reestablish contacts
between his Bavarian youth and Protestant youth groups in
other countries.82
All of the objectives and policies which OMGUS and the
Army

developed

activities

in

1946

throughout

activities.

the

remained

the

American

basis

occupation

for

their

and

HICOG

OMGUS maintained a philosophy to induce young

Germans to learn and internalize democratic behavior, while
the

Army's

assistance

GYA
to

program

the

youth

continued
in

the

to

provide

communities.

practical
By

1947

Washington had caught up with the youth officers' practical
approach.

OMGUS received help in Germany from American youth

and welfare organizations who provided young people with
urgently necessary food and clothing, but the Friends also
recognized that youth work needed to overcome the traditional
organizational boundaries.

They introduced a concept of

youth work which opened the door for young people who did not
intend to become organized in any way.

Fruitful youth work

within Germany, however, could only become a reality if the
four occupying powers would be willing to coordinate their

i2German Youth 47-48 31-32.
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efforts.

Events throughout Germany and especially in Berlin

soon revealed that this cooperation would not be forthcoming.
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CHAPTER VII
The other Zones. 1945-50; East vs.West

Re-educating German youth did not take place in a vacuum
and was by no means an exclusively American undertaking.
While youth activities went underway in all four zones of
occupation,

differences

in

the

approaches

of

the

three

western powers and of the Soviet Union not only threatened to
paralyze youth activities in Berlin, but also brought the
profound political and ideological differences between the
Soviets

and

the

three

western

allies

to

light

which

ultimately led to the division of Germany.
Four Occupiers: Four Approaches
Lucius Clay soon had to learn that American ideas about
postwar Germany in many respects differed sharply from those
of the other occupying powers.

The former allies were unable

to agree even on minor issues.
giving Clay serious problems.

Not just the Soviets were

Initially the French were most

adamant about avoiding any political or administrative move
that would strengthen the Germans in any way.

Even while the

Germans were still fighting, Charles de Gaulle had tried to
expand French influence in Germany.

French troops refused to

leave Stuttgart to the Americans, for example, in an attempt
to incorporate a major city in their zone of occupation and
only withdrew when Eisenhower applied massive pressure.

De

Gaulle also insisted on the French exclusive right to redraw
321
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the western border of Germany, which included the annexation
of the Rhineland.1
French, British, American, and Soviet occupiers brought
very different philosophies and cultures into their zones of
occupation.

The British,

for example, decided to retreat

from direct controls over the Germans already early in 1946.
They did not attempt to introduce a thorough re-education
program but rather tried to gain the trust of the Germans and
guide them through council and advice.
other hand,

The French, on the

had a tendency to retain direct control over

German authorities as long as possible.

They were the last

to permit elections in their zone of occupation and exploited
it economically to the largest possible extent.

Americans

occupied a middle ground in administrative matters, but were
the most adamant denazifiers.

The Soviets struggled with

formulating and pursuing a coherent occupation policy, but
from the beginning overturned the political system in their
zone and eventually replaced it with a Stalinist regime.2
‘Krieger 72-85, 104-109; Willis 7-31; see also Schwartz
29-32.
2For British Policy see Michael Balfour, "In Retrospect:
Britain's Policy of 'Re-education'," Nicholas Pronay and
Keith Wilson, eds., The Political Re-Education of Germany and
Her Allies lifter World War II (London & Sydney: Croom Helm,
1985) 139-51; for the French outlook and policy see Krieger
104-109, Willis 32-46; French initiatives in the cultural
realm are also in Henry Pilgert, Community and Group Life in
West Germany with Special Reference of the policies and
Programs of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for
Germany
([Bad Godesberg]: Office
of
the
U.S.
High
Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary,
Historical Division, 1952) 76-77; see also Schwartz 29-32;
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When Clay realized that governing Germany as a political
and economic unit was impossible,

he opted for the next

feasible solution, the unification of the Western zones.

His

motives were not the well being of Germany but rather the
huge financial burden the American zone of occupation posed
for taxpayers in the United States.

Once again he found the

French to be obstinate.

They had nurtured the particularist

movements

southwest while at the same time

in Germany's

preparing the incorporation of the Saar region into France.
Not

surprisingly,

the

French

needed

eighteen

considerable pressure from the United States,

months,

as well as

economic incentives to join the bi-zone and did so with
reservations.3
Although

Paris

recovery depended

recognized

that

Europe's

on that of West Germany,

economic

its military

government officials in Germany found it difficult to give up
their control over the new West German government in 1949.
They

insisted

intervention

reserving

as

many

powers

in German affairs as possible

Commissioners
Governors.

on

who

were

going

to

replace

for

direct

for the High
the

Military

In the end American and British overcame the

French resistance.

An International Authority of the Ruhr

provided the French with the means to guarantee their access

for the results of Soviet policy see Naimark 9-68, 141-204,
353-397.
3Krieger 282-289; Willis 17-31.
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to German coal and maintaining their influence in Europe's
most powerful industrial area, while NATO bound the United
States to Western Europe from 1949 on.

It took the three

Western Allies another six years, however, to find a way to
integrate the Federal Republic in such a way into the Western
camp that France's security needs could be satisfied.

West

Germany's autonomy coincided with the Republic's admission to
NATO, a step which not just strengthened the Alliance but
also provided adequate security against any future German
aggression.

American, French, British, and Canadian troops

remained in Germany as allies.4
Cooperation in the West
While Clay was fighting his battles over reparations,
deindustrialization and decentralization with the French and
the Soviets, OMGUS officers in charge of youth work did not
seem to face the same difficulties.

They took an interest in

the activities of their allies early on.

Whereas the first

American meeting dedicated to youth activities in Berlin in
1946

was

an

entirely

American

affair,

a

conference

in

Garmisch-Partenkirchen in October 1946 included participants
from the British and the French military governments.

At

this conference the Americans were not just reporting about
the progress in their own area of occupation, but also were
4Krieger 23-24; Schwartz 28-42, 57-83; Elmer Plischke,
History of the Allied High Commission for Germany: Its
Establishment, Structure, and Procedures, ([Bad Godesberg]:
Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Office of
the Executive Secretary, Historical Division, 1951) 21-27.
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eager to hear the British and the French representatives
describe the situation and policies in their zones.
officers found lots of common ground.

The

Colonel R.T. Percival,

the British representative, reported to the Americans that
the British basically had pursued the same objectives as the
Americans.

Their

reconstruction.

approach from the

start had aimed

at

They had permitted youth organizations and

laid responsibility for youth activities in German hands soon
after the war and were satisfied with the results.

Just as

in the American zone, Military Government officials remained
in the background as far as possible.
Colonel

Percival

also

pointed

out

some

between the British and the American policies.

differences
First of all,

the British mainly targeted a much smaller proportion of
young Germans, namely just those between the ages of fourteen
and eighteen years.

British officials also had never made

the past of young people an obstacle to their participation
in youth activities after the war.

Percival commented that

the British were more reluctant to let the army participate
in the youth program.

He argued that, although they might

share the same objectives,

they would always be at odds,

unless the army could be closely supervised by Military
Government's youth experts.
established,

With these ground rules clearly

the British army just then began to start a

small scale program.

While Clay's first thought on youth

had included the feasibility of encouraging and readmitting
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the scout movement in his zone, Percival reported that a
British general,
advised

his

who was an authority in this field,

government

to refrain

from

because the Germans were not yet ripe

such

had

an

action,

for this

type of

activity.
The problems in the British zone also were similar to
those of their neighbors:

Percival reported that many young

Germans had lost their families and homes
wandering.

It was a challenging task to help them back into

a normal life.
material.
to

spare,

and were just

The Colonel also talked about the shortage of

Apparently the British army did not have anything
so

Military

Government

there

had

to

rely

exclusively on captured German material which did not go very
far to satisfy the enormous need.

There also was a serious

shortage of literature, which the British had been trying
"desperately hard" to eliminate.
As far as the future was concerned, British authorities
in Germany energetically promoted an international exchange
and were trying to convince their Foreign Office of the
necessity to facilitate travelling.

Percival thought that it

would provide a real solution to many problems to permit
Germans to travel

abroad and to bring people from other

countries to Germany, especially if they had been neutral.5

5Garmisch Conference 4-5.
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The British Field officers' efforts were successful.

By

January 1947 they had an official and extensive exchange
program in place with their zone of occupation.6
Interestingly,

an American pointed to

an additional

British program which he thought deserved the attention of
the members of the conference.

Abe Vinik, Youth Officer in

Greater Hesse which bordered the British zone, informed the
participants at the Garmisch conference that the British were
trying to find ways

to provide youth organizations with

professional advice and support without having to resort to
German youth offices,

whom the British mistrusted.

The

occupiers had introduced full time Jugendpfleger. According
to him, these youth secretaries, who were professional youth
workers, dedicated their entire energy towards the promotion
of youth activities.

Vinik reported that some German youth

leaders thought that the British initiative was worth copying
in the American zone.7
On the whole American and British youth officers seemed
to share the same objectives and problems.
authorities

had

embarked

on

an

official

British military
reconstructive

program long before Washington had made up its mind, but they
were even harder pressed for material assistance for youth
activities than the Americans, who could draw to a certain
extent on their army's vast resources.
6Pilgert, The West German Educational System 16-77.
7Garmisch Conference 6.
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In view of the economic exploitation and the way French
troops and officers lived off their zone, one would expect
that

French

re-education

Nevertheless,

efforts

did

not

go

very

far.

in what one historian called a "paradoxical

occupation" the French military government made far reaching
attempts to cure the Germans from the disease of exaggerated
nationalism and militarism.
re-education

Capable officers directed its

efforts and pursued a very far sighted and

effective policy.

German schools in the French zone were the

first ones to reopen in Germany after the war.

The French

introduced more new school books per child than either the
British or the Americans.
reaching

goal

of

a

military

government

While it did not pursue the far

complete
made

some

school

reform,

significant

the

changes

French
which

facilitated transferring between the different school tracks.
At

the

university

level,

the

French

purged

30%

of

the

faculties at the two universities under their control, but
had them running again in 1945.

To alleviate the desperate

situation for many students, they reinstated the university
in Mainz which had been closed in 1817,

an interpreter's

college in Germersheim and a school for administrators in
Speyer.8
As far as French goals were concerned, Major Moreau, one
of the two representatives of the French zone at the Garmisch
conference, distinguished the French efforts from those of
8Willis 44-45.
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their

neighbors.

He

explained

to

his

colleagues

that

continental Europeans tended to assign great importance to
ideologies,

whereas

Anglo-Americans

seemed

to

regard

democracy as a more practical undertaking, a "habit of life."
Moreau pointed to some important differences between his zone
and its two neighbors.
did not

Since the French area of occupation

include any major or

intellectual

and

political

capital cities

elites

who

could

with
act

their
on the

occupiers' behalf, he argued that the French had to interfere
with German lives, institutions, and youth work in a far more
direct and visible way.

Therefore French authorities had

played a much more active role in German youth affairs than
their neighbors.

They also had reinstalled the German youth

offices at the end of 1945,
power.

but had not given them much

Just as their British and American counterparts, the

French considered the available staffs too old, too set in
their traditional behavior, and simply not dynamic enough to
be up to the post-war challenges.

The French also found that

adequate replacements were very hard to find and introduced
youth committees in the communities as important devices of
the democratization process.

These committees had similar

tasks and consisted of the same groups of people as those in
the other zones.
the

committees

The French agreed with their allies that
had

to maintain

their

independence

government influence.
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Moreau
authorized

further reported that his
the

resurrection

of

youth section had

traditional

German

groups just like the Americans and the British.

youth
In all

three western zones the Catholic and Protestant churches
claimed the largest following, but French authorities were
the only ones who heavily promoted the Friends of Nature
movement.

According to Moreau,

this

youth group had

a

democratic structure with roots in Switzerland and a record
of resistance to Hitler, at least in the French zone.

Moreau

was far more skeptical of the youth hostel movement which he
considered to be undemocratic.

The forty youth hostels open

in the French zone therefore operated under the supervision
of

provisional

committees

with

good

results.

Moreau

continued that the French had permitted political formations,
such as the Falken and the Free German Youth, which came from
the Soviet zone, under the provision that they could not be
part of any official party structure.9
All three occupying powers assigned leadership training
high priorities, but the French military government developed
a unique solution to the problem of finding and schooling
youth

leaders.

Whereas

government

officials

leadership

schools,

the

Volkshochschulen, a

type

efforts.

and

British

British

tried

to

French
of

and

American

establish
enlisted

evening

military

independent
the

help

of

school,

into

their

American authorities

also

were

9Garmisch Conference 10-11; see also Willis 45-46.
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supporting these institutions which had been a product of the
Weimar Republic,

but mainly used them for educating and

reorienting adults.

According to Moreau, the French tried to

use these schools exclusively for learning about democracy
and

discouraged

education.

their

traditional

role

of

continuing

They had found that 80% of the participants of

evening school courses were under the age of thirty.

Since

these Germans obviously were interested in re-education, they
seemed to be the natural pool for recruiting youth leaders
and

could

training.

remain
To

in

achieve

a

familiar

their

environment

goals,

the

for

French

their

strongly

encouraged these schools to cooperate closely on a zonewide
basis.

Moreau

thought that

this

task was

at

least

as

important for future developments than the promotion of adult
education.
The emphasis
approval of Paris
position

within

colleagues

who

governments

and

contacts.

The

on cultural

affairs

with the

gave French youth officers

military

government

encountered

than

superiors

when

French

agreed

it came to
with

a stronger

that

difficulties

the

official

of

with

their
their

international
others

that

international contacts would help the Germans to overcome
their isolation and were already in the midst of an extensive
exchange program.

Since many organizations,

such as the

YMCA, the Boy Scouts, the Catholic Church, young workers, and
political parties already had international contacts, French
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authorities simply encouraged contacts between the German and
French branches.

Moreau said that French students had gone

to the university of Tubingen and discussed "fundamental
problems, such as war guilt and Nazism" there.

According to

him, the results of this visit were better than expected and
so plans were underway to expand the program.

By 1948 the

French had established a far-flung exchange operation between
their

zone

of

occupation

and

France

which

included

partnerships between cities.10
Apparently the French did not have to worry as much
about homeless and wandering youth as the British or the
Americans.

Moreau reported that French authorities did not

face the same problems as their colleagues
zones.

in the other

Since their zone of occupation was largely rural and

much smaller, they had left all welfare activities to German
authorities.

While their zone was small and furthest away

from the huge population movements which were taking place in
the east of Germany, one may wonder if Moreau did not simply
justify his military government's inactivity in this realm.11
The

French

exchange

during the next years.

program

expanded

significantly

French authorities assigned lecturers

to the universities and— according to American observers—
French language teachers to practically all schools in their
zone of occupation who not only taught courses, but also were
I0Willis 46.
nGarmisch Conference 10-11.
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instructed to cultivate informal contacts with the German
faculties of the universities to which they were assigned,
something Americans were not yet officially permitted to
do.12
The French efforts to bring their civilization to the
Germans also included institutions similar to the America
houses.

Four

of

these

institutes

offered

Germans

information, cultural programs, lectures, free concerts, and
language courses.

Like the Americans,

they arranged for

exhibitions to reach those Germans in their zone who could
not travel to their institutes.

Personal contacts often led

to official Franco-German societies and helped mitigate the
economic exploitation and occasional transgressions of the
occupational troops.13
All

three delegations

should cooperate closely.

in Garmisch agreed that

they

Interestingly, even the French

delegation agreed that the interzonal travel restrictions
were one of the largest obstacles to a fruitful cooperation
between German youth leaders, although their commanders were
largely
officers

responsible
decided

to

for

these

bring

restrictions.

their

desire

All
to

youth

lift

12Pilgert, The West German Educational System,
Pilgert, Community and Group Life 77-78.
13Willis 46.
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restrictions on interzonal travel to the attention of their
commanding officers.14
During the next year and a half not much changed in the
relations between the allied powers.

The annual report for

1947/48 only stated that the Allies held numerous formal and
informal conferences during the preceding year,
mainly

served

consulting

American report also

purposes.

The

but they

author

of

the

found it "interesting to note that

American and British policies are more similar than either
the French or the Russians."15
When the High Commissioners

took over in 1949

they

decided to improve relations at the grassroots and introduced
an

exchange

program between the American Kreis Resident

Officers who were in charge of HICOG's local detachments and
their counterparts in the French and British zones.

Coburg's

Kreis

example,

Resident

Officer

Francis

Lindaman,

for

reported favorably on his experiences in the French zone and
lauded above all French administrative efficiency.
also

very

Officers

impressed
were

the

with
ranking

the

fact

officers

He was

that

Kreis

Resident

in

their

military

districts regardless of the ranks of officers in charge of
tactical units.

The American found the practice to assign a

French national as teacher in the faculty of every school was

14Garmisch Conference 16; for
interzonal travel see Willis 17.

French

resistance

lsGerman Youth, 47-48 5.
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their most effective reorientation device.

Apart from that

he found that French and American reorientation programs were
remarkably similar.

His counterpart cultivated contact with

the German population and maintained an open door policy for
every concerned citizen
Coburg.

just as he was trying to do

in

Lindaman finally pointed out to his superiors that

people in general were very interested in the United States
but that many misconceptions about America as well as the
American zone existed.16
Anthony Sega, Kreis Resident Officer in Schwabach,

a

town in the vicinity of Nuremberg, was chosen to spend some
time

with

a British

industrial town

Resident

Officer

in the Ruhr area.

in Oberhausen,

an

Sega noted that the

British did not have an explicit reorientation program and
were rather skeptical about the American attempts to sell
theirs, but this did not mean that the British were inactive.
Sega noted that they had a very busy social schedule and
tried

to

encourage

democracy

through

informal

contacts.

According to the American, the British paid much attention to
youth.

They

worked

hard

to

counteract

any

Communist

influence they might detect by organizing youth rallies and
I60ffice of the United States High Commissioner for
Germany, Office of the Land Commissioner for Bavaria,
Resident Office Coburg to Kenneth L. van Buskirk, Chief, FOD,
Office of Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Munich, Germany, 28
Jun. 1950; Guy A. Lee, ed., Documents on Field Organization
of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany 19491951 ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the High Commissioner for
Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary, Historical
Division, 1951) doc. 16.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

336
providing funds for youth groups who did not like communism.
Sega reported that the only but very successful

special

reorientation program in which the British were investing
much money

and

effort

was

Die

Briicke

(The

Bridge) , an

institution similar to the Amerika Hauser in the U.S. zone.
Sega and his wife had a most cordial reception and found the
British trying to make their stay as comfortable as possible.
Obviously getting along in the field was easier than at the
conference table.

Just like his colleague from Coburg, the

American found that German residents of the British zone were
well disposed towards the Americans and very curious about
the United States,

but also about the conditions

in the

American zone, an indicator of how difficult travel was still
five years after the war's end.17
A Different Concept in the East
The opening of Soviet and former East German archives
after the collapse of the Soviet empire reveal a surprising
picture of Soviet planning and policy making for post war
Germany.

While the Soviets

from the start regarded the

occupation of Germany as a struggle between communism and
capitalism, they did not have a blueprint for the future of
their zone of occupation, but remained open to maintaining
the unity of Germany as long as they perceived a chance that
I7Anthony S.
Germany, Office
Resident Officer
FOD, Office of
Germany, 24 Aug.

Sega, Office of the High Commissioner for
of the Land Commissioner for Bavaria,
Schwabach to Kenneth van Buskirk, Chief,
Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Munich,
1950; Lee, ed. doc. 17.
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they would be able to expand their influence further west.
According to one historian, they began to rebuild the Soviet
zone based on the only model they knew and accepted:

the

Soviet Union.18
Interestingly,

the

Soviets neither

had

sufficiently

trained military government personnel at their disposition
nor were they able to eliminate rivalries and competing
interests
police,

between

different

agencies

such as

the

secret

the tactical commands, military government units,

party representatives, and the returning German communists.
Graft,

violence especially against women,

and corruption

remained a feature of the Soviet occupation throughout its
existence which officially ended with the creation of the
German Democratic Republic in 1949.

The Soviets never seemed

to

but

formulate

specific

policies,

rather

relied

on

communist and Stalinist ideology to provide the guidelines
for the occupation.
widely.
Nazis

Not surprisingly, the results varied

It could happen that Soviet officers kept former
in

important

administrative positions

much to the

annoyance of the German communists who wanted to see them
removed.
political

Although
power

to

the
the

Soviets
German

increasingly
communists,

delegated

they

always

maintained the ultimate authority and made very clear even to
their German allies that they knew best which way to go in
establishing a new socialist state in Germany.

Many of the

l8Naimark 465-468.
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occupiers

displayed

an

arrogance

and

assumed

an

air

of

superiority which even long term members of the communist
party often found intolerable.

Walther Ulbricht and his

comrades ultimately were only able to wrest control of the
Soviet Zone's affairs from the occupiers by catering directly
to

Soviet

policies

demands

and

making the

fulfillment

of

Soviet

their highest priority— a behavior that secured

their power,

but cost them and their ideology almost all

public support.19
Promoting Russian and Soviet culture in Germany took on
special significance for the occupiers in the east.
it was

a way to

prove wrong Nazi

propaganda

First,

which

incessantly denigrated Russian and Soviet culture.

had

At the

same time making culture available to the masses was an
important part of communist doctrine.

In contrast to the

Western zones the Soviets were not content with simply making
Russian and Soviet films, literature, and music available to
Germans

for their

information.

To assure that cultural

activities would serve their political agenda, the Soviets
tried to control every aspect of cultural and intellectual
activity.

They

promoted

and supported

authors

such

as

Gerhard Hauptmann or Heinrich Mann who had written books that
had exposed flaws and injustices in the capitalist order, but
they also introduced censorship and increasingly oppressed
deviating ideas or criticism by German intellectuals.
19Naimark 9-140.
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very narrow minded dogmatism of

Soviet and German party

members who did not tolerate any apolitical activity or
deviation from stalinist doctrine completely alienated even
those

German

intellectuals

towards reform.

who

were

favorably

inclined

Many opted to vote with their feet and took

residence in the west.20
Interestingly, the idea of a cultural exchange program
also circulated in the Soviet zone of occupation.

German

communists as well as some Soviet officers regarded it as a
good chance to show those who had not been to the Soviet
Union the achievements of the socialist state first hand.
While the occupiers in the West integrated such a program as
an

essential

part

of their re-education efforts,

remained very cool to the concept.

Moscow

Sending delegations from

the Soviet zone to the Soviet Union was a major undertaking
reserved for very few select people.

The beginning campaign

in the Soviet Union against those who maintained contact with
the outside world further stifled any attempts to establish
closer personal ties between German and Soviet citizens.
arrogance

and

insensitivity

the

few

Soviet

The

educators

displayed who could be convinced to travel to the Soviet zone
even

towards

exchange
relations.

serious

program

did

German
not

communists

automatically

showed
lead

that

to

an

better

Once a delegation from Germany made it to Moscow,

the hosts took their re-education mission very seriously and
20Naimark 398-440, 459-464.
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did not leave the slightest details to chance,

but their

efforts were hampered y the fact that the Soviet leadership
relegated

the

German

visitors

to

the

role

of

passive

observers whose sole task was to admire the achievements of
the Soviet Union.21
Not surprisingly, cooperation between the Soviets and
the western allies was not forthcoming.

While OMGUS reports

stated that all four allies met regularly,

it seems that

Soviet delegations did not venture beyond the limits of the
Berlin Kommandantura or the Allied
Soviet

youth

officers,

Control

for example,

Garmisch conference in October 1946.
reveal the reason for their absence.
Soviets

declined to participate

in

Council.

participated

No

in the

The minutes do not

It is possible that the
such rather

informal

meetings without the basis of any formal agreements by the
Allied Control Council, but American youth officers may not
even have invited them.

Events in Berlin and in the Soviet

zone of occupation had made sufficiently clear by October
1946 that Soviet authorities followed a completely different
approach

to

youth

work

which

they

were

not

willing

to

compromise.
German communists in exile began preparing for post war
youth work quite early.

Those who

had gone to

England

decided to create a youth organization in 1939 which they
called the Free German Youth.

The organization's main goal

2INaimark 406-408, 450.
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was to unify all exiled young Germans under the banner of
antifascist activity, but the communists soon had to realize
that they did not strike a responsive cord.

Free German

Youth did bring together a number of youth activists who
worked in English factories and donated their wages to the
English war chest or to the Soviet Union.

Many of them

joined the British army when they finally were permitted to
do so in 1943.

Those who survived formed the nucleus of

communist youth leaders who, claiming a right to leadership
based on their war time activities, expected to be employed
in key positions in Germany immediately after the war.
British,
Germany.

however,

The

were slow to permit them to return to

Most of the communist emigres from Great Britain

finally made it to Berlin, where they joined their comrades
who had arrived from Moscow.22
Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, German communists who
had survived the purges in Moscow, became the key figures in
planning and determining the political course of the Soviet
zone of occupation after the war.

Whereas youth work and

even schools were just a minor aspect in American planning
and did not acquire a prominent position until 1948, the
communists assigned youth work a high priority already in the
planning stages.

According to them, Hitler's Germany had

completely annihilated Germany's scientific achievements, had
destroyed the country's educational system and pushed the
“Fussl 207-212.
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Germans'
standards.

socio-cultural

values

to

the

lowest

imaginable

It would therefore be urgently necessary to start

a program of reconstruction at the earliest possible moment.
The communists targeted youth, because young people were the
ones who would be most capable of learning from the past and
would be the group which most likely would be able to take
over leadership positions in a new Germany, soon.

The young

generation therefore needed to receive a special place within
the re-education agenda.

Since Hitler's policies had led to

a complete social levelling, the communists thought that for
the first time they would be able to reach the formerly
hostile bourgeois classes with their message, since basically
every German had

to start her or his

life

at the same

abyss.23
The planners in Moscow concentrated on two aspects of
re-education.

Not surprisingly they advocated a complete

school reform which would eliminate the class differences in
Germany.

Especially the secondary

schools which

taught

ancient languages and thought to a traditionally bourgeois
elite would have to go.

The communists in Moscow thought

that they would be able to win the bourgeois middle classes
over to their plans because they assumed that Hitler's policy
and the devastation of the war had eliminated much of the
class differences which had previously existed.24
“Fussl 205-206.
24Fvissl 198-204.
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As usual
thing,

planning a complete school reform was

implementing the plan quite another.

schools and universities were concerned,

As

one

far as

the Soviets and

their German helpers initially had to come up with solutions
for the same immediate problems the Americans, British, and
French were facing in their zones of occupation.

Many of the

school buildings lay in ruins and the number of children who
needed schooling had swollen dramatically due to the influx
of refugees and expellees from the east.

There were no

heating materials or light bulbs, no textbooks, paper, or
writing utensils or other teaching materials.

Just as in the

western zones, a vast majority of elementary school teachers-up to 90%— had belonged to the

Nazi party.25

To remedy the dramatic shortage of teachers and to take
the first step in the direction of their democratization
ideal, the Soviets introduced short courses with the aim of
transforming

farmers

and

workers

into

school

teachers.

Initially the three weeks courses, conducted under the most
primitive circumstances, provided just the most rudimentary
education for these future teachers.
administrators

complained

Parents and responsible

that they

did

not

know

their

materials and often also demonstrated serious deficiencies in
spelling and grammar.
general

denazification

Consequently and in line with their
policy,

the

Soviets

soon

allowed

nominal Nazis to return to the schools, but made sure that
^Naimark 454-455.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

344
they would not replace the new teachers and could not rise to
supervisory positions.26
While

the

situation

in

the

western

zones

improved

perceptibly from 1947 on, schooling conditions in the Soviet
zone remained beyond any acceptable levels throughout the
occupation

and

beyond.

Just

as

the

Americans,

Soviet

educators and their German helpers made almost no progress in
their attempts at school reform during the first four years
after the war.
Democratic

Even after the foundation of the German

Republic

they

never

achieved

the

complete

transformation of the traditional German school system.
Much to the communists' dismay, teachers also refused to
accept the role of political vanguard the party expected them
to play.

Even many of the new teachers either remained

apolitical or showed a distressing tendency to join the ranks
of the conservative party.

At the university level the

situation was even more alarming.

Communists in the Soviet

zone had to deal with recalcitrant young men and women, a
good part of whom remained staunch nationalists while others
began to embrace western ideas of democracy.

Although the

communists finally managed to make political reliability and
indoctrination key parts
higher education,

of their admission policies

to

it seems that they never were able to

transform a great number

of those who went through the

26Naimark 455-57.
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process

into

convinced

followers

of

the

new

socialist

regime.27
The

German

communists

made

extracurricular

activities another pillar of re-education.
goal

they

would

organization.
atomization

introduce

an

all

youth

To reach this

encompassing

youth

According to Wilhelm Pieck and others, the
of

youth

work,

which

socialist forces before 1933,

even

had

divided

the

had been one of the major

factors in preventing young Germans from forming a national
antifascist

front which

Hitler's rise to power.

could

have

effectively

resisted

The exiles argued that neither the

communists nor the social democrats nor the bourgeois youth
groups had been able to satisfy the young Germans' wishes for
a unified youth which included both sexes, and the solution
of the "national question."

Hitler's creation of a national

^Naimark 440-452, 456-459. I have not been able to find
a study on the long term impact of communist indoctrination
attempts. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, I participated in
regular illegal conferences between West German and East
German school teachers in East Berlin with a church
affiliated organization.
According to many of the East
German teachers, most students and teachers regarded the
official indoctrination as an unwelcome nuisance.
SED as
well as army recruiters usually were pressed hard to fill
their quotas and did not attract the more successful
students.
People my age who were active in the Lutheran
church but were permitted to study nevertheless, simply
complied with the required Marxist-Leninist rhetoric in their
application papers and the courses in ideology which formed
part of the curricula even at medical schools. Friends who
studied to become teachers or relatives with closer
affiliations to the party, police, or army, however, avoided
contacts with the West such as letter writing because it
could hurt their chances for promotions or even could lead to
losing their jobs.
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organization and his emphasis on the young generation had
superficially satisfied the young people's desires.

The

communists from the start thought that German youth would
have to come to terms with its share of the blame for the
catastrophe, because they had followed Hitler blindly and
quite willingly.

Since all young people were equally guilty,

all would have to undergo the same treatment.

The logical

step for postwar Germany therefore would be the creation of
the national front which had eluded the youth organizations
before 1933.

This thinking was in line with the communist

strategy of creating antifascist people's fronts.

It also

had the advantage that young Germans would have a sense of
continuity, since the nationwide structure would rely on many
components of the Hitler Youth.

The communist planners

decided that recreating a separate youth organization of
their party would not be necessary.

They would concentrate

on occupying the key positions of the new, all encompassing
movement.

It would also have the advantage that relatively

few people would be able to control a large apparatus.
would

be

in

a position

to

suppress

attempts

to

They
create

independent youth organizations in the name of unity.

Of

course such a strategy would make it initially necessary to
scale back communist agitation.28
Even such a limited program required additional help.
Nazi prosecution had depleted all ranks of the communists and
28Fussl 203-04, 218-19.
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of course had made recruiting of young people impossible for
twelve years.

Soviet attempts to fill the gaps from the

millions of prisoners of war resulted in the creation of the
National

Committee

for a Free Germany

(Nationalkommittee

Freies Deutschland or NKFD), but had meager results.

The

great majority of the prisoners regarded those who joined the
committee as traitors.
able

to

win

some

Nevertheless the German exiles were

converts

which

could

implementation of the youth programs.

help

with

the

Fritz Rucker,

for

example, had been a member of the circle around the legendary
Paul Oestreich,

himself a communist,

Determined School Reformers.

and his Alliance of

The Nazis had stripped Rucker

of his job at a Berlin secondary school and sent him to the
eastern front, where he became prisoner in 1942.

Rucker soon

began to realize the merits of Marxist doctrine and the
shortcomings of his own bourgeois reform attempts.

He set

out to develop new curricula for the schools under Soviet
rule in 1944 along Marxist lines and under Ulbricht's and
Pieck's supervision.

After some more examining on the part

of the German communists and the Soviets, Rucker returned to
Berlin in August 1945, where he joined Ulbricht and his small
group of activists and would later play a prominent role in
reforming East Germany's educational system.

Heinz KeBler

deserted to the Soviet army already in 1941 and was one of
the

first

Germans

indoctrinated,

to

join

the

NKFD.

Thoroughly

he became the leading communist figure in
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Berlin's youth work from 1945 on.

Apart from these two,

about eighty youth activists arrived in Germany immediately
after the German capitulation and took up their positions
following an intricate plan.

One of the most influential

figures in the creation of the new movement was not a member
of the returning exiles,

but rather a communist who had

survived Nazi imprisonment for eight years.

Erich Honecker

was young, intelligent, and had the necessary flexibility to
deal with the problems the communists were soon facing on
their way to an East German unified youth.

All of the

converts, the returning exiles, and the liberated communists
who reached influential positions acted only on behalf of the
small and tightly knight group around Ulbricht and ultimately
did nothing without the explicit approval of their Soviet
comrades.29
On 4 June
Ulbricht,

1945 an early morning conference between

who was

accompanied by two other Germans,

Stalin and Molotov took place.

and

During this meeting the

Soviet dictator approved of the German comrades' plans to
initiate youth committees in the Soviet zone which would
prepare the creation of an all encompassing German youth
organization.

Interestingly Stalin told his German friends

in the same meeting that he
permanently divided,

expected Germany to become

in spite of the present unity of the

victorious allies.
29Fussl 190-95.
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Even before they had Moscow's approval for their plans
those returning from exile had to prepare the ground for
action

in the Soviet

zone of

occupation and

in Berlin.

Ironically some of the first groups they had to deal with
belonged to their own camp.

Communists who had remained in

Germany and had participated in underground work and sabotage
had created their own anti-fascist youth groups immediately
after the end of hostilities.

Since independent communist

groups did not fit into the postwar concept, Ulbricht and his
spearhead detachment needed to bring them into line with
Moscow.

Not

even two weeks

Ulbricht

reported

to

his

after

Soviet

the German
liaison

that

surrender
he

had

eliminated the problem and dissolved the groups.30
While Americans were still in the process of creating an
administrative structure for military government and did not
have more than the purely negative instructions of JCS 1067
to govern their zone, the German communists who were the only
ones who had developed a concept for youth work in the Soviet
zone quickly set out to implement their plan in the areas
under their influence and in Berlin, which remained under
exclusive Soviet control until August.
committees

in all

of Berlin's

They created youth

sectors and requisitioned

houses in which young people would be able to meet.
they invited all young Germans,

Although

they made clear from the

start that only communists had earned the right to occupy
30Fussl 214-16.
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leadership positions.
set

up

a

At the same time the Berlin magistrate

committee within

the

office

for

the

people's

education which was going to supervise and coordinate the
activities of the different districts.

Its mandate was to

re-educate the youth which was "contaminated by fascism" on
a voluntary basis.

Heinz KeBler became its chairman.

At the

end of July Marshal Zhukov, the commander of the Soviet Zone,
expanded this system of youth committees with close ties to
the local governments into all communities of the Soviet
Zone.31
Young Germans in Berlin soon made clear that they had
their own ideas about youth work.

They expressed their

discontent with the communist leadership practically from the
start.

When the chairmen of the district youth committees

met just six weeks after the German surrender to constitute
the new youth committee for all of Berlin, they agreed with
KeBler's demands that youth should not again become a tool
for waging war, that they should cultivate friendship with
the Soviet Union,

and that all young people should come

together to solve their problems.
of

those

present,

however,

The overwhelming majority

vehemently

rejected

KeBler's

thesis that all young people were responsible for the rise of
Hitler and the Second World War.

Even fellow communists

complained to Ulbricht that KeBler maintained an unacceptable
attitude.
31Fussl 218-219.
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The communists did not fare better two days later at the
first mass meeting the organized for young people.

In an

internal appraisal the communist leadership concluded that
the majority of the 1,500 persons present neither liked the
extremely long and obviously very boring admonitions of the
speakers, nor had they much positive to say about the content
of their presentations.

Young people thought that the only

interesting part of the whole affair had been the opportunity
to get a free ride to the center of the city.

Fifty per cent

of those surveyed stated that they would not attend similar
events in the future.32
The work in the districts during the following year
revealed the same conflicts.

Whereas the young people wanted

to

a

come

together

and

have

good

time,

the

communists

accepted parties and dances only reluctantly as necessary
evils.

Since many of the youth committees' chairs were not

trained youth workers,
people's

needs

address them.

they did not recognize the young

and desires and therefore were unable to
They made the situation worse with constant

attempts to use the centers and meetings for indoctrinating
and convincing the youth about their share of the war guilt.
It is not surprising that such a course of action very soon
led to an alienation of most boys and girls and to dwindling
attendance records.

32Fussl 218-220.
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The behavior of the Soviet troops did not make the
German

communists'

arbitrary

arrests

tasks
of

easier.

young

Rape,

people

violence,

remained

and

everyday

occurrences throughout the Soviet zone, although incidents
became fewer in the course of the occupation.

A group of

Berlin youth, for example, agreed to help with the harvest in
a region west of the Oder river which had just become the
border between the Soviet zone and the area the Soviets had
annexed from Germany and set under Polish administration.
They found themselves east of the Oder,

in the midst of

expulsions and hard feelings on all sides.
Polish authority,
almost no food.

Working under

they suffered from maltreatment and got
The female members of the expedition only

barely escaped repeated attempts by Soviet soldiers to rape
them.

After about three weeks the young people were able to

make it back to Berlin without any support.33
Undeterred by such setbacks, the communists proceeded
with their plans.
youth

committee

leadership.

In September 1945 they founded a central
for

This

the

youth

education administration.

Soviet

zone

committee

under

became

Honecker's

part

of

the

Honecker defined its main tasks:

The committee would take care of all young people up to age
twenty one.

It would become a presence in all aspects of the

young people's lives, their jobs,
cultural affairs.

schools, sports, and in

Honecker's main goal was the ideological

33Fussl 220-225; Naimark 69-140, 382-85.
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re-education of German youth which, according to one of his
closest co-workers,

"had succumbed to a very reactionary

militaristic policy."
During the next months Honecker and his aides had to
work

hard

to

overcome

appearance of unity.

resistance

and

to

maintain

an

The communists scored an important

victory when they were able to convince the Social Democrats
that it would be better to cooperate in a united front than
to found a separate organization.
felt sufficiently strong to

In December the communists

launch the drive for a Free

German Youth in the Soviet Zone, but the meeting in a Berlin
school, in which young Germans themselves were supposed to
demonstrate and express their desire for a united youth front
went all but smoothly.

An American observer noted that in

spite of the "definite communistic background and complexion"
of the meeting he was surprised to

see very pronounced

opposition to the proposal emerging from the floor.

Above

all delegates from various Berlin districts either completely
opposed the foundation of a unified front or wanted to create
independent organizations within the front.

The opposition

notwithstanding the communists made sure that their motion to
unite all youths in the Soviet zone carried the day.
The churches were the last considerable stumbling blocks
towards creating a united front, but Church leaders of the
two denominations soon had to realize that they did not have
much choice.

Honecker's constant pressure, which he paired
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with promises of openness and compromise, brought them in
line.

They also hoped that their conditional cooperation

would enable them to influence the course of the movement.
With the last obstacles removed, Pieck dutifully noted at the
end of the year that he approved the creation of the front
but that Moscow would have to decide the matter.
light from the Soviet Union came in February.

The green

While church

leaders were still admonishing the communists to guarantee
diversity within the front in February 1946, the distribution
of the offices within the Free German youth revealed their
true intentions.

When the organization officially started

operations in March, communists occupied all key positions in
the new organizations, relegating most minor offices to the
Social

Democrats.

Democratic

Party

Only

one

received

an

member

of

the

administrative

Christian

post.

All

committees would continue to receive government founding.
This

organization

scheme

foreshadowed

the

forced

fusion

between the communists and the Social Democrats in the Soviet
zone the following month.

From that moment on until the

reunification of Germany in 1989 the Free German Youth in
fact remained the German Democratic Republic's only and all
encompassing youth organization.

Just as its founders had

envisioned, its organization and its practices in many ways
continued the work the National Socialists had done during
the previous twelve years.34
^Fiissl 226-232, 238-41.
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Conflict in Berlin
Events

in

the

capital

soon

revealed

the

major

differences between the allies in approaching youth work and
provided young Germans with the opportunity to voice and
enact their own preferences.
immediately apparent.

The frictions did not become

Americans, French, British, and the

Soviets agreed that National Socialism had done serious harm
to young Germans and needed to be eliminated from their
minds.

Americans certainly could have no objections to the

professed goals of the communists to return German youth to
decent

behavior

and

a

good

work

ethic.

The

American

education officer in Berlin, Captain Paul F. Shafer, also
could

observe

education.

that

the

Soviets

were

serious

about

re

While Shafer was alone and still had to wait for

directives, an administrative setup, and an increase in his
office's personnel, he could observe that the Soviets were
already busily implementing their policies with an adequate
staff.

The four allies apparently also agreed that they

should leave youth work in the hands of the Germans, although
the Germans in the Soviet zone clearly had no inclination to
do

anything

without

Moscow's

approval.

The

political

orientation of the youth committees and of the centers the
Americans inherited from the Soviets in their sector were
bound to lead to conflicts in view of the American policy not
to permit any political organizations in their zones.

Since

the Americans were slow to organize in Berlin as everywhere
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else and did

not assign

their

education staff the high

priority the Soviets obviously found necessary, it was not
until 1946 that they became active.
The mere presence of the three Western Allies in Berlin,
however,

encouraged the young Germans who were living in

their sectors to take the
people

initiative themselves.

from different organizations

Wilmersdorf,

Young

in the districts

of

Zehlendorf and Steglitz openly contested the

communist claims to exclusive leadership of the committees
late in 1945.

Heinrich Schiller,

for example, twenty-one

years old in 1946, was one of the most active opponents the
communists

encountered.

The

National

Socialists

had

prosecuted him because of his partly Jewish heritage, but he
survived and returned to Berlin in 1945.

Schiller became a

full time city employee for cultural affairs in August and
was

able to

interest a considerable number of secondary

school students in youth work.
opposed

communism,

Since almost all of them

the organizers

of the

Steglitz

youth

committee faced an uphill battle in the predominantly middleclass district.

Schiller also soon recognized the value of

living in the American sector of Berlin and established close
contact with the occupiers, above all with David Cozart, who
became the city's American youth officer in January 1946.
Not surprisingly, Steglitz was the first district in which
the Americans dismissed the communist chairs of the youth
committee.
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Apparently encouraged by his
Schiller

organized

a

conference

successes
in

May

in Steglitz,

1946

in

which

representatives of the city's western districts stated that
a large majority of the Berlin youth criticized the youth
committees' orientation
representatives

into

demanded

that

just

one

the

direction.

Berlin

youth

The
should

determine the composition of their committees through free
elections and that the Free German Youth should not be the
only organization representing them.
immediate results.
and

to

support

Government

The initiative had

To counterbalance the communist monopoly
the

decreed

democratization

at

the

end

of

efforts,

the

month

Military

that

OMGUS

representatives would have the last word in the determining
who would represent young people in the American sector. This
step clearly reveals that the positive side of the American
program earlier or later would have to come in conflict with
the communists.
National

Not being content with simply eliminating

Socialism,

Americans

in

the

field

supported

democratic procedures against any form of dictatorship.

The

American initiative quickly spread to the French and the
British

sectors,

where

the youth

themselves along democratic lines.

committees

The last communist in

West Berlin lost his office in June 1948.
large number

reorganized

of the young people who

Interestingly a

carried

the

fight

against the communists in West Berlin in 1945 and 1946 in
later years came to occupy prominent positions in the Federal
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Republic's social and political life.

Schiller went to the

United States to study social work at the University of
Minnesota. He was probably the first German after the war to
receive a degree from an American institution.

He returned

to Berlin and became involved in the training of social
workers there.

In 1953 he accepted a position as assistant

professor of Nuremberg's new school of social work and became
its director in the sixties.
most

prominent

teachers

of

Schiller still is one of the
social

work

in

the

Federal

Republic.35
The following one and a half years saw a deadlock in the
Allied

Commandantura

between

the

Americans

who

were

determined to deny the Free German Youth a monopoly, and the
Soviets,

who

organizations.

did

not

want

to

permit

any

other

youth

While this deadlock could not stop practical

youth work, German initiatives for creating a central youth
office failed to gain the recognition of the Allies.
situation seemed to be hopeless,

The

but in October 1947 the

British were able to find an acceptable compromise which led

35Fussl 244-47. He also provides short biographies of a
number of those involved in West Berlin's anti-communist
youth activities (295-97).
Many of them became prominent
politicians in Bonn and Berlin. Others went on and occupied
leading positions in journalism or in the business world.
Ralf Dahrendorf, then sixteen years old and member of the
Social Democrats, started his distinguished career resisting
the communist advance in youth work.
See also Heinrich
Schiller, personal interview, 26 July 1995; for details on
the school of social work see chapter XIII below.
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to the official

recognition of various youth groups

for

Berlin only.
The

allied

compromise

polarization in Berlin.

could

not

overcome

the

deep

The Free German Youth had lost its

bid for taking over control of all young people in Berlin and
had to limit its activities more and more to the eastern
sector of the city.

The only other youth group which tried

to operate on a city wide basis, the Falken,

soon had to

withdraw from the east due to persecution.
Youth

work

suffered

considerably

from

the

lack

consensus between 1946 and 1947, but it did not stop.
it was

of

Since

impossible to reach a consensus about permitting

German youth organizations, Clay decided to take the only
route open to him.

He expanded GYA, which was a purely

American venture, into Berlin six weeks after its official
inauguration in the American zone in April 1946— against the
advice of Shafer who predicted difficulties with the Soviets.
Once the army found a suitable youth officer for this unique
assignment, it went to work.

For over one year GYA remained

the only active youth organization in West Berlin.

At the

inauguration event in August 1946 12,000 young Berliners
showed that Clay had correctly assessed the need for such an
organization.
activities.

During

the

next months

GYA expanded

its

Although GYA had to deal with some internal

problems due to the constant fluctuation of personnel and
attacks from the Soviets on the "militaristic character" of
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the

program,

the

army

took

its mission

seriously.

It

dramatically increased the number and the quality of youth
centers in its sector.
program replaced the
Germans became

A more sophisticated reorientation
initial emphasis on sports.

involved in discussion groups

Young

or drew up

constitutions for their own youth organizations with the help
of American soldiers.
German

youth

facilities.

Of course GYA continued to support

organizations

with

material

and

transport

1947 saw the start of a summer camp program

within Berlin with the aim to improve the health of the
city's young population.

The army also initiated a program

that enabled young Berliners to spend their summer vacations
in

the

western

zones

or

even

in

Switzerland.

The

participants

of all the camps not only enjoyed a change of

scenery,

also

but

received

health

care

and

much

needed

additional calories.36
GYA was not the only successful American endeavor in
Berlin.

Just as in the American zone, military government

youth officers

in Berlin regarded the training of youth

workers as essential for reaching their re-orientation goals.
1948 saw not only the creation of the Free University in West
Berlin, but also the opening of the renown Wannseeheim, a
joint

German-American

venture

in which

Germans

had

the

opportunity to learn the ins and outs of effective youth
work.

As long as it was still possible to cross the zonal
36Fussl 255-56.
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borders, the center also attracted a considerable number of
people from the Soviet sector and zone.37
The

direct

confrontation

two

competing

systems in Berlin led to a remarkable phenomenon.

American

surveys conducted during the

between

the

late 1940s

and early 1950s

showed that the process of transforming the minds of German
youth was indeed a slow one.

The pollsters found that many

young people had not yet internalized democratic ideas or
shed all of the Nazi indoctrination.
as

a surprise

in

While this did not come

a country which was

just

then

slowly

beginning to recuperate from the war, it is interesting to
note that Berlin youth consistently fared much better in the
surveys than their counterparts in the western zones.
anticommunist

attitude does

Their

not explain this phenomenon,

since one does not have to be a democrat to reject socialism.
According to Fiissl, Berlin's special position was responsible
for this difference in young people's attitudes.

The open

fight against the communists in Berlin made a much closer and
more intense contact between Americans and the other western
allies and young Germans in the city inevitable.

It not only

led to an immense increase in the significance of youth work,
but also resulted in a socialization process which took place
outside of the institutional boundaries of the school.

This

socialization process provided a much stronger impetus and
therefore accelerated the process of democratization in young
37Fiissl 248-270.
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people who participated in it.
American

model

also was

attractive alternative.
individual

rights,

and

the

It should be added that the
most

visible

and the

It fought communism,
was

able

to

most

emphasized

produce

seemingly

boundless riches and opportunities.38
Youth work in the four zones as well as in Berlin in
many ways anticipated the political and economic division of
Germany.

On the one hand American,

French,

and British

military government youth officials in the field agreed on
most of the basic assumptions and on the principles that
underlay the course they were steering in re-educating young
Germans

early

considerably.

on,

although

their

policies

differed

In all three zones the Germans were mainly

responsible for re-establishing their youth activities.
British

apparently

were

much

more

willing

to

The

delegate

authority than the French, who insisted on control, and the
Americans, who went to great lengths to sell their programs.
All three western allies had introduced youth committees,
which were surprisingly similar in their organization,

to

open up youth work to a democratic decision making process.
International

contacts

as

well

as

introducing

a

new

generation of youth workers became their main goals, but only
the Americans were trying to involve their tactical troops in
the

re-orientation

effort.

On

the

other

hand

Soviet

authorities had other objectives and a very different idea
38Fussl 268-270.
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about the meaning of bringing democracy to youth work in
Germany.
with

They were the only ones who came to Germany armed

a

master

supervision

set

plan.
out

German
to

make

communists

drastic

under

changes

in

Soviet
formal

education and to bring youth work under communist control.
The Soviets assigned youth work and education a high priority
from the start of the occupation on, whereas the leading
officers of the western allies, especially in OMGUS, seemed
to recognize the importance of youth work, but did not follow
through with the necessary administrative adjustments until
1948.

The unique situation

in Berlin

led to a special

relationship between the younger generation in the western
sectors and the western allies.

A closer look at the field

in the American zone will have to show to what an extent
Americans there would be able to play a role in defining the
direction

which

youth activities

and

youth work

western parts of Germany would take in the future.
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CHAPTER VIII
Nuremberg, 1946-48; Emergency Management

While Americans and their former allies were discussing
politics and beginning to implement their programs for German
re-education, life for young people went on.

For the first

three years after the war they were facing difficult times.
German authorities and private organizations did their best
to help young people, but few new patterns in organizing them
emerged.

Youth groups developed a surprising interest in

cultural activities.

Giving children, adolescents, and young

adults something meaningful to do during their spare time
became one of the main objectives for youth organizations.
Summer camps and week-end trips acquired a central place in
youth activities.
and

to

offer

They were a way to escape the drab city

some physical

and

mental

relief

from

the

struggle to survive.
Life in Nuremberg
Just as in any other city the time between 1945 and 1948
was for most people in Nuremberg a daily fight for survival
and young people were no exception.
their homes or their families or both.

Many had lost either
Often their fathers

or brothers were prisoners of war so that it was up to them
to provide their share for the support of the family.

Heiko

Kistner, for example, had to look for a job and work as long

364
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as his father remained in captivity.1 Many who did not have
a home lived in train stations or in the woods and travelled
all over Germany.

Not surprisingly the criminal delinquency

rate in Nuremberg rose dramatically after the war.2

The

effects of the occupation were causing considerable concern.
In April 1947, for example, German police reported that the
conditions of the occupation had a negative influence on many
young people in the city.

According to the police, clubs for

African-American soldiers were hotbeds of moral decline for
Nuremberg's youth:

"It was generally observed that young

people of all ages not only are involved in intense bartering
with colored soldiers, but also have immoral dealings with
them."

The authors of the report noted that the desire to

get to know and to become acquainted with the foreigners soon
replaced the initial reservations which had existed on both
sides.
but,

Children were the first to overcome the barriers,

the police

noted,

some

of

these

contacts

made

necessary for responsible German circles to intervene.

it

Boys

and girls left their families to move in with American units
or their American boyfriends.
curiosity.
but

also

Soon profiteering replaced

According to the police, not only teenage girls
a considerable

number

of their mothers

became

involved intimately with American soldiers, spreading disease
‘Heiko Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994.
2The
three
special
editions
of
the
Niirnberger
Nachrichten, Trummerjahre, Wiederaufbau, and Erinnerungen
provide a vivid picture of life in the city after the war.
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among GIs and their own families.

The authors stated that

many children, often with the encouragement of their parents,
were spending most of their time loitering around American
facilities hoping to obtain goods or food.

The police found

that these contacts with Americans often led to black market
activities, kept children away from school, work, or their
apprenticeships.

Since black market activities and American

friends could be quite profitable,
refused to work.

some young people even

In looking for the causes the authors

showed a clear grasp of reality.

They noted that the reasons

behind this moral decline often were not •'moral weaknesses,"
but rather "naked, merciless want.

People have lost their

homes, they lack clothing and food.

They trade their moral

decline for an economically better supply through contact
with the occupation forces."3
The numbers indicated that the problem had not reached
major proportions.
living in Nuremberg.

At the time about 300,000 people were
German and American courts had to deal

with 276 cases which were in some way connected with the
occupation between August 1946 and February 1947.
young people were

arrested

for

illegally

crossing

Thirty
zonal

borders, twenty one because they owned American property.
Becoming arrested for the latter offense was not at all
difficult.

Military Police apprehended Heiko Kistner, for

Memorandum from the City of Nuremberg to the German
Council of Cities, 2 Apr. 1947: 16-19; Niirnberg 1945-49, II,
doc. 217.
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example, for owning American occupation dollars.

Kistner had

sold his bicycle to a man for the highly valued currency.

A

few days later he was arrested for illegal possession of
foreign currency.

The bicycle buyer had stolen the dollars

and Military Police were trying to recover the fortune.
Americans
brought

confiscated what was
Kistner

to

Government building.

a

The

left of the treasure and

Military

Court

in

the

Military

Apparently not much happened to him and

the "crime" never affected his career in any way.4
Roughly half
against

the

prostitution,

of all offenders

public

order,

which

but could also be

had committed

included

crimes

loitering

and

simply not having their

identification papers with them.5 In a twelve months period
between 1946 and 1947 courts tried a total of 685 juveniles,
two thirds of them boys.

This meant that cases involving

illegal contacts or deals with Americans seemed to occupy
most of the judges' time.

The numbers declined steadily

during the following years.

An official publication of the

city in 1950 pointed out that the vast majority of the city's

4Memorandum from the City of Nuremberg to the German
Council of Cities, 2 Apr. 1947: 16-19; Niirnberg 1945-1949,
II, doc. 217; Heiko Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994.
Memorandum from the City of Nuremberg to the German
Council of Cities, 2 Apr. 1947: 16-19; Niirnberg 1945-1949,
II, doc. 217; for Nuremberg's population statistics see
Statistische Nachrichten no. 2, Feb. 1948: 5; Niirnberg 19451949, II, doc. 216e.
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young people in one way or another tried to find their way
back into a normal life.6
Living normally at that time more often than not meant
that Germans had to spend much of their time "organizing"
food and other necessities.
where

Many went to the countryside

they tried to exchange

amenities such as china.

food from the

farmers

for

Others had to bring their cameras

and other luxury items to the black market where they would
barter them for butter, potatoes, or for American rations.7
Even Nazi literature found its buyers.

Gerhard Springer

recalled that his father made a good deal with an American to
whom

he

sold

Alfred

Rosenberg's

Mythus

des

Zwanzigsten

Jahrhunderts, the main opus of Hitler's chief philosopher.
An improvement of the situation made it unnecessary for him
to part with a special edition of Hitler's Mein Kampf which
already then was a much sought after collector's item among
Americans.8 The most pressing problems for the citizens and
the city administration were the constant lack of food and

6Die Deutschen Stadte und ihre Jugend 11, 15-16.
7Heiko Kistner recalled that almost everybody in one way
or another became involved in illegal dealings (Heiko
Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994); see chapter IX for
some of the activities in which Germans and Americans
directly interacted.
8Eckart 193-202; Gerhard Springer, personal interview,
1 Aug. 1995.
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the deplorable

living conditions which Army requisitions

continued to aggravate.9
Many people blamed the occupiers for the crisis.

Even

Nuremberg's Lord Mayor Ziegler, a Social Democrat whom the
Nazis had prosecuted,

stated in 1947 that one constantly

heard that Hitler was to blame for the current crisis, but
that the war had been over
situation had gotten worse.

for over two years

and the

Fritz Linnert, a liberal town

councilor, showed a rare portion of courage and insight in
his reply.

According to him, Hitler indeed was to blame for

the misery, but many people did not want to confront that
truth.

Germans had

lived well

throughout the war

because they had plundered and robbed other peoples.

only
Those

who claimed that the situation had been better indeed were
right, but Linnert argued that they failed to realize that
they had lived at everybody else's expense.10
Linnert certainly did not endear himself to the public
or to the majority of his colleagues in the city council with
his remarks.

A sixteen-year-old boy,

who described the

situation in a school essay in rather drastic terms, probably
came closer

to the

sentiment of many people during the

difficult times:
[t]he first [concern] is naturally the extremely
miserable grub, because one cannot talk about food here,
9Nurnberg 1945-1949, II, docs. 138, 156, 161-176; Eckart
181-193.
10Eckart 209-211.
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and the ragged clothing.
With the exception of the
black market one cannot buy anything. And now the Ami
[American] wants to make us believe that there is a food
crisis all over the world. All these are nursery tales.
When the German cities were suffering from the
continuous terror bombings, we had our food and now in
peacetime we don't have anything. Just because the Ami
wants it this way. One does not get an education in the
shop because all is in ruins. An incredible mass bunk
instead of an apprenticeship. One lives in half a house
with a broken chimney, with a little wind from the west
the oven smokes like a factory chimney. The only thing
the Ami has done was to beat up our cities and to brag
in a great way, but most of these cowards never heard a
bullet whistle. When one sees them in their clubs, they
are completely drunk and have their feet on the table.
And that kind of people want to bring us culture and
ease the misery?11
Another

German

youngster

Committee to vent his anger.

wrote

to

the

Land

Youth

According to him, young people

in the American zone were especially critical towards the
occupiers and would be negatively influenced by the wanton
acts of Americans.
were

living

up

He thought that the Americans in no way

to

their

alleged

"liberators and not as oppressors."

promises

of

coming

as

The author of the letter

was apparently very incensed about requisitioning policies
which did not differentiate between former Nazis and those
who had not supported the system.
the

Soviet

zone

had

to

live

He argued that soldiers in
in

barracks

and

showed

a

remarkable sympathy for the plight of the Germans, whereas in
the American zone apparently every sergeant could requisition

uBrief student essay by a boy, sixteen years old, father
at home; essay no. 8 accompanying a presentation regarding
the state of mind of the Nuremberg youth by A. Staudt; NCA E
10/33 no. 6; for a general account of the mood in the city
see Eckart 203-05, 212-13.
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a whole house.
christian"

Interestingly,

behavior

during

a

he compared American "un
"period

similar

to

peace"

unfavorably with that of German troops during the war.

It

provided him with a reason to declare the occupiers morally
bankrupt.

He thought that the American actions had forfeited

their right to judge the Germans and accused them of pursuing
a course of mass impoverishment and an "obvious extermination
policy."
certainly
principles

The author concluded that this type of behavior
did
and

not

endear

even

young

Germans

to

less to the Americans.

democratic
Land

Youth

officials informed the Americans that apparently the young
man had just lost his home to requisitions, but forwarded the
letter to American authorities "for their information about
realities".12
German and American authorities also had to fight with
the opposite extreme.

Detachment B-211 reported that the

German welfare organizations had considerable difficulties
with "underage girls" who were staying with American soldiers
and with young boys who preferred working for the occupiers
to attending school.13
Even those who did not fall into either extreme often
displayed a deep skepticism about their present situation.
12Herman Schild, Niirnberg an den LandesjugendausschuB,
Munchen, 14 Sept. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/10.
13OMGBY, Det. B-211, Daily Report for Monday, 14 Jan.
1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, District III, Reports, Box 1055,
13/27-1/7.
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A young girl, for example, wrote to her aunt in the United
States that
perhaps twelve years of National Socialism have spoiled
us so much that we are not yet ready to become
democrats.
We lack every understanding for it.
Our
father often wants to convert us, especially Konrad,
Martha and me, but we still want action to prove that
the new system is better than the old one. The parties
are continuously fighting now and none of them has any
power....
Why should we blame our uncle Richard for
being a member of the SS? They were not the worst kind
of soldiers...and he is still in prison just because he
had an important position.14
Changing these attitudes and helping young people return to
a normal life in the middle of want and hunger was a daunting
task.
Opinions on Youth Activities
In view of the fight for mere survival it is surprising
that many of those in charge of young people on the local
level

found

activities.

time to

develop

their

own

ideas

for

youth

Initially the Germans did not have the privilege

of assembling their experts on youth work, youth welfare, and
education to develop plans beyond their communities, so they
had to limit their concepts to the local boundaries.
spite

of

the

reconstruction,

considerable

burden

In

which scarcity,

and denazification caused, many people in

Nuremberg still managed to find time for reflecting on the
city youth's situation.
in April

A poll taken by ICD director Feiler

1946 revealed a remarkable degree of agreement

14Letter L.H., Nuremberg to M.H. , USA, 19 Jan. 1947; NA
RG 260 OMGBY, ID Predecessor, Box 111, 10/87-3/14.
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between the different

institutions responsible

for youth

work, but also staked out some major differences.
As the head of the city's welfare organizations, Theodor
Marx

became

one

of

the most

important

men

Nuremberg's youth activities after the war.

for

shaping

He had very

clear ideas about young people and what authorities should do
to help them.

According to him, young people in 1946 found

themselves in a vacuum.

They were disappointed by the Third

Reich and shocked by the outcome of the war.

At the same

time they had developed a very critical attitude towards
everything and therefore did not show much inclination to
follow the ideas which had existed before 1933.

Marx felt

that it would be best to leave young people a free hand in
the process of finding themselves.

Consequently the city

administration should not try to exercise any

influences

which went beyond making sure that young people did not break
the

law with

their

activities.

Nevertheless,

encouraging signs within a year after the war.

Marx

saw

According to

him, the majority of the young people was not looking for
material satisfaction, but rather was trying to satisfy an
"inner yearning".
Marx,

of course,

had his opinion of the role which

local, state, and eventually the national government would
have

to

play

in

youth

activities.

According

to

him,

legislation from the Weimar Republic gave sufficient guidance
in this matter, but the Bavarian state government in Munich

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

374
remained a real obstacle.

Marx thought that the Munich

authorities had never shown any inclination to accept any
responsibility for youth activities or for the welfare of the
young people in general and did not seem to be willing to
change its course.15
Marx argued that the youth committees should be guided
and supported by qualified experts.

Apparently he did not

see any contradiction between this proposal and the statement
he had made earlier during the same conversation.
not want

to

see politically active

youth

Marx did

groups

in the

immediate future, because he did not think that they were
ready for this kind of activity yet.

For the same reason

Marx opted against the creation of a unified anti-fascist
youth movement.

In his opinion it would not be wise to

create a purely negative movement with no constructive goals
in place to fight a demon which definitely belonged to the
past.
When asked about the main goal for the future of young
Germans, Marx clearly demonstrated his strong patriotism and
a deeply rooted idealism.

According to him, young Germans

15Memo
from
Eric Feiler,
Team
Chief,
Nuremberg
Detachment, OMGBY, ICD, Intelligence Section, to Chief of
Intelligence, ICD, OMGBY, Political Affairs Section, 25 Apr.
1946: results of a survey conducted on youth activities; NA
RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12. Marx had no
problems telling officials in Munich in no uncertain language
what he thought about the Bavarian government's efforts to
help young people in the state. See his account of a meeting
with responsible officials in Munich in the minutes of a
welfare committee meeting, 2. Dec. 1946, Enclosure 6; NCA
C7/IX no. 1232.
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should develop a sense of responsibility for the long term
reconstruction of Germany.

They would have to educate and

prepare themselves for this task.

Marx hoped that ultimately

all young Germans would come together as one big community to
master this great task they were sharing.16
The

ICD

responsible

survey
youth

revealed

leaders

in

that

a

majority

Nuremberg

did

politically active youth groups in 1946.

of

not

the
favor

Of the eleven

persons Feiler polled, six, among them the chairmen of the
Communist Party and of the Free German Youth, agreed with
Marx that young people were not yet ready.

Of the other five

only the chairman of the Democratic Party's youth group gave
his unqualified approval.
As far as an antifascist front was concerned, only the
communists and the leaders of the Free German Youth supported
the idea, but emphasized at the same time that of course the
members

of

all

youth

groups

should

have

a

participate in the movement in any way they wished.

right

to

It seems

that all the other people who were surveyed had already
recognized the nature of the antifascist movement in the
Soviet zone.

While the Social Democrat argued along Marx's

lines, others were less diplomatic.

Not surprisingly the

Lutheran Youth Pastor for Bavaria, Martin Helbich, and the
l6Memo
from
Eric
Feiler,
Team
Chief,
Nuremberg
Detachment, OMGBY, ICD, Intelligence Section, to Chief of
Intelligence, ICD, OMGBY, Political Affairs Section, 25 Apr.
1946: results of a survey conducted on youth activities; NA
RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12.
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chairman of the just recently founded youth chapter of the
Conservative
arguments.

party

in

Nuremberg

had

almost

identical

They thought that such an idea reminded them

strongly of the youth organization of the previous twelve
years.

His Catholic colleague did not think that it would

foster any democratic understanding in young people.

The

member of the Liberal Party made his point even clearer.

He

suggested that such a movement should be directed against any
kind

of dictatorship.Interestingly,

the

leader of the

Socialist youth organization, Hans Schubert,
voiced the most

optimistic opinion

about

in many ways

young Germans'

capabilities for recognizing any dangers to the democracy and
addressing it in a truly democratic spirit.

He argued that

youth would have to form their own opinion and should have
the opportunity to join any group they wanted.
him,

anti-fascist

groups

did not

permit

According to
this

kind

of

political freedom.
Schubert's goals for the future also came closest to the
re-education ideas of the Americans.
National
Socialist

Socialist

doctrine

Education

from

Movement

Apart from eliminating
schools

and homes,

wanted

to

the

eradicate

materialistic thinking and create an independent individual
which would not be another subject to anyone.

He explained

that the people within this movement cultivated respect for
other persons and ideas and tried to implant the will to work
for

the

community

and

to accept

responsibilities.
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Interestingly, many of those people whom Feiler polled
also

emphasized

the desire

to

integrate

international or European community,

Germany

in the

with the exception of

Rev. Helbich and the chairman of the Communist Party, the men
surveyed

also

objectives,

included

but

did

democratic

not

become

ideals

any more

in

their

main

specific.

In

contrast to the Catholic chaplain in charge of youth affairs,
Helbich defined the main goals of his Church's youth work
exclusively along Christian principles.
only

refused

to

endorse

democratic

The communists not

principles

but

also

concentrated so much on eliminating the past that they had no
future-oriented

program

to

offer

which

might

have

supplemented their anti-fascist stance.17
The Authorities: Emergency Management
Young people had plenty of time to pursue their legal,
semilegal,

or illegal activities,

although all schools in

Nuremberg had reopened by the spring of 1946.
the city reported that the

In April 1947

lack of schooling,

which had

already started during the war, would result in disastrous
consequences for the young people as well as for the future
of Germany if authorities would not be able to remedy the
situation anytime soon.
many

children

under

According to school authorities,
ten

years

were

almost

complete

17Memo
from
Eric
Feiler,
Team
Chief,
Nuremberg
Detachment, OMGBY, ICD, Intelligence Section, to Chief of
Intelligence, ICD, OMGBY, Political Affairs Section, 25 Apr.
1946. Results of a survey conducted on youth activities; NA
RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12.
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illiterates.

The education of apprentices and all other

students at the different branches of secondary education
revealed

the

"gravest

deficiencies."

School

officials

thought that these deficiencies would significantly hamper
the reconstruction of Germany for a long time to come.

The

city fathers further stated that the lack of schooling and
supervision also affected the moral fiber of children and
adolescents negatively.

According to them, the percentage of

girls who were infected with veneral disease had reached
proportions which earlier would have been unthinkable.

In

addition to that the lack of food also threatened the health
of the generation which was facing

"the especially hard

duties

local

of

reconstruction".18

The

MG

detachment

reported in July 1947 that during the previous twelve months
elementary schools had been open just two and a half hours a
day, while secondary schools provided their students with
four hours of daily instruction.

The report identified the

lack of teachers, rooms, and school materials as the causes
of

the misery.19

improved

somewhat.

By

September

The

head

of

1947
the

the situation
Nuremberg

had

school

administration, Raab, reported to the city council that the
number of students had only slightly increased, but that now

18Memorandum by the City of Nuremberg to the German
Council of Cities, 2 Apr. 1947: 29-30; Niirnberg 1945-1949,
II, doc. 217.
19OMGBY, Det. B 211, Annual Historical Report 1 July 1946
- 30 June 1947; Niirnberg 1945-1949, II, doc. 118.
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many

more

teachers

were

available,

as

well

as

rooms.

Although conditions were still far from ideal, Raab announced
that the schools had been able to increase instruction from
twelve to sixteen hours per week.20
The lack of heating materials during the winter months,
however, forced the city to close schools for extended time
periods between 1946 and 1948.

The local MG detachment

estimated that the schools had lost about twenty per cent of
their school days due to the lack of fuel during the harsh
winter of 1946/47.21
Even when the schools were open, many children could not
attend classes because they had no shoes or clothing or
because they were sick.

One teacher reported to the city

administration in March 1947 that
90% of the girls do not have any shoes anymore, 75%
[have] no warm underwear, 50% of the families no heating
materials, 6% of the families no potatoes. There is a
lack of thread and wool everywhere.
The situation is
particularly bad with stockings. 10 girls do not have
coats anymore, there are five cases of scabies in the
school.
20 children got frost bite, 1 child got a
bladder disease, 1 a kidney infection.
Better food
remains to be of utmost importance.22

20Minutes of the City Council session on 24 Sep. 47,
Point 7/8, present situation of the elementary schools;
Niirnberg 1945-49, II, doc. 13lc.
2I0MGBY, Det. B 211, Annual Historical Report,
1946-30 June 1947; Niirnberg 1945-49, II, doc. 118.

1 July

22Niirnberg 1945-49,
II,
doc.
194;
see also the
reproduction of a letter of excuse a Nuremberg mother wrote
for her son in April 1946 in Tziimmerjahre: 32.
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To alleviate the desperate situation a little, Mayor Levie
wrote to the Bavarian government in Munich requesting to have
several

thousand

pairs

of

shoes

which

were

stored

in

Nuremberg made available to the population.23
In view of these facts, the city administration found it
necessary to develop

special programs

for young people.

Under the forceful leadership of Theodor Marx the Nuremberg
welfare

authorities

activities

in the

tried
city.

their
In

best

to

September

revive

1946

the

youth
Social

Democrats made a motion in the city council to allocate
special funds for youth work.

During the coming months the

city slated 88,000 Marks for youth work which did not include
welfare activities.24 A few months later Marx announced that
the city would make one high rise bunker available to youth
groups as a youth center, but that the younger generation
would have to help with its decoration and furnishings.

This

new youth center would replace one that had not survived the
bombing raids.
center

The bunker was conveniently located near the

of the city,

but

a

full year

passed

before

the

administration actually was able to turn the center over to
“Meeting of the Senior Committee, 17 Oct. 1947; Niirnberg
1945-49, II, doc. 137m; monthly report of Nuremberg City
Council for 20 Sept. to 19 Oct. 1947: 32; Niirnberg 1945-1949,
II, doc. 161n; "Die Not muB gebrochen werden!
Notprogramm
1946/47 beschlossen," [The Misery Must Be Brought to an Endl
Emergency Program for 1946/47 Passed] NN, 7 Dec. 1946: 7.
“Welfare Committee Meetings, 26 Sep. 1946, 2 Dec. 1946;
NCA C7/IX no. 1232; OMGBY, Det. B-211, Cumulative Quarterly
Report 1 Jan. 1947-31 March 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID,
Reports Control Br., Box 207, 10/81-3/7.
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young Germans.

By then the bunker harbored a youth hostel,

several club rooms,

a youth restaurant,

a library,

and a

reading room, but just before its inauguration Nuremberg's
new youth house almost fell victim to the Army's program to
destroy all defense installations within its zone.
the

combined

effort

of

the

Youth

Committee,

It took
the

city

administration and above all, of the local GYA officer who
had proposed the project, to save the building.25
Apart from establishing a new youth center, Marx also
tried to provide for those who might not be able to reach the
bunker during the winter of 1947/48.

If lack of fuel would

force the city to close the schools again during the cold
season, there would be at least one stove in each building to
provide

some

heat

for

the

students.

Secondary

school

students would receive emergency classes in selected schools.
Marx further stated that the city carried all these measures

“OMGBY, Det. B-211, Annual Report for 1947, Chapter 4;
NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 44, 10/471/3; "Stadtjugendhaus Landgrabenbunker," [City Youth House
Landgrabenbunker] NN, 7 Dec. 1946: 7; resolution from
Nuremberg KJR to MG,
re. destruction of bunker at
GugelstraBe, 26 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
Education Br., Box 130, 5/294-2/15; James C. Barnett,
Director, MG Det. 211, to Commanding General, European
Command, Office of the Chief Engineer U.S. Army, 23 Jan.
1948; Niirnberg 1945-1949, II, doc. 157; letter from Major
Mark Selsor, Nuremberg GYA Officer, to Governor Murray van
Wagoner, OMGBY, 28 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMBGY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-3/17; James E. King jr., Staff
Secretary, OMGUS, E&CRD, to Dr. Steuerwald, KJR Nuremberg, no
date [Feb. 1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education
Br., BOX 130, 5/294-2/15.
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out in addition to the activities of the private welfare
institutions.26
Marx also was concerned with the problem of homeless
young people.

In December 1946 he suggested to the city

welfare committee that it would be necessary to initiate a
project which would provide these persons not only with a
place to stay, but also with opportunities to learn and to
develop roots which would prevent them from resuming their
restless lives on the streets.27
In view of the limited resources of the city, winning
the support of American authorities for such a project would
be the best way to get it underway.

In September Marx

immediately responded to an article in the Neue Zeitung, the
official German language newspaper sponsored by OMGUS.

The

paper had reported that American authorities in Frankfurt
were supporting a German initiative for constructing a youth
village

by

supplying

it with barracks

and tents.

Marx

inquired with the local detachment about the possibility of
getting

the

same

support

for

his

community.

Colonel

Callicott dutifully forwarded the letter to OMGBY, but no
answer

is

recorded.

Marx,

however, had

American partner who showed more concern.

found

another

In December he

26Dr. Marx to the German Association of Private and
Public Welfare, Frankfurt/Main, 19 Nov. 1947; Niirnberg 19451949, II, doc. 180.
^Minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 2 Dec. 1946;
NCA C7/IX no. 1232.
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told the welfare committee that the American youth officer in
Nuremberg, Major Mark Selsor, had demonstrated much interest
in such a project and promised his support.
taken

over his

duties as GYA officer

Selsor had just

for the Nuremberg

Military Post in summer.28
During the next year the city fathers considered various
sites for their youth village.

American troops had occupied

a former German Luftwaffe landing field in a little village
in the vicinity of Nuremberg.

Marx

found out that the

Americans would soon evacuate the barracks and included the
property on the city's wish list to the Bavarian property
control office.

Apparently Marx was successful.

In November

1947 the city council's welfare committee decided to set up
a youth village at the former air force base.

The city

fathers also planned to attach dormitories for students and
for apprentices to the property,
acted too quickly.

but apparently they had

Although eighty boys were living in the

barracks in May 1948,

the Munich Property Control Office

could not make up its mind and was threatening to dispossess
them of the property.29
28Marx to Det. B-211, 18 Sep. 1946; Col. Callicott to
OMGBY, 23 Sept. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 40, 10/43-3/24; minutes of a welfare
committee meeting, 2 Dec. 1946; NCA C7/IX no. 1232; for
Selsor's appointment see Det. B-211, Monthly Historical
Intelligence Report, Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Reports
Control Br., Box 207, 10/81-3/7.
29Minutes of welfare committee meetings, 2 Oct. 1947, 27
Nov. 1947; NCA C7/IX no. 1233; Headquarters, Nuremberg
Military Post, German Youth Activities Section, GYA Staff
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In view of these developments the city council began to
look for alternatives. It scouted a second property closer to
Nuremberg.

The former Nazi party rally area had much space

and some accommodations to offer.

After an inspection of the

site

barracks

the

committee

found

the

from

which

the

architects had guided the construction of Hitler's rally
grounds a suitable place for another village.30
Since Nuremberg only had limited funds at its disposal,
the city was looking for a private sponsor for the project.
This

kind

of

Nevertheless
buildings,

help

the

city

did

not

immediately

obtained

the

right

materialize.
to

for which it did not have to pay,

use

the

for social

purposes such as youth work by the end of 1947.31
For the time being a new and unique private organization
received permission to temporarily use the facilities until
it would be able to construct its own youth village for
homeless young people nearby which it called "Peace Village".
The idea for this organization actually did not have its
roots in Nuremberg, but rather goes back to one of the first
attempts to launch a project designed to foster cooperation
between Germany and other nations.

The organizers of an

Report for Week Covering 1-7 May 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9.
30Minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 3 July 1947;
NCA C7/IX no. 1233.
31Minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 2 Oct. 1947,
Enclosure 14; NCA C7/IX no. 123 3.
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international youth camp in Munich founded an organization
with an international board of directors which would address
the problem of homeless young people by providing them with
the opportunity to build their own boys towns.

The venture

not only tried to get young people off the streets and into
a regular life, but also set out to bring young Germans back
into the international community by looking for sponsors from
abroad and organizing youth camps with participants coming
from

all

over

the

reconstruction.

world

These

to

ideas

help

with

received

the

a

work

warm

of

welcome.

Members of the Nuremberg youth council supported the project
as did city officials like Marx, as well as the local GYA
officer.

The young people who came to live in the barracks

would soon begin building their own homes on the former Nazi
rally grounds.

1948 would be the official start for the

project.32
In spite of these efforts the relief, welfare, and youth
activities
sufficient

of
to

the

city

satisfy

administration were
even

the

most

by

no means

urgent

needs.

Nuremberg's authorities were overtaxed with the tremendous
tasks they were facing during the first three years after the
war, especially since they did not operate in a vacuum, but
increasingly had to deal with state and even the bizonal
3211Jugendsiedlung "Friedensdorf" bei Nurnberg: Ein Modell
sozialer Selbsthilfe," Jugendnachrichten des Bayerischen
Jugendringes 2, June 1948, no. 3/4: 6-7; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID,
Analysis Br., Box 189, 10/51-3/9; Karl Schmidbauer, personal
interview, 5 July 1995.
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administrations.

The whole apparatus was cumbersome and more

often than not did not function.

Nuremberg's connections to

the surrounding region suffered from a considerable lack of
enthusiasm on the side of the farming communities to support
the city.

Hitler's much propagated "folk community" simply

did not exist.

Each German seemed to fend just for himself

or possibly for the tightly knit group to which he or she
belonged.

Many farmers,

for example, did not meet their

quotas, but were able to provide goods for the black market
or to city people who had something attractive to offer.
Even without these obstacles the situation would have been
extremely precarious.

Germany needed time to recover from

the complete collapse of the Third Reich, and not much could
be done without outside help.

As a result,

Nurembergers

became increasingly disillusioned with their administrators
and representatives.

An ICD survey in 1948 revealed that a

majority of the city's

inhabitants

suspected

their

city

administrators of acting selfishly and not caring about the
public

good.

The

survey revealed

Nurembergers'

state

of

government.

Apparently

mind

than

they were

more

about
not

about
their

aware

or

the
local

overly

concerned with the obvious discrepancy between their own
behavior and the expectations of their local government.33
It comes as no surprise that the occupiers also came
under attack during the bitter months of 1946 and 1947, but
33Eckart 191-2 02.
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it is interesting to note that those who negotiated with the
local detachment on a day to day basis differentiated between
the men with whom they were dealing and those in charge of
politics.

The city fathers recognized that the Americans who

were in charge of them at the local level did much to support
them.

In general relations between detachment B-211 and the

city

administration

remained

quite

friendly.

Local

politicians and administrators usually limited their attacks
on American policy to the men in charge in Washington.34
A Youth Committee in the Making
As far as coordinating youth activities was concerned,
we have already seen that city officials and MG in Nuremberg
had developed the same concept at about the same time in
1945.

Nuremberg was one of the first cities

functioning youth committee.

to have a

Just as Americans had observed

in general, the committee in Nuremberg initially did not have
much input from young people.

It consisted of five members

of the city administration and the leaders of the nine youth
groups

which had

registered

with

local

authorities

and

applied for licenses.35
One of the committee's first actions was to take stock.
In February 1946 the Niirnberger Nachrichten reported that
"Free Youth Work Revives."

Announcing to young Nurembergers

^Eckart 205.
35Det. B-211, Monthly Historical Report, July 1946; NA RG
260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.
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that

they

would

soon

be

able

to

resume

their

youth

activities, it informed its readers that all organizations,
clubs and persons interested in youth activities should turn
to the youth office for further information.36
In April 1946 the Youth Committee established its own
constitution.

The authors of the document clearly wanted to

establish a legal and organizational continuity with the time
before 1933.

They referred to the responsibilities in the

field of youth activities which the Youth Act of 1926 had
established for the communities.
the

best

way

to

respond

to

The authors thought that
the

demands

would

be

to

reestablish the traditional youth groups from before 1933,
since many of their former leaders were still available and
could

serve

constitution

as

important

made

clear

guides
that

in

the

the

future.

committee

under

The
no

circumstances aimed at recreating the unified youth movement
of the Third Reich,

but rather wanted to coordinate the

activities of all youth groups and help them to develop their
own initiatives with the greatest possible respect for their
ideological, religious and organizational structures.

The

committee also included specific goals,

such as reopening

youth

centers,

hostels,

the

creation

of

youth

organization of retreats in its constitution.

and

the

It would serve

as a visible pressure group and try to direct the interest of
the administration and of politicians towards the problems of
36NN, 6 Feb. 1946: 5.
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all young people.
that

youth

An additional task would be to make sure

groups

complied

with

Military

Government

regulations before they received their licenses.

Only those

youth groups would be licensed who made sure that they would
eliminate all National Socialist or militaristic thought and
would try to educate their members towards becoming free,
independent, and peace loving citizens.

Any person who had

been connected to the National Socialists would be excluded
from leadership positions in the new organizations.37
Although

the

Nurembergers

created

a

body

based

on

democratic principles, Military Government officials pointed
to

a

significant

flaw

in

the

committee's

organization.

Colonel James C. Barnett, second in command who later became
commanding officer of the Nuremberg Detachment, advised the
local authorities that their constitution only represented
organized

young

people.

He

insisted

that

it would

be

necessary to develop some kind of representation which would
assure that the voice of all those young people who did not
opt for becoming members in an organization would be heard.
Barnett introduced an entirely new concept of youth work to
Nuremberg

which

also

signalled

a

new

departure

in

MG

policies.

Although a number of people had recognized that

unorganized young people so far had not received sufficient

3711Jugendring Nvirnberg," [before April 1946]; NA RG 260
OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12; monthly intelligence
report, Det. B-211, July 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Reports
Control Br., Box 207, 10/81-3/7.
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attention by German and American authorities,

nobody had

officially taken steps to remedy the situation.

Barnett was

the first American representative who raised the problem in
his community and forced Nurembergers to come up with their
own solution to the problem.
By June 1947 they were ready.

The committee adopted the

new constitution "after lively discussion".

Depending on the

number of its members, each organization would have one or
more representatives in the general assembly.
from

each

school

would

unorganized young people.

be

elected

to

One person

represent

all

To assure proper communication

with the city administration, delegates from various branches
involved in youth activities also had a seat in the assembly.
Adults would not occupy more than seven seats, a number which
just matched that of representatives of the largest Nuremberg
youth organization,

the Trade Union Youth.

At that time

about fifty per cent of all young Nurembergers had joined a
youth organization.

It was quite fitting that the chair of

the youth committee invited Colonel Barnett to the Nuremberg
Army youth center to participate in first session of the
youth

committee

under

its

new

constitution.

Americans

regarded the Nuremberg constitution as a model which other
German communities should emulate.

The fact that Germans

came up with this constitution in the city of the Nazi party
rallies

and

the

Nuremberg

Laws

significance for the occupiers.

may

have

enhanced

its

They may well have regarded
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it

as

the

first

indicator

of

the

success

of

their

democratization policies.38
The youth committee was not just a coordinating body
with no real power.
that

the

members.

On the contrary: Americans made sure

Youth Committees
The

American

had

Army

something to
released

its

offer
own

their

surplus

clothing, camping materials, and other equipment as well as
that of the former Wehrmacht to the Land Youth Committees
which they in turn distributed among the local bodies.

When

the program began on a large scale in 1947, MG in Bavaria
released 1,000 tons of camping materials and promised to take
care of the transport of the children and the necessary
gasoline or field kitchens.

MG could not keep all of its

promises, but after initial problems and some confusion on
both sides, the program got underway.

Together with the

materials the Youth Committee issued guidelines for camping
in which it stressed the importance of exercising democratic

38Report on youth committee meeting, 29 Apr. 1947;
Invitation from Andreas Staudt to Col. Barnett, 30 May 1947;
NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1427, 9/122-3/1.
A
visiting expert who examined Land and Kreis Youth Committees
in the American zone during the summer of 1948, for example,
quoted the statutes and activities of the Nuremberg Committee
verbatim as an example for others to emulate (David F.
Demarch, "Report of Survey on Land and Kreis Youth Committees
and Youth Rings, Sept. 1948: 78-85; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 138, 5/295-2/7).
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procedures in the camps.

By the end of the summer 75,000

Bavarian children had participated in the program.39
Since the city administration also was interested in the
committee,

it supported the committee's activities with a

substantial amount of money and with a 75% discount for
public transport to the camps if it was available.

More

importantly, the local food office issued special allocations
for the hiking and camping activities of all licensed groups.
The fact that the Land Youth

Committee hired a

employee

dedicated all

for

administering

Nuremberg who

his

full time
time

to

the use of the equipment and helping young

people to organize these activities, shows how important it
was

for them

to

leavethe city.

In

view

of

the dire

schooling situation, the city of Nuremberg had even decided
to take advantage of the refreshing camp atmosphere and
continued some classes in the field to catch up with its
work.

Well over 4,500 young people had participated in

summer camps which lasted between ten and fourteen days at
the beginning of August, with about six weeks left in the

39Minutes of Youth Activities Conference, Stuttgart, 1819 March 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education
Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/14; minutes of 7th Youth Activities
Conference, 15-16 May 1947, NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
Education Br., Box 120, 5/293-1/7; Jugendring, Miinchen an die
Jugendabteilung der Militarregierung in Bayern: Bericht tiber
die Zeltlageraktion 1947, 18 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2; see also list
of equipment released to LYC [1947]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD,
Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/2; report about
negotiations between Bavarian Youth Reverend Helbich and MG,
8 Nov. 1946; LCA Kreisdekan Niirnberg 318, Jugendarbeit.
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season.

When the summer was over, more than 10,000 young

people had spent some time in summer camps which lasted on
average ten days and included a substantial

increase

in

calories.40
The program was such a success in 1947 that Americans
and Germans considerably expanded their plans for the next
year.

In February 1948 MG youth officials noted that in

Bavaria alone 200,000 young people had applied for camping
materials.

The

Bavarian

Youth

Committee

had

already

scheduled a conference for camp counselors and leadership
training for camp supervisors.41
Summer camps remained very popular well into the next
decade, providing many young Germans with an opportunity to
spend their vacations away from the city, but the returning

40Helmut Stiihler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994;
Bayerischer Jugendring, Miinchen an die Jugendabteilung der
Militarregierung in Bayern: Bericht iiber die Zeltlageraktion
1947, 18 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities
Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2; Berichte des BJR an OMGBY fur
Zeitraum bis 15.8. 47: 4; 15.9.47: 4; 15.10.47: 8; NA RG 260
OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 146, 5/296-2/9;
list of summer camps in Bavaria, 13 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260
OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2.
41Letter from Lawrence Norrie, Chief Group Activities Br.
to Col. Cunningham, E&CRD, Economic Br., 19 Mar. 1948; NA RG
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br. , Box 129, 5/2941/17; minutes of 13th MG Youth Activities Conference, 12-13
Feb. 1948; NA RG 260, OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br.,
Box 120, 5/293-1/7; many of the interviewees, especially
those of the trade unions and two directors of youth centers,
remembered these camps very fondly; for trade unions and
their summer camps see also Birgitt Grieb, ed., Mit
Hordentopf und Rucksack:
Zur Geschichte der Gewerkschaftsjugend in Nurnberg und Coburg nach 1945, Oberursel:
P.V. Werkdruck, [1987], 42-46.
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prosperity brought an end to the programs.

During the 1950s

more and more young people and their families were able to
afford their own holidays farther away from home or chose
more

comfortable

Nevertheless,

accommodations

for

their

vacations.

the program had served its purpose.

Young

people received calories and could recuperate from the still
rather devastated city for a while.

Many of them also for

the first time acquired hands-on experiences with democratic
procedures.

And all of them, no matter to which youth group

they belonged, literally could feel American support.42
These benefits notwithstanding,

not all Germans were

easily convinced about the value of a Youth Committee and its
activities.

Although

it was well

known that

all

youth

organizations would have to register through the committees,
Bavaria's Lutheran Youth Minister Helbich announced to his
brothers

in the

congregations

in

February

1946

that

he

considered denominational youth groups to be exempt from
these provisions.

He instructed those who wanted to register

their groups with Military Government not to do so.

Helbich

thought that church representatives should be present in the
newly created youth committees, but that they should limit
their participation to giving
minister

informed

his

youth

"supportive advice."

leaders

The

that the committees

certainly could do some good, especially if they supported
42Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995; Willy
ProlB, personal interviews, 4 Aug. 1994, 4 Aug. 1995; Willy
Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
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youth activities by trying to reopen youth hostels, getting
price reductions for youth groups, or obtaining equipment,
but he apparently did not want to jeopardize the independence
of his own flock or give up any part of his control over it.
During the next months Helbich had to admonish several of his
pastors not to apply for licenses, since these precedents
would undermine his own course.43
In November

1946 Helbich was still negotiating with

OMGBY about the necessity of licensing Lutheran youth groups,
but by then it was clear that he would not have much choice
in the matter, although MG did not seem to force the issue.
Helbich conceded that obtaining a license would be very
beneficial

for

the work of the youth groups,

since the

Americans had taken care to invest the youth committees with
a monopoly over the distribution of all the commodities
urgently needed for youth work.

Youth hostels also were

exclusively reserved for licensed groups.

In view of these

realities, the church authorities decided not to hold out any
longer, especially after both Military Government and the

43|,Stand der Jugendarbeit des Landesjugendpfarrers," 12
Feb. 1946; LCA Landeskirchenrat VI; 1178a 1946-1964, Akten
des Landesjugendpfarrers Bd. IV; exchange of letters between
Reverend Dollinger and Helbich, April-May 1946; LCA Personen
CLXV
Dollinger
14.
Protestant
youth
groups
were
conspicuously absent from a list of youth organizations who
had applied for licenses with Det. B-211.
Of the eleven
applicants MG did not grant a license to only one sports
group because one of its sponsors was not employable under
denazification laws (MG, Det. B-211 to Lord Mayor of
Nuremberg, 25 Oct. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211 Box
1439, 9/126-1/19).
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Land Youth Committee assured Helbich that they would not
attempt

to

exercise

activities.

any

influence

on

Lutheran

youth

In view of these incentives the church leaders

announced to their congregations that they should apply for
licenses.

The

reverends

who

initiative
decision

had

had

came

memorandum
applied

not
just

made

also
for

noted

sourly

licenses

negotiations

any

in time to participate

on

that

some

their

own

easier.

The

in the

final

elaborations for the new constitution of the Nuremberg Youth
Committee.
evolved

The Lutherans joined an organization which had

away

from

adult

influences

towards

representative body of all young Nurembergers.
following decades

a

truly

During the

it would have to weather a number

of

storms, but remained to be a democratic institution which
fought for the interests of all young people.44
By

1947

the

city

administration,

youth groups,

and

Military Government had created an organizational structure
for the

representation

of the

city's

continue to serve young Nurembergers

youth which

would

for the next fifty

years, although it underwent significant changes.45
““Report about negotiations between Bavarian Youth
Minister Helbich and MG, 8 Nov. 1946; LCA Kreisdekan Niirnberg
318 Jugendarbeit.
45Ulrike Fuchs (Kreisjugendring: "... gemeinsam fiir die
Interessen der Jugend? Eine kritische Bilanz tiber 30 Jahre
Jugendpflege (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: Kreis jugendring NiirnbergStadt, 1980) 14-79) provides an interesting discussion of the
development of the Nuremberg Youth Committee.
Military
Government records as well as those of the Nuremberg city
archives and of the Lutheran church, however, reveal that her
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Reviving Youth Activities
The Nuremberg Kreis Youth Committee became one of the
pillars of the city's youth activities from the start.
committee

organized

September 1946.

the

first

"Nuremberg

Youth

Day"

The
in

About three thousand young people had the

opportunity to relax and enjoy games at twelve different
locations throughout the city.

American observers noted that

youth organizations had prepared games,
dances for their peers.

songs, plays,

and

According to the report, the Youth

Committee, MG, and tactical troops had cooperated closely to
make the event a success.46
At about the same time young people in Nuremberg could
read on posters all over the city about another innovation.
The committee opened an office whose sole task consisted of
listening
generation.

to

the

needs

and

complaints

of

the

younger

The office was only open two hours a week, but

it was the first attempt by the youth committee to reach out
to young people.

It also provided an opportunity for those

account and conclusions are not entirely reliable, especially
for the early stages of the committee's existence. She does
not recognize, for example, the very active role Americans
played in the foundation of the committee and the formulation
of its constitution.
^OMGBY, Weekly Report, Youth Activities, 4 Sep. 1946; NA
RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 143, 5/2961/17;
monatlicher
Bericht
des
Bayerischen
Landesjugendausschusses fur den Zeitraum bis 15.10.46; NA RG 260
OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 143, 5/296-1/20;
see also Fuchs 24.
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who were not organized to look for help or voice their
concerns.47
One of the most pressing problems in youth work remained
the lack of trained youth leaders.

Americans, German church

leaders, and those in charge of more mundane organizations
agreed that much needed to be done

in this

field.

The

Bavarian Youth Committee and on the local level the Kreis
Committees soon became actively involved in this task.48

In

the fall of 1946 forty-two people in Nuremberg responded to
a campaign to create an amateur theater group.

They were

just in time for the opening of a new fifty-six room youth

47Monthly Report, Land Youth Committee to OMGBY, 14 Sep.
1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36,
10/43-1/10.
Translation of the Poster:
Attention Young People!
War and the collapse has brought much harm and misery to our
youth.
Nuremberg's Youth Organizations are taking care of
the fates and worries of all young people and are providing
advice and help to all boys and girls!
Everybody may come to our new
COUNSELLING OFFICE
which is open every Tuesday and Thursday from 5-7 p.m. in the
orphanage at 34 Reutersbrunn Street.
Boys and girls come and see us!
The Kreis Youth Committee of the city of Nuremberg
48Youth leadership training was one of the main concerns
of one of the first German-American conferences on youth, 1214 Sep. 1947 (for the minutes see NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 120, 5/293-1/7). Although the
German Lutherans in general were reluctant to cooperate with
other groups, they shared their concerns. See, for example,
the presentation of German youth pastor Manfred Muller at a
conference called by the Youth and Reconstruction Department
of the World Council of Churches in Prisingen, Switzerland,
27-3 0 Oct. 1947 which Lawrence Norrie also attended (NA RG
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 150, 5/2971/13).
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15. Poster, Nuremberg Youth Committee, 1946 (Source: NA RG
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/10)
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leadership training center,

Burg Feuerstein,

located in a

small town about thirty miles north of Nuremberg.

The site

actually

Military

belonged

to

the

Catholic

Church,

but

Government turned it over to the Bavarian Youth Committee
specifically for training youth leaders.
one of many leadership schools.

Feuerstein was just

In December five young

Nurembergers went to Seeshaupt, a small town near Munich, to
attend a leadership training course there.49
After the reorganization of the committee,

the young

people in charge announced in May 1947 their intention to
create

a

youth

parliament

which

would

consist

of

representatives of various administrative offices, organized
youth groups, and unorganized young people.

Since a similar

institution in Munich previously had led to utter chaos and
quite turbulent scenes, the young people themselves decided
to limit their agenda entirely to questions which concerned

49OMGBY, weekly report, "Youth Activities,11 4 Sept. 1946;
NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 143,
5/296-1/17. "... und auf der Jugendburg Feuerstein, " [. . . and
in Feuerstein Youth Castle], NN, 26 Oct. 1946: 6. Actually
Feuerstein was a Catholic institution which the Archbishop of
Bamberg had officially handed over to young people in his
diocese in September 1946 (Weekly Report, 27 July 1946, Group
Activities Br.; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Act. Br. , Box
36, 10/43-1/10) . Judging from a common MG procedure, the
Catholic Church probably would not have been able to reclaim
the property if it had not opened the facilities to all
youth.
List of participants of a youth leader training camp, 27 Dec. 1946 in Seeshaupt; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/3.
Three of the five
Nuremberg residents were university students, one was a
secondary school student and one a medical assistant.
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young

people.

City

council

members

reacted

to

this

development with "satisfaction" and, undoubtedly, relief.50
Hans Eckstein represented the trade unions in this body.
According to him, it functioned well and managed to discuss
a wide variety of topics. Although this youth parliament did
not

attempt to run the city,

agenda.

it had a highly political

Practical youth activities were rarely discussed.

The young people rather focused on their legal status, their
working

conditions,

and

their

training.

According

to

Eckstein, adult council members of the different parties took
the ideas of the young people up and included them in their
own agendas.51
Apart from the material support it received from Munich,
the committee could count on very dedicated volunteers in the
youth groups.

The trade unions became one of the strongest

pillars of the new structure.

Denazification, the insecurity

of factory owners and managers about their future, and Allied
Control Council Directives actually had given the unions a
strong position in the shops of which they immediately took
advantage.

They not only revived their organizations and

initiated workers'

councils, but also focused on bringing

young people into their unions.

During the first three years

after the war, they were able to organize the great majority
of young workers and apprentices in big and medium sized

S0Minutes of a meeting of the city welfare committee, 5
May 1947, Enclosure 9; NCA C 7/IX no. 1233; Fussl 126-12 9.
51Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

402
factories.

In

September

1945

the

trade

union

leaders

appointed a youth secretary, Loni Burger, who immediately set
out to revive youth activities.
years

trade

apprentices

union
with

In the course of the next

representatives

were

able

remedial courses which they

to

provide

could

take

during working hours to make up for time and schooling they
had

lost during the war.

closely

with

apprentices

the

were

They also began to cooperate

Nuremberg

required

vocational

to

attend.

schools
This

which

cooperation

provided union leaders with the opportunity to reach out to
all apprentices and keep them informed about their rights.52
Surprisingly, cultural activities became the focal point
of

the

unions'

youth

work.

Burger

and

his

colleagues

recognized that political issues were important, but that
young workers also needed to catch up with activities such as
reading books which had been burnt during the Third Reich or
becoming aware of culture in other realms during their free
time.

Trade union youth groups were among the first to

develop programs for others.

In November 1946 young people

were invited to the first variety show with music, theater
sketches,

folk dances and poems, but also were invited to

participate in an essay writing contest in which young people
should develop their own ideas about democracy and their
expectations from the trade union movement.

Of course Loni

52Grieb, ed. 8-19; see also Karl Schmidbauer, personal
interview, 5 July 1995.
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Burger did not pass up the occasion to inform the youngsters
about the trade unions.

It is noteworthy that Nuremberg's

GYA officer Major Mark Selsor, not a member of the Military
Government detachment, represented the Americans.53
Theater and public performances attracted many young
people,

but most of them preferred sports.

In 1947 only

twenty-nine of the 765 youth groups in Nuremberg were sports
clubs,

but over one third of all organized young people

belonged to them.

Willy Gensmantel, for example, began where

he had left in 1933.

He had been a member of a local

workers' sports club and immediately upon his return from the
United States began to organize a youth section of the local
sports club in Fiirth, where he was living.54
Most of the Nuremberg youth organizations who applied
for licenses had existed before 1933.

The first ten groups

53,lJugend spielt fur Jugend," [Youth Plays for Youth] NN,
20 Nov. 1946: 5.
^Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
OMGBY, Det. B-211, Quarterly Historical Report, 20 Oct. 1947;
NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det B-211, Box 1425, 9/124-1/6. The
number of 765 is astounding even for a city like Nuremberg.
The reason for this number is that MG counted every single
group within the youth organization of which it was part.
Although the vast majority of young Germans belonged to the
two major denominations,
for example,
the Nuremberg
detachment listed 465 religious groups with about 10,000
members.
With an average of about twenty persons, one
suspects that this number not only included youth clubs, Boy
Scouts and YMCA but also the churches' individual Sunday
school classes.
Either the churches registered every
conceivable group with German thoroughness or the groups
hoped to obtain more material support from the Kreis Youth
Committee by registering individually.
See also weekly
report of Field Team, 17 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD,
Group Activities Br., Box 37, 10/43-2/2.
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were the Catholic Youth, the Choir and Orchestra Community of
Nuremberg, Boy Scouts and various sports clubs, one of which
did not obtain a license because one of its sponsors had been
a member of the Nazi party.
Youth,

and

the

Free

The trade unions, the Socialist

German

Youth

had

registered

their

activities with the city administration already in March
1946.

The only new member of this group was the Free German

Youth which obtained its license from German and American
authorities

without any problems.55

The

revived their activities on a large scale.

churches simply
Workers not only

revivied their trade unions but also made cultural activities
and sports programs a central part of their activities for
young people.
became

They made sure that young members immediately

involved

organizing

their

in

these

peers

to

activities
the

and

largest

took

possible

care

of

degree.

Interestingly, the communists took the lead in this postwar
organizing drive.

Karl Schmidbauer recalled that the local

trade union youth committee initially consisted of seven
members of the Free German Youth, which in Nuremberg was the
equivalent of the Communist Party's youth organization, and
only three Social Democrats.56 Traditional sports clubs, the
55Memorandum
of Intelligence,
17 Apr. 1946; NA
1/12; OMGBY, Det
NA RG 260 OMGBY,

from Eric Feiler, Det. B-211 ICD, to Chief
OMGBY, 25 Apr. 1946: results of a survey of
RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Director, Box 17 10/110B-211, Monthly Historical Report Oct. 46.
FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.

56Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995; Willy
Gensmantel,
personal
interview,
10
Aug.
1995;
Karl
Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 July 1995; see also
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Nuremberg YMCA, as well as the Socialist Falken, could look
back on a long tradition and relied on members from before
1933 who were willing to lend a hand in reconstruction.57
Apart from the Free German Youth, Nuremberg only witnessed
the creation of one more newcomer, a German-American Youth
club which became active in 1947.

The great majority of the

youth organizations relied on their traditional and well
known ways.58
American policy directives did not permit youth groups
to become politically active.

On first sight Germans in

Nuremberg complied with this request.

Americans kept a close

eye on those who had a political background,
Falcons.

such as the

Willy ProlB, for example, remembered that his group

repeatedly

ran

into

problems

with

Military

Government

representatives, because of its close affiliation with the
Social Democratic Party.59
Surprisingly, the Free German Youth did not suffer from
the same type of scrutiny.

Especially trade union members

and those of the more moderate left recalled that FDJ members
in Nuremberg seemed to have established a close relationship

Schmidbauer's recollections in Grieb, ed. 8-11.
57For the Falken see Willy Prolfi, personal interview, 4
Aug. 1994 Gerhard Knochlein recalled the revival of the local
YMCA (personal interview, 24 July 1994).
58For
below.

the German-American Youth Club

see

chapter

59Willy ProlS, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

X,

406
with Major Selsor and the GYA who did not seem to mind their
Communist

background.

News

of the

Free German

Youth's

attempts at taking over youth work in Berlin and the Soviet
Zone under Communist leadership also did not seem to affect
their standing with the Americans in Nuremberg.
back,

Looking

trade unionists and a former member of the Falcons

recalled that Free German Youth members seemed to enjoy a
somewhat preferential treatment.60
A closer

look,

however,

reveals

that all

political

parties had either youth committees or actually ran their own
youth groups.

American authorities in Nuremberg were aware

of the situation but did not report any of them as officially
registered by Military Government.

Eric Feiler's survey of

April 1946 reveals that he obviously knew the men in charge
of youth activities in all parties and was well informed
about their work.

Interestingly, only one of the party men

in charge of youth thought that young people should actually
become involved in political affairs.
chairman

of

the most

Even Hans Schubert,

visible politically oriented

youth

“See, for example, Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6
July 1995; Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug.
1995; Willy ProlS, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994; Karl
Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 July 1995. All four men
volunteered this information without being asked about it.
Eckstein thought that Americans probably targeted especially
the Communists for re-education and therefore gave them a
preferred treatment, while ProlS suspected that the better
position of the Free German Youth was probably due to the
good personal relationship between one of its leaders and
Major Selsor.
None of them was very happy that communists
seemed to get more from the Americans than those groups who
were truly democratic.
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group, the Falcons, thought that political activities were
not a good idea for young people, although all of the leading
members were clearly and openly affiliated with the Social
Democrats.

It seems that the Falcons and possibly the other

groups concentrated more on practicing democracy and teaching
their members more about the political process than becoming
involved in party politics.

The Americans apparently were

aware

supported

of

this

maintained

pattern

cordial

and

relations

with

it.

the

The

local

Falcons

detachment

throughout the occupation.61
We have seen above that summer camps became an important
means of providing young people from Nuremberg and in cities
throughout the American zone with valuable recreation and
additional calories.
hiking

and

All youth groups became involved in

organizing

summer

camps

from

1946

on.

In

Nuremberg the Socialist youth group set up the first of its
"Falcon

Republics"

next

to

the

center.

Other groups did the same.

Feuerstein

youth

leader

Trade unions were among

the first groups to use youth hostels, Lutheran groups had

61Memorandum from Eric Feiler, Det. B-211 ICD, to Chief
of Intelligence, OMGBY, 25 Apr. 1946: results of a survey of
17 Apr. 1946; NA RG 260, OMGBY, ID, Director, Box 17, 10/1101/12. The Falcons repeatedly invited Lieutenant Callicott,
who apparently was in charge of youth activities in 1946/47,
to their meetings and activities.
See, for example, their
invitation to their first state wide conference in Nuremberg
of 18 Mar. 1947; NA RG 2 60 OMGBY, FOD, Box 1415, Det. B-211,
9/127-1/16.
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their camps near a castle not far from the city.

The YMCA

did its share of camping as well.62
Camping only offered a partial solution to the recovery
needs of young people.

Permanent constructions could be used

year round not only for camping but also for retreats and
leadership training.

Burger, who also was a leading member

of the youth hostel organization in Nuremberg, was able to
have

some

of

the

buildings

which

organization before 1933 released.

had

belonged

to

the

Hans Eckstein became the

man in charge of organizing everything necessary for getting
the buildings ready for operation again.
year

travelling throughout

Bavaria

He spent half a

soliciting donations.

Eckstein was able to bring the necessary items together.

His

work earned trade union groups the right to be among the
first ones to use the reopened facilities.63
These

efforts

notwithstanding,

space

for

youth

activities and for leadership training remained at a premium.
Youth organizations, the city administration as well as the
churches all were looking for suitable places to provide
young people with the necessary accommodations.

In 1947 a

62Willy ProlB, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994; Marianne
Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug 1995; Hans Eckstein,
personal interview, 6 July 1995; OMGUS, Internal Affairs and
Communications Div. , Education and Religious Affairs Br.,
Memorandum on Trip by Sgt. Tracy Strong to German Youth
Camps, U.S. Zone, 30 July-3 August 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-1/25.
63Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 5 Aug. 1995; Grieb,
ed. 19.
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GYA youth group stumbled across an old castle in the vicinity
of Nuremberg which was almost ideally located and offered
enough space for establishing a youth hostel and training
facilities

for the city.

After

an

initial cleaning by

American women, young trade unionists, as well as members of
the Peace Village, volunteered their time to reconstruct the
old buildings, install plumbing, heating and other amenities
needed for year round operation of youth castle Hoheneck.
The Land Youth Committee initially leased the property, but
Nuremberg later took it over for its youth groups, as well as
youth leadership training.

The city also used Hoheneck as

training site for its own employees.64
As

usual

facilities.

the churches

preferred

Due to Military

to

Government

have

their

own

regulations

the

Catholic Church shared Feuerstein Castle with other youth
organizations, but some groups, such as the Lutherans, wanted
their own places.
the

leading

organization

In December 1947 Carl Schweitzer, one of

men

of

the

in Germany,

largest

Protestant

welfare

the Hilfswerk der Evangelischen

Kirchen in Deutschland, approached various OMGUS officials in
Berlin and Bavaria about a project of rehabilitating yet
another

castle

Hohenstein.

in

the

vicinity

of

Nuremberg,

named

Schweitzer apparently was aware of American

wJune Selsor, Is the German Youth a Lost Cause?
(Manuscript, typewritten, 1950, in possession of the author)
16-18; Grieb, ed. 43-45; Erinnerungen aus der Stadtverwaltung
50, Illustration 66.
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support

of

leadership

training

and

proposed

that

OMGUS

sponsor the construction of a Christian leadership camp at
the site.

Lawrence Norrie forwarded the proposal to the WCC

in Geneva,

but did not find any support there.

Clearly

unhappy that the youth section and not religious affairs had
approached him, Robert Tobias of the WCC declined to sponsor
the project.

He suggested to make the center a joint venture

with other youth organizations, especially since Schweitzer
seemed to have acted on his own behalf rather than in any
official capacity for the EKD.

OMGBY officials endorsed

Schweitzer's plan after a visit of the castle in February
1948,

but apparently wanted other youth groups to become

involved just as Tobias had suggested.
Schweitzer

that

they

would

not

They explained to

sponsor

the

project

or

requisition materials for it and referred him to the Land
Youth Committee for further consultations which also proved
to be disappointing for Schweitzer.

Apparently

concepts were too far apart for compromise.

the two

For the time

being, nothing came of his proposal.65
The Nuremberg Youth Show
In spite of all difficulties, Marx and other members of
the city administration were determined to make the best of

65Carl L. Schweitzer, Hilfswerk der EKD, to Dr. Norrie,
OMGUS, 14 Dec. 1947; Carl Schweitzer to Dr. Spahn, OMGBY, 15
Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box
39, 10/43-3/19; Norrie to Robert Tobias, WCC, Geneva, 24 Dec.
1947; Tobias to Norrie, 7 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 126, 5/293-3/15.
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the situation and to demonstrate to the public the importance
of youth work as well as its successes to date.

In September

1947 the city administration informed Major Selsor, whom it
apparently regarded as the man in charge of all American
youth activities in the city, that Nuremberg was planning to
organize a youth show for the coming year and asked for
support.
in Munich.

Selsor forwarded the request to OMGUS headquarters
The people in charge of youth activities there

thought that it was a good
exhibition was

idea,

provided that

such an

"proposed and desired by German youth and

responsibility is definitely assumed by them, through their
schools and organizations and through the Stadt- and Land
Kreis Committees".

Military Government did not think that

the occupiers should participate in such a venture "with
displays in order not to confuse the issues," but exempted
extracurricular contacts between young Americans and youth
groups from that rule.

Detachment F-211 also endorsed all

assistance the Nuremberg Military Post would be able to
provide.66
During the following months the project made progress.
With American endorsement assured, planning went ahead.

In

December Marx informed the American authorities in Munich
that the city would put the youth house, which was still

“otto Barthel, Nuremberg city administration to Mark
Selsor, GYA, 11 Sept. 1947; Selsor to Religious Affairs Div.,
OMGBY, 8 Oct. 1947; OMGBY to Selsor, 18 Nov. 1947; NA RG 260
OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 37, 10/43-2/2.
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under construction in a bunker, at the exhibition's disposal.
Contrary

to

Military

headquarters

that

Government

the city

wishes

council

he

told

also had

OMGBY

decided to

"charge the Municipal Administrative Board of Nuremberg with
the

preparation

and

the

execution

of

the

exhibition."

Neither currency reform which the Western Allies carried out
in June,

nor the resulting Berlin crisis could stop the

project.

In August 1948 the youth show opened its doors to

the public.

In their introductory remarks Marx and Andreas

Staudt, the two leading men in charge of youth affair in
Nuremberg, discussed the dire situation in which young people
found themselves in 1948.

According to them, nobody knew if

the currency reform would kill or heal the economy.

Apart

from that officials did not refer to the present political
situation but

rather attempted

to

show educators,

youth

leaders, and the general public what young people as well as
the city authorities had been able to create in spite of the
immense misery in the city.
would

be

generation

necessary

to

which

would

They also tried to show what

create
have

a

solid
to

future

shoulder

for

the

Germany's

reconstruction.67

67"Youth Show 1948 in Nuernberg," memorandum from Theodor
Marx, representing the Nuremberg City Council, 15 Dec. 1947;
NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br. , Box 42, 10/441/5; official program of the Nuremberg Youth Show, Aug. 1948:
1-6; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Branch, Box
121, 5/293-1/9; see also "Youth Exhibition Nuernberg 1948,"
Jugendnachrichten des Bayerischen Jugendringes, August 1948:
3

.
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The Nuremberg show demonstrated that Nuremberg indeed
had

made

some

progress

towards

the

democratization

and

elimination of old habits which American authorities regarded
as essential for the spiritual recuperation of Germany.

Otto

Barthel, one of Nuremberg's school superintendents, pointed
out that for the

first time

in the city's history many

different

organizations

had cooperated

to make the

show

possible.

The group charged with its organization had been

able to enlist the help of many departments within the city
administration, the regional government, and the Kreis Youth
Committee.
the

Free

Almost all of Nuremberg's youth groups, including
German

Youth,

contributed

with

theater

musical performances, or folk dance evenings.
speakers
ranging

informed

the public

from welfare

about youth

and guardianship

plays,

Distinguished
related

topics

of homeless

young

people to their health and, of course, the school system.
Films completed the effort.68
The

public

achievements

could

have

elementary school work,
of

first

hand

look

at

the

in twenty-seven rooms of one of the city's

rehabilitated school houses.

forms

a

teaching

for

Six rooms dealt with practical

explaining the
the

formation

importance of new
of

young

children.

Adequate nutrition was extremely important, so the Hoover
plan

which

helped

to

provide

Nuremberg's

children

with

680fficial program of the Nuremberg Youth Show, Aug.
1948: 20-24; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education
Branch, Box 121, 5/293-1/9.
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urgently necessary additional calories had its own room in
the exhibition, in which many children's drawings expressed
their gratitude.

The health department, youth office, youth

radio, as well as the youth organizations occupied additional
rooms.

To help young people in their job search, the city's

vocational schools and industry occupied a quarter of the
available space.

Following Munich's instructions neither the

local MG detachment nor GYA participated in the show.69
The city's initiative found a positive echo.

Under the

headline "Youth Show 1948 - Symbol of Hope" one of the local
newspapers provided its readers with detailed information
about the exhibition.

An American observer also found that

the effort was a "good one" and recommended that American
representatives visit the show which was just a ten minute
walk away from the Palace of Justice.
housed

the

Education

IMT
Branch

personnel
which

but

had

also

just

In 1948 it not only
the

moved

OMGUS
from

Community
Berlin

to

Nuremberg.70
American officials also could be satisfied with the
outlook of Nuremberg's school administrators.
to

incorporate

modern

concepts

of

They proposed

teaching

into

the

690fficial program of the Nuremberg Youth Show, Aug.
1948: 12-20; NA RG 260, OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education
Branch, Box 121, 5/293-1/9.
70Report on the Opening Meeting of the Nuernberg
Jugendschau 1948, [August 1948] (Lawrence Norrie received the
program together with the report); NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Branch, Box 121, 5/293-1/9.
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exhibition.

History teachers would no longer dwell upon

political and militaristic subjects, but focus on the history
of civilization.
time

found

Civics or Social Sciences for the first

attention

as

a

"very

up

to

date"

subject.

Geography would serve as a vehicle to become acquainted with
other peoples and to demonstrate the interdependence of the
world's community.

Teachers would also discuss "universal

reconciliation" in geography classes.71
The show also demonstrated that Nuremberg still had a
long way to go.

In typically German fashion the authorities

planned the enterprise and occupied most of the exhibition's
space.

The

organizing

administrators.

committee

consisted

entirely

of

Marx and his colleagues never asked young

people for their ideas for an exhibition which was dedicated
to them.

Youth organizations were relegated to organizing

the entertainment section of the show.
made

the

exhibition

for

adults

to

Clearly adults had
inform

them

about

activities and possibilities in the realm of youth work.72
71"Youth Show 1948 in Nuernberg," memorandum from Theodor
Marx, representing the Nuremberg City Council, 15 Dec. 1947;
NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 42, 10/441/5. Interestingly, the proposal for geography did not talk
about "nations" but preferred "peoples." This wording may be
an indicator for a turn away from the power politics approach
which had promoted chauvinism and an extreme nationalism
towards the neutral concepts based on ethnology and
anthropology.
^Willy Gensmantel described Marx as a very energetic man
who undoubtedly invested much of his energy in youth
activities but who also in some ways remained in the
traditional ways of thinking. According to Gensmantel, Marx
expected young people to accept and respect his authority
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In the immediate postwar period, however, young people
were not yet ready to tackle these issues.
pressing practical problems.
desperate.

Many facilities,

They had more

The food situation remained
gymnasiums, and sport fields

were either destroyed or requisitioned.

Youth groups also

did not have equipment, shoes, or clothing for sports.
were no tents or food for camps.

Travelling even to the

immediate vicinity of the city remained difficult.
occupiers seemed to have everything.

There

Only the

And they helped out.

without any questions (Willy Gensmantel, personal interview,
10 Aug. 1995).
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CHAPTER IX
American Assistance at the Grass Roots, 1946-1955

Although the American presence in Nuremberg caused some
problems and hard feelings towards the new rulers, it also
opened many opportunities for the German population.
occupiers did much to alleviate the dire situation.

The
In

addition to that the Americans modified but continued their
reorientation efforts.

Many Germans used the increasing

opportunities to become acquainted with American history,
politics, and culture.

Most of the programs were designed

for the entire population, but all of them included special
features

for the young

benefitted

people.

disproportionally

from

The

younger

American

programs, and support for its activities.

generation
jobs,

food

These contacts not

only provided additional calories, but also quite favorable
impressions.
Working for the Occupiers
Large-scale black market activities or prostitution were
not the only ways to become involved with Americans.

In

spite of negative feelings which a considerable number of
Nurembergers seemed to harbor towards the occupiers, many
others, among them a large number of young people, did not
mind either officially earning their living by working for
the armed forces, or doing their share of dealing with the
occupiers on a much more

innocent,

if not always

417
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basis.

Getting a job with the occupiers was enormously

attractive because it meant that food would almost be sure to
be on the table.

According to a woman, at the time twenty

years old, nobody was concerned with furthering his career
after the war, but everybody had to fight for survival.

Her

husband took up a job as a janitor with the Army in 1946
which he kept for the next three years.1
Heiko Kistner, nineteen years old in 1946, also had to
look

for

employment

immediately

after

his

return

to

Nuremberg, because his father was still in an allied prison
camp.

Since he had worked for the Americans before,

decided to look for a job with them again.

he

Kistner slowly

worked his way up from dishwasher to waiter in an American
club.

When he applied for a job, he observed that Americans

handled everything in a much more casual manner than German
authorities.

Papers of the past of a candidate did not seem

to interest the soldiers in charge of hiring.

They employed

people based on their impressions and on the Germans' ability
to communicate in English.

Kistner never obtained official

release papers from the Army or from a prisoner of war camp,
for example, but the Americans never asked for them.

He soon

found a job in the Army's special services' entertainment
section.

Between 1946 and 1948 Kistner travelled with German

floorshows as master of ceremonies to units stationed across
northern

Bavaria

to

entertain

them.

He

was

not

only

•Mrs. H., personal interview, 1988; NCA C104 no. 2.
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responsible for arranging the shows, but also for the welfare
of

the

troupe.

According

to

him,

international, but rarely American.

the

artists

were

Since he only worked at

night, he was able to support his family and finish his
secondary

school education at the

employment with American troops

same time.

Kistner's

ended with the currency

reform of 1948.2
Kistner

also

learned an unexpected

lesson from the

Americans after American Military Police had arrested him for
illegal possession of foreign currency and brought him to the
American court.

When the judge entered the court, he stood

at attention until the judge asked him why he did not stand
at ease.

This remark made him aware of the deep roots the

training of the Hitler Youth and in the military had in him.
At that moment he decided to eliminate the Third Reich's
remaining influences on him.
Kistner recalled that he never got into close relations
with American soldiers.

He did have some friends with whom

he went on sightseeing tours around Nuremberg, but in general
he saw enough Americans doing his job.
distance from the Americans, because,

He maintained his
according to him, a

psychological barrier prevented him from seeking too much
contact with them.

After all they were the occupiers and the

Germans were the occupied.

Apart from that, working and

2Heiko Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994.
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going to school at the same time did not leave him much room
for other activities.3
Johannes Wahner also began to work for the Americans in
1946 at age seventeen.

He obtained a job with the Army

through the local Labor Office.

During the next years he did

a variety of jobs which ranged from packing and crating the
possessions of soldiers who returned home,

to handiwork.

Since he was living in one of the largest and poorest refugee
camps, he constantly was searching for something they might
be able to use.

He remembered that occasionally he had

"organized" things before, but when he started to have a
regular income he did not have to steal anymore.

According

to him, most of the time the Americans were very willing to
help him out anyway.

When he asked, for example, if he could

take home some wood from crates which the Americans were
discarding so he could heat his accommodations, he promptly
received a paper that he could do so.
one crate,

Instead of just the

however, the soldiers loaded one of their GMC

trucks with wood and took Wahner and his treasure home.
retained his job with the Army until the 1950s,

He

when he

joined the German border police forces.4
His

job did not only provide

Wahner with work

and

opportunities to organize valuable commodities for his family
and the refugee camp, but also enabled him to experience
3Heiko Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994.
“Johannes Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

421
American culture
parties,

firsthand.

According to

to which German employees

families also

were admitted,

were

him,

American

and their friends or
very popular.

For a

nominal fee one could indulge in unheard of quantities of
food,

but

also

American music,

could

mingle

and dance.

started in these events.

with

Americans,

Some personal

listen

to

relationships

Wahner remembered how he met a very

attractive African-American lady on one of these occasions.
They began to see each other more often.

The affair became

so serious that Wahner decided to introduce the lady to his
parents and began contemplating emigration to the United
States, obviously without being fully aware of the situation
he would have to deal with overseas.
While all of his friends envied him for going out with
a very attractive American lady, his parents displayed much
less enthusiasm for the affair.

Although his father,

a

carpenter, also had shortly worked for the Army, he did not
share his son's

attitude towards the occupiers.

Wahner

remembered that his father was quite embarrassed by pictures
of nudes in a bar which he helped to furnish for GIs.

He

became suspicious about American morality in general, but the
deciding factor for him was the color the girlfriend's skin.
Going out with a black woman was too much

for Wahner's

parents who, according to him, were unable to overcome their
deeply rooted racial prejudices.

Left with the choice of

losing his family or ending the relationship, he opted for
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the latter.

Fifty years later Wahner still regretted the way

this encounter had ended.5
Germans who were able to play an instrument also had a
good

chance

occupiers.

of

finding

employment

and

food

with

the

Hanns Bader and H. Wisura, seventeen and nineteen

years old in 1946, began earning a living playing jazz and
swing music for the occupiers.

Since sheet music was not

available and the Nazis had outlawed jazz as "degenerate,"
listening to the latest songs on the American Forces Network
became vital for the musicians' success.
played the piano as a soloist,

Wisura successfully

whereas Bader was one of

thousands of young men who joined one of the many jazz and
swing bands in the Nuremberg area and throughout the American
zone.

Playing this new music was more than simply earning a

living.

Bader began to collect swing and jazz records and

made the music a lifelong hobby.6
Bader was not alone in this passion.

Ironically, the

Germans got to know the light and easygoing music of Glenn
Miller

and

Benny

Goodman

as

well

as

jazz

and

George

Gershwin's compositions at a difficult time and when the
American audience actually had passed on to something new.

5Johann Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995.
SH. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995; Hanns
Bader, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994; see also "Joe in der
Baby-Band: Musiker spielte urn Zigaretten und Kaffee," [Joe in
the Baby-Band: Musician Played for Cigarettes and Coffee]
Triimmerjahre: 38; "Begeisterung uber Glenn Millers Sound,"
[Enthusiasm About Glenn Miller's Sound] Wiederaufbau: 30.
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Nevertheless this new style of music became an immediate and
long lasting success in the American zone of occupation.
helped to

disseminate

the

new

music

and

seems

attracted more German than American listeners.
fans

soon

opened

their

own

club

which

to

AFN
have

Serious Jazz

featured

live

entertainment and long jam sessions of German and American
musicians, many of whom were GIs.7
Even those who would not tune in to the American radio
station got their share of the new music.

The "Ten of the

Week," which brought almost exclusively American songs from
1946 on, became one of the most popular programs for young
people on the German radio station in Munich.

In spite of

the paper shortage the station received about 1200 letters
7Hanns Bader, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994; Heiko
Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994. Just like Bader,
Kistner became a serious collector of Jazz records. See also
"Joe in der Baby-Band: Musiker spielte urn Zigaretten und
Kaffee," [Joe in the Baby-Band: Musician Played for
Cigarettes and Coffee] Triimmerjahre: 38; "Begeisterung iiber
Glenn Millers Sound," [Enthusiasm About Glenn Miller's Sound]
Wiederaufbauz 30.
One of my father's (born in 1931) most
prized possessions are two sets of sheet music printed for
the United States Army with Gershwin and other American
contemporaries.
Like so many others of his age group, he
thoroughly enjoys Glenn Miller and Big Band Music. Winfried
Bliimel reported that friends who worked in the Bavarian Radio
Studios in Munich had told him that AFN received more fan
mail from Germans than from Americans (Winfried Bliimel,
personal interview, 28 July 1994). See also Werner Maar, Die
Jugendarbeit der U.S.-Army nach dem Kriege in Niirnberg
(Nuremberg: Pentalog, 1995), 55-56. Maar, apparently himself
one of the former members of the German-American Youth Club
in Nuremberg, provides an insightful, entertaining, and
provocative account of the times.
See also Egon Fein,
Niirnberg in den SOern: Die Stadt in stiirmischen Aufbaujahren
der Nachkriegszeit. Geschichte, Geschichten, Anekdoten und
400 Bilder (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: Verlag Niirnberger Presse,
1995) 234-35.
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each month, many of them requesting particular songs.

An

OMGUS survey found in December 1947 that about 70% of all
young people

listened to the radio.

Under 10% of those

between ten and seventeen years of age listened to the news,
but 57% listened to music which was not considered to be
serious.

An additional 37% declared that they listened to

school and youth programs which undoubtedly also included
broadcasts such as "Ten of the Week."

78% of those between

eighteen and twenty-five listened to the non-serious section
of

the

German

radio

music

scene

as

well.

Since

the

broadcasting landscape in Germany did not have much variety
to offer, it is reasonable to assume that a good sized part
of the light music listeners tuned in to AFN or programs such
as the "Ten of the Week" which proved to be popular all over
Europe.

The OMGUS Radio Control Branch reported that the

program had fans in Great Britain, Switzerland, Norway and
Holland.

According to one lady in Nuremberg, the new music

simply went "into your legs."8
AFN was probably the most popular radio station in the
American zone and West Berlin for young people.
just

provide

the

latest

music

but

also

entirely new way of using the radio.

It did not

represented
Winfried

an

Bliimel,

8Marga Guthmann, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1994; Radio
Control Branch, OMBGY to ICD, Monthly After-Action Report, 130 Nov. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Historical Reports, Box
56, 10/66-1/2; the survey is in OMGUS, ICD Opinion Surveys,
Report No. 99, 5 Mar. 1948: 12, 16; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID
Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/13.
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fourteen years old in 1946, for example, became fascinated
with the way American disc jockeys were able to communicate.
According to him, the Germans still made radio news an affair
of state, while the Americans provided news and information
in a much more relaxed, but no less credible manner.

Bliimel

felt that AFN often was able to reach its listeners in ways
unthinkable in German programs.

He recalled that one night

he was listening to AFN in bed when he suddenly heard a
serious voice asking "are you smoking in bed?" and alerting
its listeners to the dangers of doing so.

Since Bliimel had

a lit cigarette in his hand exactly at that time, the message
got immediately through.

AFN remained his and many others'

favorite radio station well into the sixties, when German and
other European broadcasters began to introduce programs which
emulated the American example.9
Wisura's job as musician was not his only source of
income from the occupiers.
his own business.

It also enabled him to initiate

Like many other people, he became involved

in illegal activities with the occupiers in order to survive.
Alcoholic beverages seemed to be an especially attractive
field of trade.

Kistner was able to obtain the gasoline he

Vinfried Bliimel, personal interview, 28 July 1994; H.
Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994; "Radio liefert
Lebensgefiihl,"
[Radio
Provides
a
Feeling
for
Life]
Wiederaufbau: 26; Gerd Walther, "Morgens anti-Vietnam, abends
AFN: Die Geschichte des amerikanischen Soldatensenders,"
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kultur im GroBraum Niirnberg, Fiirth,
Erlangen, Schwabach, eds., Facing America, Ein Mosaik: Texte,
Fakten, Meinungen (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: Plarrer Verlag,
1992) 130-131; see also Maar 23.
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needed

to

return

schnapps.

to

Nuremberg

through

his

trade

with

Wisura had to adapt to different tastes to become

successful.

Americans did not

like the high percentage

schnapps distilled from fruit he obtained, so he diluted his
raw material with water, colored it with sugar caramel and
sold

it

as

cognac

in

appropriately

Apparently his product was popular.

labelled

bottles.

Wisura recalled that one

of his best costumers was a member of a Military Police unit.
His neighbors soon got used to the regular appearance of an
MP in full uniform mounted on his heavy motorcycle who came
to refuel at Wisura's house.10
In 1951 Wisura exchanged the work at the piano with a
job in the photo laboratory of an American air base.

He

recalled that the sergeant in charge of the facility did not
ask for any papers, but rather wanted to see if Wisura would
be able to do the job.

Soon, the he did not just develop

films, but also took photos for the Air Force.

After hours

he was often invited to American parties and remembered well
that the sergeant had no problem entrusting him with his new
American car to bring intoxicated guests home.11
Wisura stayed on the air base until Washington returned
it to the new German Luftwaffe in the late 1950s.

Although

10H. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994. Maar (24)
and Kistner (personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994) stated that
this kind of activities was by no means exceptional in
Nuremberg.
nH. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994.
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the Germans wanted him to continue his work, he was highly
disillusioned with their behavior and with the new atmosphere
on the base.

While the American sergeant had run the entire

photo laboratory in a rather informal but very efficient
manner,

the Germans

introduced
environment.

a

needed an officer

very

authoritarian

for the task who

and

inflexible

work

Even worse, Wisura witnessed that the German

air men developed an attitude towards their American partners
which he found objectionable.

He recalled that the Americans

cordially received the first Germans who arrived at the base
to prepare the takeover.

They were invited to the clubs and

even to the homes of their allies, and the German soldiers,
outcasts just a few years earlier, were grateful.

As soon as

the new German Luftwaffe was in control of the base, however,
the remaining Americans had to bear the brunt of a reemerging
self-confidence and arrogance which Wisura could not accept.
According to him, the German air men at the base were aloof
and did not even allow American officers in their clubs.
Wisura remembered that the U.S. Air Force officers who were
treated in such a way began to wonder if American policy
makers

had

rearmament.

not

made

a

serious

mistake

in

permitting

Wisura preferred to leave such an environment

and looked for work elsewhere.12
During the 1940s Hans Eckstein also

at times had a

commodity available which he could convert into American
l2H. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994.
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cigarettes.

The prosecutor in one of the war crimes trials

in Nuremberg ordered him to appear repeatedly at his office
to provide him with information about the situation in the
factories

during

the

Third

Reich.

To

get

to

the

International Military Tribunal (IMT) building at the other
end of the city, the company provided Eckstein with a car.
When he was returning to the factory for the first time, he
gave GIs a ride who were stationed near his workplace.

To

his surprise the soldiers gave him packs of cigarettes, the
unofficial currency in the American zone, for his service.
From that moment on Eckstein never failed to take an American
soldier along, sometimes repeating his trips between the IMT
and the factory several times before going back to work.13
Not only men found employment with the American forces.
Two sisters who had just returned to the city also applied
for a job with the Americans in 1945.

Both started to work

in a Red Cross club for African-American soldiers.

They

quickly overcame their initial apprehensions when they found
out that the different culture and different behavior of
African-Americans did not in any way interfere with their
jobs.

Working for the occupiers not only meant that they got

additional calories and became acquainted with exotic drinks
such as Coca Cola, but, according to them, it also saved the
life of their mother who could not eat the German bread due
to a serious health problem.

The white bread from the club

13Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995.
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which the sisters were saving for her every day helped her
survive.

Both

continued

to

work

for

the Americans

in

different capacities when the club closed in 1947.14
Friedrich Voigt's wife also helped support the family by
working for the American forces.

According to him, she found

a job in the kitchen of a club next to the train station.
The work there enabled her to bring hamburgers and real
coffee home, which not only served as a welcome commodity,
but also as a precious exchange object.

Voigt recalled that

on occasion the women were allowed to bring their families
along and that there were special parties for the children.
A job with the Americans could lead to more extensive
contacts.

While working at the club, Voigt's wife also got

to know a GI whose parents had emigrated from Denmark to the
United States.
for

his

The Voigt family was able to provide a room

girl-friend

Lorraine.

who

had

followed

him

from

Alsace-

Johnny showed his appreciation by providing them

with many amenities.

They got corned beef and one time could

have a party with a fifty liter barrel of "real" beer which
a Nuremberg brewery made only for the occupiers.
continued
apartment.

even

after

Johnny

moved

into

The contact

a requisitioned

Voigt helped him repair the house's heating

system and in return Johnny kept him equipped with shoes as
well as blankets and thread which the Germans could transform

I4Liselotte Arnold, personal interview, 18 Aug.
Helga Stadtlander, personal interview, 15 Aug. 1995.
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into Bavarian costumes and coats.
the quality of the products.

Voigt was impressed with

He kept some of the thread for

almost fifty years.15
Working for the occupiers was by no means an isolated
phenomenon.
Army was
region.

During the first three years after the war the

one of the

largest employers

in the Nuremberg

In the period from October to December 1947, for

example, over 28,000 Germans worked for the American forces
stationed in and around the city.16
These numbers did not include jobs Germans were doing
for American soldiers on a private basis.

Many Nurembergers

began to do the laundry for American soldiers.
usually paid in cigarettes or food.

The GIs

Hans Wahner remembered

that many refugees were able to obtain additional calories in
this

way,

but

that

the

business

was

not

always

easy.

Occasionally GIs did not come up with their end of the
bargain.

It

is

interesting to note

that— according

to

Wahner— African-American troops had a reputation for never
cheating the Germans.

This might account in part for the

l5Friedrich Voigt, personal interview, 26 July 1994.
I6Headquarters, Nuremberg Military Post,
Quarterly
Operations, Fourth Quarter 1947, Section V - Logistical
Support; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box
118.
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increased

activities

German

authorities

noticed

around

African-American clubs.17
American Help
Marx and the city council did their utmost to carry the
city and its citizens through desperate times, but both the
administration and many Germans had to rely on the occupiers
for their survival.

Whenever the situation became serious,

Nuremberg

had

officials

Americans for help.

no

other way

but

to

appeal

to

During 1946 and 1947 Nuremberg's mayor

Levie repeatedly asked for assistance with the city's wood
cutting program.

In clear reference to the Army's disease

and unrest formula, Levie informed the commander of the local
infantry regiment that "15-20 big trucks with motor fuel" for
the transport of wood would be enough to avoid the outbreak
of epidemics.18
As we have seen, the Army usually complied with these
requests, but American trucks did not just transport wood.
Whenever the Nuremberg city administration was unable to
provide the necessary transport facilities, a call at the
local detachment was enough to send American trucks out to
secure supplies from the region.

In November 1946,

for

example, a shortage of tires had left 50 of the city's 90
17Johannes Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995; see
also "Nescafe als Lohn fur Englischunterricht," [Nescafe was
salary for English lessons] Triimmerjahre: 6.
18Mayor Levie to Colonel Williams, Commander, 26th Inf.,
Nuremberg-Fiirth enclave, 12 Sept. 1946; Niirnberg 1945-1949,
II, doc. 165c; see also docs. 165a, b, d.
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trucks immobilized.
over.

During the next weeks the Army took

Every day about a hundred trucks, "including drivers

and gasoline," went to the surrounding villages to pick up
the food the city needed.

When shipments were not yet ready,

the truck drivers did not hesitate to help with packing and
loading the

precious

commodities.

Mayor

Levie publicly

thanked the American authorities and tactical units for their
support.19
Young

people

found

that

American

vehicles

could

alleviate the public transport crisis in a more informal way.
Heinz Fiegl lived in a little town just out of Nuremberg
after the war.

Since public transport to the village was not

yet reopened, he had to find other means of transportation.
Luckily for him an American transport unit was stationed
nearby so that many trucks commuted between the city and
their base.

Fiegl remembered that he never had a problem

getting a ride back home, especially since this was a Black
unit and African-Americans tended to be more cooperative in
this respect than white GIs.20
Detachment B-211 also had to deal with requests which
were harder to fulfill.

In December 1947 the director of the

19"Bobby Milton holt Gemiise ab: Die Amerikaner helfen der
Bevolkerung, [Bobby Milton Picks up Vegetables: The Americans
Help the Population] NN, 20 Nov. 1946: 5; "Die Not muB
gebrochen werden!
Notprogramm 1946/47 beschlossen," [The
Misery Must Be Brought to an End!
Emergency Program for
1946/47 Passed] NN, 7 Dec. 1946: 7.
20Heinz Fiegl, personal interview, 6 July 1995.
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city food office described the situation of provisions to the
local Military Government detachment.

The severe drought

during the previous summer had made an already very poor
situation even worse.

According to the director, the city

did not even have enough potatoes to satisfy the need of
December.

People

had

not

seen

vegetables

for

months.

Basically all available foodstuffs were cut to the bare bone.
If American flour or grain would not arrive soon, there would
be serious problems by the end of January, he warned.

Beyond

that, only massive American supplies would be able to prevent
the impending catastrophe.21
It is not clear how American officials reacted to this
specific plea,

but their help was forthcoming.

young people were the first to benefit from it.

As usual
During the

summer of 1946 the city had initiated an emergency feeding
program for children who were getting dangerously close to
starvation.

The city's program only reached about 15% of the

school children but, according to Marx, 90% of them showed
signs of mainourishment.

In July the first help arrived.

Marx informed the city council about a feeding program for
children with American supplies.22 This private relief help
enabled the city to expand its program by October 1946 but it
was scheduled to last just two months.

Although it provided

21City councilman Glatthaar to MG Nuremberg,
1947; Nurnberg 1945-1949, II, doc. 162c.
^"Kinderspeisung," in minutes of welfare
meetings, 18, 25 July 1946; NCA C7/IX no. 1232.

18 Dec.
committee
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660,000 meals, the program was not large enough for improving
the situation significantly.
downward spiral.
the

program

Nevertheless it halted the

Of the 30,000 children who benefitted from

less

than

10%

lost

weight

and

about

20%

maintained their weight, but the 70% who gained weight only
showed a maximum increase of a little more than a pound.

To

make such a program work it would be necessary to carry it
out for a much longer time.23
By April 1947 much more substantial help was on the way.
Marx later reported gratefully how the American government
came to the rescue with former President Herbert Hoover's
plan.

In April the city dispatched sixty trucks to the port

of Bremen to pick up the first shipment of food for the
children.

From April through September

1947

all

school

children between six and eighteen years of age participated
in the program.

In spite of cuts during the following school

year, 85% of all children— about 47,000— still were able to
get additional calories at school.

In 1947/48 the Hoover

plan provided Nuremberg's children with more than twelve
million meals.24

^MG Detachment B-211, Intelligence Report, 18 Apr. 1947;
NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.
24|,Die Schulspeisung in Niirnberg," [The School Feeding
Program in Nuremberg] Councilman Dr. Marx to MG Ansbach, Mr.
Thomson, 1 June 1948: 1-2; Niirnberg 1945-49, II, doc. 182b;
for details on the transport see MG Detachment B-211,
Intelligence Report, 18 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det.
B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.
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Currency reform ended the worst crisis, but the American
plan remained in place until 1950.

By then the number of

recipients had dropped to 30,000 and the city administration
was

able

to

resources.

continue

the

feeding

with

its own

During the next two years the number of needy

children declined dramatically.
received

program

In 1951 only 13,500 students

additional meals at school,

dropped to 4,000.

by

1952

the number

During the next eight years the city only

provided a nutritious breakfast and subsidized milk sales at
schools.25
Many ordinary Nurembergers found ways to express their
opinions about the American food program.

The newspaper

printed a little girl's description of the first days of the
"Hoover Feeding" in her school in 1947.
all

children

in

her

class

were

very

additional meal they were about to get.

According to her,
excited

about the

The girl and her

fellow students enjoyed the variety and taste of the food,
above all

the chocolate they received.

When

the paper

printed a letter to the editor from a lady who complained
about the taste and the presentation of the food in her
neighborhood school, it got an immediate and overwhelmingly
positive reaction.

One mother wrote:

"I think that I speak

in the interest of many mothers when I say that it is about
time not to criticize in an ugly manner all the time.

^Barthel 73.
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this

case

the

American

state

really

tries

to

help

our

youth.1,26
Aid

from

private

organizations

attention in the local news.

also

received

much

The Niirnberger Nachrichten

reported in detail about the first shipment of food the AFSC
sent from New York

in March

1946.

In April

the press

informed its readers about the formation of CRALOG under the
headline "American Gifts for the US-Zone."

Throughout the

next years the newspaper updated its readers on the quantity
of CARE parcels

and other relief shipments.

When CARE

terminated the program fourteen years later,

Germans had

received nearly ten million CARE packages.27
In Nuremberg CARE parcels reached their recipients in
many different

ways.

American owned

factory,

The
for

families
example,

of

workers

were

of a

an

probably very

pleased when each of the workers found a CARE parcel at his
work place shortly before Christmas 1947 which the owner and
of the plant and workers of his American factories had sent.
In August

1948

Congressman

Louis

Warbington

arrived

at

26"Es schmeckt feini" [It Tastes Great!] NN, 3 May 1947:
5; "Klagen iiber Kinderspeisung," [Complaints About Child
Feeding Program] NN, 17 May 1947: 3; "Alle helfen mit,"
[Everybody Pitches in] NN, 4 Jun. 1947: 3; all of the
interviewees who were students at that time expressed their
gratitude for the additional calories of the Hoover program.
^"Quaker-Sendung fur die US Zone unterwegs," [Friends'
Shipment on its Way to US Zone]
NN, 30 Mar. 1946:
1;
"Amerikas Liebesgaben fiir
US Zone," [America's Gifts forUS
Zone] NN, 13 April 1946: 1; caption and photo, The Week in
Germany, 19 July 1996: 8.
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Nuremberg

with

population.

He

1,000
had

constituents in Ohio.

CARE

parcels

collected

for

50,000

the

suffering

Dollars

from

his

This was enough to provide eight of

the hardest hit cities

in the American

zone with

1,000

parcels, all of which included the addresses of the donors.
It is safe to assume that a considerable increase in mail to
Ohio took place during the following months.

Undoubtedly

some longer lasting exchanges of letters especially among
young people were the result, opening an avenue for widening
horizons on both sides of the Atlantic.28
In spite of all American efforts

the demand always

seemed to exceed relief shipments from the United States.
Throughout

1946

and

1947

the

headquarters

of

the

most

important Lutheran Church's relief organization in Bavaria,
the Innere Mission, was swamped with requests from Lutheran
kindergartens throughout the state who asked to be included
in

the

feeding

Americans.

program

it

was

administering

for

the

The Nuremberg office could only answer that not

enough was available for everyone and that especially the
rural areas would have to rely on their own resources.29
Tactical units as well as individuals also did their
share in offering relief to the needy.

In 1946 the Bavarian

28"CARE Paket auf dem Gabentisch,11 [CARE Parcel Under the
Christmas Tree] NN, 24 Dec. 1947: 5; “'Neighbors in Action:'
1000 Carepakete fur Niirnberg," [1,000 CARE Parcels for
Nuremberg] NN, 28 August 1948: 5.
29LCA Diakonisches Werk 1742, Schulspeisung.
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Ministry of the Interior informed the state's youth office
that American families living in Bavaria were planning to
present German
authorities

families

were

with Christmas presents.

advised

to

name

deserving

Local

orphanages,

refugee camps or kindergartens close to the American bases.
Nuremberg responded with a long list which the city sent
express

mail

to

Munich

with

names

and

addresses

of

kindergartens, refugee camps, the city's school for the blind
and hospitals.30
Nuremberg's children were not disappointed.

In December

the Ntirnberger Nachrichten reported on its special page for
young people
Claus."
about

that

GIs

were

"Diligent

Workers

for

Santa

In Nuremberg and Fiirth alone, Americans invited
10,000

parties.

children

for

the

first

time

to

Christmas

The soldiers were busy making presents for older

and younger people, but were also gathering candy and money
which they would invest in the much desired CARE parcels for
German

families.

American

parties

and

gifts

for

needy

children became a standard feature of Nuremberg's Christmas
preparations

during

the

next

decades,

although

their

importance diminished with the returning prosperity after
currency reform.31
30Bavarian State Ministry of the Interior to Land Youth
Office, 25 Oct. 1946; City of Nuremberg to Bavarian Ministry
of the Interior, 8 Nov. 1946; NCA C25 no. 479.
31»FleiBige Heifer des Weihnachtsmannes: Amerikanische
Soldaten sorgen fur strahlende Kinderaugen," [Diligent
Helpers of Santa Klaus: American Soldiers make Childrens'
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Tactical troops did not limit their efforts to Christmas
parties.

A GYA youth club sponsored by a unit stationed in

the city had an idea of providing support for undernourished
children of an orphanage and the soldiers put the plan to
action.

In March 1947 the unit set aside a building for the

care of ten orphans who not only received "donated food," but
also went through a special exercise program.

Army doctors

supervised the program which the soldiers expanded from ten
to twenty children and reported "excellent results."

As

usual, Military Government's policy makers needed some time
to catch up with the actions in the field, but by September
1947

headquarters

signalled that

it

was

not

opposed

to

welfare activities as long as the troops cooperated with
German authorities and provided "qualified personnel
liaison."

for

GYA personnel in Roth, a town in the vicinity of

Nuremberg, had no problems with the directive.

They not only

established a visiting program for young patients at the
local

hospital,

calories.

but also donated much

Interestingly,

the

page

on

needed
which

additional
the

paper

reported about the GYA activity also displayed an ad that
admonished German farmers to produce more milk in view of the
fact

that

Germans.32

Americans

were making

sacrifices

to

help

the

Even the children of the American families in

Eyes Shine] NN, 7 Dec. 1946; see also Maar 30-31.
32USFET, GYA Report for March 1947, 30 Apr. 1947; NA RG
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br. , Box 43, 10/44-1/9;
Memo, D. Sims, OMGUS Internal Affairs, 15 Sept. 1947; NA RG
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Nuremberg pitched in.

They enlisted the help of the German

Red Cross to organize an Easter party for young Nurembergers
in 1947.33
Escaping the Citv
American support became not just important for obtaining
food, but also was crucial for assuring the success of German
summer camps.
with

The Nuremberg Military Post cooperated closely

Detachment

B-211

in this

support from headquarters.

venture

Directives

and

enjoyed

in 1947

full

and 1948

instructed military post commanders in the American zone and
Berlin to render all possible help to German youth groups
with personnel, transportation and supplies.
sponsor

their

own

camps

if

they

did

not

Units could
find

German

organizers.34
With Army support the Nuremberg Youth Committee became
the city's largest sponsor of youth camps.

In 1947 the

Nuremberg GYA officer received 100 tons of camping material

260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br. , Box 42, 10/44-1/4;
'•GYA betreut kranke Kinder in Roth," [GYA Takes Care of Sick
Children in Roth] NN, 3 Mar. 1948: 3.
33Signal Corps Photo, 28 Mar. 1947; NA RG 111 Still Photo
Collection, U.S. Army Signal Corps [hereinafter SC] 19411954, Box 131, 28 30 15. All Signal Corps Photos not only
provide visual evidence but also have detailed information
about the captured events on the reverse side.
^[EUCOM] Summer Camp Bulletin No. I [early 1947]; NA RG
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2;
Directive from EUCOM to: All Theater Commanders, 13 Apr.
1948, subject: Army Assistance to German Youth Activities,
Summer Camping Programs; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
Education Br., Box 128, 5/294-1/16.
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which he turned over to the youth committee.

All equipment

initially

came

or

surplus.

The equipment was incomplete, arrived late, and

from

captured

enemy stocks

from Army

sometimes was in a sorry state, but the Army provided the
materials at no cost.

since the German corporation which

handled the released materials had come under harsh criticism
for overcharging youth organizations for the equipment they
needed and

refused

to

sell

any

more material

to

youth

organizations in 1948, EUCOM drafted an extensive list of
Army materials it wanted to distribute among German groups
before they would be released to the German economy.
60,000 tents,

Over

18,000 cooking stoves and more than 600,000

sleeping bags were slated for the 1948 summer program in the
American zone and Berlin.

Headquarters also "encouraged”

post commanders "to authorize the loan of unit expendable or
non-expendable supplies
programs."

for assistance to summer camping

As a result the big American troop tents as well

as smaller versions became an indispensable part of every
German youth camp and were deeply appreciated.

Germans

cleaned their drinking water with American tablets, acquired
field kitchens and the necessary fuel for them,

and they

received food from American stocks, but even this source
could not satisfy all German wishes.
Government detachment

The local Military

had to deny a Lutheran

reverend's
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request for an entire field kitchen he wanted for his rather
small Christian boy scout group.35
Occasionally it took the experience of those who had
been exposed to American culture before to use American
utensils correctly.

One reverend reported that it would take

time for young people to learn to construct their camp with
the American equipment.

Young people who camped with Willy

Gensmantel did not have these problems, since his internment
in the United States had introduced him to everything they
saw for the first time.

He not only helped them with the

construction of their tents, but also made sure that they
properly used previously unknown products.

Food was one of

the essentials for the summer camps, but the Army also made
sure that boys and girls took care of hygiene by providing
them with soap, toothpaste, tooth brushes, and other items.
Since all of them had English labels,
inevitable.

some mishaps were

In one camp a boy used tanning lotion as shaving

35[EUCOM] Summer Camp Bulletin No. I [early 1947]; NA RG
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2;
Selsor to OMGBY, 4 Aug. 1947; OMGBY to Selsor, 12 Aug. 1947;
NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 37, 10/432/2; EUCOM, memorandum, subject: Army Surplus Purchased by
Germans, 26 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/17; Directive from EUCOM to:
All Theater Commanders,
13 Apr.
1948,
subject:
Army
Assistance to German Youth Activities, Summer Camping
Programs; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br.,
Box 128, 5/294-1/16; Willy ProlB, personal interview, 4 Aug.
1994; Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995;
Karl Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 Aug. 1995; Hans
Wiesner to Dollinger, C[hristliche] P[fadfinder], Sommerlager
Bischhofsgriin,
23.-27.5.47;
Pastor
Dollinger
to
MG,
Nuremberg, 27 July 1946; MG, Property Control, Nuremberg, to
Dollinger, 6 Aug. 1946; LCA Personen CLXV Dollinger 10, 16.
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creme, much to the delight of his comrades.

Children in a

trade union camp thought that American toothpaste was mint
candy and ate it instead of brushing their teeth.

It took

Gensmantel some time to set the matter straight.36
Americans also tried to alleviate the lack of facilities
for youth organizations.
Trade Union Youth,

The local youth committee, Falcons,

and many other groups used facilities

requisitioned by the Army for youth or sports activities
without

any

charges.

When

Willy

Gensmantel

needed

a

gymnasium for his sports club in neighboring Furth, he found
an understanding sergeant in charge of youth activities who
secured the necessary facilities from the local unit.37
Mark
Army's

Selsor,

GYA

the officer in charge of the American

program

in Nuremberg,

actively

took

part

in

decorating the bunker the city had handed over to youth and
successfully intervened with his superiors on behalf of the
Nuremberg youth groups when the Army was going to destroy the

36Hans Wiesner to Dollinger, C[ristliche] P[fadfinder],
Bischhofsgriin, Pfingstlager, 23.-27.5.47; LCA Personen CLXV
Dollinger 16; OMGBY, Det. B-211, Quarterly Historical Report,
20 Oct. 1947, Chapter VIII: 8; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B211, Box 1425, 9/124-1/6; "Die Besten Witze sind die
unfreiwilligen: Die verkannte Fettcreme, [The Best Jokes are
Involuntary: Tanning Creme was not Recognized] The Young
World: A Two Language Information Sheet of the Armed Forces
Assistance Program to German Youth Activities for Nurnberg
Military Post [hereinafter cited as YW], vol. 4, no. 10, Oct.
1950: 6; Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
37Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
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bunker

just

shortly before

its

official

inauguration

in

1948.38
Youth groups desperately needed equipment for their
activities and once more the Army provided help.

Skis,

backpacks and some sports equipment came from captured enemy
stocks,

balls and uniforms from American surplus,

but in

spite of pooling all these resources the Nuremberg Post never
had enough equipment to satisfy the enormous demand.39
Army trucks remained the only reliable and available
means of transport to and from summer camps as well as for
weekend trips and picnics for young people throughout the
postwar

years.

The

Germans

were

impressed

with

the

willingness of many GIs to sacrifice their spare time and
drive them wherever they needed to go,
lasted

longer

occupation.

than

a

day

and

led

to

even if the trip
other

zones

of

Many of them not only drove the trucks, but also

shared their rations or even brought extra food along for the
journey.40

38See above, chapter VIII; for Selsor and GYA see below,
chapter X.
39,,Eine Bitte der NN," [NN Asks for a Favor] NN, 9 Nov.
1946: 4. The lack of equipment was a constant complaint of
local GYA centers to Major Selsor which he reinforced and
sent to headquarters. See, for example, Nuremberg Military
Post, GYA Quarterly Report for First Quarter 1948; NA RG 338
Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 124.
40Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995;
Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995; Willy ProlB,
personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994.
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Since many African-American GIs belonged to transport
units, they did a considerable part of the driving.
from their

Apart

apparently friendlier disposition towards the

Germans, they may have had deeper motives than simply good
will for their volunteer jobs.

Karl Schmidbauer recalled

that his youth group always had one specific driver whose all
black unit was fittingly stationed in the former SS quarters
near

the

Nazi

party

rally grounds.

This GI

took

them

wherever they wanted to go as long as a blond and blue-eyed
German girl sat next to him while he was driving.

If the

Germans were unable to come up with a girl, he refused to
drive.

Schmidbauer thought that this behavior was noteworthy

because the soldier never made any advances to the girls who
accompanied him in this way.

For the German this behavior

was not more than an amusing episode, but the soldier may
well

have

undertaken

desegregating

his

his

own

first

world,

successful

apart

from

attempt
getting

at
the

satisfaction of being able to demand the presence of good
looking female company.41
Initially only those youth groups whose members had
personal contacts to a local unit received the transport they
needed,

but Major Selsor made sure that organizations who

were not able to arrange for their own transportation with
individual units also came to enjoy the benefits of American
trucks.

Selsor used an average of more than two thousand

4,Karl Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 Aug. 1995.
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gallons

of

gasoline

per

month

for

these

additional

services.42
Re-education Continues
While local detachments and units usually tried their
best to help the Germans with their material plight, they
often were hard pressed to satisfy the desire of some Germans
to find out more about the United States and to learn from
the occupiers.
Nuremberg,

A young German secondary school teacher in

for example,

inquired with the

local American

authorities in October 1946, if it would not be possible to
carry the American

re-education work beyond

the highest

echelons:
[i]n our endeavor to guide our youth according to the
principles of democracy we regret very much that all
discussions so far have concerned only the deans of the
different high schools, while the teachers, especially
the younger ones, had no chance to exchange opinions and
receive first-hand information about American high
school education. I take the opportunity to assure the
MG officer in reference, that the teachers of Nurnberg's
high schools should appreciate with gratitude any
forthcoming meeting with American colleagues and
experts. We all certainly should be grateful to learn
about American conception of high school training and we
are convinced that we should profit greatly by such
discussions as they are already established in other
towns.43

42Helga Stadtlander, personal interivew, 15 Aug. 1995;
see also GYA Quarterly Report for the Third Quarter of 1948;
NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125.
43From Lewis Maussner, teacher at the high school
WolkernstraBe-Nurnberg to MG Niirnberg, Officer for Education,
24 Oct. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1415,
9/127-1/15.
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In his reply Klise could only inform the teacher that his
proposal

"contains

merit,"

but

that

the

staff

of

his

detachment had been reduced so much that the only education
officers on duty were in Bavarian headquarters in Munich.44
The more progressive teachers in Nuremberg had to wait
another year until they were able to satisfy their curiosity
and

to

engage

grassroots.

in

discussions

In October

1947

with

OMGUS

Americans
opened

an

at

the

Education

Service Center in the city to accommodate the needs of the
teachers.

The centers actually document that Americans from

the start pursued their goals on different levels in this
field.

While in Bavaria the Kulturkampf between the German

ministries and the American authorities was still raging,
some OMGUS educators obviously had come to the conclusion
that

in

the

long

term

persuasion

and

discussion

with

progressive teachers might do more for their goals than a
rather hopeless fight with an entrenched Bavarian Minister of
Cultural Affairs.
in

the

classrooms

They also realized that teacher behavior
might

be

just

as

important

for

the

democratization process as administrative reform.45
To support their new grassroots approach of persuasion
instead of directives the Americans needed to provide German
educators with the means to obtain access to the latest

^C. Klise, Director Det. B-211 to Lewis Maussner, 8 Nov.
1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1415, 9/127-1/15.
45Muller 134-138.
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literature and publications in their profession.

Initially

Americans had opened textbooks centers in 1946 to help with
the production of
chauvinistic
American

school books without militaristic

contents

zone.

The

or

Nazi

centers

ideology

had American

and

throughout

the

directors

and

several German employees to assist teachers who visited the
centers.

Nuremberg was one of the first eight cities in

which OMGUS opened centers in 1947.

All of them were well

equipped with literature, but the German teachers who could
not

read

English

initially

found

the

choices

rather

limited.46
With their mission largely accomplished by 1948, the
centers expanded their activities during the following years
both under OMGUS and its successor, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Germany (HICOG).

They still supported the

writing and publication of democratically oriented textbooks
as well as curriculum revision, but the emphasis shifted to
personal education and help with practical problems that
would

aid teachers

in the classrooms.

The

centers

had

special translation programs to introduce German teachers to

“^Pilgert, Information Services 40-43. Pilgert does not
seem to have had reliable information on the opening dates of
the centers. According to him, the Nuremberg center did not
open until December 1948, for example.
The official
invitations for the opening ceremonies, however, establish
the date as 31 October 1947 (NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Branch, Box 41, 10/44-1/2).
Since the center
initially shared a building with the local Amerika Haus,
Pilgert may have mistaken the move to a different location
for the official opening date. See also Maar 59-60.
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the latest pedagogical trends, they promoted the publication
of periodicals, organized parent-teacher organizations, and
hosted their meetings.

They also tried to interest teachers

in the use of modern teaching aids, for example audio-visual
equipment.

Most

importantly,

the

centers

initiated

or

supported research in education, especially in the field of
student evaluation which Germans had virtually ignored up to
then.

It was not until

1951 that Americans decided to

consolidate the program,
fifteen

centers

institutions,
instructed
development

open.

such

Bavarian
of

but they still
HICOG

as

the

Munich

teachers

student

also

in

left six of the

supported
Test

new

German

Institute

which

the

administration

and

or

the

for

testing

Institute

International Educational Research in Wiesbaden, with funds,
visiting

experts

from

the

United

States,

and

exchange

programs for German researchers and educators.47
Just as all other institutions, the Nuremberg center
soon became involved in more than just writing textbooks or
developing
accept.

curricula

which

Bavarian

ministries

did

not

Nuremberg traditionally had been a center for the

more progressive currents among German educators.

Together

with the Americans they developed curricula for individual
subjects as well as for a reformed school system but much to
their

disappointment

they

were

unable

to

penetrate

the

defense of the Munich authorities and had to be content with
47Pilgert, Information Services 41-51.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

451
some

token

concessions

in 1950.

In

1955

the

Bavarian

ministry at least expanded elementary school education from
eight to nine years.48
Since the center had a dormitory that could accommodate
up to seventy persons, it was able to organize rather large
week-end or week-long workshops.

In 1948 the center hosted

a pedagogical conference in which educators discussed the
possibilities of the use of audio-visual equipment at school.
With American help they did not have to theorize long.

At

the end of the year OMGUS made one thousand radio receivers
available to German schools in the American zone, of which
Nuremberg received thirty-five.

OMGUS was aware that this

new medium would need some explaining and so it combined the
official delivery of the equipment with lectures by German
experts on the use of radio in the classroom.

A second

conference in 1949 resulted in the foundation of the German
Association for Education which began to publish its own
monthly magazine.

Since many members of the organization

48Barthel 66-68. Interestingly, Barthel does not mention
the American institute at all in his book, although there are
indications that the school office relied on American help.
Barthel describes the contribution of Nuremberg teachers to
the development of school books at length.
Much of this
undertaking undoubtedly took place in the textbook center
since it was the only place which was able to command any
resources, such as paper.
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also were in charge of educational radio programs, Nuremberg
became the center of research in this field.49
The center did not limit its activities to specialized
workshops.

One

of

its

main

functions

progressive ideas among German teachers.

was

to

promote

Young teachers from

Nuremberg and the surrounding region, for example, started
their own organization of “determined educators." The center
was their logical choice for meetings.

When the local Kreis

Youth Committee did not have a place to meet, it was welcome
to use the extensive facilities as well.50
The center apparently also organized presentations for
teachers by American educators.

In May 1948 Freemont Wirth,

who had been a professor at a teacher's college in Nashville,
Tennessee before he joined OMGUS headquarters

in Berlin,

visited Nuremberg to introduce vocational school teachers to
the concept of social studies.

According to Nuremberg's

school superintendent Raab, the teachers would have to pay
special attention to this new subject if they wanted to help
their students in becoming independent citizens instead of
the subjects they had been before.

As usual the American did

not waste any time with theoretical discourse, but rather
limited

his

informal

presentation

to

explaining

to

the

49Pilgert, Information Services 41-43, 51, 53; "Amerikanische Radios fur deutsche Schulen," [American Radios for
German Schools] NN, 20 Nov. 1948: 3.
S0Karl Ritter, personal interview, 26 July 1995; Willy
Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

453
Germans how schools in the United States incorporated social
studies in their curricula and gave some practical advice on
how to do something similar in Nuremberg.51
The

efforts

of

progressive

educators

such

as

chancellor of the Erlangen university, Eduard Brenner,

the
to

reintegrate German educators into the international teachers'
organization

met

with

success

in

1949.

In

March

the

organization extended an invitation to Bavarian educators,
represented by Otto Barthel in Nuremberg, and invited them
cordially

to

participate

in

its

upcoming

conference

in

Switzerland.52
While the first attempt by OMGUS to officially promote
re-education

through

German-American

cooperation

in

the

educational field needed some time to become a reality, it
had a successful predecessor long before American educators
in Berlin discovered this avenue.
J. Klier,

In the fall of 1946 Frank

Press Officer for Detachment B-211,

decided to

introduce the German public to the United States on his own
initiative.

He offered a course at the Nuremberg evening

school under the title "Discussion about America."
obviously was the right person for the job.

Klier

He had taught at

the university level before joining Military Government and
spoke excellent German.

Klier's course actually served three

51"Schule furs Leben,"
Life] NN, 8 May 1948: 5.

[Schooling for Mastering Your

52"Zusammenarbeit aufrichtig gewunscht,"
Earnestly Desired] NN, 16 Apr. 1949: 3.

[Cooperation
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purposes at the same time.

First he was able to still the

Germans' hunger for information from the outside world.

In

his lectures he also introduced democratic procedures

in

theory and practice by talking about several aspects of the
American political process.
was more subtle.

The third goal of his mission

Klier conducted the classes in a manner to

which his students had not been exposed previously.
of just lecturing,
topics,

and

to

Instead

he permitted them to chose their own

discuss

them

in

depth.

His

audience

apparently appreciated his informal teaching style which,
according to the local press, tore down any barrier which
might have existed between the American and his audience.
The

newspaper

praised

above

all

Klier's

openness,

his

willingness to be critical about his own country when he was
answering guestions, and his ability to acknowledge when he
did not know
contrast

to

something
the

which

attitude

and

apparently
behavior

stood
of

in

many

stark
German

professors.53
Klier continued his work at the evening school in 1947.
In six two-hour discussion groups in which about fifty people
participated, the Germans dealt with a wide range of topics.
Klier encouraged them to choose their own agenda.

According

to him, the topic which aroused most interest was emigration
to the United States.

The question whether Germany could

53"AG
1:'Diskussion viber Amerika',"
[Workshop
"Discussion about America"] NN, 3 Oct. 1946: 7.
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become an American style democracy also ranked high on the
Germans' interest scale, whereas the Germans relegated issues
of educational reform,

comparisons

between conditions of

specific groups in Germany and the United States, or finding
means of parliamentary self-help against maladministration,
to the bottom of the agenda.

Klier estimated that about 60%

of those attending were under thirty-five years old.
impressed with the

quality

of

the

presentations

He was
he had

assigned to the twenty-four to thirty-five year old group
"despite limited means of research."

Those over thirty-five

usually were outstanding in the discussion of any topic.
Klier noted that during the discussions the Germans did not
display bitterness and also did not resort to heckling or
baiting although "lively exchanges of opinion were frequent."
Klier

informed his

superiors

that his courses

found due

attention in the local and regional German newspapers, but
that his duties did not permit him to continue his courses at
the evening school during the current trimester.

He expected

to resume them in the fall of 1947.54
Some members of Detachment B-211 did not feel that the
higher echelons attached any importance to their re-education
efforts.

In his annual report for 1947/48 the officer in

^Report on Re-educational Work from Frank J. Klier,
Press Control Officer, Detachment B-211 to James A. Clark,
Chief ICD, OMGBY, 20 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det B211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/13; see also "Mr. Klier stellt
richtig," [Mr. Klier Clarifies] NN, 19 July 1947: 3.
The
paper reported that Klier's approach found a very receptive
and grateful German audience.
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charge noted that he and eight German workers had to take
care of a district with half a million people living in it.
According to him, only the understanding commander of the
Nuremberg Military Post allowed him to maintain even that
small number of personnel.

He wrote to Munich that the

complete lack of cooperation from headquarters did not leave
much room for going beyond the routine administrative tasks.
Even when his busy schedule permitted him occasionally to
include re-education in his agenda, he had a very hard time
getting the materials he needed, especially films, for his
activities in Nuremberg.

The author concluded that Military

Government had become "Penny-wise, but pound-foolish.1,55
Bringing America to Germany
In spite of this complaint of an overworked OMGUS field
officer, the situation was not as bleak as he painted it.
The ICD's information center program, for example,
seem to have these problems.

did not

As was the case with other

projects, OMGUS field officials developed the program.

They

collected Army surplus materials for their centers and held
regular

meetings

to

develop

a

consistent

policy,

to

coordinate the efforts of the different centers and reading
rooms, and to use their resources throughout the zone to the
largest possible extent.

Tensions between the Soviet Union

and the United States became apparent during the Berlin
55OMGBY, Det. B-211, Annual Historical Report, 1 July
1947 to 30 June 1948: 4-5; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211,
Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.
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crisis

in

1948

and seemed

to make

German

reorientation

towards Western ideals even more urgent than before.

By then

Information Control had established a sound system of "overt
education" in the American zone and in Berlin and was ready
for expansion.56
The program reached Nuremberg long before the Cold War
made its appearance.

In November 1946 the city got its own

American library which was located in the basement of the
building which housed Detachment B-211.57 Under the headline
"Books - Messengers of Peace,"

Germans

learned in their

newspaper that the American Congress had appropriated an
annual budget of $ 15,000

for the Nuremberg Information

Center which offered over two thousand books in three "nicely
furnished,

well heated rooms."

The article informed its

readers that patrons would be able to check out almost all of
the books without any charges.

The center's goal was to

inform Germans about the United States and the world and to
fill the gaps which Hitler's book burnings and the war had

56"The United States Information Centers:
General
Information," 17 Aug. 1946; OMGUS, Director of Information
Control, 3 Oct 1946, subject: agenda for USIC meeting in
Stuttgart; Subscription orders to various American newspapers
by the Frankfurt USIC, 7 Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD,
Information Centers and Exhibitions Br., Box 313, 5/314-3/10;
Maritta Hein-Kremer, Die amerikanische Kultur-offensive:
Grtindung und Entwicklung der Information Centers in
Westdeutschland und West-Berlin (1945-1955) (Cologne: Bohlau,
1996) provides the first and long overdue scholarly study on
the subject. Her book, however, was not yet available in the
United States when this dissertation was approved.
57For the roots of the program see above, pp. 280-82.
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opened

in German libraries.

In his opening speech Col.

McMahon, Chief of ICD, OMGBY, emphasized that he hoped that
especially young Germans would be able to become acquainted
with American literature, the United States in general, and
the world.

Interestingly,

the American dignitaries who

participated

in the opening presented their

speeches

German while mayor Levie responded in English.

in

The press

noted that the only drawback which would hopefully soon be
remedied was that most of the books were in English.58
Three months later the press revisited the Information
Center.

By then the reading rooms were stocked with three

thousand volumes and had much to offer to those who were
acquainted with some "basic understanding of the English
language."

Apart from American authors the users also could

find a selection of German writers whom the Nazis had banned.
1,200 people had taken advantage of the borrowing privileges
during the first three months, but, according to the paper,
many more frequented the "cozy reading rooms."

The choice of

books clearly indicated the Germans' desire to overcome the
isolation of the previous twelve years.

The vast majority of

the users wanted to learn as much as possible about other
countries and parts of the earth, but many tried to catch up
with the latest technological trends and advances as well.

58"Biicher - Boten des Friedens: Eine amerikanische
Bibliothek eroffnet [Books - Messengers of Peace: An American
Library Opens] NN, 16 Nov. 1946: 7; see also Pilgert,
Information Services 76.
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American magazines and newspapers also became the focus of
much attention.

The paper further reported that interested

Germans could participate in "free and open discussions"
about American literature with an American.

The journalists

learned from the reading room personnel that plans for a move
and an expansion were already underway.59
In line with ICD policy and in step with many other
cities, the Information Center grew considerably during the
next months.

Not even a year after its inauguration it

needed a new location.

In October 1947 the library moved to

a very representative villa close to the center of the city
and to the major hub of the city authority's public transit
system.

The

Americans

initially

used

12

rooms

building and also expanded their activities.

of

the

The center

sponsored discussion evenings and exhibitions from November
1947 on.

The number of volumes grew to over 4,600

and

monthly attendance rates went from about 1,000 at the old
location to well over 8,000 in December 1947.
patrons

also

designation:

had given
Amerika

the

Haus.

library
As with

its
all

The German

official
other

German

American

enterprises, the stage was set for a new take off in 1948.60
59"Blick in eine andere Welt: Starkes Interesse fiir das
US Information Center," [View Into Another World: Much
Interest for the US Information Center] NN, 22 Feb. 1947: 5.
^ilgert, Information Services 76; Report "Amerika Haus
Nurnberg," [June 1949]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ICD, Information
Centers Branch, Box 335, 5/319-3/3; "Die Umerziehung beginnt
in der Bibliothek: Das Amerikahaus sollte die Deutschen auf
dem Weg zur Wahrheit iiber die Welt fiihren - Gutbesuchte
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In January 1948 Patricia van Delden, the head of the
Exhibitions and Information Centers Branch of ICD, travelled
throughout Bavaria to evaluate the program in the state and
to make suggestions for its further development.

For the

Nuremberg region she noted that the Amerika Haus in the city
as well as the reading rooms in Ansbach, Bamberg, and Coburg,
were functioning very well with German personnel under the
local Military Government officers' supervision.

Neighboring

Erlangen had a facility which cooperated closely with the
university.

According to her, American employees, many of

whom were about to arrive, would strengthen the program if
Military

Government

would

be

willing

to

free

German

authorities from the task of having to provide rooms and
supplies.

For

more

efficient

operation

and

greater

attractiveness, van Delden recommended that all centers be
equipped uniformly and should have attractive light fixtures,
curtains

and

furniture.

Three

trailer

trucks

would

be

necessary to provide them with the necessary supplies, but
also to function as mobile libraries and information centers
that could reach out to villages and small communities which
otherwise would not have any access to American information.
Van Delden's report also reflected the growing tensions
between

the

United

States

and

the

Soviet

Union.

She

recommended that two more centers be opened in the immediate
Sparchkurse," [Re-education Begins in the Library: Amerika
Haus was Designed to Guide Germans on Their Way to the Truth
- Well Frequented Language Courses] Wiederaufbau: 15.
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future.

One of them, which would be located in Hof, was

particularly important, "because it is close to the Russian
line of demarcation."

Reorientation would have to counter an

additional totalitarian threat to democracy, this time in the
form of Stalinist socialism.61
The report found a warm reception.

In February 1948

headquarters not only authorized the two additional centers
van

Delden

had

asked

for,

but

also

complied

with

her

suggestions for revising the general policy statements.

The

Information Centers and Exhibitions Branch lost no time and
developed

operating

procedures

along

the

revised

policy

directives to ensure close cooperation and the best use of
the resources available in Germany, including American guest
speakers.62
61Interoffice Memorandum from Patricia van Delden, OMGUS,
ICD, Chief, Exhibitions & Information Centers Branch, to
Colonel Textor, Director, OMGUS, ICD, 30 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260
OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibitions Br., 313,
5/314-3/10.
“Memorandum from OMGUS, Office of the Military Governor,
to OMGUS Land Directors, subject: U.S. Information Centers,
U.S. Zone, Feb. 1948 (Draft Revision); Memorandum from Cecil
Headrick, IC Br., OMGUS, to Captain Chester S. Wright, Chief,
Exhibitions and Information Centers Br., OMGBY, subject:
distribution of films, 4 Feb. 1948; Memorandum from Patricia
van Delden, Chief, Exhibition and Information Centers Br.,
OMGUS, to Chiefs of Exhibition and Information Centers
Branches in the Land Detachments, the American zone of
occupation, subject: Exhibit Instructions to Information
Centers, 2 Feb. 1948; Memorandum from Patricia van Delden,
Chief, Exhibition and Information Centers Br., OMGUS, to
Chiefs of ICD in the Land detachments; subject: procurement
of German books with reorientation funds, 9 Feb. 1948. These
are just a few examples of a considerable number of new
policy directives and guidelines for the field operations
which van Delden and her staff developed between February and
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In Nuremberg the arrival of an
Amelia Horn,

energetic American,

as director of the Amerika Haus marked the

beginning of a new era.

During the next months the new

director considerably expanded the activities of the facility
and reached out to the surrounding region.

By 1949 Horn had

established ten reading rooms in the bigger communities of
Middle Franconia.

The list of employees grew from eleven

Germans in January 1948 to forty-two in December 1949.

Most

of them served as librarians.63
In spite of a persisting uncertainty of the future of
the Amerika Haus program and a lack of a specific budget
which currency reform aggravated even further, Horn managed
to renovate the new facilities and to bring the program to
life.

She was able to enlist the help of the local Military

Government detachments for her projects and also enjoyed the
support of the Nuremberg Military Post's commanding general.
Generally

the

detachments

found

suitable

reading rooms, often in their own buildings.

June 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD,
Exhibits Br., Box 313, 5/314-3/10.

locations

for

GYA as well as

Information Centers and

63Roster of indigenous employees of the Amerika Haus
Nuremberg, 12 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information
Centers and Exhibitions Br., Box 313, 5/318-3/18; USIC
Nuremberg, List of Active Personnel, [Dec. 1949]; NA RG 260
OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibitions Br., Box 326,
5/316-2/47.
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Military Government officials conducted at least some of
their activities in these rooms.64
Support from other American agencies in the field was
urgently

necessary

in

view

of

much

confusion

and

a

considerable lack of communication between the field agencies
and headquarters.

In

1948

the Amerika Haus

improved the quantity of its reading materials.

had vastly
Its patrons

were equally impressed with the facilities and the available
material.

Horn found that German patrons did not show any

interest in a considerable number of magazines which OMGUS
provided, but that many Nurembergers searched in vain for
scientific literature and magazines.

They seemed to be

available in the Munich Amerika Haus but not in Nuremberg,
although the city traditionally had been Bavaria's leading
industrial center and now looked to the Information Center to
catch up on recent technological information.65
“Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October
1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits
Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/11.
Horn never hesitated to turn to
higher authorities to have bills paid or to get some
uncooperative local Army official in line. See, for example,
Amelia Horn, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, OMGBY, FOD to OMGBY,
Munich, ICD, Exhibitions and Information Control Branch, 27
July 1948, subject: payment of bills for Amerika Haus and
Reading Rooms; Amelia Horn, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, OMGBY,
FOD to OMGBY, Munich, ICD, Exhibitions and Information
Control Branch, 1 Oct. 1948, subject: repair work for Amerika
Haus; NA RG 260 OMGUS ICD, Exhibitions and Information
Control Br., Box 313, 5/318-3/18.
“Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October
1948]; Amerika Haus Niirnberg, OMGBY, FOD, Area Niirnberg, to
C.S. Wright, Chief, Exhibitions and Information Centers Br.,
ICD, OMGBY, subject: monthly report for period ending 11 Feb.
1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

464
Obtaining reading materials was just a minor problem of
the operation.

Horn thought that the whole Amerika Haus

program should be much better organized.
her

superiors that the

She explained to

lack of funds and a

firm budget

prevented her from reaching out to the public and expanding
the program in a way she desired because she simply could not
pay the bills.

Apart from that, nobody seemed to be sure

about responsibilities.

In spite of Patricia van Delden's

efforts to provide the Information Center directors with
guidelines, her field officers felt that a clear cut policy
which defined and assigned responsibilities within OMGUS was
necessary.

Horn

thought

logistical

support

would

that

more

certainly

centralization
improve

the

and

program

because the local directors would not have to waste time on
the procurement of supplies and the classification of books.
In addition to that, she made clear to her superiors that she
would need more personnel for the very extensive operations
she felt were necessary to make the program a success.66
The OMGUS film program was a special case in point. In
February 1948 OMGUS headquarters issued a directive which
outlined in detail a new 16 mm re-education and reorientation
film program.

The directive determined exactly how many film

projectors would be available for each city and county and
Br., BOX 314, 5/314-3/11.
R eport of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October
1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits
Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/11.
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provided a list of all available films.
be aware of the instructions,

Horn did not seem to

although the Amerika Haus

obviously had received the projector it was supposed to get
and had employed a projectionist by June 1948.

The director

related to headquarters that Nuremberg had been fortunate in
obtaining documentary films for her program, but had had to
rely entirely on the resources and connections of local
personnel.

According to her, supply or distribution centers

had not shown any support in this field.

Horn stated that

she "would be very much interested in knowing who started the
film program,

how they expected it to function and what

happened to it, like "Topsy" it seemed to grow, I heard a lot
about it and nothing happened.

She would not have had to go

far to find out about the directive.
had received and

faithfully

distributing

paper

the

filed

within

The local detachment
it

the

apparently without
American

community.

Neither Ms. Horn nor the local GYA officer ever received a
copy of the directive

from James Barnett,

the Nuremberg

detachment's director.67
Horn would have been able to gather further information
from

the

local

newspaper

Niirnberger Nachrichten

as

well.

reported that

In

March

Military

1948

the

Government

67Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October
1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits
Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/11; OMGUS, Office of the Military
Governor, Berlin to Land Military governments in the American
Zone, 2 Feb. 1948, subject: distribution and use of re
education and reorientation 16 mm films and projectors; NA RG
260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1419, 9/126-3/8.
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would make

about

eleven

film projectors

hundred films about culture available.

with about

one

Above all schools,

churches, and the villages around Nuremberg would benefit
from the program.68
The

start was

difficult.

In

April

1948

Nuremberg

Military Government officials had one projector at their
disposal.

By December twenty projectors were available and

the

number

same

projectionists.
of

the

year

of

Germans

were

trained

as

full

time

It also took OMGUS officials until the end

to

allocate

the

necessary

an

adequate

supply

budget

for

the

program.69
Obtaining

another obstacle.

of

films

proved

to

be

ICD alerted its information centers to an

"immediate source", the Signal Corps Training Film Libraries
throughout the American zone.

Their films would certainly

complement the documentaries available to OMGUS so far.
this

way,

Germans

got

to

know

"A

Small

"Washington," or "A Suburban Family."

Town

in

In

USA,"

By the end of 1948

OMGUS was taking steps to reorganize film distribution and
overhaul

the

available material.

From

June

1949

field

“ "Hundert Kulturfilme kommen," [One Hundred Cultural
Films About to Arrive] NN, 3 Mar. 1948: 3.
69Memo James Barnett to OMGBY, 18 Mar. 1948; NA RG 260
OMGBY, FOD, Box 1419, 9/126-3/8; MG Det. B-211, Monthly
Report covering May 1948; MG Det. B-211, Annual Report of 7
Aug. 1948 for Period Covering July 1947 to June 30 1948; NA
RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2; OMGUS, E&CRD, Semi
Annual Report for Period Ending 31 Dec. 1948; NA RG 260
OMGBY, ID, Box 54, 10/130-2/5.
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detachments could order film packages for specific audiences
which included newsreels, documentaries, and entertainment
films.70
In
priority.
programs

Nuremberg

James

Barnett

made

young

people

his

His detachment began to show forty five-minute
to children.

Barnett also negotiated with the

Nuremberg school superintendent about bringing a projector
and movies to each school every two weeks.

Adults had to be

content with whatever time would be available, but as soon as
Barnett had enough projectors and material, he developed a
program for adults which included discussions of the movies
the

audience

emphasis,

as

had

seen.

long

as

Headquarters
the

showings

agreed
had

with
a

this

definite

reorientation mission and were accompanied by discussions or
presentations of the local Liaison and Security Officer.71
During the next years the film program became one of the
most

important pillars

of American reorientation policy.

Each projectionist toured the countryside,

introducing the

70ICD, Information
Centers
Br.
to
Directors
of
Information Centers, 19 Feb. 1948, subject: Army films
available to Information Centers; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ICD,
Information Centers Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/20;
OMGBY,
Reorientation Staff Unit, minutes of meetings, 30 Nov. 1948,
7 June 1949; OMGBY Reorientation Committee, minutes of
meeting, 16 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, CAD, Democratization
Br., BOX 112, 13/150-2/13.
7lMG
Det.
B-211,
From
James
Barnett,
Director,
Supplemental Intelligence Report, 24 Aug. 1948; NA RG 260
OMGBY, ICD, Information Centers Br., Box 312, 5/314-2/12;
OMGBY, minutes of Reorientation Staff Unit, 7 June 1949; NA
RG 260 OMGBY, CAD, Democratization Br., Box 112, 13/150-2/13.
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local population to American films.

A HICOG study revealed

that in some regions the American films were the first moving
pictures the people had ever seen.
high.

Usually turnout was very

Entire village populations attended shows in local

restaurants,

gymnasiums or even

in the

open

air.

USIC

produced a considerable number of movies on the functioning
of the democratic process, but documentaries about the United
States proved to be the most popular feature of the program.
HICOG spent almost one million dollars for these activities
in 1950 and 1952.

In that year it also decided to replace

the old and not very reliable projectors with new ones which
were

smaller,

easier

to

use,

and

had

a

better

sound

quality.72
HICOG was not content with bringing American films to
Germany and synchronizing them.

It continued the production

of the weekly newsreels and also produced many films in
Germany

which

addressed

specific

reorientation

issues,

especially the practical application of democratic principles
in many different situations ranging from the democratic
procedures in local government to elections in trade unions
or youth organizations.

Young people

learned about the

American student exchange program for Germany.

To teach them

more about youth work in the United States, OMGUS produced
^Pilgert, Information Service 61-76; memo from
Dept, of State, 11 Dec. 1950; memo from HICOG to
State, 19 Sept. 1951; NA RG 59 Decimal Files
511.62A5/12-1150, 511.62A5/9-1951; Franz Schmalz,
interview, 5 July 1994.

HICOG to
Dept, of
1950-54,
personal
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films

about

the

function

of

youth

centers,

progressive

schools, or community initiatives for more playgrounds.73
Attendance
impressive.

in

the

Nuremberg

area

were

An average of more than one hundred people came

to each show.
reorientation
Three years

numbers

In 1948 about 26,000 persons saw American
movies

every

later the

month

HICOG

throughout

Kreis

Resident

the

region.

Officer

for

Nuremberg reported that the film program for his area had
just registered its 500,000th visitor.74
The popularity of the program also made it an attractive
feature for private sponsors.

The German Shell Corporation,

for example, decided to make its name better known to the
rural areas of Northern Bavaria through its own film car.
The local GYA newspaper reported that the car would "stop at
every youth center and school" to show educational films.75
In Nuremberg many youth groups took advantage of the
program.
equipment,

After taking a course in handling the portable
youth

representatives

were

able

to

check

a

projector and films out of the Amerika Haus and show it to

^ISD Motion Picture Branch Monthly Report - November
1950; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 511.62A5/1-251.
74Det. B-211, Annual Report of 7 Aug. 1948 for Period
Covering 1 July 1947 to 30 June 1948; NA RG 260, OMGBY, FOD,
Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2; Det. B-211, Reorientation
Report (consolidated), 1-15 Oct. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD,
Headquarters, Box 333, 16/53-1/21; Office of the Land
Commissioner for Bavaria [hereinafter OLCB], E&CRD, monthly
report for March 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, FOD, Director, Box 2.
75Caption and photo, YW, vol. 4, no. 6, 2 June 1950: 8.
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their youth groups.

Horst Klaus, a trade union youth leader,

decided to take up the reorientation offer from the Americans
and make it part of his work in one of Nuremberg's factories.
He had developed a taste for American movies previously when
the GIs

stationed close to his home allowed children to

attend their unit's shows.

Thanks to his efforts management

agreed to grant apprentices part of their work time for
educational purposes.

Klaus obtained the necessary equipment

for showing movies from the Information Center.

To comply

with the education mission he would first show a documentary
about the work of trade unions in the United States or about
the function of the democratic process.

A second movie

invariably would deal with the culture or different regions
of the United States and other parts of the world.

According

to Klaus, the program was very popular with the apprentices
and served him well in his work for the trade unions.76
In line with traditional Military Government policy to
leave as much as possible to the Germans, HICOG officials
decided to turn the films and most of the projectors over to
the Germans from 1951 on.

HICOG field officials carried

their task out, but also let headquarters know that they did

76OLCB, District III Report: HILITES for January 1951; NA
RG 466 OLCB, FOD, Director, Box 2; Horst Klaus, personal
interview, 11 Aug. 1994.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

471
not

understand

why HICOG was

cutting

such a successful

program.77
The

film

program

led

to

another

interesting

reorientation feature for young people in the American zone.
In 1950

the Nuremberg Resident Officer began to develop

quizzes which followed the films.

Young Germans reacted

enthusiastically to this new and fun way to expand their
horizons.

GYA groups and the German-American Youth Club

organized their own quiz bowls and HICOG introduced a zonewide

competition.

standard

feature

By
in

1953

many

these
of

contests had become

Nuremberg's

youth

a

groups'

activities.78
In 1948, however, these successes seemed to be far away.
The

information

centers

program

support from higher echelons.

still

needed

to

secure

Horn was not the only one to

^OLCB, Public Affairs Division [hereinafter PAD],
monthly reports, June 1951, Sept. 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, PAD,
Box 1.
78Harald Lund, Kreis Resident Officer for District III,
to Kenneth E. van Buskirk, Chief, FOD, OLCB, 20 Sept. 1950;
NA RG 466 OLCB, FOD, District Land Office Activity Reports,
1950-52; District III Hilites for January 1951; NA RG 466
OLCB, "EEI" Reports, 1950-51. The local newspaper reflected
the success of the idea: see, for example, "Quiz-Abend beim
KJR: 13 Verfassungen in der Bundesrepublik," [Quiz Bowl at
the Kreis Youth Ring: 13 Constitutions in the Federal
Republic] NN, 3 Mar. 1951: 13; "Die besten 'Quizer' sind
ermittelt: Frankische Endausscheidungen der HICOG-Quizveranstaltungen - Antwort in 15 Sekunden," [The Best
"Quizzers" Were Found: Finals of HICOG Quiz Bowls in
Franconia - Answer in 15 Seconds] NN, 14 Dec. 1951: 9;
"Betriebsjugend lost Ratsel: Sechs GroBfirmen treten in
Wettstreit," [Youth in Factories Solves Riddles: Six Major
Firms to Compete] NN, 18 Mar. 1953: 9.
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At the Army Youth Center #2, Nurnberg, Germany, a quiz was
held between German members of the German-American Youth Club
of Nurnberg [sic] and Dependents of the Nurnberg-Furth [sic]
Military Post. The Quiz was sponsored by the youth club as
part of their cultural program. The final score of the quiz
was: the U.S. dependents; 350; the German youth: 395._____
17. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 299412, Dec. 1947.
criticize procedures within Military Government.

Amerika

Haus directors throughout Bavaria had similar grievances.
Local Liaison and Security Officers were equally frustrated
by the

lack of coordination between headquarters and the

field.

Coburg and the surrounding region were immediate

neighbors of the Soviet zone of occupation.

In view of the

mounting tensions with the Soviets and Patricia van Delden's
awareness

of the

importance

of this

region

in American

reorientation efforts,

the frustration of the local field

officer is surprising.

In October 1948 he reported about the

condition of the Coburg Amerika Haus program and its attached
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reading rooms.
status

Coburg had just recently been upgraded to the

of Amerika Haus.

problem was

the

The detachment's most pressing

lack of personnel.

In the town three

employees were running the facility at the time.
noted

that he would have

no

problems

The officer

finding qualified

personnel "if and when the proposed allocation of employees
for this Amerika Haus is authorized."

Until that moment it

would be "necessary to beg, borrow or steal assistance from
every possible source."
reading

room

border.

The situation was even worse for the

in Kronach which was

The

two employees there

Special Branch.

equally

close to the

actually were paid by

Since the branch was being phased out, they

would be terminated by the end of the month.

While the

detachment had supplies and space available for a number of
additional

reading

rooms,

it

had

no

employees

disposition to run them in October 1948.
problems in Coburg were resolved.

at

its

Apparently the

In 1950 the town still had

its own Amerika Haus, but plans were underway to consolidate
American activities.

Coburg became a branch of the larger

institution in Hof.79
In

spite

of

all

obstacles,

Horn

transformed

the

Nuremberg Amerika Haus into a vibrant cultural center which
tried

to

offer

something

for

everybody

and

enjoyed

79Lawson R. Beard, OMGBY, FOD, Area Coburg to OMGBY,
Office of the Land Director, Munich, 12 Oct. 1948; NA RG 260
OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibition Br., Box 313,
5/318-3/18; Pilgert, Information Services 38, 76.
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considerable success.

By September 1948 the twenty-five

employees of the Information Center were busy.

They had

issued over 7,000 readers cards to people who took advantage
of the open shelf system— a new feature in Germany— and had
a home to enjoy the literature.

4,000 of the almost 18,000

available volumes were checked out during that month.

7,200

people came to the library during September to study books or
to read magazines.

The center offered 124 English courses in

which more than 2,500 people participated.
these

courses

was

participation.

so

great

Twenty-one

1,800 participants.
880 listeners.

that

The demand for

teachers

discussion

had

evenings

to

limit

attracted

Concerts and recorded music hours found

Lack of suitable films and their low quality

did not seem to bother German audiences.

The center's film

hour

and

was

usually

an

extremely

enjoyed

popular

capacity

feature

audiences.

In

performances

September

twenty-four performances for adults netted 2,400 people.

1948
An

additional 1,200 visitors came to see an exhibition at the
center.

Over 20,000 Nurembergers had found their way to the

Amerika Haus during that month.80
During the next months the Center was able to increase
these numbers considerably.

In February 1949 almost 30,000

people used the facilities.

Half of them came to read or

80Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October
1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits
Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/11; "Reges Leben im Amerika Haus,"
[Lively Activities in Amerika Haus] NN, 21 Feb. 1948: 5.
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borrow books, the other half took advantage of the English
courses, listened to American and German lecturers on topics
ranging from American authors to Psycho-Analysis.

The film

program introduced Germans to Ireland, the British Empire,
Mexico, and life in the United States.

Woody Woodpecker and

Mickey Mouse entertained the children.

The Amerika Haus also

increasingly developed into a center of the city's cultural
life.

Various classical music groups performed works by

modern American and German composers, but also included the
traditional works by Bach, Handel, Mozart, Ravel, Brahms, and
Chopin in their programs.

Even in this realm, however, the

staff did not forget its reorientation mission.

Discussions

about the music always followed the performances.81
Reading

rooms

were

in no

position

to make

similar

programs available to their patrons, but almost all of them
offered more than

just library services

from the start.

English courses and story times for children were the most
popular choices.

One year after the reading rooms had opened

their doors they had consolidated their activities.

Ansbach,

Middle

west

Franconia's

capital

about

thirty

miles

of

Nuremberg, for example, had about 33,000 inhabitants at the
time.

In August 1949 two employees were in charge of the

81Amerika Haus Nurnberg, OMGBY, OD, Area Nurnberg to Mr.
C.S. Wright jr., Chief, Exhibitions and Information Centers
Br., Information Services Division [hereinafter ISD], OMGBY,
Munich, subject: monthly report for period ending 11 Feb.
1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits
Br., BOX 314, 5/314-3/11.
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local

reading

room

which

was

centrally

located.

1220

registered borrowers could choose from 628 German titles and
5,100 English books.

The library had 390 books in German and

3,406 books in English available for young people.
traditionally

was

the

slowest

time

of

the

year,

nevertheless 2,160 people visited the reading room.
Ansbach

was

largely

an

administrative

Summer

center,

but

Although
technical

magazines were among the three most popular items, but the
people

who

literature.

came

were

not

just

interested

in

American

A considerable number of users wanted to find

out more about the American Constitution.
management was another popular topic.

American office

Significantly, over

half of the patrons at the time were juveniles who took
advantage of the library's large youth section.

The reading

room also offered a special children's hour which introduced
the

youngest patrons to

translated American

stories

and

poems.82
82Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October
1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits
Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/11; library data report, U.S. Reading
Room Ansbach, attached to US Information Center Nuernberg,
month of August-September 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD,
Information Centers and Exhibitions Br., Box 326, 5/316-2/47.
The folder contains reports from all other reading rooms
serviced by the Nuremberg Amerika Haus. The Ansbach reading
room is representative of the rest of the region.
All
reading rooms which were not within easy reach of the Amerika
Haus in Nuremberg served between 5 and 10% of the population
living in these communities. The percentage of young readers
was usually about 50% of the total. The fact that many of
the reading rooms also hosted GYA activities may play a role
in the high proportion of young patrons.
It also could
reflect a greater degree of curiosity and a more pronounced
desire to get to know more of the world.
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Its success obvious success notwithstanding, the Amerika
Haus program had to endure considerable cuts and uncertainty
about its future when the War Department finally handed over
military government responsibilities to the Department of
State at the end of 1949.

By then the Cold War, which turned

hot in Korea in 1950, clearly influenced the agenda.

Harry

Truman and Dean Acheson announced that the United States
needed to expand its own world wide information services
program to counter Soviet propaganda.

To provide HICOG with

the necessary guidance, the State Department's German desk
sent daily cables, weekly information letters and a special
series

of

Republican
reacted

notes

on

Congress

slowly

to

Soviet
which
the

activities
was

demands

Democratic administration.

to

eager

to

for

more

Berlin,

but

save money
funding

of

a

only
the

Even within the State Department

the expansion of the program did not enjoy unanimous support.
Considerable cuts in allocations and a drastic consolidation
program by HICOG were inevitable.83
In spite of these cuts,

the U.S.

Information Agency

maintained an impressive presence in Germany.

In 1953 forty-

seven Amerika Hauser with fifty-four American and 961 German
employees spent three million dollars to maintain their own
operations which included twenty book mobiles and 115 GermanAmerican libraries.

Nuremberg employed two Americans and

83Pilgert, Information Services 1-6, 37-38.
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forty-two

Germans

in

1956.

Throughout

the

1950s

the

Nuremberg Amerika Haus retained a large children's section.®4
Americans continued to reach out to the countryside.
Franz

Schmalz,

a member

of

the

USIC

staff

recalled the consolidation phase vividly.

since

1948,

Initially he had

been a member of the reading room staff in Ebermannstadt, a
small town in Upper Franconia.

When the room closed Schmalz

decided to remain with USIA and moved to Bamberg.
became director of the Amerika Haus in Hof.

In 1950 he

He remembered

that book mobiles became one of the most important vehicles
to keep the population of his district, which bordered the
Soviet zone, informed.
mobile

not

materials,

only
but

According to him, the American book

provided

also

brought

the

population

exhibitions

with

and

reading

information

materials to the most remote areas.85
Schmalz observed firsthand that during the 1950s young
and old people were "hungry for information" about the United
States and the world.

Most patrons and visitors wanted to

fill the void which the twelve year long isolation under

®4Office of the United States High Commissioner for
Germany, Information Centers Division, The America Houses: A
Study of the U.S. Information Center Program in Germany (Bad
Godesberg: Office of the United States High Commissioner for
Germany, [1954]) 1; William F. Sheldon, "Facing America Facing Germany:
Amerikahaus und Deutsch-Amerikanisches
Institut seit 1946," Facing America.
Ein Mosaik: Texte,
Fakten, Meinungen, ed. Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur Kultur im
GroBraum Nurnberg, Fiirth, Erlangen, Schwabach (Nurnberg
[Nuremberg]: Plarrer Verlag, 1992) 122.
®5Franz Schmalz, personal interview, 5 July 1994.
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Hitler had left.

Many members of the older generation came

to the American institutions to request books which the Nazis
had

burnt

and

therefore

libraries anymore.

were

not

available

in

German

School classes visited the center in Hof,

and in Bamberg many secondary school students became regular
patrons, but, according to Schmalz, USIA did not particularly
emphasize youth work.86
American Aid to Churches
Lutheran church leaders displayed a considerable reserve
towards OMGUS and HICOG programs as well as the Army's GYA,
even though members of the churches appreciated American help
as long as it came from the right sources.

As early as 1946

Bavarian Youth Reverend Helbich could report that Nuremberg
had

re-established

Churches

contacts

with

the

World

Council

(WCC) and with churches in Switzerland.

of

Helbich

welcomed these contacts because in this way the Germans would
be able to clarify "many misunderstandings."87
Nuremberg

saw

the

first

prominent

international

Christian youth leader in June 1947, when John R.

Mott,

President of the Young Men's Christian Association, visited

86Franz Schmalz, personal interview, 5 July 1994.
87Stand der Jugendarbeit des Landesjugendpfarrers, 12
Feb. 1946; LCA Landeskirchenrat, Akten des Landesjugend
pfarrers VI; 1178a 1946-1964, Bd. IV.
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the city to confer with YMCA leaders, as well as with church
representatives and American authorities.88
The WCC maintained close contact with the occupation
authorities
actions.

and kept them abreast of

its intentions

and

In March 1947 OMGUS representatives encouraged the

WCC to participate in the reorientation effort.

Robert

Tobias of the WCC in Geneva informed OMGUS in July 1947 that
the

council

was

candidates."89

"in

the

process

of

selecting

suitable

Four weeks later he provided OMGUS with a

detailed plan of the mission of six WCC representatives whom
the WCC would assign to "strategic centers."

One of them was

slated to go to Nuremberg where he would be "attached to
Protestant Youth Council of Bavaria in area leadership for
conferences,
September

camps,

1947

over-all planning,

Reverend

Chester

field work."90

Baird,

born

in

In

China,

recently ordained and just twenty-five years old, arrived at
Nuremberg to coordinate and revive the international contacts
between the Lutheran youths of Germany and abroad.

The

reverend stayed until 1949, but actually does not seem to
have done more than listen and observe.

He made it a point

88Cable from JCS to OMGUS, 29 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-l/[2].
89Letter from Robert Tobias, WCC, Geneva, to Arnold Olsen
and Lawrence Norrie, OMGUS, 1 July 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 150, 5/297-1/13.
Proposed Plan for Christian Youth Leadership Exchanges
by Robert Tobias - World Council of Churches, 30 July 1947;
NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 150,
5/297-1/13.
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not to participate in Nuremberg's social life in order to be
able to concentrate on his mission in Germany.

According to

him, churches in Germany and overseas were achieving the goal
of reconciliation fast, because "there were no boundaries
between Christians the world over."

Baird thought that the

real problem for Germany were those young people whom the
churches were unable to reach.91
In

spite

criticism

of

of
the

the

Nuremberg

materialistic

Lutheran
attitudes

youth

leaders'

which American

programs for children in Nuremberg allegedly promoted by
distributing food,

candy and Coca Cola, those involved in

youth work found that love in fact became a matter of the
stomach

as

the

German

proverb

says.

The

reverend

who

organized one of the first youth camps of the Lutheran church
in Bavaria in June 1946 gratefully reported about the food he
obtained from the Americans.
but rather Lutherans,

This time it was not the Army

Mennonites,

and Baptists,

who,

the

9lApplication [for residence in Germany], Carl Chester
Baird; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box
150, 5/297-1/13; "US Church Worker Lives Quietly in Nurnberg:
'No Borderlines between Christians ...'," YW, vol. 2, no. 17,
1 Jun. 1948: 2. With the exception of an article by Pastor
Helbich in which he bid good-bye to Baird in 1949, I was
unable to find any materials on or from Baird in the Lutheran
Church Archives in spite of the fact that he spent two years
in Nuremberg. Interestingly, MG approached Baird in January
1948 and asked him to provide MG with reports of his
activities and a list of capable youth leaders.
Baird
probably took great care not to compromise his position.
I
found no answer to the request.
(Letter from Richard T.
Alexander, OMGUS, to Carl C. Baird, Nuremberg, 28 Jan. 1948;
NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 126,
5/293-3/15)
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reverend observed, had already started to collect food for
hungry Germans while the war was still raging in Europe.
Without the help of canned beans, dried milk and vegetable
preserves, the author noted, the children in his summer camp
would have gone hungry.
gratefulness

for

American visitors recorded the same

American

food

supplements

in

church

organized summer camps throughout the American zone.92
American generosity in this field,
reach all Germans.

however,

did not

American churches had not only collected

food in the United States,

but in 1947 also sent 50,000

Dollars to Switzerland to procure food for summer camps in
Bavaria.

Military Government officials initially assumed

that all youth groups were included in the program, but the
churches did not show any signs of Christian charity.

They

were

left

not

willing

to

share

their

resources,

which

Military Government and German authorities scrambling for
alternatives just weeks before the program was to start.
action

certainly

did

not endear

the

Lutheran

The

clergy to

^Pentecost 1946, Camp in Georgensgemiind; LCA Personen
CLXV Dollinger 16; see also Dr. Arnold Dannemann, report on
summercamps for German boys, [Fall 1947]; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/14; "Bericht
iiber die Lager ar be it des CVJM Ev. Jungmannerwerkes in der
amerikanischen, britischen und franzosischen Zone," Summer
1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box
151, 5/297-1/25. This report contains a considerable number
of thank you letters, some of which came from boys who lived
in Nuremberg.
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Military Government, German administrators, and youth workers
who were not affiliated with the churches.93
The

practical

assistance many American

institutions

rendered to Nuremberg's population and especially the city's
youth

during

barriers

the

between

postwar
the

period

did

victors

much

and

to

the

tear

down

vanquished.

Nurembergers had countless opportunities to get in contact
with Americans, to become acquainted with their culture, and
last,

but

not

least,

to

survive

with

their

support.

Americans continued their efforts to re-educate young Germans
by means of a more democratic school system, but they adapted
their strategy to the situation in Bavaria.

Amerika Hauser,

Education Centers, and the OMGUS film program worked towards
the end of instilling democratic ideas and ideals in young
and old Germans alike, but almost always took special care to
reach out to Germany's youth.

CRALOG, CARE, and the Hoover

program became household names in Nuremberg.
While Lutheran church leaders maintained their reserve
about American authorities in Germany,

they established a

separate

the United

track

of

communications with

States

through the World Council of Churches which also was designed
to alleviate the physical needs of Germany,

but also to

reintegrate the Lutheran church and its members into the

93Bayerischer Jugendring, Munchen an die Jugendabteilung
der Militarregierung in Bayern, Bericht iiber die Zeltlageraktion 1947, 18 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2.
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international community.
help

The tactical troops' willingness to

out wherever it was necessary

left

a long

lasting

favorable impression on many young and older Germans who
certainly appreciated the effort.

A

close look at GYA

activities in Nuremberg will show that the Army not only
assisted German youth organizations,

but went beyond the

traditional boundaries of German youth work in the American
zone, providing German administrators as well as young people
with alternatives to the traditional German ways.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER X
The GYA; Army Assistance to German Youth Activities in
WiirAnihera. 1946-1952

The Army's program in Nuremberg developed from small
beginnings into a full fledged operation with a wide variety
of programs designed especially for those who did not want to
join a youth organization.
the

Besides a warm place to stay and

famous candies and cookies,

the Army centers of the

Nuremberg Military Post offered a wide range of activities.
Many

of

them were

educational,

others

offered

hands-on

experiences in democratic procedure, respect, or individual
initiative.

The open door approach offered an attractive

alternative

to the

strictly regimented

life

the younger

generation had come to know in the Hitler Youth and which the
Free

German

impressive
advantage
leaders,

Youth

number
of

continued
of

young

in

the

Germans

in

the many GYA programs.

however,

traditional turf.

resented

this

Soviet
the

zone.

An

region

took

Many German youth

encroachment

on

their

Nevertheless GYA served as a model for

progressive German educators and youth workers.
Laving the Foundation
Just

like

everywhere

else

in

the American

zone of

occupation, American soldiers and their units in and around
Nuremberg began to start making contacts with young people
early on.

The Army directive of April 1946 made youth work

485
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an official responsibility of the local commanders.

GYA

activities in the region initially consisted almost entirely
of sports.
teams,

Some officers in Fiirth had established boxing

other

Americans

introduced young

Nurembergers

to

American sports such as baseball, football, or basketball,
since equipment for German sports was not yet available.
Weekly stage shows in the Fiirth opera house provided youth
with

the

only

GYA-sponsored

cultural

activities.

In

Nuremberg 1st Lt. William Schroeder, the officer in charge of
the city's extensive sports facilities which the Army had
requisitioned for GIs, was the first man to become active for
GYA.

He soon was well known among D.P. children who lived in

a camp close to the sports facilities,

but also to young

Germans, many of whom inhabited a nearby refugee camp.1
Mark Selsor received his appointment as head of the
Nuremberg Military Post's German Youth Activities program in
August 1946.

He remained with the assignment until May 1950

and became one of the most important and respected figures in
the city's and the region's youth work.
area

for which he was

responsible

The Nuremberg Post

included the

city of

l0MGBY, Det. B-211, Monthly Historical Report,
Aug., Sept. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box
9/124-1/2; Hanns Bader, personal interview, 12 Aug.
Lore Falter, personal interview, 29 June 1995; "Good
Lt. Schroeder!" YW vol. 1, no. 2, 1 Feb. 1947: 2.
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Nuremberg, the entire region of Upper and Middle Franconia as
well as parts of the Upper Palatinate.2
Selsor was well equipped for the job.

He had spent time

in Germany during the twenties and spoke German well.
difficult

childhood

had

helped

him

to

develop

a

A

deep

understanding for the problems young people faced during hard
times.

As a professional soldier, Selsor was able to combine

these gifts and a high degree of idealism with a profound
understanding
serving.

and

respect

for

the

organization

he

was

From the outset, he and his family not only tried

to give something to young Germans,

but actually made an

attempt to share some of their misery with them.

The Selsors

decided to skip one meal a week and donate the proceeds to
needy people.

Soon, many families of the military community

did the same.

This combination of inside knowledge, skills,

and dedication

enabled

Selsor to

secure

support

of

his

superiors and to mobilize the enormous facilities the Army
had

to

offer

in

personnel sector.
transferred

and

spite

of

constant

difficulties

in the

Capable officers and enlisted men were
could

not

be

replaced,

and

qualified

2A11 of the interviewees who were directly involved in
leadership positions in Nuremberg youth groups remembered
Selsor well and expressed their respect and gratitude for the
American youth officer, although they did not always see eye
to eye with him about youth activities in the city. See also
Maar 106.
Selsor retired as a Colonel and to date has not lost his
willingness to lend a helping hand.
In spite of serious
difficulties with his health, he and his family were
extremely helpful and provided me with very valuable
information and documents.
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indigenous personnel was equally hard to locate.

The Major's

dedication, qualities, and tact also earned him the respect
of the German youth leaders, with whom he remained in close
contact, and the admiration of many of the young people who
experienced first hand Selsor's and his wife June's work in
Nuremberg.

Originally assigned to work at the IMT, the major

immediately volunteered for the job as youth officer for the
entire Post when it became available.

From the start Selsor

cultivated good relations between German authorities and his
office.

Even more important, he successfully reached out to

the German youth organizations in Nuremberg, but also offered
alternatives to those who did not find their way into youth
groups.3
One of Selsor's main objectives was to support German
youth groups as much as he could.

MG was only able to assist

German groups with the help of the tactical command.

All

material

the

and

assistance

the Army

which

provided

in

Nuremberg region went through the GYA office.

3OMGBY, Det. B-211, Monthly Historical Report, Aug.
1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2;
"Ein Portrat: Niirnbergs Jugendoffizier," [A Portrait:
Nuremberg's Youth Officer] NN, 11 Jan. 1947: 6; for Selsor's
permanent struggle with adversity see especially his almost
complete monthly narrative reports for 1948 (NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9, Box 47,
10/19-3/16, Box 34, 10/43-1/4); June Selsor (10) reports
about the meal skipping initiative. Mrs. Selsor's manuscript
provides a unique and very thoughtful perspective of her
family's four years in Germany, as well as her and her
husband's work for GYA.
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The Major and his co-workers were not content with the
rather limited approach of the program for which he had taken
responsibility.

GYA made it into Nuremberg's newspaper for

the first time in September 1946.

Nurembergers found an

interview with Lieutenant William Schroeder on the sports
page in which Schroeder announced that he was planning to
introduce a city-wide youth sports club open to everyone.
Young

Germans

would

be

able

to

become

acquainted

with

American sports but would also have the chance to revive the
traditional German disciplines under American supervision.
The officer told the press that the Americans would provide
all the equipment necessary for these activities.

Although

the interview appeared on the sports page, Schroeder went far
beyond the realm of physical education.
blessing

of

Major

Selsor,

he

Probably with the

provided

the

Niirnberger

Nachrichten with a complete outline of the program which the
GYA intended to establish for the city's youth.

During the

winter young people would not only be able to use local
gymnasiums for playing ping-pong or chess, but the Americans
would

also try to provide them with

"spiritual values."

Schroeder counted on the generosity of the local troops to
donate food and candies so that the events would have a
nutritional value for those who would attend.

The first

lieutenant explained that the Army would make club rooms
available which were not used to capacity by local units.
Trucks would provide safe transportation home for those who
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came during the long winter nights.

Obviously impressed by

this news, the interviewer noted that the city administration
should be grateful for the initiative and should support it
above all through the schools.4
Schroeder did not deliver empty promises, although he
left Nuremberg just four months after his interview.5

The

Nuremberg Military Post initiated an all encompassing program
throughout the region.

While GYA's first attempt to bring

young Germans to the requisitioned Nuremberg opera house did
not meet with an enthusiastic response,
give up.

Schroeder did not

An amateur theater performance of Erich Kastner's

"Emil und die Detektive" broke the ice.

According to the

local paper, the function attracted many young Nurembergers
and was a tremendous success for everybody involved.6
Nevertheless GYA did not take off with a resounding
success.

ICD collected contradictory information about the

program.

While a study of March 1947 concluded that about

50% of all Germans in the American zone knew GYA and about
10% of the zone's youth participated in it, a second survey—
conducted

just

two

months

later— reversed

the

positive

4"Wir Amerikaner helfen Niirnbergs Jugend: Der StadionSportoffizier entwickelt in einem Gesprach mit den 'N.N.'
seine groSziigigen Plane," [We Americans Help Nuremberg's
Youth: The Stadium Sports Officer Develops His Generous Plans
in an Interview with "N.N."] NN, 21 Sept. 1946: 6.
s"Good Luck Lt. Schroeder!" YW, vol. 1, no. 2, 1 Feb.
1947: 2.
6"Emil und die Detektive," [Emil and the Detectives] NN,
12 Oct. 1946: 7.
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findings.

The new study stated that very few people knew the

program and an even lower percentage were actually involved.
Questionnaires

of

the

Nuremberg

ICD

apparently part of the latter survey,
negative findings.

unit,

which

were

supported the more

According to them, adults usually thought

that the Americans either wanted to educate young people for
democratic
trouble.
not

ideals

or

simply wanted to keep them

out

of

Almost all of the parents indicated that they would

object

activities.

to

their

children

attending

American

youth

Boys and girls were curious and signalled their

willingness to participate, but in general did not have any
opinion about the purpose of such a program.7
Going to the Movies or Having them Delivered
The survey was conducted only two months after Selsor
had introduced the GYA youth film hour which soon would
become one of the most successful American programs in the
city and assured that GYA became widely known.

The 35 mm

film program came just in time to provide young people with
a warm place to go to during the cold winter months.

For a

7Adolf Kiifner, Bericht iiber die Freizeitgestaltung der
Jugend, 28 Jan. 1947. Kiifner, a German ICD employee, seems
to have based his report on a rather small sample of sixteen
adults and sixteen children. The sample included one member
of the upper class, one member of the upper middle class, and
one member of the lower middle class. The rest of the people
he polled were members of the working class. In spite of its
obvious limitations, it probably is a good indicator for
German sentiment in Nuremberg at the time. The two surveys
are Information Control Weekly Review no. 15 (15 Mar. 1S47)
and no. 23 (10 May 1947); NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion
Surveys Br., Box 158, 5/234-2/5 and 5/234-2/6a.
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mere thirty Pfennigs young Germans could attend functions in
the opera house from December 1946 on.

Under the guidance of

Ignaz Wiihr, a qualified and dedicated German volunteer who
owned one of Nuremberg's movie theaters, the film program
became one of the major attractions for young people in the
city.

By March 1947 already 24,000 children and adolescents

had visited the American movie hour.

Selsor made sure to

establish close contact with city officials.

The schools

took care of ticketing and the collection of the fees, and
German as well as American officials were at hand to explain
the significance of certain movies to the young audience.
Not even four months after its inauguration Selsor could
celebrate the fiftieth function and announced that over sixty
thousand children had visited this GYA program to date.

It

continued to be part of the Nuremberg youth activities for
many years.

A little over twelve months after the first show

Selsor informed the press that 120,000 tickets had been sold
for the one hundred functions the program had given so far.
In January 1947 sixteen American, two Swiss, one British, one
French, and one Soviet, as well as three German feature films
stood at the program's disposal.

Charlie Chaplin's “Gold

Rush” was one of the favorites,

but "Young Tom Edison,”

"Union Pacific," or "Madame Curie" also filled the theater.
Twenty-one documentaries dealt with topics which covered
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American technical and governmental achievements as well as
life, history, and culture of the United Sates.*
GYA field work leaped ahead of the policy makers as well
as Military Government activities.

In March

decided to integrate film programs into GYA.
the

tendency

to

provide

the

GYA

1947

EUCOM

To counteract

visitors

just

with

inexpensive entertainment officers were instructed to use
"suitable motion pictures [... ] to the fullest as a means for
illustrating democratic life."

Entertainment films needed

Military Government approval and had to be combined with
documentaries.

Selsor was sorry about the limited number of

films and the rather poor physical condition of the available
copies, but he thought that they were better than nothing.
Success proved him right.
1948.

The program expanded further in

During the second quarter of the year over 316,000

young people in Nuremberg, Hof, and Bamberg took part in the
film hour.9
*"GYA Movies," YW, vol. 1, no. 1, 2 Jan. 1947: 3; list
of films available for German audiences, 23 Jan. 1947; NA RG
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 147, 5/2963/5. The GYA film program became a regular feature in the
Niirnberger Nachrichten. See, for example, "Jugendfilmstunden
im Opernhaus," [Youth Film Hours in the Opera House] NN, 30.
Nov. 1946: 7; "Jubel um Tom Edison," [Cheers For Tom Edison]
NN, 25 Jan. 47: 7. "Jugendfilmstunde - sehr beliebt," [Youth
Film Hour - Very Popular] NN, 15 Mar. 1947: 5; "Jugendfilmstunde hat Jubilaum," [Youth Film Hour Has Anniversary] NN,
5 July 1947: 3; "100. Jugendfilmstunde," [100th Youth Film
Hour] NN, 28 Jan. 1948: 5.
9From EUCOM to Field Forces, directive re.: motion
pictures, 11 Mar. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
Education Br., Box 141, 5/295-3/7; Nuremberg Military Post,
GYA Quarterly Report for Second Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit
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GYA
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eiaa balba Scuada .or deal Segiaa der F3 m - Vonteiluac

18. GYA Youth Film Hour Advertisement, 1952 (Source: YW, vol.
6, no. 7, July 1952: 6)
Currency reform in 1948 suddenly wiped out all cash
reserves and for a time saddled GYA with considerable debts,
almost eliminating the program, but Wiihr, the heart and soul
of

the

film

hour

who

had

been

mainly

responsible

for

organizing the films,

managed to overcome that crisis as

well.

1950

In

December

he

could

look

back

to

400

performances, 400 different films and over 300,000 guests.
To celebrate the occasion,

Wiihr provided an audience of

teachers and 1,200 students with the synchronized version of
"Lassie Come Home" in color.

To accommodate some people who

criticized the choice of the films GYA had announced in the
summer of 1950 that it was planning to introduce a screening
committee consisting of educators,

both churches,

Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125, [1].
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which would be responsible for selecting the movies.

Until

such a committee could be organized the film hour would
continue in its traditional manner.10
One year later the film hour moved to a new Army theater
next to the opera house which the city had constructed with
considerable
facilities.

HICOG

help

to regain

full use

of

its

own

By then participation had increased to 43 0,000.

Almost every show was sold out.
organize valuable films.

Wtihr tried his best to

In January 1950 "The Jungle Book”

made its debut before a packed audience.

For the 500th show

he was able to obtain the Swiss film "The Search" which had
been shot partly in Nuremberg and nearby Ansbach.
ran

for the

first

time

in Germany

positive review in the papers.

and received

The film
a

very

One of the last shows once

more demonstrated the popularity of the film hour.

In spite

of competition from Hollywood, quality films still attracted
large audiences.

2,000 young people tried to get one of the

10"Niirnbergs Jugendf ilmstunde feierte Geburtstag:
4 00
Vorstellungen, 400 Filme und 307 000 Gaste: Trotz Kritik:
Die besten Filme fur die Jugend!" [Nuremberg's Youth Film
Hour Celebrated its Birthday: 400 shows, 400 films and
307,000 guests: In spite of Criticism: The Best Films for
Youths!] YW, vol. 4, no. 12, Dec. 1950: 3. Interestingly,
this article did not have its English counterpart in the
paper.
Often the authors modified articles under the same
headline specifically for the German or American audience.
"Council Named for Youth Films," YW vol. 4, no. 8, Aug. 1950:
2.
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920 tickets available when "All Quiet on the Western Front"
stood on the program.11
The days of the film hour were numbered, however.

In

March of 1952 the GYA officer and the director of the city's
youth office reached an agreement that the Army would cease
its operations as soon as the new city youth home, which also
housed a small movie theater, would be opened in fall.

Some

city fathers continued to attack the quality of the program.
The city council's art committee initiated an investigation
about

the

especially

"educational

value"

of

about the selection

the

youth

procedure

film

for the

hour,
films.

Apparently the investigation touched a raw nerve with Otto
Barthel,

by

then the

city's

school

superintendent.

He

reported that in view of some questionable choices, the city
had attempted to establish a screening committee in 1950.
According to Barthel, Wiihr had not cooperated in the venture
which had resulted in a considerable controversy in the
press.

Apparently upset by Wiihr's independence, Barthel had

refused to continue the promotion of the program in the
city's

schools.

assessment.

Not everyone

shared

Barthel's negative

Andreas Staudt reported that most of the movies

""Jugendfilmstunde geht weiter,"
[Youth Film Hour
Continues] YW, vol. 4, no. 1, 1 Jan. 1950: 4; "Nurnberg Youth
Movie Hour lights 4th Candle: 400 Performances, 400 Films,
and 307,000 Youth," YW, vol. 4, no. 12, Dec. 1950: 3,4;
"Youth Movie Hour In Its Sixth Year: Performances Now at New
Post Theater," YW, vol. 5, no. 6, Oct./Nov. 1951: 3; "2000
wollten ins Kino: "Im Westen nichts Neues,"" [2,000 Wanted to
Go to the Movies: "All Quiet on the Western Front"] YW, vol.
7, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 1953: 6.
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were very valuable, although some of them seemed to be too
difficult for the young audience.

He thought that the city

should not revive the controversy since the administration
would take the film hour under its wings when the new city
youth house would be finished.12
35 mm films were not the only movies for young people.
In 1948 GYA also became involved in the 16 mm film program
which ICD had initiated.

Like Amelia Horn, the director of

the Nuremberg Amerika Haus, Selsor had to find out by himself
what

policy

OMGUS

officially

pursued.

Directives

from

headquarters informed him about the five hundred projectors
OMGUS was making available throughout the American zone and
Berlin.

Apparently unaware of James Barnett's efforts along

the same lines, Selsor reported in July that the initiative
was well accepted in spite of the lack of suitable films and
that

he

would

try

to

include

schools

and

other

German

institutions in the program.13
Selsor

and his

successors were

able to establish a

successful venture by using the versatility of the smaller

12Nuremberg Post Journal, 31 Mar. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit
Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122; minutes of a
metting of the committee for school andcultural affairs, 4
July 1952; NCA C7/IX no. 1307.
13Directive from OMGUS to Field Detachments, subject:
distribution and use of re-education and reorientation 16 mm
films and projectors; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
Education Br., Box 118, 5/292-2/1; Headquarters, Nuremberg
Military Post, German Youth Activities Section, GYA Staff
Report, 20 July 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9.
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format to their advantage.

The Nuremberg GYA center no. 1

had its own full time staff and film library which included
educational, cultural, and entertainment movies.

Three film

projectors and one for slides were available to show the
material.
GYA

also

Movies came mainly from HICOG and the Army, but
acquired

German

entertainment movies.

borrow

them

as

well

as

The German Shell corporation supplied

some technical films.
either

documentaries

All youth groups and schools could

for

a nominal

complete performance which

fee or

arrange

for

included a projectionist,

a

the

equipment, and the movies.14 In 1950 GYA Nuremberg obtained
a four wheel

drive

Dodge Army pick up

converted into a film car,

truck

which was

enabling a German driver and

projectionist to reach out even to the most remote villages
in the region.

Just when everything was in place the program

had to take a first setback.

In November 1950 GYA announced

that

to

it was

anymore.

not

permitted

show 16 mm

feature

films

Apparently commercial theaters were afraid of the

competition.15
Although young Germans had a number of choices to see
American

movies,

GYA

remained

very

busy

in

this

field.

Practically all youth groups took advantage of the program.

l4,lFilm Library Starts Work Again After Inventory," YW,
vol. 4, no. 9, Sep. 1950: 4.
15Photo and caption, YW, vol. 4, no. 6, 2 June 1950: 4.
"Film Library Changes Hours: Feature Films No Longer
Available," YW vol. 4, no. 11, Nov. 1950: 1.
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The trade unions were among the most frequent users, followed
by sports clubs, the YMCA, the protestant youth groups, and
the

Falcons.

showings.

Youth

groups

in

factories

GYA provided displaced persons

arranged
from

for

Czechos

lovakia, Russia, and Poland, who lived in camp Valka on the
former Nazi Party rally grounds, with shows as well as German
expellees from the Sudetenland and Silesia who occupied other
camps

in

introduced

and

around

several

American culture,

Nuremberg.

thousand

young

In

this

people

to the United States,

principles of democracy.

way
each

the

Army

month

to

but also to the

A certainly not unwelcome side

effect of the very popular shows was that it filled the
coffers of youth organizations with the new currency which
was otherwise hard to obtain.
youth groups

Between 1948 and 1950 German

in the region earned about 10,000 Marks,

a

substantial sum at the time.16
The trade union youth used the offer to feature a weekly
show in their centers which attracted capacity crowds until
the middle of the next decade.

The increasing prosperity of

young people, who by then were able to buy tickets to see
commercial

movies

which

GYA

was

not

permitted

to

show

anymore, brought about the end of the program, but Americans
I6|,Film Attendance Booming Again: May Report: 8,910
Participants," YW vol. 4, no. 7, July 1950: 4; "Summer Film
Slump: Only 5,879 Spectators," YW vol. 4, no. 8, Aug. 1950:
6; "10,000 DM brachte die GYA Filmbticherei deutschen
Jugendgruppen in die Kassen," [GYA Film Library Netted 10,000
DM for Coffers of German Youth Groups] YW, vol. 4, no. 12,
Dec. 1950: 3.
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made sure that the Germans could continue the work.

The

trade unions, for example, received a projector when the Army
phased the program out and continued to use it for their own
educational endeavors.17
Youth Centers
Movie theaters were not the only place that offered
young people a place they could visit.

Soon after he assumed

his post, Selsor began to search for a suitable youth center
in Nuremberg.

As a first measure, American soldiers had

decided to share their club facilities with young Germans
during the cold winter months.

The soldiers would not only

provide the facilities, but also initiate discussion groups
and organize sports events.18

In Nuremberg

young people

could use the requisitioned track and field installations and
the swimming pool.
provided

them

with

During the wintertime the Americans
opportunities

for

ice

skating.

GYA

estimated that about 45,000 children throughout the Post area
had participated in these activities during the first six

17Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
Trade Unionists agreed that the beginning of prosperity was
the end of many of their activities. Hans Eckstein, personal
interview, 6 July 1995; also Grieb, ed. 41 (Horst Klaus); for
the termination of the film program see Grieb, ed. 71 (Erwin
Schonleben). It should be noted here that GYA and the USIS
did not coordinate their film programs officially.
Since
cooperation between GYA and MG was good in Nuremberg,
Americans there probably managed to avoid duplication in
effort and material.
“Newspaper
clipping,
"In
Bayern,"
[In
Bavaria]
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 1 Sept. 1946: n.p.; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/10.
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months of 1947.
the next year.

The numbers increased substantially during
In May 1949 it passed the 100,000 attendance

mark for one month.

At the end of the year over 140,000

young people in one way or another received GYA support.

It

was only natural that GYA supervisors and volunteers who took
care of the installations began to instruct the children who
came to their facilities.

As a result American football and

basketball matches between teams from different Posts became
a feature.

GYA also organized its own soccer league within

the Post area as soon as it was able to obtain the proper
equipment.19
Selsor soon began to look for a center which young
people would have all to themselves.

In early 1947 the major

found a requisitioned restaurant in the suburb of Erlenstegen
and

made

it

the

first

GYA

center

in

Nuremberg.

The

restaurant not only had a kitchen and rooms but also was
surrounded by a park for outdoor activities.

The fact that

many German dignitaries attended the inauguration of the new
center shows the importance German authorities attached to
GYA which was growing rapidly.

Just six weeks after the

190MGBY, Det. B-211, Annual Historical Report, 1 July
1946-30 June 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box
1425, 9/124-1/6; Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly
Reports for First, Second, and Third Quarter 1948; NA RG 338
Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 124, 125; the
Young World reported in detail about activities throughout
the post; see, for example, "Participation Booming," YW vol.
4, no. 2, 1 Feb. 1950: 2; see also Willy Gensmantel, personal
interview, 10 Aug. 1995, and "Education," OMGUS Information
Bulletin no. 80, 7 Feb. 1947: 17.
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official inauguration of the first youth center GYA moved to
a larger home with a park in a requisitioned huge villa not
far from the Nuremberg party rally grounds.

Selsor's close

connections with the city helped him in remodelling the place
quickly.

While the Army provided the building materials and

furniture,

Mayor

Levie

was

able

craftsmen to finish the job quickly.

to

where

the

young

visitors

Nuremberg

The new center not only

had more rooms availabe to everyone,
kitchen

mobilize

but also offered a

often

got

ice

cream,

doughnuts, or candy and could learn about American recipes.20
The

center

activities.

soon

became

the

focal

point

for

many

The youth committee, trade union groups and many

other youth organizations took advantage of the facilities,
but the center from the start also offered its own programs
for those who did not want to join a German club.

The

center's largely German staff had much to offer to young
Germans: A music teacher and a singing instructor, a manual
arts instructor and a sports teacher, as well as a librarian
and her assistant occupied full time positions.

All these

professionals also were in charge of helping units in the
region with setting up specific programs.

Interestingly, MG

officials noted that the IMT, which continued to prosecute
20,lReport Vacant Buildings," YW, vol. 1, no. 1, Jan.
1947: 3; "Ein Haus fiir die Jugend," [A House for Our Youth]
NN, 16 Apr. 1947: 5; "GYA zieht urn," [GYA Moves] NN, 14 May
1947: 5; Lore Falter, personal interview, 29 June 1995; for
the German help see correspondence between Selsor, Mayor
Levie, and the local crafts association of April and May
1947; NCA 085/I Handakt Levie.
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German war criminals throughout the forties and maintained
many

of

the

international

staff

from

the

first

trial,

provided a considerable number of enthusiastic international
volunteers who were willing to support the Army with its re
orientation efforts.21
The center's employees were always busy.

Young Germans

came to sing in an English choir, a children's choir and a
choir

for

young

traditional folk

adults.

The

repertoire

songs to classical music.

ranged

from

Since EUCOM

permitted Americans to teach German youths handicrafts in
June 1947, the new facility also offered workshops ranging
from woodwork to photography.
high on the girls' agenda.

Sewing and needlework ranked

Materials for their activities

came either from Army scrap or directly from the United
States where GYA was able to mobilize considerable support.22

2ILore Falter, personal interview, 29 June 1995; Arno
Hamburger,
personal
interview,
11 Aug.
1994;
Helga
Stadtlander, personal interview, 15 Aug. 1995; Nuremberg
Military Post, GYA Quarterly Report for First Quarter 1948;
NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 124.
OMGBY, Semi-monthly report, 25 June 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 143, 5/296-1/18; see also
Maar (107-110) for contacts between IMT interpreters and GYA
youth groups.
^Selsor managed to have various reports on GYA
activities with appeals for support published in English and
German newspapers in the United States as a result of which
GYA received books, cloth, clothing, and shoes.
See, for
example, "Friends, Helpers, and Visitors: Many thanks to all
the friends from the United States listed below, who have
assisted GYA Nurnberg with their gifts," YW vol. 4, no. 4, 1
Apr. 1950: 4.
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Boys and girls had the chance to take dancing lessons which
they could put to good use in the graduation balls their
schools frequently held in center no. 1 as well.

.Since W UIr is a member of a G YA erxftshop he is so very industrious;"
.Seic mein W illy in der GYA-Basteistundc ist, ist er mSchtic fleiS if!"

19. GYA Cartoon (Source: YW, vol. 2, no. 10, 1 Oct. 1948: 4)
Early in 1948 Selsor was able to inaugurate the Junge Btihne
in the villa's basement which featured a full fledged stage.
A

serious

lay

theater

Jugendspielbiihne,

group,

became

the Frankische

the

main

beneficiary

installation and attracted large audiences.
Nuremberg

Post

area

playing theater

venture in the larger cities.

Volks-

became

of

und
the

Throughout the
a successful

Meetings and mutual visits of

different acting clubs within the region and in the American
zone formed part of their activities.

The room in Nuremberg
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also served as the center's movie theater which usually
attracted capacity crowds.23

Members of German Youth Activities from the Darmstadt
Junggesellen Leben Club who presented a show for the
Nuremberg members of the activities.
Heidelberg, Germany,
12 July 1947.
20. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 286778, 18 Aug. 1947
Selsor continued to look for possibilities to improve
the center for the benefit of young Germans.

Shortly before

he left Nuremberg in 1950, the major was able to inaugurate
the center's own youth hostel which offered twenty beds for
young travellers.

In August of the same year participants of

an international youth camp rehabilitated the park of the
“Headquarters Nuremberg Military Post, Consolidated
Report, Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities
Br., Box 45, 10/47-1/6; "Vom Schwimmbad zum Theater,"
[Swimming Pool Becomes Theater] NN, 23 Mar. 1948: 3; caption
on photo, 18 Aug. 1947; NA RG 111 SC 1945-1954, Box 133,
286778.
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youth center and constructed outdoor sport facilities with
the help of heavy Army equipment.24
Apart from the help GYA rendered to
summer camp activities,
unable

to

join

organization

in

support German

it also sponsored those who were

those

camps

its own

or

camps.

did
In

not
1947

belong
9,000

to

an

children

attended GYA camps in the Nuremberg Military Post district.
Currency

reform

in

June

1948

severely

hampered

the

organization of summer camps by wiping out the entire German
currency funds of the Nuremberg GYA, but still 5,000 children
participated in the summer program.
to 9,000 again.
tent

camps

In 1949 the numbers rose

In 1950 GYA sponsored or co-sponsored ten

throughout

the Post

area,

prosperity put an end to the program.

but

the

returning

In 1952, its last year

of operations, only a few hundred young people spent their
time in one consolidated summer camp for the entire region.
The unit in charge of the camp made sure that the needy also
would have a chance to attend by assuming the costs for those
who were unable to pay the fees.25
24"International Youth Camp in Nbg. Dutzenteich Center,"
YW, vol. 4, no. 8, Aug. 1950: 1.
^Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly Report for
Second Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg
Military Post, Box 125; Report from Headquarters, Nuremberg
Military Post, Youth Activities Section, to Commanding
Officer, Nuremberg Military Post, subject: GYA staff report
for week covering 26 June-2 July 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9; Report from
Headquarters, Nuremberg Military Post, Youth Activities
Section to Commanding General, Headquarters EUCOM, ATTN:
Director of GYA, subject: monthly narrative GYA report for
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From

the

start

GYA

educational opportunities.
for older
centers

boys

provided

young

During

with

One of the more popular choices

and girls were the

offered.

Germans

the

English

first

half

courses many
year

of

its

operations in Nuremberg, seven teachers taught nine English
courses at center no. 1.
international

volunteers

GYA could count on a number of
who

were

employed

International Military Tribunal at the time.

by

the

Hans Lamm, a

Jewish emigree who had returned to Germany as interpreter at
the IMT,

became one of the most popular teachers.

member of the occupation forces he was

As a

living in rather

luxurious accommodations in Nuremberg's undestroyed suburbs
and

invited

his

students there.

Lamm was

teacher who used progressive methods.
his students to American

literature,

an excellent

He not only introduced
but also made them

speak, something unheard of in German classrooms at the time.
To overcome the language barrier and to induce his students
to speak freely, Lamm rewarded those who were able to give
presentations in English with much coveted contents of CARE

Aug. 1949; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post,
Box 125; "Tent Cities in Bavaria," YW, vol. 4, no. 7, July
1950: 4; "Site for Summer Camp Wanted: Only One Camp Planned
for NMP," YW, vol. 4. no. 1, Jan. 1952: 1; "GYA," Nuremberg
Post Journal, 25 July 1952; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg
Military Post, Box 122.
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parcels.

Needless to say that Lamm always had a group of

highly motivated students.26

A request was made by GYA, that books be sent to the German
Children in GYA clubs throughout the zone. German papers,
printed in the United States, let the request be known, and
many books are now being donated by American and German
citizens.
German children at the GYA center in Nurnberg [sicl] start
looking through the books even before they are unpacked.
21. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 310899, 25 Oct. 1948
Books and reading materials became an important issue
for Selsor and his staff.

Initially GYA just supported the

idea of a book drive of the local newspaper by supplying the
necessary transport.

Apparently a simple appeal was not very

successful for filling the gaps on the shelves which the war
26OMGBY, Annual Historical Report, 30 June 1946-1 July
1947, chapter IV, Youth Activities; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD,
Det. B-211, Box 1425, 9/124-1/6; Gerhard Knochlein, personal
interview, 24 July 1995; Arno Hamburger, personal interview,
11 Aug. 1994; Maar 113.
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and

National

Socialism

had

opened.

Selsor

found

an

additional incentive for youngsters to donate the books they
did not need to the Army center.

In December 1947 GYA

announced in Nuremberg that there would be cake and ice cream
as well as a free library card for every donor of a book.
Those bringing more than one book would receive a special
prize, a free pass to the GYA's film hour at the opera house.
The results of the ensuing book party exceeded the greatest
expectations,

in spite of bad weather.

The major and his

wife made sure that all children received their promised
rewards.

By the end of the day the center had acquired

almost 2,500 German books for its patrons.
public library helped cataloging them.

The Nuremberg

Similar book drives

in the towns and cities throughout the Nuremberg Post made
sure

that

all GYA centers

held an impressive

suitable reading materials for their visitors.

number of
Many young

people undoubtedly found their way to the center through
their stomachs, but Selsor made sure that they got something
more than food before they left.

In March 1948 the center

handed out its 1000th library card to a young Nuremberger.27

27,1Eine Bitte der NN," [A Request by NN] NN, 9 Nov. 1946:
4; Lore Falter, personal interview, 29 June 1995; "German
Youth Activities Idea Exchange," 22 Dec. 1947; NA RG 260
OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/295-3/5;
Narrative GYA Report for Nov. 1947, Nuremberg Post; NA RG 260
OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 144, 5/296-2/1;
Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly Report for First
Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military
Post, Box 124.
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German children wait for books at the GYA children's library,
Nurnberg [sic!]. The library, which has now been open three
years, stocks more than three thousand books.
22. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 335833, 25 Nov. 1949
During the following years the library continued to
expand.

By June 1948 the Nuremberg Youth Center's holdings

of youth books surpassed those of the city library.

City

officials also conceded that GYA in Nuremberg actually had
more young patrons than they did.

Selsor and other dedicated

GYA workers were able to mobilize donors in the United States
and bought many books

in Switzerland.

In this way the

library in Nuremberg grew by about fifty books a week in
1949.

Interestingly,

young people shared their parents'

interest in technical and scientific literature, but it was
impossible

to

Nevertheless,

satisfy
three years

the

demand

after the

in

these

inauguration

fields.
of
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Selsor could proudly report that six libraries throughout the
Post had 22,000 volumes available to young readers.

GYA

center no. 1 in Nuremberg offered 6,000 books to its patrons
and cooperated closely with the city's library.

At the end

of 1951 the Nuremberg Post GYA libraries had 15,600 German
and about 9,000 English books on their shelves.

In many

towns,

library

such as Ansbach,

Americans

ran

the

only

specifically designed for young people.28
To reach out even further to young people who did not
have the chance to visit one of the GYA libraries, Selsor
decided to furnish the Post's own book mobile, an idea which
the Air Force had pioneered late in 1946.

As was the case

with GYA, EUCOM transformed an initiative in the field into
official policy.29 Headquarters furnished a 2 1/2 ton truck

28,lDrei Jahre GYA in Nurnberg: Major Selsor und Lt.
Hirsch berichten iiber das vielseitige Jugendprogramm," [Three
Years GYA in Nuremberg: Major Selsor and Lt. Hirsch Inform
About the Many-Sided Youth Program] NN, 16 Mar. 1949: 5;
caption on photo, 25 Oct. 1948; NA RG 111 SC 1941-1954, Box
155, 310899; caption on photo, 25 Nov. 1949; NA RG 111 SC
1941-1954, Box 178, 335833; "GYA Library Has Nearly 4,000
Users," YW, vol. 2, 1 Jun. 1948: 2; "Old Nurnberger in USA
Sent Books to GYA," YW, vol. 2, 1 Jul. 1948: 1; "1000th GYA
Reader to Get Fancy Cake: 2,000 Volumes Augmented Libraries
in 1951," YW, vol. 6, Jan. 1952: 5.
Once again, GYA and the local Amerika Haus did not
officially cooperate.
It seems, however, that the Amerika
Haus staff referred children and teenagers to the GYA center
for many youth programs, although the Amerika Haus also had
a room dedicated to children.
29The GYA book mobiles served exclusively the needs of
young people and schools.
As we have seen in the previous
chapter, U.S. Information Centers copied the idea. When GYA
ceased its operations, the Amerika Hauser were able to pick
up the slack.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

512

German youth eagerly read books obtained from the bookmobile
during its visit to a German High School in Schweinfurt,
Germany.
The Wurzburg [sic!] Post bookmobile placed in
operation in June 1948 travels through the post area giving
children an opportunity to read American fiction and
magazines. Also in demand are more serious books on science,
psychology and geography. School authorities, teachers, and
parents, as well as the students have expressed appreciation
for this book service.
23. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 313582, 7 Oct. 1948
for each Military Post and instructed the local commanders to
convert them into mobile libraries complete with their own
German drivers and librarians.
be in place by July 1947.

The program was supposed to

In Nuremberg a refurbished truck

was ready for action in August.

Apparently it was easier to

get the truck than the books necessary to operate it.

By

November it had only about two hundred mostly American books
on its shelves,— not enough to satisfy the demand of readers
between the age of ten and twenty years

in small towns

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

513
throughout the region.

Nevertheless

Selsor reported

in

December that the book mobile finally had started operating.
Four months later it had to cease operations temporarily once
more because there were not enough books available to run it,
but in the course of 1948 the Post GYA was able to solve the
problems.

The mobile library became so busy that Nuremberg

headquarters furnished a second truck for this mission during
that year.

The situation in other Posts was much the same.30

Selsor tried to make sure that parents were informed
about their children's activities.
to get to know the center.

They received invitations

GYA representatives took the

opportunity to explain to parents that their program was not
intended to transform German children into little Americans,
but rather to help them become responsible and articulate
citizens.

To assist parents and educators with the task, the

Major invited German parents and teachers to discuss the
education of their children at home and at school and use the
center's facilities for their meetings.

Apparently teachers

30EUCOM, Directive re.: Bookmobiles, 20 June 1947; NA RG
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 141, 5/2953/7; "Eine fahrbare Bibliothek," [A Mobile Library] NN, 26
Oct. 1946: 6; Headquarters, Nuremberg Military Post, German
Youth Activities Office, Weekly Report of the Army Assistance
to the GYA Program, 28 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det.
B—211, Box 1427, 9/122-3/1; "Bibliothek auf Radern," [Library
on Wheels] NN, 1 Nov. 1947: 3; Nuremberg Military Post,
Narrative GYA Report for Nov. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 144, 5/296-2/1; Nuremberg
Military Post, GYA Quarterly Report for Second Quarter 1948;
NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125,
[1]; report [n.d.] Nuremberg Military Post; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-3/18.
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and parents responded to the offer.
Nuremberg

newspaper

reported

In March

that

the

city's

administration officially endorsed the program.
the

paper,

Otto

Barthel,

who

had

1949 the
school

According to

succeeded

Raab

as

Nuremberg's school superintendent, thought that this type of
cooperation between parents, teachers and the GYA could help
all parties to solve some of the problems they were facing in
this field.31
Although GYA Youth Center no. 1 in Nuremberg remained
the best equipped facility in the Post area, Selsor made sure
to spread his efforts throughout the region.

To communicate

better

introduced

with

information

his

co-workers,

bulletin

in

the

English

major

immediately

after

an
his

appointment in 1946,

in which he informed them about the

latest developments.

In January 1947 the bulletin became a

newsletter, followed four weeks later by a German version for
GYA participants as well as for the employees.

By May 1948,

just two years after GYA's inauguration, The Young World made
the transition from a mimeographed newsletter to a full
fledged printed bilingual newsletter with a circulation of
two thousand copies.

It changed its format several times,

31Caption on photo, 12 July 1947, NA RG 111 SC 1941-1954,
Box 133, 286777; "Elternabend beim GYA," [Parents Meet at
GYA] NN, 26 Mar. 1949: 6; see also Lore Falter, personal
interview, 29 June 1995; "German Parents to Visit Army Youth
Center Nr. 1," "Eltern trafen sich im Jugendhaus Dutzenteich:
Deutsche Kinder sollen keine "Amis" werden!" [Parents met in
the Youth Center Dutzenteich: No Intentions to Transform
German Children into "Little Amis"!] YW, vol. 3, no. 4, 1
Apr. 1949: 3.
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Mrs. Augustus J. Regier, wife of Col. Augustus J. Regier of
the Nuremberg Military Post, is shown after she pours the
first cup of coffee at he first official German Youth Mothers
and GYA Officials meeting.
Approximately 200 mothers of
German youths, members of the Nurnberg GYA Club attended.
24. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 286777, 12 July 1947
but it always faithfully recorded American youth activities.
As should be expected,

the emphasis lay on successes and

achievements of the Nuremberg Posts's program.

Even budget

cuts and the Army's policy to turn the program over to the
Germans after 1951 could not stop its publication.
Lorraine

Schultz,

at

the

time

the

Post

GYA

approached the problem in typical American fashion.
1952 she found a local sponsor for the paper.

Captain
officer,
In July

Nuremberg's

largest supplier of photographic equipment assumed the cost
of producing the paper and had it printed in his business's
print shop.

In return, he had one page of The Young World
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for promoting photography in general and advertising his
products.

The newsletter continued until the end of the

program in 1954.32
Selsor's efforts to promote GYA within the Nuremberg
Post area in 1947 were not in vain.

During that year many

units throughout the Post started their own programs under
his and his staff's guidance.
were

operating

headquarters
average

of

was
more

in

the

region

responsible.
than

60,000

By 1948 forty-five centers
for

which

the

Throughout

the

young

persons

Nuremberg
region
per

an

month

participated in GYA events which an average of 450,000 people
attended.

Three officers, three enlisted men, one American

civilian and eighty-eight Germans worked full time for the
recreation and re-education of young Germans.33

32MG, Det B-211, Annual Historical Report, 20 July 1947;
NA RG 260, OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1425, 9/124-1/6; see
also Maar 47-49; most issues of the Young World are in NCA
AvPer 202.2 (apparently the newsletter found wide attention
within Military Government: the first issue is in NA RG 260
OMGBY, ID, Box 52, 10/60-1/46, the first German issue in NA
RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Act. Br. , Box 48, 10/43-2/14);
Nurnberg Post Journal, 11 Jan. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit Records,
Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122; "USAREUR GYA Thanks Mr.
Porst," YW, vol. 7, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 1953: 5.
33Monthly Report of the Deputy Commander in Chief, EUCOM,
31 May 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br.,
Box 37, 10/43-2/3; Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly
Report for First Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit Records,
Nuremberg Military Post, Box 124; Nuremberg Military Post,
GYA Quarterly Report for Second Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit
Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125, [1]; for a zone
wide perspective see "GYA Civic Centers," OMGUS Information
Bulletin, no. 109, 8 Sep. 1947: 7-8, 14, and "Army Youth
Program," OMGUS Information Bulletin, no. 80, 17 Feb. 1947:
21-23.
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German Children of the 385th Station Hospital GYA Club in
Nurnberg [sic!], Germany, work their private plots of ground
in th§ GYA garden.
Each boy or girl may grow whatever he
pleases in his own plot. There are approximately 150 small
gardens in the Nurnberg [sic!] area that are cared for by the
German children of the Nurnberg [sic!] GYA clubs.____
25. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 301250, 21 May 1948
Not all GYA efforts met with success.
Youth

Committee

in neighboring

When the Kreis

Fvirth asked

the

Army to

derequisition a house so that it would be able to transform
it into a youth center, the Army refused to oblige because it
had made

plans

for

German youth groups
longer

for

their

constructing

a

bowling

alley

there.

in Fiirth would have to wait a while

own

facilities

in

spite

of

Selsor's

21-23.
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intervention on behalf of the project.

In the meantime they

continued to rely on various GYA centers in the city.34

Wives of officers and enlisted men act as hostesses at the
grand opening of the Erlangen Youth Center, which is operated
by the Erlangen Air Force.
26. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 283024, 2 Apr. 1947
In spite of obstacles,

many units

in the Post area

emulated the example which the GYA center in Nuremberg set
for them.

Erlangen,

facility in March 1947.

for example,

opened

its own youth

It featured a library of over 5,000

volumes, a sports clinic, and, from May 1948 on, its own 35
mm film hour.
GYA

offered

Together with most units in the area the local
summer

camps

for

needy

publication to disseminate its news.

children

and

had

a

Like many others, the

^Letter Dr. Kaltenhauser, Fiirth KYC to LYC and OMGBY
headquarters, 21 Jan. 1947; NA RG 2 60 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/3.
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managers of the Erlangen center found that a garden project
appealed to its patrons.
initiatives.

Erlangen also developed its own

The local GYA chapter introduced youth day

rooms which permitted working mothers who did not have a
husband to leave their children under supervised care.

"Many

and urgent requests" caused the local Post to expand this
part of its program in 1948.

By June GYA Erlangen was

providing day care facilities for 160 children.35
In the course of

1947 the Army conducted extensive

inspections in Upper Franconia which revealed an interesting
picture.

Major Townsend, the inspecting officer, found much

praise for the majority of the youth centers he visited.
None of them operated under similar conditions or could even
rely

on

the

same

resources.

In

general

the

centers

functioned to Townsend's satisfaction, although he thought
that

there

was

much

room

for

improvement

and

that

GYA

officers and enlisted men should pay more attention to the
re-educational parts of their mission.

On only two occasions

the major recommended to remove personnel or to close down a

35"GYA Activities," Nuremberg Military Post, Erlangen
Subpost, Historical Report April-June 1948; NA RG 338 Unit
Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 119, [1]. Erlangen was
a quite typical local operation. All of the posts had their
own libraries by 1948, many offered summer camps and had
garden projects for which Selsor was able to obtain seeds and
other planting materials (Nuremberg Military Post, GYA
Quarterly Report for Second Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit
Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125) . Day Care Centers
also were not unique to Erlangen (see "Day Care Centers,"
OMGUS Information Bulletin, no. 113, 6 Oct. 1947: 2-4).
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This acrobatic act is staged at the opening night of the
Erlangen youth center. More than 2,000 youths belong and it
is operated by the Erlangen Air Force._______________
27. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 283025, 2 Apr. 1947
center.

In his reports Townsend took unit commanders and

other officers to task for being indifferent to the Army
program,

for

not

providing

the

necessary

personnel

and

support, and for the high rate of turnover which often left
a

good

program

in

limbo

and

young

Germans

bewildered.

According to him, German authorities did not always render
the desired cooperation.

When American troops withdrew from

Kronach, for example, local authorities initially kept the
GYA center and the youth hostel in the town's old fortress
open, but soon after the units were gone the city fathers
dismissed the German manager allegedly because of lack of
funds and closed the facilities at the castle, although the
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young people of the town urgently needed a center and a youth
hostel

and

had

demonstrated

their

support

for

the

GYA

creativity

and

institution.
Townsend
innovative

also

detected

programs.

In

a

Coburg,

lot

of

which

was

practically

surrounded by the Soviet zone from three sides, the major
found a well managed youth center under GYA auspices which
the

local

youth

had

constructed themselves.

They

also

handled the administration of the facilities in a democratic
fashion.
center

The local GYA officer had managed to steer the
free

of political

controversy,

a

task which was

certainly not easy in the vicinity of the very different
political outlook and content of the programs the FDJ offered
just a few miles away.

Apart from the already familiar

features, the young people who participated in the center's
activities had initiated a program for taking care of single
mothers and their babies, most of whom had been fathered by
American soldiers.36
1948 saw the inauguration of a very successful zone wide
GYA program which the Army designed to foster young peoples'
sense of fair play and sportsmanship, apart from providing
them with a meaningful occupation during their spare time.
In December Nurembergers witnessed the first soap box derby

36Clifford Townsend, Headquarters EUCOM, to Commanding
General, OMGUS, subject: reports of inspections of GYA
installations, 8 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 144, 5/296-2/1.
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in their city.

To everybody's surprise the local population

demonstrated a tremendous interest in the races.

Over 40,000

people assembled on the ruins around the old fortress to see
more than one hundred young boys and seven girls race down
the steep hill on cobblestone streets.

All of them had

constructed their cars at GYA centers.

Encouraged by the

success, Selsor promised additional derbies for the coming
year.

The next time police had to terminate the event early

because it was unable to control the crowds.

From the start

GYA enlisted the support of private sponsors such as the
German Shell Corporation, General Motors, or local factories.
Successful racers could win new motorcycles and bicycles,
cameras, plane trips from Nuremberg to Munich, vouchers for
clothes, and rain coats made by GYA sewing classes from scrap
materials the Army had donated.

The Adam Opel Car Factory,

a subsidiary of General Motors, provided the racers free of
charge with axles and wheels from 1949 on.

Many GIs, but

also local HICOG Resident Officers, acted as sponsors or lent
a helping hand during construction.

German teachers in Furth

showed their interest by offering their help and expertise to
soap box enthusiasts in their schools.

In 1950 more than a

thousand racers participated in preliminary races throughout
the Post area.

The winners came to Nuremberg to race in the

regional qualifiers which 15,000 spectators attended.
champion

of

the

zone-wide

finals

could

look

forward

The
to

becoming the owner of a motorcycle and a two week journey to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

523
the United States with all expenses paid by Opel and General
Motors for the parents as well.37
The soapbox derbies enjoyed much attention of the local
press from the first race on.

With corporate sponsors well

established, GYA retreated from center stage in 1950, but
German enthusiasm for this new sport did not wane.
12,000

spectators witnessed the races

In 1952

in Nuremberg.

Of

course the Army still was willing to lend a helping hand.
Young Germans continued to build their soap boxes in GYA
centers.

Army Engineers built a ramp for the event at the

former party rally grounds to make sure that operations went
smoothly and safely.38
37James 34-35; "GYA Sponsored First Nurnberg Soap Box
Derby: Big Hit With 40 000 Spectators," YW, vol 2, no. 23, 1
Dec. 1948: 1, 3, 4; "Over 1,100 Soap Boxes Ready to Run in
NMP," YW, vol. 4, no. 5, 4 May 1950: 5; "Further Lehrer
beraten junge Seif enkistlbauer," [Fiirth Teachers Advise Young
Soap Box Builders], YW, vol. 4, no. 5, 4 May 1950: 6; "15,000
see Grafenwohr Win 1950 NMP Box Derby,"
"Gen Handy Honors
Winner of US Zone Soap Box Derby," YW vol. 4, no. 7, July
1950: 1; "GYA Rennfahrer auf der Strecke," [GYA Racers En
Route] YW, vol. 4, no. 11, 1 Nov. 1950: 6; see also "Was ein
richtiger Rennfahrer werden will...: 40 000 Niirnberger
wohnten dem Burgbergrennen bei. 'Nervenzersetzende Rivalitat'
in Seifenkisten," [Who Wants to Become a Real Race Car
Driver...: 40,000 Nurembergers Attended Race at the Fortress
Hill. "Nerve Wrecking Rivalry" in Soap Boxes] NN, 22 Nov.
1948:
4;
"Kinderjubel
um
das
'Seifenkistl'-Rennen,"
[Children's Cheers for Soap Box Derby] NN, 30 May 1949: 5.
38For German coverage of the events see, for example,
"Was ein richtiger Rennfahrer werden will...: 40 000
Niirnberger wohnten dem Burgbergrennen bei. "Nervenzersetzende
Rivalitat" in Seifenkisten," [Who Wants to Become a Real Race
Car Driver...: 40,000 Nurembergers Attended Race at the
Fortress Hill; "Nerve Wrecking Rivalry" in Soap Boxes] NN, 22
Nov. 1948: 4; "Kinderjubel um das "Seifenkistl"-Rennen,"
[Children's Cheers for Soap Box Derby] NN, 30 May 1949: 5;
for the construction of the ramp in 1952 see photo and
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A soap box derby, sponsored by German Youth Activities, with
the help of various German industries, was held for German
children in Nurnberg on 29 May.
Young dare devil wins the
third race in his midget car.______________________________
28. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 323455, 29 May 1949
The following year a Nuremberg apprentice won the West
German championship.

He received a cheque for 5,000 marks to

help pay his education, the trip to the United States, and an
invitation to participate

in the American championships.

Extensive newspaper coverage accompanied him on his journey
to the New World and reported in detail about his experiences
at the championships in Akron, Ohio.

Even the Department of

caption, YW, vol. 7, no. 4, June/July 1953: 6.
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State's official shortwave radio broadcast "Voice of America"
featured the guest from Germany.39
Other GYA programs also received much publicity.

From

1949 on, for example, the Army organized zone wide handicraft
contests for boys and girls.

Projects ranged from needlework

and sewing to building boats and even model roller coasters.
GYA furnished the materials and facilities for the young
people.

In 1950 over 3,500 boys and girls participated in

the new program within the Nuremberg Post.

The following

year, judges had to evaluate the work of over 40,000 zone
wide contestants.
the contests,

The Nuremberg region always did well in

a fact the

local press duly acknowledged.

Exhibitions of the young people's work throughout the Post
area provided additional opportunities to generate public
support.40
39"Ein Niirnberger Bundessieger," [Nuremberger the Federal
Republic's Champion] NN, 20 Jul. 1953: 6; "Im Geleitzug durch
die StraBen," [Grand Reception in the Streets] NN, 22 Jul.
1953: 5; "Heinz Martin schied aus," [Heinz Martin eliminated]
NN, 11 Aug. 1953: 5; "Die Rader waren schuld," [Wheels to
Blame] NN, 20 Aug. 1953: 5; "Wie ein Staatsmann empfangen,"
[Reception of a Statesman] NN, 24 Aug. 1953: 7; the newspaper
continued its extensive and enthusiastic coverage of soapbox
derbies throughout the fifties.
40James 35-36; "Handfertigkeitswettbewerb mit iiber 3,500
Teilnehmern.
Madchen: Nahen, Stricken und Schneidern
iiberwiegt. Amerikaner und Deutsche in den Schiedsgerichten
[Handicraft Contest with over 3,500 Participants.
Girls:
Sewing, Knitting and Tailoring Most Popular.
American and
German Referees] YW vol. 4, no. 4, 1 Apr. 1950: 5; "Miinchen
erster Sieger, Nurnberg zweiter im groBen GYA-Handfertigkeitswettbewerb," [Munich First, Nuremberg Second in Zonewide
Handicraft Contest] YW vol. 4, no. 6, 2 June 1950: 3; "9
Preise im Handfertigkeitswettbewerb nach Franken: Insgesamt
beteiligten sich iiber 40,000 Jugendliche," [9 Prizes in
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Examining the items of the GYA handicraft exhibition at the
GYA center are: Dorothea Erhardt, German handicraft teacher;
1st Lt. L.A. Schultz, Assistant Post GYA Officer, and Mrs.
Harold Carroll.
29. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 344451, 3 May 1950
In 1949 Major Selsor and the Nuremberg GYA initiated a
zonewide program designed to revive West Germany's cultural
life.
contest

From
for

1950

on Nuremberg

aspiring

young

hosted

singers

of

the

Meistersinger

classical

music.

Handicraft Contest for Franconia: Overall Attendance over
40,000] YW, vol. 5, no. 6, Jun. 1951: 3; "Craft Contest
Highlights April Program," YW, vol. 6, no. 4, Apr. 1952: 3;
"All Youth Invited to Join In 1954 GYA Handicraft Contest,"
YW vol. 7, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 1954: 5; for coverage in the
German press see, for example, "45 Meisterbastler erhalten
Preise: Feierstunde im Armee-Theater," [45 Master Tinkerers
Receive Prizes: Celebration at the Army-Theater] NN, 25 Apr.
1952: 10; "Verdienter Lohn fur gute Arbeit: Die 81 ersten
Gewinner
im
GYA-Handfertigkeitswettbewerb
wurden
ausgezeichnet," [Deserved Premium for Work Well Done: 81
First Prize Winners in GYA Handicraft Contest Received
Prizes] NN, 25 Apr. 1952: 9.
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Selsor

from the start tried to

project.

interest Germans

in the

He was able to assemble a committee of German

musicians, music critics and other dedicated men and women
close to the music scene in the city who worked out the
regulations.

The highest American and German dignitaries,

among them High Commissioner John McCloy and the Federal
Republic's first President, Theodor Heuss, acted as honorary
chairpersons.

Local

firms

and

factories

provided

many

attractive prizes which made the contest a resounding success
from the start.
Germany.

Preliminaries took place throughout West

The finalists met in Nuremberg and competed in the

opera before a carefully selected jury and a packed house.
The winners

received considerable cash prizes,

but more

important for their further development was the publicity and
scholarships in the United States which obviously helped to
launch them successfully.

Hermann Prey, one of Germany's

most accomplished postwar singers, started his career in this
way.41

41James 36.
Both, the Young World and the local
newspapers extensively reported about the Meistersinger
contest throughout its existence.
See, for example, "Mrs.
and Mr. McCloy Ehrenprotektoren im Sangerwettbewerb,11 [Mrs.
and Mr. McCloy Honorary Chairpersons of Singing Competition],
YW vol. 4, no. 3, March 1950: 1; "Meistersinger Working Comm.
Sets Dates for 1951 Contest: Seven Equal Prizes for the
Winners - Age Limit from 18 to 25," YW, vol. 4, no. 9, Sept.
1950: 1; "President Heuss and High Com McCloy, John Handy as
Meistersinger Co-Chairmen," YW vol. 6, no. 3, Mar. 1952: 1;
"1952 GYA Meistersinger Proclaimed," YW, vol. 6, no. 6, July
1952: 1.
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Reorientation
Although GYA focused on recreational and educational
activities, Selsor and his successors never lost sight of the
re-orientation aspect of their work.

In November 1947 the

Nuremberg Military Post reported that steps had been taken to
organize
centers

German

advisory councils

in the Post area.

The

for

the three

largest

idea was a success.

In

Erlangen, for example, 450 parents discussed the next year of
the program in 1950 and elected their representatives for the
advisory council.42
Selsor and his superiors also tried to make sure that
American and German employees received adequate training for
their rather difficult mission.
Army

to

officials.

initiate

training

MG criticism prompted the

programs

for

American

To improve the program further,

GYA

headquarters

hired an American civilian youth specialist as its official
adviser.

In September 1948 GYA also began to establish

training schools for its German employees.

In addition to

that, MG and GYA representatives met at regular intervals to
discuss their problems.

To be able to assess the situation

better on the state level, they invited representatives from
the Bavarian Youth Committee to their conferences from 1950
on.

On

the

local

level

Selsor

initiated

round

table

conferences for all American and German employees within the
42Nuremberg Post, Narrative GYA Report for Nov. 1947; NA
RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 144, 5/2962 /1 .
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GYA 3UGENDSANGERWETTSTREIT
riitd e r.s fle is tp rs iiig e c s ta d t l9.-20.3uni Iosa

30. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 454852, 20 Jun. 1953
Post area.

The turnout was not always satisfactory,

but

Selsor also maintained personal contact by means of frequent
inspections of

the centers throughout the Post.

German

employees and volunteers of the Nuremberg GYA also had the
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opportunity to attend courses in youth leadership schools
such as Ruit near Stuttgart.43
Selsor's efforts were not always recognized by high
ranking

members

of

the

OMGUS

youth

section

which

had

relocated to Nuremberg from Berlin when the blockade began.
In July 1949 Selsor prepared two training conferences for
German GYA employees of the Nuremberg Military Post.
invited Norrie to participate in a panel discussion.

He

Selsor

explained that
conversations with both Americans and Germans have shown
that there must be a meeting of the minds of German
youth, German parents, German youth officials, and those
Americans who are endeavoring to build up a program
towards
the reorientation
of German youth,
the
preparation of German youth for participation in future
democratic Germany.
Apparently Norrie was not impressed with Selsor's efforts and
did

not

participate.

invitation

stated:

A
"Not

brief

handwritten

important.

Only

note

on

the

suggesting

a

discussion between GYA, MG, and Germans."44
43Headquarters, EUCOM, memorandum, 25 Sept. 1948; NA RG
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/8;
"HICOG and GYA Personnel Will Meet in Nurnberg," YW vol. 4,
no.6, 2 June 1950: 1; "GYA Personnel to Receive Special
Training: Parliamentary Procedure First on Schedule," YW,
vol. 4, no. 11, Nov. 1950: 1; "I Visit a Youth Leader
Training Course," YW, vol. 3, no. 4, 1 Apr. 1949: 7; for one
of Selsor's many complaints about lack of participation in
training conferences see Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Office
to Commanding General, Headquarters EUCOM, Attn.: Director of
GYA, 16 Aug. 1949, subject: monthly narrative GYA report for
July 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br.,
BOX 154, 5/293-2/7.
^Invitation from Maj. Selsor, Post GYA Officer to
Lawrence Norrie, OMGUS, 5 Jan. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/295-3/3.
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Dr. Weldon Shofstall, left, Dean of Stephen's College,
Columbia, Missouri, at present German Youth Activities
civilian adviser for the European Command, conducts a
discussion on "discussion procedure" with a group of German
youth leaders at the Berghaus Sudelfeld , Germany, a former
SS officers' recreation area. This meeting is held to bring
about better understanding among youth leaders throughout the
first military district.
Twelve of the group present are
chosen to participate in a discussion. The rest of the group
acts as the audience.
Members of the audience are given
rating sheets, on which to write their criticisms and
opinions and answers of the discussion group. Carl Stordel,
who is acting as his interpreter, is with the GYA in Bamberg.
He teaches English to the girls of the GYA girl's club.
31. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 292388, 14 Feb. 1948
While

all

reorientation
further.
the

framework

activities
of

MG,

lay

GYA

well

carried

within
its

the

mission

Whereas OMGUS always made it a point to remain in

background,

people.
help

support

the Army

reached

directly

out to

young

The American sponsors of GYA activities did much to

them

gain

a

new

perspective

on

their

responsibilities in society and in the world.

place

and

Activities
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within the centers offered many opportunities to practice
democratic procedures.

GYA encouraged youth groups to write

their own constitutions and to elect representatives.
start the undertaking was not easy.
never

participated

in

Many young people had

elections

responsibilities for a group.

At the

or

taken

over

In 1950 GYA center no.

l

invited all youth groups and individuals connected with its
activities to form a youth council whose task it would be to
develop operating procedures, to support those groups who
needed

help,

planning

of

and

to

participate

all

events

within

in
the

the

scheduling

center.

and

Selsor's

successor, Major Robert A. Norman, was satisfied with the
first meeting, but also pointed out that the young people had
wasted considerable time because they were not acquainted
with democratic procedure.

The council would provide them

with the opportunity to practice.45
GYA officers in other communities carried the idea of
democratizing young people a step further.

In February 1950

Charles Emerick, the High Commission's Resident Officer in
Fiirth, discussed the possibility of having a "mayor for a
day"

program

with

local

authorities

and

the

GYA

45"Jugendbeirat im Haus am Dutzenteich," [Youth Advisory
Council in Dutzenteich Youth Center] YW vol. 4, no. 6, 2 June
1950:
5;
"Dutzenteich
Youth
Center
Accepted
House
Constitution," YW vol. 4, no. 11, Nov. 1950: 4. Many other
youth centers had similar institutions.
See, for example,
"Bayreuth: Musterbeispiel eines Jugendrates," [Bayreuth: Fine
Example of Youth Council] YW, vol. 5, no. 6, Jun. 1951: 3;
see also Selsor 5-6.
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representatives in Zirndorf, a small town in the vicinity of
Fiirth.

According to him,

positive.

the response was immediate and

Without any further help from Mr.

Emerick GYA

officers and local officials cooperated closely in making his
proposal a reality.
schools

elected

In March 1950 students of the local

officials

to

occupy

the

most

important

positions in city hall, which the adults quite willingly left
to them for that day.

The Nuremberg radio station even

provided the town with its own branch, which a young reporter
supplied with the news of the day.

Emerick thought that all

candidates the young people had selected were "exceptionally
good".

As a first sign of changing times, the young people

chose a girl for second mayor.
to hold an office in the town.

She was the first female ever
All parties involved agreed

that the idea had been a success and should be carried on the
next year.46
Hands-on experience in democratic procedures was just
one of GYA's reorientation features.

Its managers encouraged

^OLCBY, Resident Officer Fiirth to OLCBY, FOD, 29 Mar.
1950; special report, Jugendregierung Zirndorf, Landkreis
Fiirth; enclosure in Essential Elements of Information for the
period 10 Mar. to 7 Apr. 1950; NA RG 466 OLCBY, ID, Elements
of Essential Information 1950-1951; "GYA 'Youth day' at
Zirndorf Deemed Success by Officials," YW, vol. 4, no. 4, 1
Apr. 1950: 1; "Die Jugend von Zirndorf hatte ihren groBen
Tag: Wahlurne, Abstimmung, Stadtverwaltung, Rundfunk: Alles
war fiir einen Tag in der Hand der Jugend," [Big Day for
Zirndorf's Youth: Polls, Voting, Town Administration, Radio:
All for One Day in the Youths' Hands] YW, vol. 4, no. 4, 1
Apr. 1950: 3; Military Governor S.P. Sussel, head of the
Kronach detachment, actually pioneered the idea in Franconia
as early as December 1948.
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young people to initiate or participate in community projects
which ranged from playing music in hospitals to constructing
playgrounds or youth centers.

To help them overcome their

previous isolation, the Army introduced its Youth Helps Youth
program which provided groups and individuals with pen pals
in the United States.

In the Nuremberg Post area alone the

Army was able to initiate contacts between more than 4,000
German and American boys and girls.

GYA also provided many

of the quiz bowl programs which HICOG initiated in the 1950s
with the necessary facilities.47
Of course much depended on the way staff and volunteers
interacted

with

young

Germans.

Reorientation

Nuremberg GYA often had a very personal note.

in

the

Lore Falter

had been a member of the Nazis' girls organization where she
mainly

participated

in

folk

singing

groups.

She

took

advantage of the possibilities the GYA center offered to
revive a singing group.

Since nothing else was available,

she used a book the Nazis had printed.
Nazi

lore,

the

book

also

unpolitical German folk songs.

contained

Besides the usual
traditional

and

Falter took great care to

47James 36-38; "GYA to Copy HICOG with Reorientation
Quizzes," YW vol. 4, no. 11, Nov. 1950: 1; "Quiz Programs
enjoy Increasing Popularity," YW vol. 5, no. 4, Apr. 1951: 4;
for specific activities in the Nuremberg area see, for
example,
"Dutzenteich Singing Group Practises Community
Service," YW vol. 5, no. 6, June 1951: 5; "Sorghof Youth
Center - Community Service Project," YW vol 5., no. 13, Dec.
1951:
3;
"4000
Deutsch-Amerikanische
Freundschaften
vermittelt," [4000 German-American Friendships Arranged] YW
vol. 6, no. 4, Apr. 1952: 8.
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hide the book from American eyes, but one day Selsor asked
her to show it to him.

Falter was afraid that he would

either confiscate her book or even might regard her as a Nazi
and terminate her appointment as singing instructor.

The

Major, who was certainly no stranger to the lack of suitable
singing materials, did nothing of the sort.

He took the book

with a smile and promised to look the other way if he found
anything that should not be in there.

Instead of censorship

and punishment, Falter got a valuable lesson in tolerance,
understanding and respect which she never forgot.48
Surprisingly,

even

young

people

with

background participated in GYA activities.

a

solid

Nazi

The Selsors took

great care to be especially attentive to them, since they
felt that this group needed reorientation most.

One girl

came from an ardent Nazi family and was herself the prototype
of an enthusiastic and unrepentant admirer of Hitler in 1947,
when she visited the Nuremberg center for the first time.
June Selsor never challenged her convictions or excluded her
from the girls' activities, but rather spent more time with
her which even included driving lessons.

On one of these

excursions the car was passing in front of the tribune where
Hitler had made his appearances during the party rallies.

As

if in a trance the girl stood up in the car with the Nazi
salute and her foot firmly on the accelerator.

Mrs. Selsor

finally managed to push the girl's foot off the accelerator
48Lore Falter, personal interview, 29 June 1995.
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at almost fifty miles per hour just in time to prevent a
nasty accident.

According to Mrs. Selsor, the girl's Nazi

convictions slowly subsided.

She became a close friend of

the family with whom she remained in contact over the next
five decades.49
The German-American Youth Club
One

of

Selsor's

first

initiatives

in

the

realm

of

reorientation actually caused a considerable stir within
Military Government.

Apparently unaware of the very real

differences between Military Government Detachment B-211 and
the Nuremberg GYA,

the Niirnberger Nachrichten reported in

November 1946 that the "Office for the Support of the German
youth of the American Military Government" (GYA) invited all
young Germans between fifteen and twenty-five years of age to
attend the initial meeting of a German-American discussion
club.

With the Major's encouragement, his German secretary,

Richard Sperber, had decided to found a club with German and
American membership to initiate the intellectual exchange
between the two nations.
Military

Government

In spite of Selsor's support the

detachment's

public

safety

officer

refused to grant the new club a license because at that time
joint German-American ventures were not officially permitted.
Selsor decided to take the case to the leading youth officer
in Bavaria, Hans Thomsen.

He explained to him that OMGUS

could not accept several passages in the statutes as well as
49Selsor 13; personal correspondence with Mrs. Selsor.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

537
the name of the club, because German-American cooperation was
still illegal.

The Major did not give up and ended up with

Lawrence Norrie, the man in charge of all youth activities in
the American zone.

Norrie showed more understanding.

He

thought that the club could have a license as long as Selsor
promised that he would supervise its activities closely.50
Norrie's support notwithstanding,
tragicomical

dimensions

during

the

the affair reached
following

months.

Apparently headquarters did not disseminate the news about
the granting of the license to all divisions.
1947 the CIC became involved in the affair.

In January
Sensing the

brewing of a subversive storm of sizable proportions,

a

special agent decided to conduct a "discreet investigation,"
after he had learned form the Nuremberg security officer that
the club was operating without a license.

In best secret

service fashion he employed an infiltrator who was working
for the GYA in Fiirth to become a member of the club for
spying purposes.

The agent dutifully reported that the club

was still functioning and even accepting Americans as members
in clear violation of Military Government directives.

He

provided personal profiles of the two leading German members
together

with

their

Third

Reich

backgrounds.

Further

evidence included a membership card of the infiltrator, as
S0"Deutsch-Amerikanischer
Diskussionsclub,"
[GermanAmerican Discussion Club] NN, 23 Nov. 1946: 4; Hans Thomsen,
OMGBY to Director, OMGBY, 5 Mar. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
Intelligence Predecessor Organizations, Box 11, 10/87-3/11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

538

32. Membership Card GAYC Nuremberg, 1947 (Courtesy of Gerhard
Knochlein, Nuremberg)
well as an invitation to a costume ball in January 1947,
undoubtedly an ideal setting for sinister purposes.

Although

the club received its license by the end of January, the CIC
investigation
attention.
Bavarian

made

sure

that

it

would

receive

further

In March the news reached the director of the
Land

Detachment

who

explanation from Hans Thomsen.

demanded

and

received

an

Information control continued

to keep a close eye on the club's activities, but obviously
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Norrie understood the complete nonsense of the whole affair.
Apparently due to his initiative, OMGUS issued new directives
in July 1947 which permitted Americans to become involved in
joint German-American ventures as long as they "promoted
understanding of democracy" or furthered "worthy projects in
the local communities."
important step towards
between victors

The Club and Selsor had made an
officially changing the relations

and vanquished

into those of more

equal

partners.51
The

directive

opened

the

throughout the Nuremberg Post.
Hof

inaugurated

their

own

way

for

similar

ventures

In October 1948 Ansbach and

German-American

youth

clubs.

Erlangen followed suit in March 1949.52
Untouched by internal Military Government affairs the
Nuremberg club flourished.
German dignitaries,

Local Military Government and

among them the Bavarian Government's

Representative for Middle Franconia, Lord Mayor Ziegler, and

5IHeadquarters, Sub-region Niirnberg, Counterintelligence
Corps Region VI, memorandum Julius Stein, Special Agent, to
Headquarters, 11 Jan. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Intelligence
Predecessor Organizations, Box 111, 10/87-3/11; Det B-211,
ICD to OMGBY Political Affairs Division, Bericht iiber den
Diskussionsabend am 26.3.47 im Kiinstlerhaus; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
ID, Director,
Box 17
[Envelope containing classified
material]; OMGUS, Commanding General, Berlin, 28 July 1947,
subject: formation of Military Government (US) discussion
clubs;
NA
RG
260
OMGBY,
Intelligence
Predecessor
Organizations, Box 104, 10/86-3/7.
52,1
Two New Youth Clubs Open in Nbg. M.P.,".YW, 1 Oct.
1948: l; Erlangen Sub-Post, weekly information bulletin, 30
Mar. 1949; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post,
Box 121.
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Mayor Levie participated in the inauguration ceremonies in
December 1946.

One year after its inauguration it boasted

over seven hundred members.53
From the start, Lamm tried to make the club a truly
joint venture.

In November 1948 he alerted the director of

the OMGUS Education and Cultural Relations Division which had
just recently relocated from Berlin to Nuremberg,

to the

existence of the club and invited him and "and all members of
your Division" to attend a meeting in the club home located
in the city's youth bunker.54
Using
together

his

members

connections
of

his

with

club

the

and

IMT,

Lamm

American

brought

high

school

students in the courtroom to hold their discussions there.
Participants debated whether the tribunals were fair or if
world government could solve their present problems.

To help

developing this spirit and apparently upon the request of the
club members, Selsor provided the Club with 1,000 verbatim
translations of the American constitution, of which 950 were
distributed within a few weeks.

The change of rules and

these very constructive activities apparently induced the
local MG detachment to throw its full support behind the
venture.

In December 1948 it reported to headquarters that

53Chronik der Stadt Nurnberg 1945-49:
1946; NCA F2 no. 48.

209,

7 December

^Letter from Hans Lamm to Director, E&CRD, 1 Nov. 1948;
NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 129,
5/294-1/17.
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Approximately two hundred American and German youngsters
gathered in the main court room of the Palace of Justice in
Nuremberg, where Goering, Ribbentrop and other bigwig Nazis
had to account for their atrocious misdeeds.
The youth
gathered in this impressive hall to discuss a question which
may decide their fate and ours: "Will world government save
us?" With amazing maturity and alertness, with refreshing
candor and frankness, opinions were exchanged. There was no
uniformity and no regulated thinking, but agreement on one
issue; that the peoples of the world must learn to live
together and must force their governments to adopt effective
measures for preventing war. The German youngsters, former
members of the Hitler Youth, and the Americans, high school
students, demanded world unity for freedom and peace for all
peoples. A lengthy question and answer period was conducted
in the style of American town hall meetings and gave youth
the opportunity to express their doubts,
hopes, and
convictions. This is democracy in action, reeducation in
practice and groundwork for a better future without ado and
fanfares.
33. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 315814, 20 Dec. 1948
the German-American Youth Club was "what has been needed for
so long in Germany."

The authors suggested that local school

officials should become actively involved in this interchange

of ideas between Americans and Germans.

MG observers noted
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that

the

majority

of

the

participants

in

the

latest

discussion round in the halls of the IMT
both German and American, raised their hands in favor of
one World Government. They felt that the only way out
of the present dilemma is for the establishment of one
World Government. The result of this forum speaks for
itself.55
During the next years the Club continued to discuss
topics of current interest ranging from the Nuremberg Trials
in 1947,

school reform in 1949, to West Germany's social

problems, or the role Germany would have to play in defending
the West in 1951.

Lamm succeeded in interesting prominent

Americans

Chief

such

as

Justice

Telford

Taylor

or

Land

Commissioner Murray van Wagoner in addressing the club.

In

February 1950 Helen McCloy, the High Commissioner's wife, not
only gave a presentation about "The Responsibilities of Young
People

in

a

Democracy” but

also

promised

to

attend

an

informal discussion with club members after the end of her
official program.

With these high calibre speakers it comes

as no surprise that local German politicians became frequent
guests at these events.56
55Caption photos 315814, 315815; NA RG 111 SC 1941-54;
Det. B-211, bi-weekly reorientation report, 16-31 Dec. 1948;
NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Headquarters Records, Box 342, 10/542 /2 0 .
56,lSchulreform im Bild," [School Reform in Pictures] NN,
9 Feb. 1949: 3; "Mrs. McCloy Gast beim GAY Club," [Mrs.
McCloy Guest of GAY-Club] YW, vol. 4, no. 2, 1 Feb. 1950: 3;
"Deutsche Schicksalsfragen": 5 Jahre Deutsch-Amerikanischer
Jugendclub," [Vital Questions For Germany: 5 Years GermanAmerican Youth Club] NN, 24 Oct. 1951: 5; "Alle Parteien sind
'sozial': Ein Diskussionsabend beim Jugendclub," [All Parties
are "Social Minded": A Discussion Evening at the Youth Club]
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Not all local dignitaries were willing to help with the
re-education

effort.

The

director

of

Nuremberg's

art

collections, Schulz, for example, displayed a lively interest
in the Nuremberg GYA's efforts to revive the city's cultural
life and even offered to participate in these ventures.

In

March 1950 a member of the German-American Club approached
Schulz and inquired if he would be willing to inform its
members about the current state of the city's reconstruction.
Apparently thinking that the Club was part of Major Selsor's
domain, Schulz approached him in May about the possibility of
giving such a presentation.

After a considerable amount of

confusion which Selsor helped to clarify, Schulz became aware
that the club was not connected with the American staff.
Schulz's reply to the major's request to support the club in
spite of this fact came promptly.

He wrote to Selsor that he

would support the American authorities, but that he had no
intention of wasting his time with the German-American Youth
Club.

At

the

same time

Schulz

informed the

club

that

preparations for the city's impending 900th anniversary were
taking up all his time,

making it impossible for him to

accept the club's invitation.

Apparently lecturing Americans

about progress in Germany was one thing, supporting young

NN, 17 Nov. 1951: 5. The Chronicler for the Nuremberg City
Archives dedicated considerable space to the German-American
Youth Club.
See, for example, Chronik der Stadt Niirnberg
1945-1949: 284, 22 July 1947; 387, 13 February 1948; NCA F2
no. 48.
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Germans'

attempts

to

become

informed

citizens

quite

another.57
At the end of 1947 Lamm, by then one of the chairpersons
of the club, began to reach out to other organizations with
similar

interests

and

prepared

American clubs in Bavaria.
were not yet permitted,

a

conference

of

German-

Since statewide organizations

both Selsor and Raymond Spahn of

OMGBY Youth Section thought that the idea was premature.
Instead of insisting on his original plan, Lamm settled for
a community wide discussion meeting to which he invited the
man in charge of Bavaria, Governor Murray van Wagoner.

These

meetings developed into Nuremberg's widely publicized youth
forums.

The organizers always were able to find topics of

current interest and distinguished speakers for these events.
Even

when

prominent

people

were

not

able

to

come

to

Nuremberg, they usually found the time to respond to Lamm's
requests with enthusiasm.

Lamm received messages from Lucius

D. Clay, John McCloy and even Eleanor Roosevelt.58 Under the
57Letter Demleitner, GYAC, to Schulz, 21 Mar. 1950;
Schulz to Selsor, 2 May 1950; Schulz to Demleitner, 4 May
1950; Selsor to Schulz, 11 May 1950; Demleitner to Schulz, 13
May 1950; Schulz to Selsor,
16 May 1950; Schulz to
Demleitner, 16 May 1950; NCA C34 no. 17.
58See, for example, his exchange of letters with John
McCloy throughout his tenure as High Commissioner. Although
McCloy never was able to attend one of the forums, he made
sure to comply with Lamm's request for a letter addressing
the participants and that a high caliber speaker from HICOG
would be available. Lamm to McCloy, 23 Apr. 1950; McCloy to
Lamm, 26 Sept. 1950, 11 Oct. 1950; Lamm to McCLoy, 23 Jan.
1951; McCloy to Lamm, 12 Feb. 1951; Lamm to McCloy, 7 Nov.
1951; McCloy to Lamm, 15 Nov. 1951, 6 Dec. 1951; NA RG 466
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guideline

"We

Build

Our

featured

representatives

Bavarian

State,

as

well

World",
of

the

Military

as

of

first

youth

Government,

local

forum
of

the

authorities

who

introduced the participants to the different functions of a
democratic government and engaged in lively discussions on
the role young people would have to play in this process.
Although the newspaper dedicated a full page to the forum, it
did not mention that the east-west conflict had begun to
encroach on reorientation.

Major Selsor, who attended the

forum as well, reported to headquarters that the Free German
Youth

had

been the most

vocal

group

during

the

event.

According to him, they designed their questions "to embarrass
the speakers" and "appeared to have a political import."59
Political agitation notwithstanding the club continued
along the lines it had set.

A second forum took place in the

HICOG, Security-Segregated General Records, 1949-1952; see
also Maar 110-111 for a list of important personalities with
whom GYA members became acquainted.
Much of the HICOG
material is still classified, which makes working with this
source difficult.
S9Memorandum Dr. Spahn re.: German-American Youth Club,
22 Dec. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br.,
Box 37, 10/43-2/2; "Frankisches Jugendforum diskutierte: 'Wir
bauen unsere Welt:' 300 Jugendliche aus 40 Stadten trafen
sich in Nurnberg - Vertreter der Militarregierung, der
bayerischen Regierung und der Stadt Nurnberg beantworteten
Fragen zu Gegenwartsproblemen," [Franconian Youth Forum
Discussed "We Build Our World:" 300 Young People from 40
communities met in Nuremberg - Representatives of MG, the
Bavarian State Government, and the City of Nuremberg Answered
Questions About Current Problems] NN, 27. Apr. 1949: 3;
Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Office, to Commanding General,
Headquarters EUCOM, ATTN. Director of GYA, Monthly Narrative
Report for Apr. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 45, 10/47-1/7.
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fall of the same year, in which prominent men and women from
France,

the Untied States,

India and Germany,

among them

Frank Klier who was still in Nuremberg in 1949, and Franz
Joseph StrauB, the man in charge of youth for the State of
Bavaria,

tried to analyze the current crisis.

In 1951

Germany's role in Europe aroused much interest.60
Interestingly, some Germans began a witchhunt against
suspected

communist

agitators

even

before

the

infamous

Senator Joseph McCarthy took center stage in Washington in
1950.

Lutheran ministers

warned

the

Americans

from

in Nuremberg consistently had
1945

on

that

they

should

concentrate on the fight against ,,Bolshevism,, instead of
trying to denazify,

re-educate,

and democratize Germans.

60,1'Die Zeitkrise und ihre Losung:' 2. Internationales
Jugend-Forum
des
Deutsch-Amerikanischen
Jugendklubs
eroffnet," [The Crisis of Our Times and Solutions: Second
International Youth Forum of the German-American Youth Club
Opened] NN, 10 Sept. 1949: 14; "Jugend diskutierte die Krise
der Zeit: 2. Internationales Jugend-Forum des DeutschAmerikanischen Jugendklubs beendet," [Youth Discussed the
Crisis of Our Times: Second International Youth-Forum of the
German-American Youth Club Ended] NN, 12 Sept. 1949: 6;
"Professor Hale wird Jugendforum eroffnen," [Professor Hale
will Open Youth Forum], YW, vol. 4, no. 11, Nov. 1950: 3;
"Third Nuremberg Youth Forum Saw Heated Discussions," YW,
vol. 4, no. 12, Dec. 1950: 2; "'Gesprach mit der Jugend:' Das
Vierte Nordbayerische Jugendforum," ["Discourse with Youth:"
The Fourth North Bavarian Youth Forum] NN, 5 May 1951: 20;
"'Familiarize Youth With Self Government Early!' First Youth
Forum Brought Many Suggestions," YW vol. 5, no. 9, Sept.
1951: 1,2,7.
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These efforts would invariably drive Germans into the arms of
the Soviets.61
During the following years the presence of Soviet troops
and a Stalinist regime in the Soviet

zone of occupation

certainly had an impact on Nuremberg and the surrounding
region.

The Nuremberg Military Post bordered the Soviet zone

in the north and Czechoslovakia in the east.

Events like the

Berlin blockade made Americans and those Germans who had cast
their lots with them apprehensive about the future.

June

Selsor recalled that a number of dependents who were living
with their husbands in Nuremberg decided to return to the
United States in 1948.

German rumors that communists had

marked the houses the Americans occupied for "plunder and
murder"

in case the Russians were

nothing to ease the tension.
to deal with

coming,

certainly did

Mrs. Selsor and her husband had

worried GYA employees

who

inquired

if the

Selsors would be able to secure a place for them and their
families on American planes in case of an evacuation.

Others

related to their American friends or employers that they were
on ominous lists which the communists allegedly had written.
Selsor and German GYA workers also found that many boys and

61See, for example, Dean Schieder's "Ansprache vor den
amerikanischen
Kriegspfarrern,
17.12.45
in
Zirndorf."
Schieder's answers to an ICD survey conducted by Hans Feiler
in Nuremberg showed that he had not changed his mind in 1947.
As far as the political future of the world was concerned,
Schieder commented that it was clear to everyone that earlier
or later there would be a confrontation between East and West
and possibly war (LCA Kreisdekan Nurnberg 138) .
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girls were reluctant to visit their centers or to become
involved in GYA activities because they were speculating that
the

communists

might

come

and

did

not

want

retribution in case of an American withdrawal.
success

of

the

Berlin

airlift

confidence in the Americans.

in

1949

to

face

The obvious

seemed

to

boost

Attendance numbers throughout

the Post increased dramatically from May of that year on.62
The Cold War brought to light that even some of those
people who were much in favor of the American presence in
Germany and of a reorientation of German thought sometimes
did not understand the American mission.

Richard Sperber,

the first president and founder of the German-American youth
club, who had been secretary in Selsor's office in 1946,
found himself at odds with Hans Lamm in 1949.

A letter to

Lamm under the headline "About Freedom of Speech in the Club"
strongly objected to the Club's invitation of former Lord
Mayor Hans Ziegler— a Social Democrat who had been expelled
by his own party— to talk about his recent journey to Moscow.
According to Sperber,

Ziegler had previously accused the

United States of trying to provoke a war and to "slander the
American nation, the same nation, to which you have the good
fortune to belong," without being punished for it.

Sperber

demanded the immediate cancellation of Ziegler's appearance
at the club because Ziegler would certainly use it as a forum

62Selsor 10-11; "Participation Booming," YW vol. 4, no.
2: 2 .
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for further anti-American and pro-Soviet

agitation.

He

thought that such an action certainly would disrupt the
rather fragile beginning of the German-American friendship.
Sperber suspected that Ziegler's invitation was just part of
a sinister plot on Lamm's behalf.

He constructed the fact

that Lamm had publicly protested against Ziegler's decision
to invite only Free German Youth members to a peace rally as
a clear indicator of Lamm's intentions.

Sperber also noted

that Lamm had invited three prominent communists to the
previous youth forum, which "was quite a lot for such a small
and insignificant party."

Unwittingly using vocabulary which

clearly had its roots in the Third Reich, Sperber concluded
that he had not
founded the German-American Youth Club so that you
permit it now to be abused as a welcome propaganda stage
for communist fellow travellers!
The healthy and democratically thinking members of the
club therefore should defend themselves with all its
energy against attempts to carry the virus of
disintegration in its youth organization.63
aRichard Sperber to Hans Lamm, 2 Nov. 1949 (underlined
in the original).
Apparently American officials had not
forgotten the 1947 order of monitoring the Club's activities.
The letter and Lamm's reply found their way into the
intelligence reports which Hans Feiler, still in Nuremberg as
intelligence officer for HICOG, sent to Munich (NA RG 466
OLCB, ID 1949-1950, Bi-weekly Reports from Nuremberg Field
Office) .
Sperber's choice of words betrays the deep and lasting
impact of antisemitic vocabulary even after the Third Reich
was gone and discredited. Daniel Goldhagen (Hitler's Willing
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1996) esp. 64-65) cites impressive evidence
that comparing Jews with vermin and deadly diseases,
depicting Jews as an evil enemy in the midst of Germany, was
not just a Nazi invention.
The Nazis expanded the target
group to Bolsheviks and legitimized the phraseology.
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Lamm's answer revealed his commitment to fairness and
his

faith in the strength of democratic principles.

He

pointed out to his predecessor, who, according to Lamm, had
not

attended Club activities

for years,

that the Club's

executive committee was convinced that
it can only serve the healthy and democratically
thinking club members if they deal with representatives
of all [political] directions.
It appears to be a
matter of course to us that we do not make an exception
to the principle of free speech in the case of a man
whom the SPD has expelled.
Lamm rejected any form of pre-selection or censorship of
people

scheduled to speak

at

the

club.

He

found

that

Sperber's anticommunist zeal often led him to misrepresent
the

facts

or

at

least to

misinterpret

them.

The

Club

president pointed out to Sperber, who was a member of the
Social

Democratic Party

and

was

working

for the

Social

Democratic newspaper, that none of his party's leading men
had found it necessary to attend the youth forums to which
they had been invited while the Communists apparently had
regarded them to be sufficiently important to be present.
Lamm further noted that three Germans had talked about their
experiences in the United States during the previous months
so that it would only be fair to give another German— who
Sperber's letter supports Goldhagen's argument about a deeply
ingrained racist antisemitism in Germany's population,
although his conclusions are certainly open to dispute.
Apparently Sperber was neither aware of its racist
implications, which must have been all too familiar to Lamm,
nor of the irony that he was actually verbally continuing
Hitler's fight against the enemy that had survived World War
II and Germany's racial cleansing.
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still

considered

himself

a

Social

Democrat

and

not

a

Communist— the chance to talk about his experiences in the
Soviet Union.

He thought that the members of the club were

sufficiently mature and critical to resist any pro-Soviet
propaganda that might occur.

The interpreter also called

Sperber's attention to the fact that the Communists made no
bones about their dislike of the German-American Youth Club,
because it resisted any attempts to be abused for party
politics.

Lamm concluded that

we are and will remain above party politics and defend
the freedom of speech for everybody, as long as he
respects existing laws; as little as we permit the KPD
to order us about, as little we can and want to become
dependent on the party to which the esteemed founder of
this club happens to belong at the time.64
Apparently the matter did not stop there.

According to

Lamm's former secretary, McCarthyism caught up with the IMT
interpreter.

CIC repeatedly interrogated him, a fact that

considerable dampened his enthusiasm for his reorientation
work.

Nevertheless he organized one more forum in Nuremberg.

In 1952 he left the city to return to the United States.
Without Lamm's support and untiring efforts in this realm,
this promising initiative came to an end.65
“Lamm to Sperber, 7 Nov. 1949; NA RG 466 OLCB, ID 19491950, Bi-weekly Reports from Nuremberg Field Office.
65Maar 84-85, 139-140; for a short biography of Lamm see
Joseph Volk, Kurzbiographien zur Geschichte der Juden 19181945 (Munich: Leo Baeck Institute,
1988) 212; Lamm's
Departure from Nuremberg did not go unnoticed: see Chronik
der Stadt Nurnberg 1952: 503, 15 July 1952; NCA F2 no. 49;
Nuremberg Post Journal, 15 Sept. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit
Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122.
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For a while GYA tried to continue the tradition.

In

September of 1951 another forum for Northern Bavaria took
place under direct GYA sponsorship at GYA center no. 1 in
Nuremberg, but the emphasis shifted from political topics and
intellectual

reorientation towards practical

suggestions,

extensive workshops, and a good deal of entertainment.

The

American organizers also did not pass the opportunity to
promote their own goals and included educational reform on
the agenda.

On the practical side young participants, among

them Willy Gensmantel who represented the Nuremberg KYC,
It is not quite clear to what an extent McCarthyism
really was responsible for the CIC actions, since Maar does
not provide dates. At least some members of the intelligence
community obviously disliked the Germans and at the same time
harbored the most outrageous phantasies about German and
Soviet designs. We have seen above that members of the CIC
seemed to be eager to follow even the most unlikely leads to
uncover allegedly subversive action (see, for example
Situational Report by Donald T. Shea, Director, OMGBY ID to
Land Director, [1949]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Land Director, Box
284, 13/144-2/11) . Shea also undertook to discredit GYA with
a "fairly hot number" a fellow intelligence officer had
organized. He decided to circulate a very negative report by
a German boy, who obviously was disillusioned with the Munich
GYA, within OMGBY headquarters. The result of this type of
action should not be underestimated.
Information which
obviously came from the boy's report suddenly appeared in a
number of MG's evaluations of the Army's program (Jim Clark
to Mr. Don Shea, 23 Aug. 1948; Shea to Clark 23 Aug. 1948;
Clark to Shea 24 Aug. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Director,
Box 17, 10/110-1/14). The fact that the exchange of letters
between Lamm and Sperber went to Munich, reveals the interest
which intelligence in Bavaria had in the affair. It remained
at the state level, however.
McCloy's correspondence with
Lamm in 1951 does not indicate any knowledge of the CIC
interviews and allegations.
Judging from the available
evidence it seems that Sperber's letter actually triggered
the CIC investigation. When Feiler sent his factual report
to Munich, he was probably not aware that he was initiating
a witchhunt against Lamm. Joseph McCarthy simply provided a
good way of justifying such actions from 1950 on.
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suggested that their generation should have a greater voice
in

youth

work.

organizations

They

found

that

the

different

youth

needed to achieve a much higher degree of

cooperation and worked out a list of suggestions for reaching
this goal.

Apart from that, the forum participants adopted

a resolution addressed to the Bavarian State Ministry of
Education in which they suggested that the administration
should

include

schools.

social

studies

in

curricula

of

Bavarian

American exchange teachers and students from the

local high school were at hand to explain their concept of
student

and

teacher

participation

in

school

affairs.

According to the Young World, this part of the forum evoked
much

interest

and

considerable

enthusiasm

among

the

participants.66
Organizing youth forums and discussions with prominent
persons found much attention of the newspapers and made the
German-American Youth Club well known, but they were not the
only club activities.

Its affiliation with GYA and American

volunteers provided the members with ample opportunities for
occupying their leisure time.
of

parliamentary

procedures,

To further their understanding
club

members

travelled

in

American trucks to Munich to attend the sessions of the state
legislature.

Their "roving reporter" even found his way to

the floor where— much to his surprise— he discovered that
6611'Familiarize Youth With Self-Government Early!' First
Youth Forum Brought Many Suggestions," YW, vol. 5, no. 9,
Sept. 1951: 1,2,7.
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leading politicians such as Thomas Dehler, Wilhelm Hogner,
and

even

Alois

Hundhammer

listened to his questions.
lesson to his readers.

proved

to

be

accessible

and

The reporter conveyed another

Although Hogner,

Hundhammer,

and

Dehler belonged to different political parties and certainly
had opposing opinions about issues such as school reform,
they did not seem to harbor any personal animosities.67
Apart from politics, American literature and culture
became popular topics for workshops.
theater group.

The club had its own

Music, hiking, and "unforgettable excursions"

on Army trucks or buses formed part of the agenda.
attended

and

apparently

rather

wild

parties,

in

Well
which

American music became a standard feature, remained one of the
club's most popular features.6*
In view of the popularity and the activities of the club
it is surprising that it did not maintain its momentum and
failed to carry the torch of German-American understanding
much beyond 1951.

Just as in any other organization, much

depended on capable leadership which was hard to come by.

It

67"Nvirnberger Jugendclub besuchte Landtag: Minister Dr.
Dr. A. Hundhammer spricht mit Jugendreporter - 'Wie lange
soli Schulreform in Bayern dauern?' Dr. Dehler und Dr. Hogner
begriiBen Mitglieder des Deutsch-Amerikanischen Jugendklubs
Nurnberg," [Nuremberg Youth Club Visited State Legislature:
Minister Dr. Dr. A. Hundhammer Speaks with Youth Journalist "How Long Will School Reform in Bavaria Take?" Dr. Dehler
and Dr. Hogner Welcome Members of the German-American Youth
Club Nuremberg] YW, vol. 3, no. 4, 1 Apr. 1949: 7.
68Gerhard Knochlein, personal interview, 24 July 1995;
Arno Hamburger, personal interview, 11 Aug. 1994; Maar (70135) provides an excellent picture of the club activities.
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also

seemed

that

the

post

war

situation

provided

an

environment for such an organization which it was impossible
to continue once life returned to normal.

Since most of the

club's members were students, it was natural for them to move
on to

universities

or careers

in other

locations.

The

increasing wealth and the pursuit of their careers did not
leave them the time and energy they had been able to dedicate
to the enterprise.
with

individual

Last, but not least, negative experiences
soldiers,

for

example

the

murder

of

a

Nuremberg taxi driver, who was a popular member of the club,
by a GI,

as well

enthusiasm

for

as CIC activities did much to dampen

the

enterprise.

belonged to the occupiers,
symptomatic

Although

initially

he

Hans Lamm's further career is

of that of many Germans.

briefly to the United States.

He

only

returned

In 1955 he went to Munich,

where he pursued a successful career, during which he held
many distinguished positions and became the head of the
Jewish community.

Many other club members became professors,

doctors, managers, notaries and lawyers.
among others Richard Sperber,

A number of them,

decided to emigrate to the

United States.69
The Girl's Club
While the German-American Youth Club took care of many
intellectuals among young men and some women, June Selsor,
Mark Selsor's wife decided with a number of other American
69Maar 110, 113, 116-123; Volk 212.
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Twelve members of the GYA prepare to write the constitution
for GYA Center no. 1, Nurnberg, Germany.
The constitution
will be put to a vote before the members of the club as soon
as it is prepared. The Nurnberg girls council has spent the
last eight months studying "democratic practice" before
undertaking this important step in the foundation of the
club.
Three of the officials of the club [GYA] help the
girls put it in writing.___________________________________
34. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 294874, 15 Dec. 1947
women to become active with GYA and to do something for the
less progressive members of the opposite sex.

She had been

approached informally by many girls who were looking for
somebody to help with their problems or to ask for advice.
In April 1947 Mrs.

Selsor issued official invitations to

initiate a girls club within GYA.

Over two hundred young

ladies appeared for the first meeting.
variety of social backgrounds.

They came from a wide

It took Mrs. Selsor and her

co-volunteers some time to introduce democratic rules, and
even more importantly, to instill a democratic spirit and a
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willingness to take up responsibilities in the group members,
some of whom still were ardent and unabashed admirers of
Hitler.

Under the

leadership of Mrs.

Selsor

and other

American volunteers the girls wrote their own constitution
and

practiced

democratic

procedures.

The

girls

organized its own summer camps and skiing excursions.

club
GYA

provided transportation and equipment, but the food had to
come from a different source.

After the first camp had

almost ended in nutritional disaster, Mrs. Selsor made sure
that the girls club never left without a considerable stock
of American supplies which the local military community as
well as the Selsor family generously contributed.

Other

allied volunteers and workers operated in a similar fashion.
It is noteworthy that GIs and volunteers provided all drinks,
food, and candy available at the American youth activities
out of their own pockets or collected the items within the
military community.70
On the lighter side, American women introduced German
girls to the mysteries of being a modern woman.

A zone wide

GYA publication, The Idea Exchange reported in December 1947
that
two former stateside models, American dependents,
inaugurated the Nuremberg Charm School. In addition to
70Selsor 4-6, 20; "Nuremberg Girls' Club: The work of US
Dependents in Army's Assistance to GYA," OMGUS Information
Bulletin No. 151, 28 Dec. 1948: 15-18; Lore Falter, personal
interview,
29 June 1995; Helga Stadtlander,
personal
interivew, 15 Aug. 1995; Arno Hamburger, personal interview,
11 Aug. 1994.
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lessons in graceful movement, the girls are taught the
art of rising and sitting with ease, proper posture and
balance.
Useful hints are given the girls to enable
them to dress to the best advantage on the limited
clothing available to them.
The women's section of the local newspaper had much praise
for the course.
issue.

Even in this realm reorientation could be an

The article noted that the Third Reich had tried to

transform the opposite sex into uniformed paramilitary "birth
machines."

The charm school provided the girls with the

means to become more independent and to take care of their
own interests with a "secure, self-evident grace."

The paper

lauded the attempt to show the girls one side

of their

personalities which they should not neglect.71
"Reorientation" could acquire many different faces and
reach very different people.

We have seen how Hans Lamm

exercised spiritual and intellectual guidance in the GermanAmerican Youth Club.

Approached by Lamm, Arno Hamburger also

found his way into GYA as a volunteer.

Born in Nuremberg, he

had experienced Nazi discrimination,

prosecution,

and the

burning of the synagogue first hand before he managed to
leave Germany in 1938.

During World War II he served in the

British Army and returned to the city in 1946 to help his
lxGerman Youth Activities Idea Exchange, 22 Dec. 1947;
NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140,
5/295-3/5; "Darf ich vorstellen: meine Charm-Klasse," [May I
introduce my Charm-Class] NN, 17 Apr. 1948: 4; see also "Mrs.
Charkoff kampft gegen Mauerblvimchen: GroBer Erfolg der ersten
Charm-Klasse - Wie komme ich mit Grazie und Wiirde durchs
Leben?" [Mrs. Charkoff fights against wall-flowers: First
Charm-Class Great Success - How do I Master Life with Grace
and Dignity?] YW, vol. 2, no. 5, 10 May 1948: 2.
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parents— who

had

survived

the

existence.

The

girls

discussions,

but rather participated in one of the many

under

Holocaust— rebuild
his

sports groups which GYA sponsored.

care

did

not

their
attend

Nevertheless, Hamburger,

an excellent athlete, saw a chance to help them understand
what their fathers and grandfathers had refused to learn.
organized outings and week-end trips.

He

Whenever his group did

not have enough supplies, he made sure that they would not go
hungry by obtaining food in the Army stores to which he had
access as an employee of the IMT.

Under his guidance the

girls not only did physical exercise, but also were able to
discuss the fate of the Jews in Nuremberg with a witness who
spoke like them, who had grown up in the city, and who was
able to relate to them first hand what most of their parents
and grandparents chose to repress.

The girls learned in this

way not only about the terrible consequences of their city's
recent past for people who were just like them.
came

to

understand

understanding,

that

practicing

They also

tolerance

and

as well as building a democracy would help

them to lay the old demons to rest.

According to Hamburger,

the girls began to ask and he was able to provide some
answers in a way which the group could understand and to
which it could relate.
actually

called

him

The bond went so deep that the girls
"Dad."

Some

of

them

remained

occasional contact with him fifty years later.
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Interestingly, not only the girls benefitted from this
relationship.

Looking back, Hamburger did not think highly

about the older generation in Nuremberg.

After his return he

found that most people had not changed and never would, but
working with the girls gave him hope that not all might be
lost.

He considered the time he spent with his GYA group to

be the best he had had in Germany.72
German Perceptions
Of course the widespread American support for young
Germans did not go unnoticed and certainly was not unwelcome.
When GYA celebrated its fifth anniversary in 1951, many local
dignitaries, among them the President of Middle Franconia's
government,

the Catholic dean in Nuremberg and even the

Lutheran youth pastor in charge of the city,
congratulatory notes.

sent their

All of those who wrote were grateful

for the material help they had received from the Army without
which their youth work would have been next to impossible.
The Catholic dean spoke of "five years of good will, sincere
concern,

advice,

"idealists"

had

and

active

invested

support"

in German youth.

which

the

GYA

The Lutheran

pastor pointed out that young Germans "came to know far away

^Arno Hamburger, personal interview, 11 Aug 1994; see
also Maar 63-70; Frank Stern's The Whitewashing of the Yellow
Badge is an excellent study of the way in which West Germans
dealt with the Holocaust and Jews after World War II.
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countries and their peoples projected on the walls of our
narrow rooms.,|73
In spite of much praise not everybody was happy with
the American activities.

At the end of 1947 a Nuremberg

journalist criticized the trend in Germany to concentrate
American re-education efforts

on the younger generation.

According to him, young people had never known anything else
but Nazi ideology.
"stubborn,

This brainwashing had made young people

obstinate,

and

diabolical,"

hopeless target for re-education.

and

therefore

a

According to him, people

over thirty-five years still remembered the Weimar Republic
and therefore would be more open to the American efforts.74
A conference of Bavarian youth leaders in November 1947,
at which no Americans were present, also brought to light
some interesting opinions about the American activities in
Nuremberg.

Church leaders in general seemed to be far more

reserved about the Army's GYA program than anybody else and
made

no

bones

about

their

dislike.

Other

leaders

of

73"Five Years of Army Assistance to German Youth," YW
vol. 5, no. 7, July 1951: 1,3.
The following section deals exclusively with the
Nuremberg GYA. A detailed study on GYA throughout Bavaria
which the Intelligence Division of HICOG carried out in 1950
indicates that the situation in the city and in Northern
Bavaria was very similar to that in other areas (Office of
Intelligence, HICOG, Essential Elements of Information on
GYA, 25 May 1950; NA RG 466 OLCBY, ID, Elements of Essential
Information 1950-51).
74"Deutsche Gegenwart: Ein Informationsbrief," edited by
Karl 0. Paetel, 8-43 Burns Street, Long Island, N.Y., 1 Dec.
1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box
142, 5/296-1/15.
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Nuremberg youth groups did not have much positive to say
about

GYA

either,

although

everybody

present

appreciate the helping hand of Major Selsor.
became the catchword of the day.

seemed

to

"Materialism"

Many thought that the

Americans were far too generous with their material support
which was spoiling the young people and raising too many
expectations from the side of the youth which German clubs
and authorities would never be able to fulfill.

Others

complained that GYA youth centers attracted and protected
young criminals.

Apparently the youth leaders did not see

eye to eye with Americans in Nuremberg about educational
values,

but opinions on what exactly GYA was doing wrong

differed

considerably.

Some

complained

that

American

soldiers simply transferred the military tone and behavior to
the centers, while others detected a lack of discipline and
order which would ultimately lead to the deterioration of
moral standards.
As far as GYA successes were concerned,

a number of

Nuremberg youth leaders and city officials were skeptical.
In general the new and freer education methods did not meet
much approval.

One Nuremberg school principal revealed that

he was clearly aware of the American goals,
completely

entrenched

in

his

but remained

authoritarian

thinking.

According to him, "German children want to be told what to do
and not to be educated according to American free methods."
Re-education apparently had not reached this educator, but
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more progressive youth

leaders and teachers welcomed the

changes which they detected in the children who attended the
American programs.

Another school principal thought that the

contact with Americans had led to an increased interest of
students and awakened the desire to become more active in
their school affairs.75
A zone-wide GYA study conducted in 1950 confirmed the
director's observation.

Young Germans in general revealed

that they were still not as convinced about democracy as
teenagers in the United States.

While 65% of young Americans

indicated that they regarded a free government under the
control of their constituents as the most desirable form of
government and 35% did not have an opinion on the issue, 15%
of young Germans were against such a government, 47% had no
opinion

and

government.

only

37%

supported

the

democratic

form

of

GYA participants revealed a stronger support of

democracy than those who did not attend the program.

51% of

GYA members supported democracy, 40% had no opinion and only
9% were against it.

While the results were certainly not

ideal, Weldon Shofstall, the GYA's civilian adviser who had

75"Appendix to Report on Attitudes Towards the Army
Assistance Program to GYA," 26 Nov. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/245-3/4.
The
appendix actually is a report about a youth leader meeting of
the Bavarian Youth Committee.
The author noted that no
Americans were present and the Germans took the opportunity
to voice their opinions freely.
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conducted

the

survey,

noted

that

these

results

were

encouraging.76
Nevertheless GYA was facing a constant uphill battle.
The program did not reach a considerable number of young
people in Nuremberg.77

Others did not find their way to a

youth center because they and their families avoided contact
with Americans.78

Although incidents between soldiers and

German civilians were rare, they tended to undermine what
Selsor and his colleagues were trying to build.79 The Major
repeatedly had to defend the program against attacks from

76,,Attitude of Youth Towards Control of Government by the
people," "GYA Hits the Target," YW, vol 4, no. 5, 4 May 1950:
5. Fiissl (162-63) suggests that this survey should be used
with caution since, according to him, it was conducted with
the intention to justify the GYA program against attacks from
MG and Germans. The rather extensive sources on GYA and MG
conferences, however, indicate that the Army and its civilian
adviser, Weldon Shofstall, made an honest attempt to evaluate
the program.
This chapter also shows that reorientation
indeed was a concern for the Nuremberg Military Post GYA
personnel and had the desired results.
^Some of the people I interviewed were not aware of its
existence or only became acquainted with parts of the program
(see, for example, Peter Fries, personal interview, 8 Aug.
1995; Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995).
78Marga Guthmann, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1995; Helga
Kohler, personal interview, 13 July 1994.
Helmut Stiihler
also recalled that some parents instructed their children to
go to the German homes of the open door instead of GYA when
they opened in 1950 (Helmut Stiihler, personal interview, 12
Aug. 1994).
79Helmut Stiihler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994; see
also Maar 84, 124.
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members

of

the

Bavarian

Youth

Committee

or

other

organizations.80
Although dissatisfaction was widespread in some circles,
many other Germans did not share these opinions.

In May 1947

the Army's program in Nuremberg was just beginning to embark
on a more sophisticated approach.

Nevertheless Nuremberg's

school superintendent Raab defended GYA against criticism
from local OMGUS officials even at that early stage.
Military

Government

officers

had

demonstrated

The
their

solidarity with some German critics by publicly declaring
that it was time to give German youth something for their
minds

instead

thought

that

of sports
the GYA

equipment and Coca

approach

actually was

American reorientation mission quite well.

Cola.

Raab

serving

the

According to the

superintendent, young Germans were suspicious of any kind of
ideological instruction and needed above all food and jobs.
He

argued

that

sports

activities

helped

raise

morale,

occupied the youths' idle time, and provided hope for the
future.

Participating in sports activities with Americans

80See, for example, Nuremberg Military Post, GYA officer
to Commanding General, Headquarters EUCOM, Attn.: Director of
GYA, subject: monthly narrative report for July 1949.
Intelligence reported in 1949 that Martin Faltermeyer, the
President of the Bavarian Youth Committee, added much to the
dissatisfaction about GYA when he claimed that his
organization had to pay thirteen million marks
for
maintaining GYA, a figure that turned out to be ten times the
real amount
(letter from Donald Shea, Director OMGBY
Intelligence to Mr. Arndt, Director, OMGUS Intelligence, 24
Mar. 1949, in which he also sent the "guinea pig report" of
the German boy from Munich to headquarters; NA RG 2 60 OMGBY,
Director ID, Box 17, 10/116-1/1).
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and sharing their Coca Colas would ultimately result in an
increased confidence in American ideas and intentions.

More

on the practical side, a trade unionist noted in 1950 that
his youth work would not have been possible without GYA
support and that he simply could not understand how anybody
who was active in youth activities still managed to criticize
a program that was doing so much for young people.81
The discrepancy between the actual operations of the
Nuremberg
leaders

GYA

and

striking.

and the
even

opinions which a number

some

city

youth

officials

of youth
voiced

is

A closer look at German complaints reveals some of

the difficulties the Germans were having with the American
program.
Military

In one of its monthly reports to the Bavarian
Government

the

Bavarian

Youth

Committee,

for

example, severely criticized the lack of cooperation between
GYA and youth groups in 1947.

Its authors also complained

that American support went mainly to GYA activities and not
to German youth groups, an opinion which Martin Faltermeyer,
President of the Bavarian Youth Committee,
1949.

reiterated in

The example of Nuremberg shows, however, where the

real problem lay.

While Selsor did support organized groups

he was also stressing the need to concentrate the program's
focus on those who did not want to join youth organizations.
81Det. B-211, W.B. Morell, Deputy Director, Weekly
Intelligence Report, 15-22 May 1947; NA RG 2 60 OMGBY, FOD,
Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2; "GYA hat Pionierarbeit
geleistet," [GYA Has Done Pioneer Work] YW, vol. 4, no. 1, 1
Jun. 1950: 4.
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The Major considered himself to be the spokesperson for these
people.

This

emphasis

did

not

escape

the

Germans'

attention.82
The results of a HICOG investigation of GYA activities
in

Bavaria

addressing

in
a

September
real

1949

problem.

proved

that

According

Selsor

to

the

was
youth

specialists from Munich, Germans in general were not aware of
the problems unorganized youth were facing.

The commission

commended Selsor for his cooperative attitude, but found that
both Andreas Staudt and Theodor Marx, the most important city
administrators in the field,

displayed a rather negative

attitude towards the program.83

This was not surprising.

The fact that GYA provided opportunities for young people
without forcing them into a firm structure was a novelty
which completely undermined the very essence of German youth
organizations.

The program threatened

their reason

for

existing by offering attractive programs which otherwise were
only available by joining a club.

GYA would go away, but the

principle of open youth work might not.

In this context the

constant demands by the Germans that American help should be
channeled

through

German

youth

organizations

and

the

complaints that the Americans did not adapt their activities

82OMGBY, Field Research Section, Bi-weekly Intelligence
Report, 8 Sept. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 3,
10/107-1/49.
83Monthly Report of Public Education, OLCB, Sept. 1949;
NA RG 466 OLCB, Central Files 1948-52, Box 1, 120.5/1.
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to the German situation reveal the anxiety of the old school
youth leaders in Nuremberg.

They were very much afraid to

lose control of a large segment of young people in Nuremberg
and with that, the basis of their organizations' power.
Occasionally the conflict erupted openly.

In Zirndorf,

the GYA officer reported in July 1949 that he was making some
progress towards "building up better cooperation in that
town."

According to him, the local sports club was the main

obstacle to reaching good relations.

Its leadership did not

want to make the town's only gymnasium available to non
members because it would undermine its power.
concluded

that

"some manipulation

is

still

The officer
in order

in

Zirndorf, but should succeed in the near future in bringing
about the desired results."84
German fears were not unfounded.

Hans Werner,

who

became director of a GYA center in Furth in 1948, recalled
that a number of young people decided to open a photo group
at his facility.
First,

Werner had to adjust to many changes.

the center was

relocated,

then consolidated with

Nuremberg center no. l which also moved to a new location.
Werner remained director of the center when it came under the
control of the Nuremberg city administration.

According to

him, the members of his photo group as well as others decided
to relocate with Werner and remain under his guidance because

m GYA, 16th Infantry Report of 8 July 1949; NA RG 260
OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-2/5.
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they

found

membership

the

traditional

requirements

German

rather

long after

club

life

restrictive.

with
The

continued

to meet

it had outgrown

centers.

Werner still received invitations to

its

group

the youth
its get-

togethers in 19 95.85
Of course youth leaders who criticized the Americans for
being materialistic knew that they could not compete with
candy, cookies, and even cigarettes one could obtain at GYA
centers.

These incentives, as well as the fact that the

centers had so much more to offer than any German youth group
at the time,

undoubtedly made many of the youth leaders

apprehensive about the strong competition which had emerged
for their own organizations.86
The less democratically inclined the leadership was, the
more problems it had with the American approach.

An American

survey revealed that Lutheran church youth leaders were among
those who did not practice a democratic regime in their youth
groups.

We have seen already that Bavarian youth pastor

Helbich, who had his offices in Nuremberg,
opposed any movement that threatened to

from the start
infringe on his

domain and on the control he exercised over his youth groups.
Not surprisingly, Nuremberg Lutheran youth leaders proved to
85Hans Werner, personal interview, 21 Aug. 1995; for more
details on the further history of the GYA centers in
Nuremberg see chapter XI, below.
86See, for example, Willy ProlB, personal interview, 4
Aug. 1994 and 4 Aug. 1995; Hans Eckstein, personal interview,
6 July 1995.
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be the group most opposed to the American youth program.

Of

course the older generation in general also remained strongly
nationalistic.

Quite a few youth leaders expressed their

resentment or at least their discomfort with the impact which
American culture had on young people.87
Older youth leaders and the churches had reason to fear
the new currents.

The youth leader meeting of 1947 revealed

that especially children who were not organized appreciated
the opportunities the centers offered to them.
warm room and company in the GYA facilities.

Many found a

Even one of the

most outspoken critics conceded that in general parents did
not object to their children becoming involved in the local
GYA activities.
become

GYA also gave young elites an opportunity to

acquainted

with

magazines and books.

the

outside

world

by

means

of

One youth leader even thought that

especially those between fourteen and fifteen years were
attracted to GYA activities

because they represented the

87|lAppendix to Report on Attitudes Towards the Army
Assistance Program to GYA,11 26 Nov. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/245-3/4. An OMGUS
survey on youth actually found that 70% of all religious
groups in the American zone appointed their leaders while 70%
of all other groups followed democratic procedures. Members
of the church groups also tended to have more pronounced
anti-democratic attitudes than those of other youth groups.
OMGUS, ICD Opinion Surveys, report no. 99, 5 Mar. 1948: 8-9.
NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/116-1/13.
The
surveys were conducted at about the same time in which the
meeting took place.
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complete opposite of the Hitler Youth which many had come to
dislike.88
The last observer revealed a sound judgement.

Young

people found more in the Nuremberg GYA center than meets the
eye.

After years of strict discipline at home and in the

Hitler Youth, GYA offered them new ways of getting to know
themselves and the world.

Fifty years after their stay in

Nuremberg, Major Selsor and his wife evoke respect, fondness
and even strong emotions because of their humanity and their
genuine concern for the needs of the young people under their
care.

June Selsor actually decided to initiate her girls

club because German girls had approached her on a personal
basis with their concerns and problems.

The fact that two

hundred girls from all walks of life showed up for the first
meeting of the club documented this search for something new
and humane in a harsh environment.89
The Army's GYA program undoubtedly was one of the most
extensive and quite successful relief programs of the United
States in its zone of occupation.

A look at the Nuremberg

Post revealed that the Army did far more than simply provide

88|,Appendix to Report on Attitudes Towards the Army
Assistance Program to GYA," 26 Nov. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/245-3/4; for young
people's reactions to the Nazis' attempts to completely
absorb them into their state see Detlev J.K. Peukert, Inside
Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday
Life (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982) 145174.
89Selsor 4; see also Maar 106.
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candy

and

sports.

Many

of GYA's

programs

offered

new

approaches to young people and youth work in general.

It

remains to be seen, however, to what an extent young people
and the Germans who were responsible for youth work were
willing and able

to continue on the way which American

reorientation programs were trying to pave for the future.
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CHAPTER XI
Reorientation Continued: 1948-1952

The Office of the High Commissioner for Germany under
John

McCloy

continued and

in some

ways

intensified the

reorientation course for young people on which OMGUS had
embarked,

although it had relinquished all

powers in this realm.

its mandatory

The American focus shifted from school

and administrative reform to political pressure on German
governments, an increased support of German projects, and on
the formation of individual attitudes.

On the local level

German-American cooperation assured that many new ideas and
concepts

made

lasting

contributions

to

the

way

Germans

conducted youth work.
American Policy Formulation. 1948-1952
1948 was an eventful year for Germans and Americans in
Germany.

The Berlin Blockade and currency reform dominated

the agendas, but Military Government officials also received
notice

that

the

political changes

and

the

move

towards

forging the three western zones into one state would bring
the long envisioned transition of American authority from the
Department of Defense to the State Department.

The latter

set up an organizational structure in Washington that would
slowly bring the programs in Germany in line with the same
operations elsewhere in the world.

The State Department also

had come to the conclusion that OMGUS needed to reorganize as
573
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well

to

streamline

duplication

and

the

waste

command
of

structure

funds.

One

and

of

to

the

avoid

central

propositions of a fact finding mission from Washington in
1949 was that all reorientation efforts should come together
in one office which should have equal rank with other offices
and direct access to the High Commissioner.

McCLoy took up

the idea and created the Public Affairs Office (PAO) in 1949
which reflected the fact that HICOG and the State Department
regarded reorientation as one of the most important missions
the

Americans

employed

more

still
than

had
50%

in
of

Germany.
the

entire

PAO

consistently

HICOG

headquarters as well as on the state levels.

staff

in

In December

1950, for example, the office had 3345 employees of a total
of 6123 at headquarters.

On the State level the ratio was

less impressive with about 1,500 employees for PAO against a
total of 4,374.1
The

administrative

reorganization

meant

that

most

divisions needed to take stock and define their missions to
secure their continuation under the State Department.
had

successfully

civilians into MG.

carried

out

his

program

of

Clay

bringing

This meant that the High Commissioner for

Germany, John McCloy, would be able to rely on an experienced

‘Kellermann 80-93; the figures for 1950 are in Guy A.
Lee (ed.), Documents on Field Organization Docs. 22, 23.
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staff in the areas in which he would continue the work of
OMGUS.2
Alonzo Grace and his Education and Cultural Relations
Division were no exception to the rule.
Berchtesgaden

in November

course

of

his

which,

according to him,

1948

Grace

Education and Cultural

At a conference in
charted

the

Relations

future

Division

would have to play a far more

important role than it had previously in order to achieve the
objectives of the occupation.
material

Grace emphasized that the

reconstruction of West

Germany

in

form

of the

Marshall
Plan certainly was useful and important, but that Germany's
"spiritual,

moral,

intellectual,

and cultural redemption"

from Nazi rule and Hitler's successful indoctrination could
not be neglected.
To deal with minds and hearts which have thus been
conditioned, plus the effect of the war, presents a
problem far beyond the comprehension of those who would
view education or cultural relations as something that
should occur only after material reconstruction has been
completed.
Clearly departing from Alexander's re-education concept which
emphasized structural reform, Grace found that "true reform"
could

only

"come

from

within".

According

to

him,

organization or structure of German schools probably would be
less important for the future of Germany than the contents of
the curricula or the quality and convictions of the teachers.

2Tent, Mission 307.
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Grace maintained that the future of American efforts would
depend on a higher degree of coordination between American
agencies.

GYA, for example, could provide tremendous help if

the Army found ways to cooperate more closely with the Youth
Activities Section.

Ultimately, however, Grace insisted that

only cooperation with German authorities and citizens would
bear

fruit.

He advocated

an expansion of the

exchange

program which should include all social classes, not just an
elite, and an increase in American cultural activities in
Germany.3
Grace's address clearly reflected the evaluation work
his

field officers had done during the previous months.

Harold Patrick, OMGBY youth activities officer in Munich, for
example, sent a detailed analysis to Grace through Norrie in
November 1948.
several

serious

According to him, OMGUS needed to address
shortcomings

in

its activities

to

date.

While he recognized that schools, teachers, and educational
reform were certainly necessary, Patrick provided statistical
evidence that young Germans actually were spending as much or
more time out of the classrooms than at school.

He continued

that OMGUS had done nothing to address the issue of leisure
time although experts agreed that these activities were vital
for forming the personalities of young people and developing
30ut of the Rubble: An Address on the Reorientation of
the German People by Alonzo G. Grace, Director E&CRD given at
the Berchtesgaden conference, 8-12 Oct. 1948; NA RG 260
OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 112, 5/292-1/12;
see also Tent, Mission 306-307.
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their political habits.

The youth officer argued that the

youth groups to which OMGUS tended to delegate its work,
often aggravated the problem.
through

the

reenforce
behavior

traditional

the

typical

patterns

structure.
monopoly on

Since

German

organizations

"Central

and did
youth

resources

The OMGUS approach to work

European"

nothing

to

and

facilities,

to

authoritarian

change

organizations

tended

the

generally

social
had

a

young people were

exposed to "political, religious or ideological influences
before they are mature enough to make their own decisions."
Patrick also alerted Grace and Norrie to the fact that so far
only 25-30% of all young people had chosen to become part of
youth groups.

This meant that about 70% had much leisure

time at their hands which they could use creatively if they
had opportunities and facilities available.4
Patrick

suggested that

several levels.

OMGUS

should

take action on

He proposed that OMGUS would have to use its

leverage far more than previously to induce state and local
governments to develop programs for all youth, not just the
4,lBrief analysis of task facing Youth Activities
Section," by Harold Patrick, OMGBY, Youth Activities Section,
18 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education
Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18.
Patrick's report is just one of
many.
American youth experts in general believed that
progress had been made but that German youth leaders still
tended to use authoritarian methods and did not pay attention
to their membership. Many reports also critically commented
on the exclusiveness of German youth organizations which only
tended to look after themselves and their members. See, for
example, Situation Report by Charles Winning, Director,
E&CRD, OMGBY, [1949]: 15-20; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Land Director,
BOX 284, 13/144-1/19.
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organized groups.

Patrick thought that OMGUS also would have

to make sure that the German authorities clearly understood
and shared the American concept of a democratic education.
To help with this task Military Government should shift the
emphasis

of

its

programs

to

young

regardless of their affiliations.

people

in

general

Patrick argued that youth

leadership programs were an essential tool for accomplishing
that mission.

He estimated that Bavaria alone needed between

ten and eleven thousand trained youth leaders in 1949, and
German institutions did not seem to be willing to take up the
task.

The

cultural

exchange

programs

which

OMGUS

was

developing would provide youth leaders with opportunities to
acquire first hand knowledge of different approaches to youth
work.

Patrick thought that the 150 GYA centers operating in

the American

zone were

actually

serving as

the type

of

community centers he was envisioning for German youth, but
that the Army needed advice in administration and program
development.

Therefore OMGUS and GYA would have to cooperate

much more closely.

The youth officers also would have to

determine the amount of support they might be able to receive
from the Amerika Hauser,
program.
was

Education Centers

and the

film

Patrick informed Grace and Norrie that his staff

already

developing projects

along

the

lines

he

had

outlined, but that the Youth Activities Section would need
additional personnel to be effective.
not to

Although Grace chose

include Patrick's main concern in his address at
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Berchtesgaden,

it became one of the major pillars of the

HICOG reorientation efforts.5
Apparently headquarters maintained close contact with
its officers in the states.

Lawrence Norrie submitted a

summary of the activities of his Group Activities Branch and
an outline for further action to his superiors just before
the Berchtesgaden conference, which essentially went along
the lines Patrick had suggested.
paper to youth activities.

He dedicated most of the

Norrie did not waste any time

with the discussion of directives or policy statements but
rather provided Grace with nine "specific aims" most of which
had been on the agenda since 1946.
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)
(e)

Through active encouragement and aid to increase
and widen German voluntary efforts to develop an
educational and recreational program for the
leisure time of all German youth.
To afford German youth a wide choice of activities
and
interests,
aimed at the development of
individual
initiative,
personal
dignity
and
integrity, civic responsibility and a social
conscience.
To encourage approved German public and private
youth serving agencies to work on selected
projects as part of a total community plan;
to
fit non-German agencies and resources in integral
part of the German plan.
To assist youth itself in assuming responsibility
for the planning and conduct of its own programs
with a reasonable amount of adult guidance.
To discover and train young German leaders in a
type of program planning and operation consistent
with a changing German social structure and
present-day German youth needs.

s"Brief analysis of task facing Youth Activities
Section," by Harold Patrick, OMGBY, Youth Activities Section,
18 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education
Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18.
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(f)

(g)

(h)

To aid in the establishment of a voluntary,
coordinating
committee
responsible
for
the
supervision, coordination, and development of
youth organizations in every Kreis and other
designated local areas.
To encourage German youth serving agencies to
experiment
in training
for responsible
and
constructive citizenship through such means as
youth rings,international work camps, cooperative
community
service
projects,
international
conferences and community youth centers.
To facilitate opportunities for German adult youth
workers
and
older
youth
to
study
youth
organizations and method in democratic countries.6

The list shows that Norrie and his section did not modify
their

goals

Leadership

in

any

training

way,

but

rather

would provide

supplemented

an effective

securing the American mission in the long run.

them.

tool

for

OMGUS also

recognized for the first time that it would have to pay much
more

attention

to

those

who

did

not

join

any

kind

of

organizations, since many of the German youth groups did not
show much interest in furthering democratic goals.
Interestingly, Norrie and his officers did not find it
necessary to refer in any way to the developing Cold War.
Just as Grace did at Berchtesgaden, the head of the Group
Activities Branch and his youth activities officers continued
to emphasize the necessity of reorienting German youth away
from

their

democratic

traditional
ideals.

patterns

They did not

of

behavior

seem to

towards

recognize the

potential benefits for their cause and their section which

6E&CRD, Report of Group Activities Branch, 10 Oct. 1948;
NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Group Activities Br. , Box 129, 5/2941/17.
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transformed their crusade against the Nazi past into a fight
against the communist threat, which increasingly captured the
attention of the American public and politicians,

might

bring.7
The comments to a proposed Senate investigation which
was to examine the alleged renazification of West Germany and
the failure of American programs in June 1949 reveal MG's
foremost concerns.

In reply to the question "whether or not

there is development in German youth of appreciation and
devotion to democratic institutions", John Fixley, Norrie's
Deputy Chief,

wrote that

less than one percent of young

Germans were affiliated with the communist party or the
"communist front organization" Free German Youth.

He thought

that "this is significant since the communist party more than
any other political party offers the external trappings of
National

Socialism.

organization

structure,

These

include:

symbols,

authoritarianism."

flags,

Fixley

also

presented a number of additional facts to show that youth
actually had made progress in the field or reorientation but
he

warned

which

permitted

National Socialism to rise in 1932 still exist."

According

to him,

that

"many

cultural

elements

Americans needed more time to teach these young

7Apart from Norrie's analysis see also "Brief analysis
of task facing Youth Activities Section," by Harold Patrick,
OMGBY, Youth Activities Section, 18 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260
OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18.
The question of the influence of communism on young people in
West Germany did not arise until the beginning of 1950.
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people the practical side of democracy which they had never
experienced.8
At headquarters,
much headway.
in German
acquire

however, reorientation did not make

Wells had been able to awaken Clay's interest

re-education

Division

and had helped

status,

but

plans

the

for

educators

to

HICOG

clearly

envisioned cuts on a broad front and certainly

not the

expansion of personnel which Grace and youth officers were
hoping for.

Grace also was disturbed by the fact that

education would not be one of the areas over which Americans
were

planning

to maintain

direct

control.

Although he

mobilized American educators, above all Herman Wells, in the
United States he was unable to change the provision.

The

reduction of his Division to Branch status within the HICOG
PAO

in

September

1949

brought

about

Grace's

immediate

resignation.9
It seems that the loss of its prominent head and the
power to order changes did not affect HICOG's reorientation
work for youth adversely.

Norrie, Patrick, and many other MG

veterans remained in charge of youth activities under HICOG
and undoubtedly continued the work they had outlined.

McCloy

and his staff apparently were happy with the OMGUS approach.

8Memo from John Fixley, Community Education Branch to
Alonzo Grace, E&CRD, 22 June 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18.
9Kellermann 75-80; Tent, Mission 307-311.
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HICOG

officially

adopted OMGUS policy

statements

as

its

own.10
Not just the higher echelons stayed on.

Harald Lund,

for example, had assumed his first assignment as Military
Governor of Kronach in the summer of 1946.

His family had

emigrated from Norway to the United States after his birth.
He and his wife spoke German.

Lund later moved to Schwabach

as Security and Liaison Officer, and succeeded James Barnett
as Director of the Nuremberg MG detachment.

In 1950 he

became HICOG Kreis Resident Officer for Upper and Middle
Franconia which included Nuremberg.

HICOG's decision to

officially accept OMGUS policies as the basis for its own
actions ensured continuity in youth affairs.11
Contrary to Grace's fears and allegations, John McCloy
focused much more on reorientation and especially on youth
than his predecessor had done.

The apparent Soviet attempt

to win over young people to the cause of socialism in a giant
Whitsuntide youth meeting in East Berlin in 1950 during which

10Lawrence Norrie, oral history interview conducted by
Lewis Schmidt, Georgetown University Library, 18 Jan. 1990:
3-7.
llFor Lund's career see "Our Hall of Fame," YW, vol. 5,
no. 3: 2; "Kinderfest der GYA und der Militarregierung,"
[Party for Children by GYA and MG] NN, 27 Sept. 1947: 3;
"Fremde Lander im Film," [Foreign Countries Presented in
Movies] NN, 12 Mar. 1949: 5); for the continuity of HICOG
policy see Pilgert, Community 19; see also OMGUS, E&CRD, "The
Aims, Goals and Programs of the Community Education Branch,"
[1949-50]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br.,
Box 128, 5/294-1/14. This memo repeats the goals Norrie set
forward in 1948 almost verbatim.
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the communists made every conceivable attempt to impress
young people with their culture and the progress of the
Soviet

System

alarmed Americans.12

The

Korean War in the same year seemed to

outbreak of

the

make it necessary for

HICOG to pay special attention to young people and win their
allegiance.

McCloy and his deputy Benjamin Buttenwieser

repeatedly emphasized that the future of Germany depended
very much on the attitude of its young people.

In July 1950

McCloy met with youth representatives for the first time.

It

was clear by then that the American democratization mission
not only had to deal

with the past but

totalitarian threat, communism.

also with a

new

McCloy told the young men

(women had not yet entered the top ranks of West German youth
organizations)
Hitler

that he was not willing to revive "the old

system

of

marching

government had done.

masses"

as

the

East

German

According to him, Americans would not

exert any pressure on young people or "put young Germans in
shirts of a different color and have them march through the
streets with flags".

HICOG rather wanted to help alleviate

the bleak employment situation in the new Federal Republic
and

provide

assistance

for

its

young

citizens'

"self-

education" . At the end of his speech he encouraged the youth

l2Lawrence Norrie, oral history interview,
University Library, 18 January 1988, 37-38.

Georgetown
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leaders to come forward with their own suggestions to use
American help more effectively.13
HICOG youth activities officers tried to capitalize on
the attention youth was getting from the highest echelons.
Harold Patrick once again wrote an extensive report outlining
the goals and shortcomings of the reorientation programs so
far.

He thought that the policies and goals which had

evolved since 1945 were basically sound and still valid but
that support of German activities could only be successful
under sufficient American supervision.

This meant that HICOG

would

in youth

have to expand

its

personnel

activities

considerably because it was "quite impossible to do more than
has been done with a staff as woefully inadequate in size as
the one in Bavaria."14
In August

1950

McCloy

invited Norrie

to

provide

a

detailed picture of the work his section was carrying out.

13Rupieper 153-55; the complete speech is in Erika
Fischer and Heinz-D. Fischer (eds.) , John J. McCloys Reden zu
Deutschland- und Berlinfragen: Publizistische Aktivitaten und
Ansprachen des amerikanischen Hochkommissars fiir Deutschland
1949-1952 (Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 1986) 105-109
(quotes are on 107-108). The book contains a representative
sample of McCloy's speeches in Germany and in the United
States.
He not only spoke to young people frequently, but
also deemed the subject important enough to consistently
incorporate it in his speeches on both sides of the Atlantic.
See also minutes of HICOG staff meeting, 11 July 1950: 28-29;
NA RG 466 United States High Commissioner for Germany John M.
McCloy [hereinafter HICOM], Extracts from HICOG Staff
Conference Meetings 1949-1950.
I4Proposal for Furthering the Development of Youth
Activities in Bavaria as a Democratic Force. 7 July 1950; NA
RG 466 OLCB, Central Files, 1948-52, Box 28, 570.5.
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After an in-depth orientation Norrie pointed out that his
office had been understaffed for a long time, but still had
been able to carry out its objectives in cooperation with the
Germans.
he

had

Although he was talking to a perceptive audience,
to

give

significantly.

up

any

hopes

for

expanding

his

office

At the meeting the HICOG staff also discussed

the outlook for the future.

Norrie learned that Congress

would probably cut its appropriations for the High Commission
by 10% in the next fiscal year.

This meant that the present

level of personnel could be maintained but would not be
expanded.

He was assured, though, that in view of the high

priority his work began to enjoy, he might get additional
help through shifting personnel within HICOG.

Norrie also

was informed that this would probably be the best solution
anyway because the economic boom in the United States made it
increasingly

difficult

to

recruit

qualified

people.

Americans were not willing to sacrifice secure and well paid
jobs for the rather uncertain year to year appointments HICOG
was able to offer.

In 1951 his branch, which also dealt with

women's affairs, community activities in general and other
programs, consisted of eleven Americans at headquarters and
thirty-five in the different states and in Berlin.

Bavaria

had ten American officials at its disposal, only one of whom
seemed to be
officer's

in charge of youth activities.

staff

in

Munich

consisted

of

The youth
ten

German

consultants, two secretaries, and two stenographers to do the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

587
work.

Each consultant was in charge of a special area of

youth work which included leadership training, youth forums,
or youth centers.15
The High Commission also did not make any changes in the
field.

OMGUS

Liaison

and

Security

Officers

in

the

communities simply became Resident Officers under HICOG.
Headquarters recognized their importance as key figures in
the German communities who not only maintained liaison with
headquarters but also became the first ones whom German
authorities approached with wishes or problems they might
have.

Often

they

served

as

mediators

between

German

authorities and the U.S. Army whenever problems arose.16 In
l5Minutes of HICOG Staff Conference, 8 Aug. 1950; NA RG
466 HICOM, Extracts from HICOG Staff Conference Meetings
1949-1950; for personnel numbers see Pilgert, Community 12;
for Bavaria see monthly report, OLCB, PAD, E&CR Br., Dec.
1950; NA RG 466 OLCB, Central Files, Box 2, E&CR, Monthly
Reports.
16Rupieper 83-110.
The situation in Nuremberg was
typical in many ways. One of the biggest bones of contention
was the American refusal to return the Opera House which it
was using as a recreation center for its soldiers to the
city.
After much negotiations between the local Resident
Officer,
his
superior,
the
High
Commissioner,
Army
headquarters in Heidelberg, and the city in 1950, the city
finally decided to build a movie theater for the Army which
the occupiers would return to the city as soon as they would
not need it anymore. HICOG provided almost one third of the
projected costs and the Army paid another third as well as a
substantial amount for renting the building. In spite of the
publicly displayed cordiality demonstrated at the opening of
the building in September 1951, city officials were not
satisfied with the American efforts.
Apparently some
administrators took additional American help for granted when
they permitted construction costs to exceed the original
projections by about 50%. There was much haggling over the
responsibility for paying permanent fixtures in the new
building which the Americans had not requested but the
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view of their importance,
number in 1949.
in

many

HICOG actually increased their

They had to be very dedicated, well versed

different

areas,

possess

diplomatic

and

organizational skills, and needed to be able to speak German.
Many of them took a special interest in reorientation and in
youth activities.

Harald Lund had been involved in youth

work already in his previous assignment in nearby Schwabach.
In Nuremberg he kept close ties to the German American Youth
Club and participated in the club's activities whenever he
could.17
Although McCloy apparently did not need any prodding,
the State Department informed him in September 1950 that a
Conference in Washington on German youth had emphasized the
importance of youth work in Germany.

Washington admonished

its High Commissioner that he should not limit his objectives

Germans had put in for the later use of the building as city
theater, for example. Once again the Resident Officer was
called in to negotiate with the Army as well as with HICOG
headquarters. Not surprisingly HICOG declined a request for
more funding.
City officials even took offense that the
money for the parking lot of the new theater came from
occupational funds, not the Army's budget. Apparently some
frugal members of the administration regarded it as
Nuremberg's right to have the Americans pay for the city's
new theater (NCA C3 5/II nos. 160, 161).
l7See for example his correspondence with the GermanAmerican Youth Club in 1949 and his opening address of a
youth discussion group in April of that year (NA RG 260
OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1425, 9/126-3/7, Box 1427 9/1223/1). In his previous appointment as MG representative Lund
had also organized special events for young people (see, for
example, "Kinderfest der GYA und der Militarregierung," [GYA
and MG Organize Childrens' Festival] NN, 27 Sept. 1947: 3).
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to "'playground' activities, but must encompass political,
economic, and social aspects as well."18
HICOG

surveys

indicated that

American reorientation

efforts to date had not yet attained the desired effects on
German youth.

Studies conducted in 1950 and 1951 found that

most young Germans still maintained their critical distance
to the occupiers and to democratic ideas.

According to the

surveys, most members of the younger generation, above all
refugees,

females,

and those who had not had much formal

education, did not demonstrate any interest in politics.

40%

of the sample did not even know the chancellor of the Federal
Republic, Konrad Adenauer.19

Clearly reflecting that their

economic plight occupied them most, many of those who had
been in the Hitler Youth thought that the government should
reintroduce

mandatory

work

service

years

for

all

young

people.20
In the same vein the majority of the young Germans did
not think that diversity in youth work was a good thing.

18Airgram from Dept, of State to HICOG, 30 Sept. 1950; NA
RG466 HICOM, Office of the Executive Director, Security
Segregated General Records, 1949-1955, Box 137, Sept. 50.
19HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff,
View the American Program VII: Acceptance
Responsibility and Related Political Issues,"
series no. 2, 30 Nov. 1950; NA RG 306
Information Agency, Reports on German Public

"German Youth
of Democratic
report no. 50,
United States
Opinion.

20HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth
View the American Program I: Some General Evaluations,"
report no. 38, series no. 2, 9 Oct. 1950; NA RG 306 Reports
on German Public Opinion.
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They preferred a central organization which would give youth
power and respect.21 Although the efforts of the politicians
in the Soviet zone to woo young people to their cause did not
go unnoticed, a majority of those living in the American zone
did not think that the communists were doing more for their
generation than politicians in the west.

The "appreciable

minority" which stated that the East German government gave
more attention to the young people there, felt that "the kind
of attention is often quite other than desirable."22
The surveys also indicated that many young people did
not

particularly

like

American

According to the pollsters,

reorientation

efforts.

less than half of the young

people living in the American zone welcomed OMGUS and HICOG
attempts to familiarize them with democratic values and a
different culture.

Youths even more than adults rejected the

idea that Germans could learn something from Americans in the
realm of culture and education, although old and young alike
thought that German youth was more susceptible to new ideas
than adults.23
21HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "Do Germans Want
a Single Youth Organization in West Germany?" Report no. 73,
series no. 2, 13 Apr. 1951; NA RG 306 Reports on German
Public Opinion.
“HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth
View the American Program I: Some General Evaluations,"
report no. 38, series no. 2, 9 Oct. 1950; NA RG 306 Reports
on German Public Opinion; see also Fiissl 164-167.
“HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth
View the American Program II: American Reorientation
Efforts," report no. 40, series no. 2, 23 Oct. 1950; NA RG
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The young people's rather negative outlook should not
have come as a surprise,

even five years after the war.

Unemployment ran high and the scars of the war remained very
visible in many cities, including Nuremberg.

The programs

they had come to know and appreciate under Hitler provided
the only models which had effectively given young people jobs
and

security.

The

leading

politicians

of

the

Federal

Republic belonged to a generation which was removed from
young people and did not seem to deal with the very real and
urgent problems of the younger generation.

Those who were

less reflective might have objected to some of the Hitler
Youth's features but certainly not to the attention and the
privileges

they

had

gotten

from

the

Nazis.

Americans

recognized that communists gained an advantage among some
young people by exploiting the younger generation's desire
towards recognition.

They appointed very young people to

prominent political positions and focused their attention on
youth much like Hitler and his henchmen had done.24
The picture was not as bleak as the surveys indicated.
The American zone of occupation actually served as a testing
ground for social scientists who were exploring this rather
new

field

of

examining

public

opinion.

Although

the

306 Reports on German Public Opinion.
M See, for example the Land Commissioner's of Hesse
evaluation of youth activities and the communist attempts to
sway youth in its favor in the Soviet zone and in his state
in his report of 19 Mar. 1951; NA RG 466 HICOM, Classified
Central Files, Box 25, D (51) 264/B.
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pollsters were recognized for their pioneer work and found
Germans in general cooperative, their surveys may not have
been entirely reliable.

Even today surveys in general do not

always reflect public opinion accurately.

Modern pollsters

have not been able to develop a consistent theoretical basis
for developing surveys.

The design of the questionnaires has

a profound influence on the results since it can channel
opinions in preconceived ways.

Equally important is which

information to include and which to leave out.
for example,

We have seen,

that pollsters completely overlooked AFN in

their surveys on radio listening.

Some historians argue that

the designers of the surveys tended to incorporate American
value systems and expectations to such an extent into the
questionnaires

that they were

unable to detect

specific

German features in the democratization process, for example.
They also seemed to expect rather negative results from their
surveys.

Their evaluations of the data often emphasized

discouraging features while minimizing progress.25

^For an excellent overview of the problems which survey
designers and sociologists are still trying to solve see
Enrique de la Garza Toledo, ed., Hacla una Metodologia de la
Reconstmccion: Antologla para la Actualizacion de los
Profesores de Licenciatura (Mexico City: Universidad Autonoma
de Mexico-Editorial Porrua, 1988) ; for a brief introduction
to the work of OMGUS and HICOG pollsters in Germany see Leo
P. Crespi, foreword, Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany:
The HICOG Surveys, 1949-1955, eds. Anna J. Merritt and
Richard L. Merritt (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1980); Eckart (19) discusses specific problems of the OMGUS
surveys which historians have detected over the years.
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Neither

McCloy

pollsters

provided

situation

of

nor
an

young

Norrie

entirely

people

in

were

convinced

accurate
Germany.26

that

picture

the

of

the

Although

the

pollsters reached rather pessimistic conclusions in their
interpretations of the surveys, some of the data they had
collected actually substantiated Norrie's and McCloy's points
of view.

The surveys revealed,

for example,

that young

people in the cities tended to be more positively disposed
towards American ideas and programs than those living in the
countryside.

Additional studies indicated that many young

people displayed a remarkable curiosity towards the United
States and made ample use of the programs the Americans
offered.

73% of all young people, a higher percentage than

that of the adults, knew the Amerika Hauser, for example.
the cities the percentage jumped to over 90%.

In

About twice as

many young people than adults claimed to have visited these
American institutions.

25% of all young Germans listened to

the Voice of America broadcasts from Washington.

50% of the

youths polled knew the American documentary film program,
although only 17% claimed to have seen at least one American
movie.

Within the youth group,

25% of all teenagers had

26Norrie, for example, expressed this view in a staff
conference in August 1950, shortly after McCloy had met the
West German youth leaders. McCloy seemed to agree. In his
public speeches in the United States and Germany between 1950
and 1952 he consistently assessed the mind frame of young
people in West Germany much more positively than the
pollsters had done (see Fischer and Fischer (eds.) 107-108,
126, 148, 231).
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visited the American shows while only 10% of those between 15
and 25 had done the same.

The film program was the only

American project which more rural than urban youths knew and
attended.

Clearly HICOG,

GYA,

and private sponsors had

correctly assessed the need for this kind of program.27
The pollsters did not seem to attach much importance to
the presence of American troops on the outlook of young
Germans and did not explore this venue in any way in 1950.
Surveys studying the differences in opinion between young
people living in cities and towns with American garrisons and
those who did not may have provided an additional field of
investigation.

An intelligence report from the previous year

provided

interesting

some

insights.

Its author

arrived

basically at the same conclusions as the HICOG surveys a year
later and recorded an interesting additional phenomenon.

The

intelligence officer found that the attitude of young Germans
towards

an

African American unit

stationed

in a

little

Bavarian town was "favorable and in many cases friendly".
The

author

noted

that

young

people

did

not

object

to

^HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth
View the American Program III: the Voice of America and
General Radio Listening Among Youth," report no. 41, series
no. 2, 23 Oct. 1950; HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff,
"German Youth View the American Program IV: Awareness and
Patronage of Amerika Haeuser Among Youth," report no. 42,
series no. 2, 25 Oct. 1950; HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis
Staff, "German Youth View the American Program V: Audiences
of US Overt Magazines and US Documentary Film Program,"
report no. 43, series no. 2, 25 Oct. 1950; NA RG 306 Reports
on German Public Opinion; see also Pilgert, Information
Services 74.
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interracial relationships as long as they were based on love,
not a "mercenary attitude" displayed by some German women
which exploited the "Negroes' generosity".
Nazi propaganda,

According to him,

which had depicted African Americans as

animals with no sexual restraints, probably did much to make
them more attractive once they were in Germany, but that
these perceptions were not the only ones responsible for the
African Americans' popularity.

The author continued that

the Negroes gained widespread approval, not only for
their sexual prowess, but for their great courtesy,
cheerfulness, and kindness.
Their attractive voices
were frequently remarked on. It was difficult to elicit
any comment indicating that young people resented the
presence of the Negroes more than they would white
troops. In fact, several volunteered the opinion that
they preferred the Negro troops to the white tactical
unit that had preceded them.
The investigator's
conclusion was that the Nazi propaganda on racial
purity, however effective it may have been, was not
strong enough to resist the influence of amiable
personal relations.28
There are additional clues that direct contact with
Americans, their institutions, and their culture may have had
some influence on young Germans.
young

people

in

the

cities

All surveys indicated that

consistently

displayed

more

interest in democracy and a higher degree of awareness and
approval of American programs and culture.

The pollsters

quite correctly attributed the phenomenon to the fact that
city youths in general were better informed than those living
in the countryside, but they also established that apparently
28OMGBY Youth and Youth Groups Intelligence Report, 2nd
draft [1949]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Analysis Br., Box 188,
10/51-3/12.
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young Germans from all walks of life were interested in these
programs and used them whenever they had a chance to do so.
Naturally

those

living

in

the

cities

had

many

more

opportunities in this field.
The HICOG survey on the radio listening habits of young
people also revealed this remarkable lack of awareness of the
armed forces' impact on young people.

It included questions

on the Voice of America program from Washington, but never
took into account the American broadcast station
American zone of occupation, AFN.

in the

We have already seen that

the military radio network had an impact on many people in
the Nuremberg region.
listened to VOA,

Since only 25% of the people surveyed

it must have come as a surprise to the

pollsters that one of the few areas in which a majority of
young Germans thought they could learn something from the
United States was in the field of radio broadcasting.

AFN

probably had much to do with this result.29
The extensive HICOG surveys certainly helped to maintain
the problem at the top of McCloy's agenda.

By March 1951 the

High Commissioner was ready to reevaluate the efforts of
American

youth

activities

to

date.

He

asked

the

Land

29HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth
View the American Program II: American Reorientation
Efforts," report no. 40, series no. 2, 23 Oct. 1950; "German
Youth View the American Program III: the Voice of America and
General Radio Listening Among Youth," report no. 41, series
no. 2, 23 Oct. 1950; NA RG 306 Reports on German Public
Opinion; interviews corroborate this assumption (see Winfried
Bliimel, personal interview,
28 July 1994; H. Wisura,
personal interview 1 Aug. 1994).
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Commissioners to submit detailed reports and recommendations
and to comment especially on the threat of communism for
young Germans.

In view of the attractive features which some

of the commissioners as well as the surveys detected in the
youth work of the communist regime, the reluctance of young
Germans to team up with the Free German Youth must have been
surprising.

Although

the

Land

commissioners

differed

considerably in their assessments of the state of youth work
in their domains, all of them agreed that to date communism
and the Free German Youth had not made any headway in the
Federal Republic.

Membership numbers bore them out, but the

commissioners cautioned that this did not mean the victory of
Western ideas.

They pointed out that many young Germans

still maintained a skeptical neutrality towards democratic
ideas, the United States, and its representatives.

Basically

they repeated the argument American youth officers had made
since 1945,

just with an additional enemy

in mind.

If

Americans were not able to fill the void the collapse of the
Nazi regime had left, the propaganda and ideology of the
communists might ultimately succeed.

It would therefore be

necessary to maintain or even intensify American efforts,
although some like George G. Shuster, who was in charge of
Bavaria, thought that Americans probably had given away their
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chance to reorient young Germans in 1947 or 1948.

Now it

might be too late to achieve anything.30
In spite of the general focus on the fight against
communism, Americans by no means were blind to developments
on the extreme right of the political spectrum.

The virulent

anti-communist rhetoric of a newly founded ultra-conservative
youth group, the Bund Deutscher Jugend (Alliance of German
Youth), in 1950 and 1951, for example, did not endear it to
American authorities.

The Alliance, which claimed 16,000

members at its peak at the end of 1950, openly appealed to
former soldiers and Hitler Youth members and advocated an
immediate German rearmament to fight the communists once
again.

With the exception of Bavaria's conservative party

and its youth specialist, Franz Josef Strauss, almost all
German youth groups and youth committees refused to recognize
the group or to cooperate with it.

Interestingly, the youth

organizations used the same argument with which they had
confronted the Free German Youth before:

Since the Alliance

pursued a largely negative anti-communist program and had
nothing constructive to offer, it was not worth any support.
In spite of some German suspicions of American backing for

30Report
by
C.P.
Gross,
Land
Commissioner
for
Wiirttemberg-Baden, 12 Mar. 1951; Report by James R. Newman,
Land Commissioner for Hesse; Report by Charles R. Jeffs, Rear
Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.), 21 Mar. 1951; NA RG 466 HICOM,
Classified General Records, 1949-1952, Box 25, D (51) 264
A,B,C; Memo from George G. Shuster to John McCloy, 23 Mar.
1951; NA RG 466 HICOM, Classified General Records, 1949-1952,
Box 26, D (51) 376; see also Rupieper 168-170.
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the group, whose considerable wealth surprised many, the High
Commission's intelligence section painted a very different
picture.

Although it apparently welcomed the strong anti

communist stand of the Alliance, it was unwilling to accept
the old demons to get rid of the new ones.

In June 1951

Intelligence reported to the State Department that
[The Alliance's] relations with other groups and youth
organizations have been marked by several unfortunate
[1] faux pas which have isolated the BDJ from all groups
except those on the right fringe. This outcast status
plus the
lack of a really democratic internal
organization, characterize the BDJ as another political
youth group with fascist potential.31
HICOG published
October

1951.

its new youth

directive no.

M-4

in

Its provisions clearly revealed that the

Americans were looking for ways to combat the new enemy but
certainly had not given up their older reorientation goals.
The directive stated that Americans had made "significant
progress" in their reorientation efforts of Germany's youth.
The authors recognized that they still needed to "strengthen
their

[young Germans]

confidence

in Germany's democratic

future" and "further among German youth loyalty to the ideals
of Western

democracy".

HICOG's

six

specific objectives

demonstrated the continuity in American youth work.

They

31Fiissl 144-146; the intelligence report is quoted on
146; see also the assessment of the formation of new youth
groups in Bavaria at the end of 1950 in OCLB, E&CR monthly
report, January 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, ID, Essential Elements
of Information Reports, 1950-1951, Box 2, E&CR Reports, Dec.
50-Feb. 51.
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simply made the nine aims Norrie had outlined three years
before official in a slightly modified form:
1. To help youth realize the inter-relationship between
individual freedom and social responsibility.
To
this end civic and political educational programs
are to be furthered.
2. To generate among German youth active resistance to
totalitarianisms of both the Right and the Left, and
dynamic support for German participation in the
defense of the free world.
3. To stimulate interest and confidence in democratic
governmental
and
political
institutions
and
practices,
as
well
as
to
encourage
active
participation in local community organizations
working for the public benefit, and in public
affairs in general.
4. To interpret and increase the understanding of the
American way of life.
5. To develop and strengthen the cultural, political,
economic, and social ties between Germany and
Western democratic countries.
6. To cooperate with Germany youth agencies working
toward the integration into the community of
homeless and unemployed youth.
To reach these objectives HICOG would
encourage, advise, and assist German youth, youth
organizations, and youth serving agencies in carrying
forward desirable plans of action in behalf of German
youth through publications, radio, press, conferences
and workshops, training projects, youth centers, and
demonstrations which further the education of German
youth towards citizenship in the Western political and
cultural world.
HICOG would also continue to conduct its own evaluations of
"needs, interests, and attitudes" and launch pilot projects
to support research.32
With the new policy statement in place, McCloy was ready
to take part in a conference with representatives of the

32HICOG Policy Directive No. M-4, 26 Oct. 1952; printed
in Pilgert, Community 20-21.
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three Western Allies in London at the beginning of 1952.
They

discussed

the

programs to date.

successes

and

shortcomings

of

their

American, British, and French participants

agreed that they had by no means won the battle for young
Germans yet.
left

they

integration

To fill the vacuum which Hitler Germany had
would
of

have
Germany

to
and

intensify

the

their

efforts

international

nationalism with the idea of a united Europe.

to

replace

The three

allies would cooperate more closely in the future, but would
not resort to any overt propaganda measures although this
would make their reorientation efforts more difficult in view
of the massive communist indoctrination in the Soviet zone.
The meeting clearly reflected the rather limited choices the
three countries had at their disposal seven years after the
war.

It also revealed a consensus that Germans had just

begun to embark on their way towards a true democracy.

The

Americans were doing everything they could to assure that
they stayed on their path.33

33Fiissl 143-44; see also Rupieper (168) for the concept
to replace nationalism with the pan-European idea.
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CHAPTER XII
Reorientation as Cooperation: American Initiatives,
1948-1955

Since the new HICOG youth directive came at a time when
the Americans were actually withdrawing from their active
participation in the communities and dissolving their local
and state offices, it is easy to assume that the new American
policy did not have any impact on youth work in Germany
anymore.

Directive no. M-4 was not so important for what it

would do in the future, but rather for summarizing the work
American officials had been doing in the previous four years;
it reflected their attitude towards German youth very well.
Interestingly,

the rather close

contact between tactical

units, American dependents, and the local population which
had existed throughout the occupation began to give way to a
segregated coexistence.

This pattern determined German-

American relations at the grassroots throughout the American
presence in Germany at a time in which military cooperation
between Americans and Germans became the order of the day.
Although McCloy and the High Commission had to carry out
their tasks with a reduced staff,
amounts

in

American

and

German

they made considerable
currency

available

for

reorientation and especially youth work between 1950 and
1952,

the peak of HICOG activities.

Youth and community

activities had over ten million marks and one million dollars

602
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at their disposal.

This amount did not include expenditures

for GYA or John McCloy's special project funds.

In addition

to that, other divisions sponsored programs from which youth
benefitted directly.

Lawrence Norrie estimated that the

Americans were spending about fifty-two million marks (at the
time about fifteen million dollars) for the reorientation of
German youth in 1951.

The next year the PAO received about

$48 million, almost half of the entire HICOG budget, for its
reorientation programs.

Youth activities undoubtedly got a

considerable portion of the budget.1
1952 marked a turning point because HICOG was unable to
maintain its level of involvement and aid.

It depended on

Congressional appropriations, and many people in the United
States still seemed to doubt the wisdom of the American
reorientation policy.

In February 1952 Lyndon Johnson, at

the time already an influential senator from Texas and member
of the Committee on Armed Services, forwarded the following
letter from one of his constituents to the State Department:
Honorable Sir:
I noticed that you were back in Texas for a few
days, and that you are on one of the "Watch Dog"
com[mittees] on expenditures.
Well, looks like some should be a watch dog on
$10,000,000 for US culture on Germans.
Senator, such
truck that the Fair Deal is putting out, and spending
the USA citizens' hard earnings is nothing else than the
stealing in the tax collection officials. Senator, you
boys better wake up.

•pilgert, Community 10-11; Kellermann 84.
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Johnson

requested

that

the

matter

consideration" and a prompt reply.

be

given

"serious

In March State explained

to Johnson that "much blood has been given by United States
citizens largely because of events originating in Europe and
especially

Germany."

The Department

argued that German

attitudes as well as the "durability of the new democracy"
were

vital

for

American

interests

in

the

Cold

War.

Apparently the argument did not meet widespread approval in
a Congress

that wanted

to save money.

It cut HICOG's

appropriations for 1952/53 in half which brought an end to
its field organization.2 The dissolution of the local HICOG
offices in 1952 also curtailed all of the High Commission's
community and youth projects.

From then on it would be up to

the Germans to show if American efforts and expenditures had
been successful.
Looking for Partners
Entering Nuremberg by car today the attentive observer
notices signs listing the partnerships between the city and
many other European communities.

Unlike smaller towns in the

surrounding region Nuremberg does not boast of a sister city
in the United States.

Americans and Germans actually thought

2Charley Cook, McKinney, Texas, to Senator Johnson,
Washington, D.C., 14 Feb. 1952; Johnson to State Dept., 18
Feb. 1952; State Department to Johnson, 10 Mar. 1952.
Interestingly, the Department not only chose to justify the
money spent for German reorientation but also explained to
Johnson at length that the American libraries in Germany
indeed contained no communist literature (NA RG 59 Decimal
Files 1950-54, 511.62A1/2-1852) . For the HICOG budget see
Pilgert, Community 10-11.
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about the idea of creating closer ties with an American
community after the war, but their motives were too different
to make it work.
In the course of its reorientation efforts OMGUS had
devised a plan to provide German communities with "parent
cities" in the United States.
Control

Division

Indianapolis

as

For Nuremberg the Information

envisioned
suitable

Houston,

matches,

New

but

Orleans,

Nuremberg's

council reacted rather coolly to the idea.

or
city

The welfare

committee simply took notice of a letter from OMGUS without
any further action.3
Apparently inspired by the American suggestion, but for
entirely different motives,
act.

He

tried

to

enlist

Lord Mayor Ziebill decided to
the

services

industrialist to support him in his search.

of

a

leading

His motives for

connecting with an American city were twofold:
Nuremberg wants to demonstrate that it is not the City
of the Nazi Party Rallies or of the Nuremberg Laws, but
wants to be a German center of culture and the economy
with a cosmopolitan outlook. We would like to ask our
American partner city to support us with our exterior,
economic, and cultural reconstruction, possibly to
deliver books to our libraries,
instruments and
medication to the hospitals, to conduct an exchange
between artists and scientists, and to provide our
undernourished children with opportunities for their
recuperation.

3OMGUS ICD Berlin to C.S. Wright, Chief, Exhibitions and
Information Centers Br., 6 Jan. 1947 [sic/ 1948]; NA RG 260
OMGBY, ICD, Information Centers Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/20;
minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 13 May 1948; NCA
C7/IX no. 1234.
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Ziebill thought that Philadelphia or Cincinnati would be good
targets and asked his partner to use his connections to
establish contact with his American acquaintances "in high
places."

The Lord Mayor made his priorities abundantly clear

when he delegated authority for future negotiations to the
city's finance department because of "possible negotiations
for loans" in the future.

Apparently the industrialist's

connections were not as good as Ziebill had hoped.

Nothing

ever came of his proposal, and Nuremberg remained without an
American partner.

At any rate Ziebill's wishes were coming

true without establishing official ties to one community.4
International Exchanges
Some of the projects the State Department considered to
be vital lived much longer than the High Commission.
them was the exchange program.

One of

Since Americans were trying

to reintegrate Germany into the international community, it
was only natural that they would assign exchanges a high
priority.

As we have seen, the State Department and Congress

laid the foundation for a global cultural exchange Program in
1946, but did not include Germans in the original provisions
of the American legislature.

Nevertheless OMGUS had received

explicit orders to begin an exchange program with the United
States in 1947.

With the help of Herman Wells it devised an

4Letter from Lord Mayor Ziebill to Egbert Fischer, MAN
Niirnberg, 5 July 1948; NCA C35/II no. 159. Ziegler had most
of his wishes fulfilled by OMGUS, HICOG, GYA and the
generosity of GIs.
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efficient system by 1948 to bring American experts to their
zone of occupation and to let Germans travel to the United
States to observe the democratic process and life in a free
society first hand.5
Under John McCloy the program expanded dramatically.
HICOG

actually created a new division within the Public

Affairs Office which was exclusively in charge of channelling
and coordinating all exchange projects.
administration were

Offices within the

advised accordingly.

The number of

people who travelled to the United States under the auspices
of HICOG went from a total of eight in 1947 to over nine
hundred in 1949.

1950 and 51 saw a peak with almost 2,500

exchangees per year which declined to about 1,800 in 1953,
less than 600 in 1954 and a mere 173 in 1955, its last year
of operations.6
The HICOG and OMGUS programs for Germany actually showed
some remarkable differences compared with
programs

the

state

Department

Fulbright and Smith-Mundt Acts.

had

other exchange

initiated

under

the

While the State Department

5See chapter VI above.
^ellermann 261, 263-65.
Kellermann, one of the
organizers of the German exchange program in the State
Department, wrote the definitive story about it. He tends to
overemphasize HICOG and State Department achievements at the
expense of OMGUS, however. This point of view creates the
impression of a dramatic new departure under HICOG which, at
least in the realm of youth work, did not exist.
See also
Henry Pilgert, The Exchange of Persons Program in Western
G e rm a n y
([Bad
Godesberg]: Office
of
the
U.S.
High
Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary,
Historical Division, 1951).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

608
concentrated almost entirely on elites and academics, HICOG—
following

the

precedents

leaders its priority.
all

Germans

education.

at

OMGUS

had

set— made

community

The Americans were aware that 90% of

that

time

never

obtained

any

college

Nobody denied that university students actually

formed a significant part of Germany's political elite, but
McCloy and his advisers did everything to reach out to other
parts

of

society

as well.

The most

important program

targeted German leadership in the broadest sense.

885 German

educators formed the strongest group of those who went to the
United States between 1951 and 1953.

HICOG was aware that

extracurricular activities needed special attention, so 314
youth leaders went to the United States to study specific
aspects

of

youth work.

Actually the

number was higher

because the groups of trade unionists and religious leaders,
listed as separate categories, also included youth leaders in
their groups.

With the exception of the first full year of

the program's

operations,

university

students remained a

minority among those who spent between three months and a
year in the United States until the end of the HICOG program
in 1955.7
None of the Germans came just as tourists to the United
States.

In Germany OMGUS had developed a large number of

projects, all of which were designed to introduce topics of
special

interest

to

small

groups

of

specialists

7Kellermann 98-123; Pilgert, Exchange 58-65.
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particular field.

HICOG continued along the same lines.

The

State Department set up an intricate organizational structure
with private

sponsors which would provide

network in the United States.

the

necessary

Youth leaders became mostly

charges of social agencies coordinated by the National Social
Welfare Assembly.

Projects included the "Observation and

Experience

of

Urban

Assistance

to

Youth

Administration

of

German Youth
Self-Help

Youth

in

the

United

Projects",

Organizations

States"

"Planning

and

Programs",

and
or

"Community Recreation and Sports".8
Although the programs had no precedents and required a
considerable amount of extra time and effort, the American
sponsors

cooperated

closely

with

OMGUS

officials

and

generally tried their best to accommodate the particular
needs of groups.

Elizabeth Lam, the officer in charge of the

exchanges of OMGUS Youth Activities Section,

for example,

established direct contact with the National Welfare Assembly
in

New

York

which

had

already

established

an

advisory

committee of outstanding youth specialists who came from the
national organizations of the YMCA and the Girls Scouts, the
CIO,

the

American

Friends'

Service

Committee,

the

US

Childrens' bureau, the New York School of Social Work and a
university.

Although Lam was not even able to determine

8Kellermann 109-113, 133-150; for specific Programs see
Pilgert, Exchange 80-86.
41 of the 131 HICOG projects in
1951 were designed for teachers, seven were specific youth
projects.
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whether there would be finances available
projects,

for her youth

planing went ahead at full speed.

Cooperation

between the OMGUS youth expert and the Assembly was close.
Lam received extensive reports and evaluations of the German
participants and their American hosts immediately after their
departure.9
Apparently the Assembly did not have problems mobilizing
its members.

In 1950 thirty-eight communities throughout the

United States hosted Germans and an additional forty stood by
for future assignments.

Interestingly, the South, with the

exception of Houston, Texas and Winston, North Carolina, did
not seem to share the interest

in German

reorientation.

Eleven colleges and universities had accepted German students
and visitors who also participated in conferences throughout
the nation.
Young people increasingly benefitted from the programs.
24% of the German participants came under
projects.

youth program

Apparently Americans targeted especially those

young people who had been exposed most to the indoctrination
of the Hitler regime at school.

44% of the visitors were

between eighteen and twenty-three years old, an additional
9From Alonzo Grace to Youth Division, National Social
Welfare Assembly, New York, 2 Sept. 1948; Elizabeth Lam,
OMGUS Youth Activities Section to Bernice Bridges, Director,
Youth Division, National Welfare Assembly, New York, 23 Dec.
1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box
129,
5/294-1/17;
Mabel
Shannon,
Coordinator,
German
Leadership Project [New York], to Lawrence Norrie, OMGUS, 11
Aug. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br.,
Box 143, 5/296-1/21.
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24% were between twenty our and twenty-eight, which meant
that they had received their entire education during the
Third Reich.10

In 1949 Americans introduced an additional

program exclusively for teenagers.

In that year the AFSC had

arranged for 100 of them, mostly refugees and expellees, to
come to the United States.

During the next six years over

two thousand German teenagers packed their mostly meager
belongings for the journey across the Atlantic.11
American officials soon encountered special problems
with this program.

Almost all of the teenagers adapted

quickly to their new living conditions after their initial
culture shock.

In fact they became so well integrated into

life in the United States that many teenagers and their host
families requested extensions

of their stays or even to

remain in the United States permanently.

Obviously these

requests alarmed the State Department since they defeated the
very purpose of the program.

Consequently extensions were

rarely granted.12
Returning

to

Germany

was

just

difficult time for many teenagers.

the

beginning

of

a

They experienced severe

10German Leadership Project, National Social Welfare
Assembly, Preliminary Report, May 1950; NA RG 59 Decimal
Files 1950-54, 511.62A3/6-1550.
"Kellermann 121-23; Pilgert, Exchange 60-62; see also
United States, Department of State, Preparation for Tomorrow:
German Boy's Year in America,
European and British
Commonwealth Series 20 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1951) 1-16.
12Preparation for Tomorrow 39-41.
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cases of reverse culture shock.
Germany's

poverty,

but

also

It was hard to readjust to

to a very different way of

thinking and a much more regimented life.

Often those who

had stayed at home regarded the returnees as "Americanized"
and rejected any proposals for changes at schools or clubs
which the young boys and girls advocated with much fervor.
Not surprisingly, teenagers frequently looked for ways to
return to the promised land, or at least to escape Germany.
A

young

participant

of

Department had arranged

a

conference

which

the

State

for teenage returnees in Germany

recalled that one of the most popular topics was not on the
official agenda.

Since the American government would not

permit them to emigrate to the United States for several
years, they looked for alternatives, such as emigration to
Canada.

The fact that the largest portion of former German

exchangees who emigrated to the United States came from this
program indicates that the problems indeed were very serious
for some.13
In

spite

of

these

difficulties,

an

internal

State

Department study of 1956 revealed that the benefits by far
outweighed the problems, although the long term results of
course could not yet be assessed.

Vaughn DeLong, who had

13Pilgert, Exchanges 62; Kellermann 122-23.
Professor
Dr. Lehmann, Director of the Max-Planck-Institute of History
at Gottingen, was one of the teenagers selected in the
fifties to go to the United States.
He provided the
information on the proceedings at returnee meetings when we
talked about my research project in the summer of 1995.
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given up his job as re-educator in Germany for that of an
exchange specialist in Washington, pointed out that the teen
age program was by far the most popular American undertaking
in the exchange field.

According to him,

this type of

exchange produced much positive publicity and attracted so
many private sponsors that the Department was unable to
satisfy the demand.

Many American families apparently did

not mind the considerable expenditures which hosting a young
German boy or girl incurred for them.

DeLong reported that

the program produced much grassroots support and pressure
from the private agencies involved which prevented members of
Congress

from

cutting

appropriations

for

exchanges

in

general.

The exchange specialist concluded that it would be

a serious mistake to phase the program out, since it provided
a "considerable segment" of the American population with an
opportunity
policy.

to

play an

active

role

in American

foreign

The exchanges operated as "two way streets" in which

not just the Germans learned something but their hosts also
became acquainted with the problems of Germany and would
better understand American foreign policy.

The program's

popularity with private sponsors ultimately enabled the State
Department

to

completely

jeopardizing the enterprise.

withdraw

its

support

without

It still forms a significant

part of the German-American exchange programs today.14
140ffice Memorandum from Mr. DeLong, IES, to Mr. Richard
Staus, GER/P, 15 Sept. 1954, subject: effectiveness of German
teenager programs: justification for 1956 budget request; NA
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To support its reorientation efforts in Germany, OMGUS
and HICOG also relied on the services of specialists

it

brought from the United States to investigate or provide
guidance for specific projects.
much

confusion,

which

aggravated even more.

slow

Initially there seemed to be
administrative

procedures

Many specialists came ill prepared or

did not have a clear idea of what OMGUS expected them to do,
some just wanted to take a nice vacation in Europe or pursue
their own research in Germany.

The language barrier proved

to be another detriment to the effectiveness of American
specialists.

HICOG officials agreed in one of their first

sessions with McCloy that only about 50% of the specialists
were effective and worth their money.

McCloy and his staff

consequently decided to scale down the program and invest the
money they saved in bringing more Germans to the United
States.

Nevertheless, between 1947 and 1955 more than 800

specialists had been in Germany.15
In spite of the skepticism within HICOG, many American
specialists

made

lasting

contributions

to

youth work

in

RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 511.62A3/9-1954.
My oldest
brother and I participated in a three week teenage exchange
program sponsored by the Bavarian Youth Committee in 1973 and
1975. In spite of the considerable cost for transport to the
United States at the time there were enough participants to
fill a chartered jetliner.
In 1978/79 the United States
hosted 880 high school students and 330 trainees from
Germany, three times as many as in 1954 (Max Planck Institute
48) .
15Kellermann 123-27, 264-65; Pilgert, Exchange 66-67;
minutes of a HICOG staff meeting, 11 Oct. 1949; NA RG 466
HICOM, Extracts from HICOG Staff Conference Meetings 1949-50.
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Germany.

Emigres like Hertha Krauss or Annemarie Schindler,

another professional youth worker who had had to flee Hitler,
returned to Germany in that capacity.

Schindler travelled

throughout the American zone to render advice to schools for
social workers as well as to the recently established youth
leadership schools.

Klara Kaiser from Columbia University

was scheduled to spend three months in 1949 in one of the
leadership schools

as a resident faculty.

Eight out of

seventy-six specialists had specific youth projects in 1949.
All of them either occupied leading administrative positions
in youth offices of American communities or were involved in
practical youth work.16
Like Mrs. Schindler, most experts travelled throughout
the American zone.

Ruth Norris, who came from the New York

School of Social Work,

focused her efforts on developing

curricula in youth leadership schools.
hands-on experience.

She also emphasized

In June 1949 she travelled to Nuremberg

to conduct a two day workshop in amateur theater with youth
leaders there.

According to her, playing theater was not

just fun, but also taught communication and understanding.
Apparently she found a perceptive audience.

Just one month

later one of the participants of the course began to organize
16Report on visiting expert projects, 1 Apr. 1949; NA RG
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Cultural Affairs Br. , Box 212, 5/334-2/12;
index for visiting experts for reporting year ending 30. Apr.
1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box
126, 5/293-3/14; Brief on Annemarie Schindler, scheduled to
arrive in Germany, 12 May 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-3/19.
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his own theater workshop at youth castle Feuerstein to which
he invited a Swiss specialist.17
American specialists also helped Germans to identify the
needs of their youth.
a specialist

In 1950 HICOG brought Jay M. Ver Lee,

in planning,

to Germany to assist with the

development of all encompassing plans for the development of
youth work in Munich and Nuremberg.

Interestingly, this time

the American officials did not act on their own initiative
but brought the expert after the two cities had requested
their help.

Ver Lee began his work on Nuremberg in November

1950 and submitted a detailed report to the city in January
1951.

The youth specialist made eight youth centers the

center of his proposal.

He suggested locations for them and

maintained that they should be open to all young people.
Although the "Ver-Lee-Plan" was never implemented entirely,
it provided the basis for Nuremberg's blueprints

in this

field.18
The American academic exchange programs
trail of the general political developments.

followed the
In 1952 the

nLetter from Ruth Norris to OMGBY, 10 June 1949; letter
from Toni Budenz to OMGBY, 26 July 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3.
18Jay M. Ver Lee, "Eine Ubersicht iiber Jugendbauten und Freizeitprogramme:" Eine gemeinsame Arbeit der Stadt Niirnberg
und des Landeskommissariates Bayern, Niirnberg, im Januar
1951; Bavarian State Archives, Nuremberg [hereinafter BSA]
Kreisjugendring Niirnberg Stadt, 1/1; "Acht neue Heime der
'Offenen Tiir'," [Eight New Homes "of the Open Door"] NN, 16
Mar. 1951: 10; I will discuss the further development of
Nuremberg's youth centers below.
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three

Western

Allies

finally

reached

an

agreement

with

Chancellor Adenauer which ended the occupation, although it
did not yet grant the Federal Republic its sovereignty.19
Nevertheless the time was ripe to acknowledge Bonn as an
equal partner, and the official resumption of international
exchanges offered a good way for doing it.
Negotiations to include the Federal Republic in the
Fulbright program started in 1951, but Germans and Americans
actually could look back to a long tradition of academic
exchanges.
researchers
nineteenth

Many
had

influential
attended

century

American

German

to pursue

intellectuals

universities

their

studies

during

and
the

at what was

considered to be the world's most advanced system of higher
education.

This

initial phase of academic contacts was

almost entirely a one way street with the Germans gladly
serving as mentors for their American students and GermanAmericans

emulating

the

German

educational

system

and

philosophy to the highest possible degree.20
World War I interrupted the exchange and also altered
the parameters.

The strident nationalism, chauvinism, and

totalitarian attitudes which most German academics,

high

school teachers, and students displayed alienated American

I9Schwartz provides the most recent and complete account
of the role the United States and John McCloy played in the
formation of the Federal Republic. See especially chapter 9
for the contractual agreements.
20Max Planck Institute (ed.) 1-11.
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intellectuals and severely damaged German prestige in the
United States.

Before, during, and after the war

technological and research breakthroughs as well as the rise
of the United States to the status of global power boosted
American
educators

self-esteem
in

considerably.

Germany

tried

to

During

overcome

the

their

1920s

country's

isolation by creating two government agencies, the Alexandervon-Humboldt Foundation and the Academic Exchange Service, to
promote closer ties with the United States.

Both agencies

cooperated with the Institute of International Education, a
pattern they would reestablish in the 1950s.

Already in the

1920s a growing number of German students went to the United
States, while at the same time many private donations helped
German universities through their chronic lack of funding
caused

by

Germany's

economic woes.

Starting with

just

thirteen German students in 1922, the numbers increased to
over

400

Hitler's

ten years
rise

to

later.

power,

They
although

sharply declined
the

exchange

after

service

continued its operations well into the war.21
During the Third Reich the transatlantic connection
became once again mainly a one way street, but this time from
east to west.

Only those interested in studying National

Socialism first-hand found their way to Germany, while many
prominent German scholars were driven out, followed by others
when Hitler's armies occupied their countries.

Their exodus

2IMax Planck Institute (ed.) 15-26.
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had a dual effect.
of

highly

German universities experienced a drain

qualified

researchers

from

which

they

never

recovered, while those in the United States proportionally
benefitted from this unprecedented influx of scientists and
scholars,

many of whom enjoyed a world wide reputation.

World War II completely cut all academic connections between
Germany and the United States.

HICOG and the Bonn government

would have to start in this field where they had left off in
1932.22
McCloy and Adenauer signed the treaty shortly before the
contractual and European Defense Community Agreements on 18
July 1952.

The Fulbright treaty took the academic community

away from HICOG's administration and integrated West Germany
into the State
understanding

Department's

replaced

the

worldwide programs.
reorientation

Mutual

concept.

The

commission in charge of administering the program in Germany
consisted equally of Germans and Americans.

During the first

year of its operations 178 graduate students, 33 professors,
and 8 teachers went to the United States.

At the same time

German universities accepted 192 students, 19 professors and
lecturers, and 12 teachers.
went to the United States.

In 1955 over 700 German students
The program enabled more than 800

Americans to study or teach in Germany that year.

Initially

Fulbright just supplemented many other HICOG programs, but

^Max Planck Institute (ed.) 35-46.
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from 1955 on it became the United States'

only exchange

program in Germany and stressed German cooperation.23
The Bonn government took its share in this "two way
street" seriously.

Even before negotiations for including

West Germany in the Fulbright program began, the Americans
noted in March 1952 German universities had invited fifteen
professors from abroad for teaching assignments.

The state

ministries for education also had taken steps to support the
cultural exchange.

The states revived the German Academic

Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst or
DAAD) and were preparing to send twenty-five teachers to the
United States with their full salaries paid.

This time they

wre not snet to demonstrate the superiority of the German
educational system but to promote mutual understanding.

To

The DAAD invited twenty-five American teachers ot Germany to
provide German secundary school students who could not go to
the United States the opportunity to become acquainted with
the culture on the other side of the Atlantic.

Washington

also took notice that only two of 104 youth leaders who
attended an international conference in Paris had been unable
to come up with their own travel funds.

The author of the

report found this remarkable because the youth leaders had
actually been sent by the State Department.
stay

behind.

The

Federal

Bonn did not

government's

financial

contributions to the Fulbright program soon began to outweigh
^Kellermann 173-205.
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the

American

prestigious

ones.
and

It remains

coveted

exchange

to

be

one

programs

of

the most

among

German

students to this day.24
Pursuing Their Own Course: The Churches
OMGUS and HICOG would not have been able to manage such
a diversified program without the cooperation of a large
number of private organizations which Wells had managed to
mobilize.

As usual the churches were not content with a

supporting role.

We have seen that the Friends initiated the

teenage exchange program.

The WCC and a number of other

religious groups also began to play a significant role in
reviving the contacts between young Germans and people from
all

over the

world.

specialists to Germany.

They

continued

to

send their

own

When Carl Baird returned to the

United States in 1949, the WCC replaced him with William

24Report from Sam H. Lynch to Mrs. M.E. Allen, 20 Mar.
1952; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-1954, 511.62a3/3-2052;
Kellermann (176-177) provides the information on German
financing of Fulbright.
Since the Fulbright program
continued beyond the scope of this study, it does not receive
the attention it actually deserves. Interest in the program
remains high.
Even almost fifty years after the program's
inauguration the Fulbright commission never has a shortage of
applicants. Interestingly, it was not until the 1980s that
young Fulbright returnees decided to create the German
Fulbright Alumni Association. Although it is fairly young,
it boasts around 700 paying members and organizes very
informative conferences. It also takes an active interest in
forwarding the idea of cultural exchanges and openmindedness
in any conceivable way.
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Graffam who came from Boston where he had studied psychology
before deciding to become a reverend.25
Graffam was already familiar with the city when he came.
He had visited the city as a participant in an international
work camp and was a friend of Baird.

Graffam seemed to be

less reluctant to become a visible presence in Nuremberg.
stayed with the Bavarian Youth Ministry for six years.
his

predecessor,

Graffam

participated

in

the

He

Like

ministry's

activities such as youth retreats, but he also became editor
of one of its monthly Das Baugeriist and managed to increase
its circulation

considerably.

The American wrote

about

topics such as celebrating Christmas in the United States,
but he also introduced new ways of thinking and behaving in
his contributions to the youth publications.

In June 1953,

for example, he told his readers that "actions speak louder
than words."
should

follow

Graffam suggested to young Germans that they
the

example

of

some

young

Christians

in

Philadelphia who were carrying out small community projects
without waiting for the authorities to solve problems.

He

not only admonished his readers to do the same but also
provided them with practical tips for organizing this type of
activity in their own communities.

Probably without being

^"Mr. Baird sagt Ade," [Mr Baird Says Good-Bye] Hand in
Hand (Oct. 1949) 10: 17; "Wir stellen vor:" [We Introduce:]
Hand in Hand (Nov. 1949) 11: 20; see also Hans Martin
Helbich, Im Dienst der jungen Generation: Erfahrungen und
Erkenntnisse in der Arbeit der evangelischen Jugend in Bayern
(Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: n.p. [1955]): 101.
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aware of it, Graffam promoted the same democratic principles
as

OMGUS

and

HICOG

officials:

he

suggested

electing

a

committee which should not just include the reverend but also
the local mayor or other important people.

Graffam also

recommended that Christian youth groups cooperate closely
with youth rings and other youth organizations.

Writing did

not just mean articles but also theater plays which Graffam
produced with

youth

groups.

The

American

also

tackled

difficult problems such as the meaning of modern life or what
consequences

"being different"

actually could have for a

young Lutheran.26
One of Graffam's main fields of operation was ecumenical
work.

With the support of the WCC the American began to

organize

services

in English and German

in the town

Oberammergau, site of a world famous passion play,

of

in the

summer of 1950.

Oberammergau was such a success that the

Bavarian

decided

church

to

make

gatherings

with

other

Protestants an integral part for young people and reverends
alike.
abroad

With Graffam as interpreter the Bavarians' first tour
led

them

to

East-London

where

they

visited

a

congregation who had suffered the loss of its church and
community center from German V 1 rockets during World War II.
The next year they set out for Scotland and also hosted

26"Anders als die anderen," [Different from Others] Das
Baugeriist (1952) 6: 146-147; "Actions speak louder than
words," Hand in Hand (Jun. 1953) 6: 12-13; "Bill Graffam,"
Das Baugeriist (1955) 10: 265-66.
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international camps with participants from the United States
and many European countries in Germany.

In 1955 Graffam

defended this "ecumenical work" against "parochialists" as
necessary.

He found it comforting to find that the Christian

church had "world wide dimensions."

Graffam also thought

that

political

the

international

work

had

a

dimension.

According to him, "the church must not only preach peace and
love but also demonstrate them at a time of hatred between
the peoples of the world."27
Before Graffam left Nuremberg in 1955, he wrote about
his impressions and experiences in Germany.
have praise in his farewell note.

He did not just

He maintained that the

shabby way in which the Lutheran church treated the women it
employed drove many of them away from the church.

Graffam

thought that theology was indeed important for working with
young people, but that at the same time an exclusive emphasis
on theology did not take the fact into account that many poor
theologians
Graffam's

major

experiences
complete

turned

out

to

criticism

of most

detachment

be
was

theology
from

excellent

real

the

workers.

of

practical

lack

students.
life

youth

and

He

noted

their

from

their

even

colleagues at other faculties of their university.

The guest

from the United States pointed out that German theology
students received one lecture on youth work during their
entire course of study.

He found it not at all surprising

^Helbich 101-103.
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that most vicars were completely helpless in the presence of
young people and often did not understand that they needed to
take practical issues such as laws or working hours into
consideration

in

their

attempts

to

reach

out

to

young

people.28
In spite of Graffam's severe criticism of the German
Lutherans in 1955, he seemed to prefer the imperfections of
Germany to those of the Protestant churches in the United
States.

Getting married to a German lady was the outward

sign that he felt comfortable and welcome in Nuremberg.
he returned to his home land it did not hold him long.

When
After

some years of missionary service in other countries Graffam
decided to return to Germany and join the Lutheran church
there.

He became reverend in a North German congregation

where he continued to write theater plays for young people.
He is still living there after his retirement.29
From

1948

on

church

international work camps

organizations
in Germany.

also

introduced

Young people from

abroad and from Germany would provide their labor free of
charge in self-help projects to German communities or groups
in special need.

This would not only generate good will but

also enable young Germans and their peers from all over the

28Helbich 104-107.
29Marianne Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug. 1995.
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world to get to know, to understand,

and to respect each

other.30
Youth camps also took place in and around Nuremberg.

As

usual the AFSC was among the pioneers of this type of work.
In 1947 one of the initiators of the Peace Village asked the
AFSC if it might not be possible to support the project with
international volunteers.

The AFSC replied promptly.

By the

end of 1947 the Friends obtained permission for one of their
representatives,
Nuremberg.

William Weber,

to take

up residency

in

Weber went to work immediately and by June 1948,

just a few months after the laying of the cornerstone for the
project,

international volunteers began to arrive to help

with the construction of the project, but also to promote a
better understanding between young people from around the
world.

Weber made no bones about the difficulty of the task.

In his project description he informed applicants that they
were not just expected to do heavy construction work free of
charge, but also to participate actively with contributions
to the spiritual life of the work camp.

Those who wanted to

30See, for example, minutes of the OMGUS Youth Activities
Staff Meeting, 14 and 15 Apr. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18; Beryl R.
McClaskey (The History of U.S. Policy and Program in the
Field of Religious Affairs under the Office of the U.S. High
Commissioner for Germany ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the U.S.
High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive
Secretary, Historical Division, 1951) 26-29) provides a very
general overview over the international contacts of the
churches.
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come generally were expected to pay their travel expenses out
of their own pockets.31
In

spite

of

Weber's

"job

description"

about

fifty

international volunteers arrived at Nuremberg to help the
inhabitants of the Peace Village with their construction
work,

but

project,

currency
so

continuing

that
the

reform wiped
the

work

volunteers
they

had

out
had

begun

the
a

funds

for

difficult

after

June.

the
time
The

participants of the youth camp did not just have material
problems, however.
the Germans

Communication was difficult since none of

spoke any English and few of the volunteers

commanded German so that discussions were cumbersome.

Bad

weather made living under normally difficult conditions in
crowded quarters with a meager diet even harder.

Building an

"effective democratic organization without falling into the
extremes of formless laissez-faire or over-authority" proved
to be another challenge for the organizers.
the Friends'
success.

An

Nevertheless,

representative regarded the experiment as a
average

of

twenty

volunteers

per

day

had

provided fifty-five work days in labor, but the Quakers found
the less tangible results equally important:
In a spirit of good will, service, and seeking, through
the medium of cooperatively and democratically shared
310gden Hannaford, AFSC, Paris, to Raymond Spahn, Youth
Activities Officer for Bavaria, E&CRD, OMGUS, 31 Dec. 1947;
American Friends Service Committee, "Work Camps in Germany.
Unsere Freiwillige Arbeitsgemeinschaft zum Wiederaufbau in
Niirnberg;" [First Quarter 1948] NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 38, 10/43-2/8.
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work, play, meditation and discussion, our work camp has
been a humble attempt to lessen the occasion for war by
building positive attitudes
towards
the world's
problems.32
During the next two years the Peace Village received further
help

from

international

volunteers,

recruited by the AFSC but also

who

were

not

just

by the World Council

of

Churches.33
Of

course

exchanges

between

the

United

States

and

Germany were not the only avenue to international contacts.
OMGUS

and

HICOG

did

not

ignore

the

possibilities which

exchanges between Germany and its European neighbors offered.
The British and the French had established their own exchange
program early on, but the Americans were the first to broaden
32Bradford Rowland (AFSC Paris) c/o William Weber,
Nuremberg, Germany to Dr. Swanson & Dr. Raymond Spahn,
Educational & Youth Division OMGBY; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 127, 5/294-1/1.
33Apparently international work camps were one of the
areas in which Chester Baird became active. In July 1949 he
requested an extension of stay from OMGUS for various
Americans who were participating in a work camp in 1949 (NA
RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/431/3); "Jugend ohne VolkerhaB: Deutsche und Amerikaner,
Franzosen und Hollander, Schweizer und Indochinesen zu Arbeit
und Spiel vereint im 'Friedensdorf'," [Youth Without Hatred
Towards Other Peoples: Germans and Americans, French and
Dutch, Swiss and Indochinese Joined in Work and Play at the
"Peace Village"] NN, 1 Aug. 1949: 5; "Geist und Kraft
Vereint: Internationales Treffen im Friedensdorf, [Spirit and
Power United: International Meeting at Peace Village] NN, 22
July 1950: 14. Of course these camps were not the only ones:
We have seen that international students spent time at the
Nuremberg GYA center in 1952.
The Lutheran Church
institution in Stein, a suburb of Nuremberg also became the
site of an international youth camp in 1950 ("Praktische
Arbeit, keine Ideologien: Internationales Studentenlager in
Stein," [Practical Work, No Ideologies: International Student
Camp in Stein] NN, 19 Aug. 1950: 11) .
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their horizons beyond the boundaries of their own zone.

A

steady stream of European specialists went to Germany and
many

Germans

were

able

to

countries with American aid.

travel

to

their

neighboring

At the end of this part of the

exchange program over two thousand German leaders had gone to
other European countries and 532 European specialists had
spent time in Germany to take care of reorientation.34
The Nuremberg YMCA seemed to be especially active in
this realm.

Possibly with the help of Lawrence Norrie, who

maintained close contact with Nuremberg's YMCA,
Nurembergers went to Switzerland in August 1949.

eighteen

At the same

time twelve others got the opportunity to travel to Sweden.
Members of other church youth groups were able to travel to
Holland.

Trade unionists re-established contacts with France

and later began to organize journeys to Italy and Yugoslavia.
Young Germans were taking advantage of all opportunities to
break through the isolation the Third Reich had created.35

wKellermann 127, 261.
35Report on exchanges, 6 July 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Cultural Affairs Br., Box 17, 10/120-1/11; for
Norrie's close ties to the Nuremberg YMCA see letter from
L.E. Norrie, Chief, Group Activities Br., OMGUS, to Dr.
Dannemann, YMCA, Stuttgart, 26 Aug. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-1/24; for
other journeys see, for example, "Eine war mit in Amsterdam,"
[One Girl Travelled to Amsterdam] Die Junge Gemeinde (Nov.
1948): 14-15; "Erster Preis: Nach Danemark," [First Price: To
Denmark] Die Junge Gemeinde (Nov. 1948): 15-16; for the Trade
Unions'
international contacts see Karl Schmidbauer's
comments in Grieb, ed., 65-66.
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American planners of the cultural exchange program were
aware that the seeds they were sowing probably would need a
long time to bear

fruit.

Their own evaluations

exchange program were cautiously optimistic.

of the

According to

their first impressions and surveys, many of the exchangees
in fact became the multipliers the Americans had hoped they
would be.

Interestingly, briefing conferences and returnee

meetings seemed to indicate that university students were
least likely to benefit from their overseas experiences.36
Young Nurembergers as well as youth leaders had ample
opportunity to travel to the United States from the start.
Two students were the first ones who left for a journey
across the Atlantic.

The American YMCA sponsored one of

them, Church World Services enabled a theology student from
the Lutheran college in nearby Neuendettelsau to continue his
studies in the United States.

In 1948 eleven members of

36Kellermann 209-252. Since Bavaria was considered to be
a stronghold of the "traditionalists", American experts paid
special attention to the effects of returnees there and were
satisfied with the immediate results the exchanges showed in
all age groups and among participants in a wide variety of
projects designed for helping young people.
See, for
example, despatch from HICOG, Frankfurt to Department of
State, Washington, 17 and 26 Jan. 1952; NA RG 59 Decimal
Files 1950-1954, 511.62A3/1-1752 and 511.62A3/1-2652; for an
evaluation of returnees and a very clear opinion about German
university students see Russel S. Wise, Consul General,
Hamburg, to Dept, of State, Washington, 22 Aug. 1952; NA RG
59 Decimal File 1950-54, 511.62A3/8-2252; a study conducted
by the Institut fur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsforschung for the
USIA in 1955 confirmed his impressions (USIA, Research Staff,
Report no. 224, Study of Impressions and Disseminations by
Information Specialists and Students from the Exchange of
Persons Program, 30 Dec. 1955; NA RG 306 Research Reports on
German Public Opinion).
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various youth groups in Nuremberg left Germany with a grant
from the Rockefeller foundation.
like Karl Maly,

the third man

1949 saw youth specialists
in Nuremberg's youth work

behind Marx and Staudt, together with Armin Schrotberger, an
elementary school teacher who worked for OMGUS, participating
in one of the youth leader projects.

Martin Helbich went to

the United States with another pastor from Nuremberg and two
from the surrounding region under the sponsorship of the
Federal Council of Churches.
scholars

in

1953

reorientation,

was

The first group of Fulbright

still

very

much

connected

to

but demonstrated well the new approach of

targeting persons instead of institutions which the OMGUS
youth section had pioneered.

The Americans brought 105

teachers to the United States.

Five of them, two ladies and

three

men,

came

from

Nuremberg.

By

that

time

State

Department objectives were not just to prove Nazi propaganda
wrong, but also to counteract erroneous impressions which
Hollywood movies seemed to cause.
trade unionists,
teachers,

students,

During the next years

teenagers,

young farmers, more

and members of the Churches

followed

in their

footsteps.37
37List of Students to attend US Colleges 1947/48; NA RG
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Cultural Affairs Br., Box 217, 5/335-3/29;
list of Rockefeller Grantees of 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD,
Group Activities Br., Box 48, 10/43-3/9; list of individuals
travelling to the US, 21 Apr. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Cultural Affairs Br., Box 215, 5/334-3/23; report on project
in foreign teacher education, German Teacher Education
Program 1952-53; NA RG 59 General Records, Bureau of Public
Affairs, International Education Exchange Service, Box 2. I
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All Nurembergers who went to the United States were most
impressed with their host country.

It seemed that the United

States had something to offer for everyone.
most of his time in the North-East.

Karl Maly spent

As a Social Democrat he

did detect differences between rich and poor, but also noted
that the poor in the United States still had more than the
average German.

Maly found the absence of any deference

towards higher social classes or authorities one of the most
striking features of the country.

He also reported back to

Germany that the United States in fact was the "Country of
Youth" because it seemed that youth activities and education
received almost unlimited public and private support.

In

view of the Peace Village and the other Boys7 Town project in
Nuremberg

it is not surprising that Maly also wanted to

become acquainted with a Boys7 Town in the State of New York.
His sponsors complied with his wishes.

Maly was impressed

with the democratic procedures the young people practiced
there.38
Bavaria7s

Youth

According to him,

Pastor

America

different from Germany.

had

a

different

in many respects was

approach.
not much

Martin Helbich talked about New York

found the names of the five Nuremberg teachers in newspaper
clippings which had been included as an appendix in the
report and was able to locate three of them in Nuremberg in
1995.
Another had passed away and one could not be found.
The Nurnberger Nachrichten maintained a steady supply of
reports of exchangees throughout the 1950s.
38|,Ein Bericht aus dem 7Lande der Jugend7," [A Report
from the "Land of Youth"] NN, 29 May 1949: 5.
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precincts in which German was still the predominant language
and he related to his readers back home— undoubtedly with
satisfaction— that he had discovered a Cafe Hindenburg, named
after the ultraconservative general, German World War I hero
and last President of the Weimar Republic.

Although Helbich

came from the conservative camp, he shared a number of Maly's
observations.

Like Maly, Helbich commented that he had ample

opportunities to meet with leading experts in his field of
Protestant youth work and to learn about youth work not just
in theory but also in practice.

He was impressed with the

way in which American teachers managed to interest their
teenage students in political issues and tried to practice
democracy

in

the

prosperity which,

classrooms.

Helbich

also

the

according to him, made youth work much

easier over there than in poor Germany,

but the Bavarian

Youth Pastor thought that this wealth was
blessing.

noted

not

always

a

He noted that the American YMCA had really fancy

houses, but at the same time had become a secular service
operation which seemed to forget its foundation in faith.
Interestingly, Helbich reported that he had not fallen into
unlimited enthusiasm but that getting to know that part of
the world was well worth the trouble.

He recommended to

everyone who had the chance to take the trouble and make the
journey.39
39Letter from Hans Martin Helbich to his friends in
Germany, 23 May 1949; LCA Landeskirchenrat, VI, 1178a, vol.
IV.
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Not all Lutherans shared this view.

Nuremberg's Dean

Theodor Schieder, for example, maintained his distance from
the occupiers throughout his tenure.

When HICOG approached

his superiors in Munich to recommend people for the exchange
program in 1951, he informed them that he "could not think of
one man who would be able above all to stay away from his
profession for such a long time."
declined

invitations

by

the

Schieder consistently

Nuremberg

Amerika

Haus

to

participate in or at least to attend discussion evenings.

In

1950 he declined to participate in a German-American Easter
service

which

Army

chaplains

were

trying

to

organize.

According to Schieder, the time was not yet ripe for such an
undertaking.

"One has to respect the feelings of the people

which happens to be the vanquished". Schieder thought that
Americans

first

would

have

to

"practice"

community

by

visiting German services and "respectable Christian German
families" .40
Although Schieder was one of the leading men in Bavaria,
he was unable to stop American advances in areas which were
not under his jurisdiction.

In spite of his reservations, an

40Schieder to the Lutheran State Council in Bavaria, 26
Oct. 1951.
The folder contains numerous letters in which
Schieder declines to participate in discussions or other
events at the Amerika Haus in spite of repeated attempts by
the director of the institution to involve him (see, for
example, Dr. Ernest G. Schweibert, Director, Amerika Haus
Nuernberg to Oberkirchenrat D. Schieder, Nuernberg, 8 Feb.
1950; LCA Kreisdekan Niirnberg 138) . For Schieder's position
on the Easter service see his Erklarung des Sachverhaltes, 13
Apr. 1950; LCA Landeskirchenrat, 525.
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Easter service took place in Munich the same year.

It seems

that especially youth reverends had less problems with the
occupiers.

In

July

1949,

for

example,

youth

reverend

Bammessel from Nuremberg invited Harold Patrick, the Bavarian
OMGUS youth officer to observe the Lutheran Church's own
youth leadership training.41
Bammessel also provided the Americans with names of
students who were willing to go to the United States.
spite

of

Schieder's

opinion,

other

Bavarian

continued to travel to the United States.

In

reverends

Especially the

staff of the Mothers' Home in Stein, who were very active in
youth leader training, had the opportunity to expand their
horizons and to learn something new in the United States.
The head of the Bavarian Inner Mission travelled to America
as

well.

He

congregations

took
in

according to him,

the

person
had

opportunity
for their

done

so much

to

thank

American

charity

work,

good

for the

which,
still

devastated country.42
American churches did not just welcome German reverends
and lay persons to the United States, but also took every
41Youth Pastor Bammessel to Mr. Patrick, 30 May 1949; NA
RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/5.
42List of Candidates for study in the US submitted by
youth reverend Bammessel, 11 July 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3; final report
of Reverend Heinz Diez, Director, Innere Mission of his trip
to the United States, 27 Sept.-19 Dec. 1951 (Diez's report
also contained train and bus tickets); LCA Diakonisches Werk,
2427; for the journeys of the Mothers' Home staff see LCA
Gemeindehelferinnen, Box 5, HICOG.
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opportunity to gather information and observe the situation
first hand.

Delegations of reverends and theology students

arrived at Nuremberg as well as individuals who wanted to
observe specific problems for which they were trying to find
solutions or funds back home.43
Heinrich Schiller was one of the
obtain a degree

in the United States.

first students to
He went

to the

University of Minnesota to study social work with Gisela
Konopka, a German emigree who was teaching in Minneapolis.
Schiller not only acquired theoretical knowledge of a new
approach to social work, but also got the chance to test the
theory in the field.

Schiller lived and worked in several

institutions for children and teenagers in Minneapolis.

He

returned to Berlin with his Master's degree in 1951, but two
years later went to Nuremberg to teach social work there.
Schiller's dissertation which contained the new approach to
social work became a standard textbook throughout Germany.
Schiller

continued

his

career

first

as

director

of

43"US Studenten in Niirnberg: Sie besichtigen kirchliche
Einrichtungen," [US Students in Nuremberg: They Visit Church
Installations] NN, 6 July 1951: 11; "Sie wollen die Not
kennenlernen: US Kirchenvertreter besuchen auch Niirnberg,"
[They Want to
Get to Know the Misery:
US Church
Representatives Also Visit Nuremberg] NN, 14 Jan. 1952; "US
Pastoren besichtigen Niirnberg,"
[US Reverends Inspect
Nuremberg] NN, 18 July 1952: 10; see also correspondence
between Nuremberg ministers and their American colleagues
regarding their visits, for example Pastor Henry 0. Yater,
Ann Arbor, Michigan to Reverend Diez, Nuremberg, 8 Feb. 1952,
in which the American thanks for the hospitality he received
on his visit and asks Diez to take care of a German student
who is about to return home from Ann Arbor (LCA Diakonisches
Werk, 778c).
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Nuremberg's own School of Social Work, from 1967 as director
of a completely new school of social work the Lutheran church
established in the city.

He also served as president in

international organizations and helped the United Nations to
promote social work in Thailand.44
Schiller was not the only person to become involved in
looking for new ways in social work.

In September 1951

German community and church social workers who had been to
the United States met in Stuttgart to collect and evaluate
their

experiences.

They

adopted

a

resolution

which

recommended the introduction of "case work" and "group work"
and demanded that "concurrent field work" become part of the
education of social workers.

They also demanded that social

work— up to then a domain of the opposite sex— be opened to
men.

The assembled social workers

further thought that

"child guidance" and "team work" were useful concepts and
that

the

child

should

be

the

center

of

all

apparently something which was new in Germany.

attention,

The Bavarian

^Heinrich Schiller, personal interview, 26 July 1995;
see also "Dr. Schiller leitet evangelisches Sozialinstitut:
Einem neuen Ruf gefolgt: Der anerkannte Fachmann ging von der
Sozialen Schule an die neue Bildungsstatte," [Dr. Schiller
Head of Lutheran Social Institute: Followed a New Call: the
recognized expert went form the School of Social Work to the
New Educational Institution] NN, 7 Sept. 1967: [n.p.].
Newspaper clipping, NCA C74 no. 138.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

638
participants

agreed

on

a

follow-up

meeting

six months

later.45
Almost from the start of the program OMGUS followed up
on the returnees' plans and activities.
Winning

and

the

German

advisory

In May 1949 Charles
committee

questionnaire to all returning Germans.

sent

a

Wining asked for

their full cooperation so that Americans and Germans involved
in the planning and selection progress would be able to
improve the program.

In the summer OMGBY invited Karl Maly

and Armin Schrotberger to participate

in one of various

conferences "to discuss further plans in youth activities in
the light of your experiences in the States."
paid

for

the

superintendent

expenses
for

and

made

Munich was

sure

present

The Americans

that
to

the

school

listen

to any

suggestions.46
OMGUS and HICOG did not have to twist many arms to have
people attend their follow-up conferences.

Returnees

general decided to remain in contact in Germany.

in

Almost all

Bavarian exchangees reacted positively to an initiative in
1950

to

found

what

was

to

become

the

Society

for

4SMinutes of a meeting of exchangees in social and health
services in Stuttgart, 24/25 Sept. 1951; LCA Diakonisches
Werk, 947.
The social workers did not have German
equivalents for the American terms, so they simply adopted
them.
^Letter, Charles Winning to returning Germans, 31 May
1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Cultural Affairs Br., Box 17,
10/120-1/1; letters, OMGBY to Karl Maly and to Armin
Schrotberger, Nuremberg, 2 Aug. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD,
Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3.
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International
Austausch).

Exchange

(Gesellschaft

ftir internationalen

Even the Bavarian Lutherans deemed the new

association important enough to send a representative.47
All of these activities of returnees clearly indicated
that in fact they were doing what the State Department had
hoped they would do: they served as multipliers.

Most of the

exchangees did their part of the reorientation work in a
quiet manner.
were

trying

They brought ideas back to Germany which they
to

implement

in

their

own

sometimes in rather unexpected places.

environment

and

Willy ProlB,

for

example, went to the United States in his capacity as a youth
leader for the Falcons in Nuremberg.
ProlB

was

impressed

hospitality.

with

the

Like so many others

American

openness

and

He also noted with disapproval the dark side of

a completely segregated social

system

in the

South,

but

almost fifty years after his journey to the United States,
ProlB, then mayor of Nuremberg, regarded the most valuable
experience in the United States his practical lessons in
dealing with a car oriented society.

He remembered that he

was very impressed with the modern systems of traffic lights
in smaller communities when the city of Nuremberg did not
have more than five of these innovations to regulate the city
traffic.

ProlB thought that he made good use

of these

47OLCB to Bavarian State Church Council, 15 Mar. 1950;
Council to OLCB, 29 Mar. 1950; OLCB to Council, 20 Apr. 1950;
LCA Landeskirchenrat, 525.
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experiences during his long and distinguished career in the
city's political arena.48
Many other returnees decided to put their knowledge to
good use, although the teachers were not always impressed
with

the

participant

American
in

the

educational
Fulbright

system.49

teacher

Karl

exchange

of

Kunze,
1953,

founded the Niirnberg Kolleg, an institution that opened up
alternatives in formal education for people who had jobs.
His companion on that journey, Karl Ritter, English teacher
at a secondary

school

in Nuremberg,

introduced American

studies in his classes as much as the curriculum permitted.
He used materials and books he had bought

in the United

48Willy ProlB, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994.
49Karl Ritter as well as another of the participants,
Elisabeth Oberndorfer thought that the German school system
provided more opportunities for advanced learning. While the
American system was democratic the German system seemed to
take better care of its academic responsibilities. A little
frustrated by the reorientation efforts which did not seem to
find anything good in the German educational system,
Oberndorfer confided to her diary that the Americans actually
could learn quite a bit in regard of academic standards from
the Germans. (Karl Ritter, personal interview, 26 July 1995.
Elizabeth Oberndorfer, Diary, in the possession of the
author). In general, however, the teachers did not differ
from others in their assessment of their trips as extremely
valuable for learning about their profession and about
Americans.
See the reports of Karl Kunze, Peter Moritz,
Elizabeth Oberndorfer, Karl Ritter, and Ingeborg Seelig to
the State Department. Four of them are in excellent English,
only one was written in German. Although the five teachers
went to different
locations,
their evaluations were
remarkably similar.
Interestingly, the teacher who spent
most of his time in Tennessee came to adopt the racial views
of his white hosts, something the State Department surely
regarded as counterproductive (NA RG 59 General Records,
Bureau of Public Affairs, IES, German Teachers Program, Box
3) .
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States.

He also tried to incorporate the different method of

teaching in his classes whenever he could.

In the seventies

the Bavarian Ministry for education put Ritter in charge of
supervising the training of young English teachers in the
region.
the

Whenever he could, Ritter included a visit to one of

American

dependents

High

Schools

the

Army

of the many military

maintained

installations

for

the

in Middle

Franconia.50
Not everybody in Germany was happy with the cultural
exchange.

The wife of one of the exchangees,

a Foreign

Service trainee, who lived in Hersbruck near Nuremberg while
her husband was in the United States, received an anonymous
note:
Don't you think that we do not know what your husband is
doing in the United States against Germany. What has he
done in Switzerland two years ago?
We know it all and we warn you.
Watch your
children and yourself closely so that nothing happens.
We hate all who sabotage German unity and have many of
them blacklisted and will soon take action.51
Since the lady's husband did not want to jeopardize his
career,

he did not think it necessary to start a police

investigation

and

asked HICOG to

be

discreet

about

the

S0Karl Kunze, personal Interview, 17 July 1995; Karl
Ritter, personal interview, 26 July 1995. HICOG also found
much evidence for this type of grassroots activity of many
returnees, regardless of age.
See, for example, Telegram
(Confidential security information) John McCLoy to Secretary
of State, Washington, 26 Jan. 1952; NA RG 59 Decimal Files
1950-54, 511.62A3/1-2652.
51Telegram, Dept, of State, Washington to HICOG, 23 Jan.
1951; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 511.62A3/1-2351.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

642
matter.

He took the threat serious enough, however, to move

his family from Hersbruck to his mother-in-law in another
village near Nuremberg.52
Occasional unpleasant notes notwithstanding,

Senator

Fulbright would have been pleased with the success of the
program if he had been able to follow the public relations
activities in Nuremberg of returnees and those who still were
spending time in the United States.

A considerable number of

articles of globetrotters from Nuremberg appeared in the
city's newspapers.

With the exception of one businessman who

probably was the first person to travel through the United
States at his own expense, all of those who had been in the
United States as specialists,
school students,

university students or high

in one way or another provided factual,

perceptive, but above all positive information of the United
States.

Germans at home learned that Americans did "not just

chew gum" or dwelled in riches.

They got a glimpse of life

at high schools and universities.
York and life in small communities.

They found out about New
They got an eyewitness

account of Christmas in Arizona or the beaches in Florida.
American friendliness and hospitality as well as hard work
were recurring themes.53
52Telegram, Dept, of State, Washington to HICOG, 23 Jan.
1951; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 511.62A3/1-2351.
53See,
Vereinigten
Nuremberger
in America]

for example "Ein Nurnberger berichtet aus den
Staaten: Als deutscher Student in Amerika," [A
Reports from the United States: As German Student
NN, 25 Mar. 1950: 8; "In den USA gut aufgenommen:
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Those

who

did

not

make

it

into

the

local

nevertheless disseminated the same message.
first

exchange

experiences

student,

in

a

a YMCA member,

Lutheran

Schrotberger,

one

of

presentations

about

his

the

youth

journey.55

Nuremberg's

wrote

about

publication.54

youth

specialists,
Even

news

youth

his

Armin
gave
pastor

Helbich's extensive article for the Baugeriist, the Bavarian
Lutheran's youth publication,

was surprisingly positive.

Helbich repeated his criticism of superficial work of which
he found especially the YMCA guilty, but he also had praise
for the way in which American congregations involved their
young members in the everyday church work which began with
Sunday school and ended with participation in the choir and
in the eucharist.

Helbich shared with his readers that the

Plauderei mit Niirnbergern, die 'driiben' waren," [Good
Reception in the USA: Chat with Nurembergers who were "over
there"] NN, 29. Aug. 1951: 4; "35 Nurnberger fahren nach USA:
Zum Studienaufenthalt bis zu einem Jahr," [35 Nurembergers
Travel to USA: Study Trips of up to One Year] NN, 27 June
1952: 10; "Dora schreibt jetzt in elf Lander: Niirnbergerin
kam nach einem Jahr USA wieder heim— 'Die kauen nicht immer
Gummi'," [Dora Now Writes to Eleven Countries: Nuremberger
Returned Home— "They Do Not Always Chew Gum] NN, 3 Sept.
1954: 9.
The only article expressing a largely critical
attitude I found was a wealthy business man's "Kritik an
'Gottes eigenem Land': Nurnberger Photo Kaufmann erlebte die
Vereinigten Staaten," [Criticizing "God's Own Country":
Nuremberg Photo Dealer Experienced the United States] NN, 24
Nov. 1953: 7.
His experiences did not indicate a hostile
attitude towards Americans in general.
The same man
supported GYA activities and sponsored the Young World.
^"Jorg der Amerika-Fahrer," [Jorg, America Traveller]
Die Junge Gemeinde (Nov. 1948): 13-14.
55Armin Schrotberger to OMGBY, 24 July 1949; NA RG 260
OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3.
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Germans were in dire need of emulating the example which
Americans were setting in training young people in the art of
discussion

at

an

early age.

He

continued

that

he was

surprised and humbled by their willingness to listen to his
opinion, to take it seriously, and to correct mistakes on the
spot without much ado.

Helbich even came out in favor of co

educational activities, although he cautioned that separating
the sexes certainly also had its place in the church's youth
work.

All in all Helbich's commentaries demonstrated that he

had gone to the United States with an
willingness

to

learn

which

certainly

open mind

and a

justified

expenditure and the effort the Americans had made.

the

He was

just one of many.56
And many more wanted to go.

A journey to the United

States remained the dream of a good number of those who did
not belong to the select few.

Helmut Stiihler, who became

director of one of Nuremberg's new youth centers

in the

fifties, was one of those for whom a journey to the United
States would have meant the opportunity of a lifetime to get
to know youth work as it should be done and to apply it to
his youth center in Nuremberg.

Stiihler was fully aware that

the city had as much to say in the selection of candidates as
had

the Americans.

Although he understood

that he was

56Hans Martin Helbich, "Die christliche Jugend in Amerika
I," Das Baugeriist 10 (Oct. 1949): 257-60; Hans Martin
Helbich, "Die christliche Jugend in Amerika II," Das
Baugeriist 11 (Nov. 1949) : 287-88.
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urgently needed in Nuremberg, he was never quite convinced
about the wisdom of the selection process.

Not quite five

decades later he thought that it might have been better to
send a man who practiced the trade to America instead of an
administrator.57
While

Stiihler

interview,
process.

did

not

even

others did not make

get

a

chance

for

an

it through the selection

Hermann Glaser, one of Germany's most prominent

cultural historians, for example, did not have fond memories
of the interview process.

Although he had applied repeatedly

for scholarships as a student, he had never been selected.
Glaser suspected that only those who demonstrated decidedly
pro-American attitudes and fit into American stereotypes were
actually allowed to go, whereas those who proved to be overly
critical

usually

did not

survive

the

screening process.

Glaser's observation may not have been entirely true.

He may

have overlooked the fact that Americans were trying hard to
win students over to their concept of democracy.
belonged to
fifties

the

who

rather rare species

were

convinced

of

democrats

Since he

students
and

in the

believed

in

progressive education there was no need for him to go to the
United States.

McCloy made clear in 1952 that Americans did

57Helmut Stiihler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994.
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not "need internationalists on the Exchange Program as much
as we do nationalists; it might cure them."58
Not surprisingly, Glaser found out when he finally made
it

to

the

United

States

in

the

sixties

that

American

educators were just humans and their schools and teaching
methods often far from the ideals which the education experts
had preached in postwar Germany— and which Glaser was trying
to implement in the classroom.

But experiences like Glaser's

were rare in the fifties and possibly belonged to a later,
more critical generation.59
Material Help
When

John

McCloy

came

to

Germany

in

1949

he

was

impressed with the lack of essential equipment in hospitals
and other public facilities which these institutions simply
were not able to acquire because they did not have the funds.
The Marshall Plan would take care of Germany's infrastructure
and housing, but beyond that the misery could still be seen
and felt everywhere.

Although the situation was improving,

the economic miracle had not yet taken off.

McCloy thought

that it would be a good idea to set aside a special fund to

58Hermann Glaser, "Die Regel war trist: Ein Riickblick auf
'padagogische Hoffnungen'," Facing America: 104-106; memo
McCloy to Shepard Stone, Mr. Burns, 29 Jan. 1952; NA RG 466
HICOM, Central Classified Records, Box 36, D (52) 281.
59Hermann Glaser, "Die Regel war trist: Ein Riickblick auf
'padagogische Hoffnungen'," Facing America: 104-106. Glaser
finally made it to the United States when he was a teacher in
the 1960s. He later became a regular guest and lecturer in
the United States.
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satisfy

these

needs.

After

the

undertaking

had

been established,

immediately

set

aside

fifty

legality
the

million

High
marks

of

such

an

Commissioner
from

GARIOA

(Government and Relief in Occupied Areas, Department of the
Army)

funds and one million dollars from the funds that

Congress had set aside to finance HICOG which had not yet
been allocated for any other purpose.

McCloy wanted the

program to help especially young people.60
In January 1950 the High Commission inquired with German
political and church leaders which areas it should target for
special projects.

The Federal Republic's first President,

Theodor Heuss, immediately appointed an official who would be
in charge of coordinating the German side of the program.
Refugees and expellees, invalids, students and returned POWs
stood highest on the German
emphasized
efforts.

self-help

list of the needy.

and American

cooperation

McCloy

in German

German institutions and government agencies were

expected to match the funds for which they applied with an

“J.F.J. Gillen, The Special Projects Program of the
Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (Office of
the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the
Executive Secretary, Historical Division, 1952) 3-4.
The American contribution to Nuremberg's reconstruction
was in fact considerable and would deserve a study of its
own. The Marshall Plan did much to accelerate the planning
and construction of affordable apartments for the lower
classes. Nuremberg architects went to the United States to
observe modern city planning.
Americans with ties to the
city contributed millions to the reconstruction of churches
and even an orphanage.
Since these projects were not
connected to youth work, I did not include them in this
study.
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equal amount of their own money.

The High Commission would

only support long term projects which contributed to the
reorientation efforts and whose future funding was secured.
In this way McCloy hoped to lay the foundation for many
projects which would continue long after American help would
no longer be available.61
HICOG tried to spread the money evenly throughout West
Germany and Berlin.

In August 1950 the other two Allies were

informed that the French would have nearly four million and
the British nearly eight million marks available for projects
within

their

zones

of occupation.

Of

the

areas

under

American control Bavaria received almost one fifth of the
total funds.62
McCloy kept his course to make youth the main target of
the program.

HICOG spent twelve million marks to support

youth activities and self-help projects.

This meant that

young people continued to receive massive support.

The

nature of the grants also forced organizations as well as
local and state administrations to fund projects if they did
not want to loose the money, effectively doubling the amount
set aside for these projects.

Another twenty million marks

went into education, half of it to universities.
there was no lack of projects.

Apparently

Not even a year after the

program's inauguration, the McCloy Fund administrators had to
61Gillen, Special Projects 5-7.
62Gillen, Special Projects 7-8.
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advise

Kreis

applications.

Resident

Officers

not

to

accept

any

more

HICOG allocated an additional four million

marks to pending projects.63
Contributions (DM)
German
American
Education
Model School
Student Residence Hall

213,420
130,000

171.000
190.000

145,161
75.000
none

97,787
82,000
13.000

1, 000
75.000

96.000
175,000

Welfare
Refugee Women's Work Program
Mother's Home, Stein

9,285
48,000

11,121
69,500

Cultural Affairs
Theater
(planned construction costs)

none

225.000

696,866

1,131,408

Youth Activities
Residence Club for Young Women
Friedensdorf
Youth Castle Feuerstein
Home for Young Men and
Community Center Sterntor
Trade Union Center, Hersbruck

Total

35. McCloy Fund contributions to projects in Nuremberg
(Sources: Gillen, Special Projects 49-76; Chronik der Stadt
Niirnberg 1951: 326, NCA F2, no. 49)
Nuremberg benefitted substantially from the McCloy Fund.
In the city as well as elsewhere, projects to help young
people received the lion's share of the allocations.

The

city administration was able to construct a model school and
a student residence hall.
Welfare

The Bavarian Association for Labor

(Arbeiterwohlfahrt)

constructed eighteen homes for

63Gillen, Special Projects 8.
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apprentices throughout Bavaria with substantial contributions
from HICOG, of which at least one was probably slated for
Northern Bavaria's industrial center.

The YMCA received

funds for a home for young men which would also function as
a community center.

To maintain the balance HICOG financed

part of a residence project for young women in Nuremberg.
McCloy also injected vital funds in the Peace Village.

The

Lutheran Church

for

received

aid to maintain

a retreat

exhausted mothers in Stein, one of Nuremberg's suburbs, which
OMGUS and HICOG used for youth leadership training as well.
The Lutheran nurses who ran the facility got additional help
from a German emigree who donated 300,000 of the 450,000
marks needed for building a new orphanage on the premises.
The newspaper reported that it would incorporate the latest
American models in child education in its activities and run
its own school.

Since Nuremberg's trade unions were among

the most active in youth work, HICOG helped them with the
construction of the Hans-Bockler-Haus, a youth retreat in
nearby Hersbruck under the condition that it had to be open
to all youth.

The nearby Feuerstein castle of the Catholic

church also got a facelift with the help of American money.64

^Gillen, Special Projects 49-76; see also Chronik der
Stadt Niirnberg 1951: 326; NCA F2 no. 49; for the Lutheran
orphanage see "Ein Kinderparadies am Stadtrand:
Eine
groBherzige Spende aus Amerika half der Diakonissenanstalt
'Martha Maria," [A Generous Gift from America Helped Lutheran
Nurses Home "Martha Maria"] NN, 28 Nov. 1952: 12; for the
provisions on Hersbruck see Willy Gensmantel, personal
interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
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McCloy made sure that not
profited

from

the

funds.

just the big city

Upper

and

Middle

youth

Franconian

communities received funds for fourteen projects related to
youth

in

addition

to

several

model

schools,

community

centers, child guidance and welfare programs, kindergartens,
and even hospitals.
65

projects

in

By 1953 the McCloy Funds had supported

Northern

Bavaria

with

DM

3,800,000

the

equivalent of almost one million dollars.65
In addition to the allocations by headquarters the Land
Commissioners received special funds for supporting small
projects, such as buying sewing machines for a refugee camp
in

Nuremberg

or

equipment

for

youth

centers.

These

contributions could not exceed 1,000 marks, nevertheless the
Land Commissioners regarded the program as such a valuable
asset to their reorientation efforts that they soon requested
more money.66
The High Commission did not just spend its own money for
youth

projects,

but

also

tried

to

convince

the

Federal

Government that this was a vital area which deserved support
from Bonn.

In 1950 Bonn complied.

The Federal Government

announced in December its first youth plan for which

it

65Gillen, Special Projects 49-76; Hynes R. Mahoney,
Information Officer,
Nuremberg Public Affairs Region,
"Investment in Democracy," HICOG Information Bulletin
(February 1953): 7-8, 12.
•^Gillen, Special Projects 9-10; "Child's Play Becomes
Woman's Work," HICOG Information Bulletin, (August 1951) : 2324.
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36. HICOG Special Project Grants for Upper and Middle
Franconia (Source: J.F.J. Gillen, Special Projects VI)
slated 52,700,000 marks.

Most of the money went to projects

which would alleviate the dire job and housing situation of
apprentices and young workers in Germany.

Adenauer also

allocated two million marks to the border region with the
Soviet zone to combat communist influence there.

Established

youth organizations received one million marks to operate on
the federal level,

youth leadership training centers and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

653
institutions which promoted the concept of a unified Europe
also received sizable allocations.67
Bonn continued its support of youth work during the next
years.

In 1952 the government spent over fifty million marks

again,

mainly

for

rehabilitating

quarters of apprentices.

work

shops

and

living

It also supported the newly founded

Bundesjugendring which served as the parent organization of
the different state youth committees.

Bonn apparently had

learned something from the set up of the McCloy funds as
well.

It reserved five million marks for grants-in-aid.

Some

funds

went to

international

exchanges

and

an

international camp at above the Rhine river.68
In spite of the rather massive allocations to youth
related

issues

the

Federal

government

did

not

show any

inclination to embark on a new departure in youth work in
Germany.

Most

of

the

support went

into

reconstruction

measures designed to create and secure jobs for young people.
Bonn allocated some money for leadership training sites, but
did not demonstrate any inclination to support projects which
would

help

young Germans

who did

not

belong

to

the

traditional youth groups.
Nuremberg

benefitted

substantially

from

the

plan.

During the first two years the federal government supported
twenty-three projects in the city, above all the construction
67Pilgert, Community 21-23.
68Pilgert, Community 23-25.
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of dormitories which would provide 2,360 apprentices from the
surrounding

region with places

learning a trade.

to

stay while

they

were

The city received almost two million marks

during the first three years of the plan's operation.69
Bonn's financial policy reflected the outlook of those
in charge of the formulation of youth policy.

From 1946 on

German administrators, among them Theodor Marx, had begun to
discuss the future of German youth work.

American attempts

to create a network for youth activities which would remain
independent
resistance

of
of

government

influence

German officials

who

met

the

decided

immediately began

to

create semi-official organizations in which the specialists
discussed the future of youth work and a revision of the
youth

legislation

of

1926.

Even

progressive

welfare

specialists like Marx thought that the federal and state
governments

should

responsibility.

make

youth

work

their

legal

Although German authorities left the youth

committees in place and granted them a representative body on
the federal level, some committees soon lost their interest
in representing

all young people

and

official lobby for youth organizations.

developed

into

an

The power of the

purse and some legal maneuvering in Bavaria,

for example,

left Americans apprehensive about the future of the youth
committees they had created.

The new youth legislation of

69Excerpt of a list with projects which were supported by
the Federal Youth Plan; NCA C75 no. 124/1.
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1953 did not give the Americans much to cheer for either.
The only new provision the federal government passed was that
from 1953 on communities and states had an obligation to
become

involved

in

youth

work.

Bonn

maintained

the

traditional framework which did not take care of unorganized
youth

and

left

HICOG

alone

with

the

burden

of

reorientation.70
Leadership Training
We have seen above that OMGUS officials had realized
early on that one of the biggest problems for young Germans
was the lack of trained youth leaders.

OMGUS had opened the

Wannsee school in Berlin in 1948, but a similar school in
Bavaria for which the Bavarian Youth Ring was responsible
always was on the brink of faltering between 1948 and 1949.
OMGBY on various occasions admonished the Bavarian Ministry
of Education that funds for such a venture were available,
but that Munich would have to show stronger support than in
the past for the idea.71
70Fiissl 133-137; Pilgert, Community 29-31. Marx played
a leading role in the Association of German Cities, an
influential organization of all large communities in the
Federal Republic. See, for example, "Nurnberger Referat auf
dem 'Deutschen Stadtetag' im 1900 jahrigen Koln fordert:
Jugendbetreuung
als
staatliche Pflicht,"
[Nuremberg's
Presentation at the "German City Congress" in 1900 year-old
Cologne Demands: Youth Care a Must for Government] NN, 1 July
1950: 7.
7I0MGBY, Report on Youth Leadership Training Site, 27
Oct. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box
39, 10/43-3/18; Clayton Jones, Report on Niederpocking youth
leadership school, 2 Aug. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br. , Box 35, 10/43-1/6; Esther Test, Youth

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

656
By 1950 the youth leadership school was finally in place
and its financing secured mostly with funds from OMGUS and
later on,

HICOG.

OMGUS officials

also had

developed a

curriculum for the training of professional youth workers in
1949.

We have seen above that OMGUS and HICOG invested

heavily in the Nuremberg region, establishing and expanding
youth

leadership

Feuerstein,

training

facilities

in

Stein,

at

and for the trade unions in Hersbruck.

Burg
Many

Germans in charge of training their youth had gone to the
United States

and were convinced about the necessity of

focusing on young people who were not organized.72
Despite this encouraging development, the proponents of
traditional youth work were by no means defeated.

Youth

organizations had restructured the Bavarian Youth Ring in
such a way that they were able to retain control over its
operations, which included the budget of the youth leadership
school in Niederpocking although it was financed by HICOG.
Not surprisingly the youth organizations preferred to use the

activities expert, Cleveland, Ohio, Report on Leadership
Training and Youth Activities, Jan. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS,
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 138, 5/295-2/7; for
American attempts to gain support of Bavarian authorities see
Charles Winning, OMGBY, to Minister President of Bavaria, 3
Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box
35, 10/43-1/5; Charles Winning to Bavarian Minister of
Education, 9 Dec. 1948; Winning to Minister President of
Bavaria, 22 Dec. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-3/17.
^Pilgert, Community 32-33; minutes of a youth activities
staff meeting, 14-15 Apr. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18.
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money and the facilities for their own benefit while HICOG
and the leadership school's staff wanted to emphasize open
youth work.

It seems that ultimately both parties reached a

compromise.

Niederpocking began to train professional youth

workers, but at the same time continued to train the youth
organizations' youth leaders.73
Helmut
directors

Stiihler

of

the

and

city's

training in Niederpocking.

Karl

Kleyer,

youth

two

centers,

of

the

received

four
their

Both had become involved in youth

work immediately after the war.

Kleyer had become active in

one of the Friends' youth centers in Berlin, where he also
had met Heinrich Schiller.

Stiihler had been in charge of

administering the camping equipment for the Bavarian Youth
Ring from 1947 on.

Although the staff at Niederpocking

consisted only of Germans at the time Stiihler attended his
courses,

he thought that everybody was

aware that their

training was based almost entirely on American ideas and
concepts.

According to him, the training provided him with

the essential tools he needed in his work

in Nuremberg.

Stiihler regretted that he had so little time to explore these
concepts.

As we have seen above, he would have liked to

complete his education in the United States.

Once Stiihler

and Kleyer graduated from Niederpocking they became directors

73Pilgert, Community 32-34; OLCB, Monthly Report, Feb.
1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, District Land Office Activity Reports
1950-52, Box 2, Monthly Reports 1951.
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of two of the new youth centers the Nuremberg Kreis Youth
Committee was opening in Nuremberg in 1950.74
The Kreis Youth Committee was not content with hiring
staff for the new centers.

In the same year it decided to

rely more on professional support and employed a youth worker
whose task it was to coordinate its activities and to develop
new

programs.

Georg

Wolfring,

another

graduate

from

Niederpocking with close ties to the trade union youth,
became the city's first professional youth worker.

True to

his training, Wolfring emphasized that he would concentrate
his efforts above all on unorganized young people.

Wolfring

remained in Nuremberg for several years before he relocated
to Munich.

Apparently he had proven the position's worth.

A professional youth worker became a permanent presence with
the Nuremberg Kreis Youth Ring.

Even today in times of

severe cutbacks the Nuremberg Kreis Youth Ring continues to
hire professional youth workers to help with its work.75
GYA in Troubled Waters
In spite of the expansion of GYA activities in 1949 and
1950, the program was in trouble from 1948 on.

The first

74Helmut Stiihler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994; Karl
Kleyer, personal interview, 22 Aug. 1995. Stiihler and Kleyer
actually met in Niederpocking, where the Nuremberger alerted
the Berliner about possible employment opportunities in the
Franconian city. Kleyer applied and got the job.
75,1'Arbeitsgebiet unerschopf lich:' Jugendpfleger Georg
Wolfring iiber seine Plane," ["A Field of Work Without
Limits:" Youth Worker Georg Wolfring About his Plans] NN, 16
Aug. 1950: 11; Helmut Stiihler, personal interivew, 12 Aug.
1995.
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complaints came from tactical troops who maintained that the
emerging Cold War and the Berlin crisis did not leave them
enough time for looking after young Germans and asked to be
released from this responsibility.
accordingly.

General Clay reacted

He revised the GYA instructions and streamlined

the program, without, however, curtailing the activities.76
A more serious threat came in the form of Military
Government officials.

They had always been critical of the

Army running this program without permitting GYA officials
any control.

Alonzo Grace regarded GYA as "Candy and Coca-

Cola Program" with little educational value.

GYA had been

able to attract much attention in the United States which
apparently caused some jealousies.

Lawrence Norrie,

who

always had felt that the program could not be adequate as
long as

it was

not

under his

control,

led

the

charge.

Although he maintained that he had been much in favor of
creating GYA in 1946, he thought that currency reform and the
returning

prosperity

superfluous.

were

rendering

the

Army's

program

In addition to that, Norrie told prominent GYA

supporters from the United States that, based on his own
observations, the program suffered from poor management, a
lack of qualified personnel, and drew considerable hostility
from the Germans because of unpleasant incidents.
fact could substantiate his claim,
withhold

the

ample

evidence

at

Norrie in

but he also chose to

his

disposal

about

76James 40-43.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

GYA

660
successes.

His presentation of the Nuremberg GYA clearly

shows his rather selective choice of arguments.

As we have

seen above Norrie had resided in Nuremberg and indeed knew
the operation in the city firsthand.

He told the visitors

that GIs

GYA had left sports

involved

in the Nuremberg

equipment with a group of young boys but preferred to spend
the next hours with their girlfriends instead of supervising
the boys' activities.77

In view of the overall quality of

the program in and around the city and the close cooperation
between the MG detachment and GYA, of which Norrie certainly
was aware, he must have known that this kind of behavior was
not the rule but rather the exception in the Nuremberg Post
area.
On first sight it seems that Norrie, who came from the
American

YMCA,

and

Grace,

a

university

educator,

were

unwilling to concede that the Army actually was capable of
planning and carrying out qualified youth work, but their
reasons for attacking the Army's youth program lay deeper.
OMGUS and HICOG consistently pursued a policy of working
through German channels and trying to bring all young Germans
into democratically structured youth organizations.

GYA

activities often seemed to run contrary to these goals.

The

Army's concept of youth centers which were open to everyone
apparently diverted many young people away from youth groups.
Norrie may also have looked with some envy on the extensive
^James 43-44.
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Army program which was not under his control while he had to
make due with a very small staff, although he was officially
in charge of American youth programs in Germany.

In 1948,

for example, the Youth Activities Section consisted of twelve
Americans,

with

Clay

refusing

to

increase

that

number,

whereas 263 officers and enlisted men worked full time for
GYA.78
Interestingly,

Norrie and Grace were depriving those

groups whom HICOG surveys had identified as the ones who were
most in need of reorientation of an opportunity to become
acquainted with the Americans and possibly with democratic
ways of thinking and acting.

Most Kreis Resident Officers in

Bavaria agreed that GYA actually was reaching those who did
not have anything.

According to the officers, the lower

classes as well as outsiders, especially young refugees and
expellees, tended to use GYA facilities and to praise the
Army's program.

The higher classes and established groups,

especially when they came from a conservative background,
seemed to have a more difficult time accepting it.79
Money became a major bone of contention in the civilian
youth officers' struggle against GYA.

In 1949 Alonzo Grace

began to argue that the Army had been using German occupation
funds illegally for the program.

In view of this situation

he instructed the Community Education Branch that he did "not
78For the employment figures see James 40.
79Rupieper 158-59.
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want us in any way associated with an organization supported
in any way by occupation costs."

Norrie was informed that

consequently OMGUS should "do nothing at any time that would
appear we were endorsing GYA."

A withdrawal of the funds in

German currency would lead to the immediate collapse of all
GYA activities because the Army would not be able to pay the
rent

or

the

employees.

buildings

and

the

salaries

of

its

German

Since OMGUS had control over all counterpart

funds in German currency,

Grace's move either would have

eliminated the competition or brought it under OMGUS control.
In this situation John McCloy,

who had

Germany, came to the military's rescue.

just arrived

in

He agreed to provide

the necessary mark funds for the next fiscal year from HICOG
funds.

In return EUCOM promised to transfer its centers

gradually to German organizations and authorities.80
Transfers. New Beginnings. Disappointments
Although the new source of funds eliminated the legal
problem,

it also meant that the Army had to compete with

other HICOG offices for constantly decreasing funds.

In 1951

GYA got only 50% of the 8.4 million Marks it had requested
and consequently was forced to give up half of the centers it
had maintained.81

80James 40-47; Memo from John Pixley, Community Education
Br. to Lawrence Norrie, 19 May 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/295-3/6.
81James 49-59.
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For GYA officers attempts from outside agencies to take
over their programs was nothing new.

OMGUS officials had

made it abundantly clear that they wanted to control GYA.

In

many cases German authorities also had set an eye on the well
equipped centers which usually offered much needed additional
space.

Military Government's Internal Affairs division had

found it necessary as early as 1947 to inform its field
detachments that all communities who tried to take over GYA
centers would have to maintain them open for young people.
Exceptions

could

be

granted

if

communities

clearly

had

greater priorities or if there was no support at all for
youth activities.
for community

These instructions left the door wide open

leaders to reclaim the

facilities

without

taking care of young people.82
Apparently

Major

Selsor

had

had

his

own

share

of

negative experiences when Andreas Staudt approached him to
discuss the possibility of a German takeover in November
1949.

Staudt reported to the city's welfare committee that

Selsor was willing to discuss possibilities to make GYA homes
available to more people and to accommodate the needs of the
younger

generation,

but,

according

to

Staudt,

he

"emphatically declined" to turn over control to the city
administration.

The major argued that his experience had

taught him that German authorities were not interested in the
82A1 D. Sims, Acting Chief, Internal Affairs Division,
OMGBY to Field Detachments, 11 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1427, 9/122-3/1.
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kind

of youth work GYA promoted

and usually closed the

centers as soon as they could lay their hands on them.83
His successors did not have much choice in the matter.
Following

instructions

from

headquarters

they

began

to

explore the possibilities of a German takeover of the 33 Army
youth centers in the region.
positively.

A number of communities reacted

The mayor of Neumarkt, for example, cooperated

closely with the Americans in the takeover of the local GYA
center.

In Schwabach negotiations needed more time but also

led to the desired result.84
Other communities did not show any interest.

In April

1951 GYA closed nine of its youth centers in the region.
year later just a few centers remained open.
continued with mixed success.

One

Negotiations

The Fiirth city administration

refused to take over any of the five centers located within
its jurisdiction.

GYA finally consolidated all youth centers

and opened one center to the army barracks of a unit which
was willing to sponsor youth activities on a voluntary basis.
Fiirth officials commended GYA for its efforts.

In view of

their reluctance to take over these responsibilities the GYA
officer took their remarks as a sign of improving relations.

83Report on conversation between Mark A. Selsor and
Andreas Staudt to city welfare committee, 17 Nov. 1949; NCA
C7/IX no. 1235.
mA complete list of the GYA installations of the
Nuremberg Military Post is in YW, 4 May 1950: 6; "The Sign of
Progress: Neumarkt," YW, March 1951: 6; "Schwabach Youth
Center now under German Sponsor," YW, July 1951: 2.
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Fiirth GYA activities had survived downsizing and continued
their reduced activities until the discontinuation of the
program.85
In Coburg negotiations had been underway already in
December 1951.

A German working group which was sponsored by

HICOG and whose goal was to support "suitable open door
projects" signalled its interest in maintaining the youth
center open.

Based on this promise the Americans obtained a

commitment by the mayor to make even more rooms available to
young Germans in January 1952, but just a few weeks after
their meeting with the mayor the group which had sponsored
the

two

support.

employees

for

the

center

suddenly withdrew

its

When German authorities took over the facility in

June 1952 its future was by no means secured.86
Nuremberg's Youth Center no. 1 faced several obstacles
before

it was clear

that

it would

remain open.

While

negotiations were underway to transfer the centers in the
region to German authority, the GYA officer was not yet ready
to concede defeat in the city.

In 1952 the center moved to

a smaller and more affordable location, but had to share the
building with a hotel for American women who worked for the

“Nuremberg Military Post Journal, 18 Feb. 1952, 25 Feb.
1952, 9 May 1952, 9 Jul. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit Records,
Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122, Folders 2, 3; see also
"Fiirth Continues," YW, June/July 1953: 5.
“Nuremberg Military Post Journal, 5 Dec. 1951, 31 Jan.
1952, 15 Feb. 1952, 4 Jun. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit Records,
Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122, Folder 2, 3.
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Army.

There GYA continued operations with reduced staff and

a new director for another year, but in June 1953 the Army
had to close its last youth center as well, but help was just
around the corner.

The city negotiated with the Army about

a possible takeover of the facility.

In August Karl Maly,

who had replaced Staudt as director of the Nuremberg Youth
Office, signed a very favorable contract with the Americans.
The Army would continue to provide the space free of charge
as long as it was not needed otherwise.
entire inventory,

GYA donated the

including an expensive and very popular

photo laboratory, to the Germans.

The city had no obligation

to continue the Army employees but maintained Hans Werner,
long time GYA employee and director of the center,
capacity.

in his

The Army promised to continue providing logistic

support.87
This arrangement lasted two years, but when the Army
annnounced that it needed the space for other purposes the
Germans had to look for a new location.
with Hans Werner and most of

The youth center

its visitors moved to the

87Hans Werner, personal interview, 21 Aug. 1995; minutes
of welfare committee meetings of the city of Nuremberg, 8
June, 18 June, 16 July 1953; NCA C7/IX no. 1324, 1325; "GYA
Heim wird iibergeben: 'Haus der Jugend' unter stadtischer
Leitung," [GYA Center Will be Transferred: "Youth Home" under
City Control] NN, 3 Aug. 1953: 5.
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recently established city youth house at the old Imperial
Fortress where it still remains open to young people today.88
Not surprisingly attendance throughout the American zone
dropped proportionally.

Whereas in July 1950 over half a

million young people had participated in GYA activities, the
number dropped to about 180,000 in July 1951 and 100,000 in
July 1952.

The Army continued to modify the program, but by

July 1954 only 32,000 children found their way to GYA centers
of activities.

The program lingered on for another two

years, but on 30 June 1956 the Army's excursion into the
realm of youth work officially came to an end.
outlasted

HICOG

which

had

ceased

to

exist

the

It had
previous

year.89
The German-American Advisory Council
The retreat of HICOG and GYA from the local scene did
not mean that contacts between Americans and Germans in the
communities suddenly died.
the

Nuremberg

Military

In July 1952 a representative of
Post

invited

Lord

Mayor

Otto

Barnreuther to participate in an advisory council in which
prominent Germans and Americans would be able to discuss
problems of mutual interest which the Kreis Resident Officer
88Hans Werner, personal interview, 21 Aug. 1995; minutes
of a welfare committee meeting of 30 June 1955; NCA C7/IX no.
1354; "Mobel zwischen Himmel und Erde: Seltsamer Umzug des
'Heims der Offenen Tiir' in den Turm 'Luginsland' auf der
Burg," [Furniture Between Heaven and Earth: Strange Move of
the 'Home of the Open Door' into the Tower 'Luginsland' at
the Castle] NN, 13 Oct. 1955: 9.
89James 49-59.
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had previously managed.

Barnreuther declined to participate

but nominated Mayor Julius LoBmann to represent the city.
Other

Germans

were

representatives.

less
The

reluctant

President

to

of

send

Middle

their

top

Franconia's

government, Hans Schregle, responded to the call as well as
Gustav Schickedanz, owner of one of Europe's largest mail
catalog

businesses

prominent

members

located
included

in

neighboring Fiirth.

Lt.

Lorraine Schultz,

Less
the

Nuremberg GYA officer, Pauline Schwickert, a school expert
who had returned to Nuremberg from American exile after the
war, the principal of the local American dependents' school
as well as various teachers
schools.

and principals of Nuremberg

To facilitate communications the Army provided one

interpreter and a secretary for each subcommittee.90
The committee was designed to be a cooperative venture
in which Germans and Americans had equal rights and shared
the

chair.

subcommittees,

Its

membersdecided

one

of which was

to

constitute

four

in charge of education.

Schregle made clear after his election to the German chair
that he did not want the committee to be just a debating club
with no connection to the community but wanted the committee

^Minutes of the second meeting of the German-American
Advisory Council, 2 Oct. 1952; NCA C 85/1 Verkehr mit
Stationierungskraften, no no.; see also Chronik der Stadt
Nurnberg 1953: 24, 213; NCA F2 no. 50.
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to

have an

impact

on the

communities

in

its

guest

for

fostering German-American friendship.91
The subcommittee for education took Schregle's wishes to
heart.

Just one month after its foundation the committee

members reported about their first project.

They invited ten

girls from the American school in Nuremberg and ten girls
from a Nuremberg secondary school to participate in a day
tour to the old town of Rothenburg, about fifty miles away
from Nuremberg.

The girls would have ample opportunity to

get to know each other on the trip.

A photo contest in which

the girls could develop their pictures in the Nuremberg GYA
center would ensure a follow up encounter.

The subcommittee

further reported that it was working on a teacher exchange
between the American and German schools as well.92
During the next months an intensive exchange between the
American and German schools began to develop which boded well
for the future.

The committee also reported that contacts

between American students and the German-American youth club
had

intensified

decided

to

again.

launch

a

In March
pilot

1953

project

to

the

subcommittee

investigate

the

9IMinutes of the second meeting of the German-American
Advisory Council, 6 Oct. 1952; NCA C85/I Verkehr mit
Stationierungskraften, no no.
^Minutes of the third meeting of the German-American
Advisory Council, 28 Nov. 1952; NCA C 85/1 Verkehr mit
Sationierungskraften no no.
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feasibility of letting Germans and Americans experience life
in the other schools for extended periods of time.93
By May the committee was ready to launch its pilot
project.

Accompanied by local press representatives, Peter

Fries became the first German exchange student in Nuremberg
who did not have to go to the United States to get the
American experience.

Born in 1937, Fries had met his first

Americans in a little village in 1945.

They had provided him

with huge quantities of chocolate and had not even entered
the house in which his family was living when they became
aware of an old aunt who wore her Red Cross dress.

According

to him, the attitude towards Americans among his peers and in
his family after the war was generally positive.

Fries loved

the GYA's youth film hour, but did not get the chance to see
American films very often because his parents restricted his
visits.

According to him, they did not consider actors like

Frank Sinatra or Hollywood Westerns to be suitable for young
people.94
Fries enjoyed his stay at the American school and with
the American family.

He thought that at that time American

93Minutes of meetings of the subcommittee for education
of the German-American Advisory Council, 28 Nov. 1952, 29
Nov. 1952, 17 Mar. 1953, 24 Mar. 1953; minutes of the fifth
meeting of the German-American Advisory Council, 31 Mar.
1953; NCA C 85/1 Verkehr mit Stationierungskraften, no no.
^Peter Fries, personal interview, 8 Aug 1995; "Fur acht
Tage ein 'waschechter Ami': der 16 jahrige Peter Fries geht
in die US Schule," [A "Real Ami" for Eight Days: 16-Year-Old
Peter Fries goes to US School] NN, 23 May 1953: 10.
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Post Exchanges displayed the signs and goods of an affluent
society whereas
recovery.

the Germans

still were

on their way

to

Fries found the atmosphere at the American high

school more informal, but most of his teachers at his German
school managed their

students

in a humane way as well.

Learning about American football and baseball, as well as
getting a first shot at golf which was and still is a very
exclusive game in Germany,
impossible.
their

Fries was surprised to find that Americans took

school

American

in just a week proved to be

flag

prayer,
in

the

every

Pledge
classroom

of

Allegiance,

very

and

seriously.

the
His

feelings revealed not just the long standing secularism in
German public schools but also that Fries belonged to a new
generation of young Germans who preferred to discuss a united
states of Europe to any nationalistic tendencies and did not
feel overly comfortable with displays of national pride.
What impressed him most was that neither his host family nor
anybody at the school or at one of the numerous barbecues he
attended displayed any hostility or arrogance towards him.
The American's visit with the Fries family seemed to
have been equally successful.95 According to Fries, not just
the young people established contacts but also their parents
who continued their private contact long after the exchange.

95"Ein junger Amerikaner als Gast bei einer Niirnberger
Familie: Gordon lebte als Deutscher," [A Young American Was
Guest of a Nuremberg Family: Gordon Lived as German] NN, 4
July 1953: 11.
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He remembered that young Germans and Americans were curious
to find out more about each other.

Fries was sufficiently

impressed with his visit that he actually discussed a journey
to the United States as an exchange student with his parents
but did not meet any enthusiasm on their side.
Fries went on with his life and became a lawyer in
Nuremberg.

He did not forget the lesson he had learned in

1953 and maintained a friendly and very positive attitude
towards the United States, even through the turbulent 1960s.
He later sent one of his own children on the one year student
exchange to the United States which he could not have and
stated that it in fact had had the positive impact on his
daughter he had hoped for.96
The pilot program was a success in every respect so that
both sides agreed to continue and extend it in the future.
At

the

same time

exchanges

between American

and

German

teachers became more frequent as well.97
wPeter Fries,
personal
interview,
8 Aug.
1995.
Interestingly,
Fries'
father
displayed
a
very
rare
openmindedness.
After the war the Americans had sentenced
him to several years in prison for his participation in
hiding the imperial jewels so that they would not be returned
to Vienna from where Hitler had brought them to Nuremberg in
1939. Instead of turning bitter because of this treatment,
however, he encouraged his son to be open minded, never had
anything negative to say about the occupiers, and had no
objections about his son's application to become an exchange
student which included hosting an American at his house.
^Letter, Lowell Bennett, Public Affairs Field Center,
Nuremberg to City of Nuremberg, 27 June 1953; minutes of the
eighth meeting of the German-American Advisory Council, 25
Sept. 1953; minutes of a meeting of the committee for school
and cultural affairs, 5 Nov. 1953; NCA C7/IX no. 1307;
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While there was considerable enthusiasm on both sides
for this type of activity during the first half of the 1950s,
it seems that it was not enough to make the programs a
standard feature of German and American schools in Nuremberg.
The German-American advisory council increasingly became what
Schregle had not wanted.

When Schregle retired from his

chair in 1959 the fate of the Council was set.

From 1960 on

prominent Germans met with American officers to organize
welfare parties and a German-American friendship week each
year which included a fair, sports events between Germans and
Americans
civilians,

and

open

houses

held

by

the

Army

for

German

but left out student and teacher exchanges or

activities in which both sides had to communicate.

A German-

American women's club became an equally formal affair which
emphasized welfare activities, but also sponsored a German
student to go to the United States every year.98

minutes of a meeting of the subcommittee for education of the
German-American Advisory Council, 23 Oct. 1953; NCA C 85/1
Verkehr mit Stationierungskraften, no no.
98It is not clear when the Advisory Commission abandoned
its more active approach.
By 1960 its activities and
membership very much fit the pattern which I got to know in
Ansbach from the late 1960s on.
Compare, for example the
programs for the First German-American Friendship week in
1954 with that of 1960 (Chronik der Stadt Niirnberg, 10-16 May
1954; 1-8 May 1960; NCA F2 no. 50, 53). Tina Hoekstra ("Der
Deutsch-Amerikanische Frauenclub Niirnberg-Fiirth: Geschichte,
Organisation, Struktur, Aktivitaten und Zukunftsaussichten,"
Zulassungsarbeit zur ersten Staatspriifung fur das Lehramt fur
Grundschulen in Bayern (Spring 1993)) provides an interesting
and detailed history of Nuremberg's German-American Women's
Club.
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It is not clear why relations cooled off after such a
promising start.

The construction of American housing areas

in which everything from electrical outlets to washer and
dryer facilities was American probably provided American
families with all the amenities they needed without having to
deal with the language barrier and a different culture.

In

spite of repeated American protests to the contrary, many
families preferred the isolation and security the housing
areas provided to the challenges contacts with Germans could
bring.

The German chairperson of the German-American women's

club, for example, found it increasingly difficult in 1958 to
invite American families to German homes.

At the same time

German dignitaries in Nuremberg never had German-American
relations very high on their list.

None of Nuremberg's Lord

Mayors ever appeared in a meeting of the German-American
Advisory Council, while their wives also did not find the
German-American women's club important enough to join or to
display any interest in its activities.

An observer who was

very well acquainted with both sides of the story in Germany
thought

that

both

sides

had

missed

the

incredible

opportunities which the presence of American soldiers and
dependents

offered

for

really

promoting

mutual

understanding.99
""Mehr Tuchfiihlung schafft Freunde," [Closer Contact
Creates Friends] NN, 15 Sept. 1956; newpspaper clipping; NCA
C74 no. 30; minutes of a meeting of the German-American
Advisory Council, 26 June 1958; NCA C85/I Verkehr mit
Stationierungskraften, no no.; Winfried Blumel, personal
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Other actions by Nuremberg authorities during the 1950s
also betrayed a sometimes rather cool relationship with the
occupiers.
for

school

In September 1954 the city council's committee
and

welfare

discussed

the

possibility

of

continuing the Meistersinger contest from which the Army was
about to withdraw.
discussion

Although some of the participants of the

acknowledged

the

public

relations

effect

the

contest had had in the past, it seemed that Nuremberg's city
fathers were not aware that the Americans had initiated an
outstanding cultural event which took place in packed houses
and at the same time provided young singers with a nationwide
audience and Nuremberg with much needed positive publicity.
The committee members did not investigate any alternatives
such as private sponsoring which the Americans had done
successfully, but simply decided that the Army had had the
luxury

of

simply

ordering

its

units

to

organize

preliminaries and send the finalists to Nuremberg.

the

Nobody

seemed to be aware that GYA officers had had to rely on their
own organizational skills to build the program from scratch
and that the program took place throughout West Germany.

It

included the French and the British zone where the Americans
did not have any possibility to rely on the tactical commands

interview, 28 July 1994; Dr. Renate Propper was one of the
charter members of the German-American Women's Club.
In a
conversation with me shortly before her death in 1995 she
expressed her
frustration at the
indifference which
Nuremberg's first lady had displayed throughout the thirty
year tenure of her husband in the office of Lord Mayor.
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for support.

In the end the committee agreed that spending

considerable amounts of money for an event which, according
to them, promised little in return, could not be justified.
It unanimously voted not to participate in any way in the
organization of future Meistersinger contests.
meant that

1955

was

the last year

of

The decision

the Meistersinger

contest.100
The American Education Center in Nuremberg which had
become an international center with an American director and
a French and British library had a similar fate.

Americans

and later on their two Allies had opened the institute with
the expectation that the city of Nuremberg or other agencies
ultimately

would take them over.

In December

1954

the

Committee for Schools and Cultural affairs discussed the
issue.

Its members came to the conclusion that

unreasonable

to

spend

60,000

marks

per

year

it was
for

an

institution which the occupiers had introduced and from which
the city could not expect to derive any material gains in the
future.

Nuremberg's

institute was

city

fathers

determined

that

the

a regional affair and therefore should be

sponsored by the regional government in Ansbach or the state
government in Munich.
that

such

an

responsibility.

Those agencies, however, had decided

institution

was

entirely

the

city's

The committee followed the recommendation by

IOOMinute of a meeting of the committee for schools and
cultural affairs, 3 Sept. 1954; NCA C7/IX no. 1320.
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the Lord Mayor's office to inform the public that the city of
Nuremberg would be unable to maintain the institute although
it recognized the valuable work it had done in the past.

The

city

the

would

certainly

institute's

activities

welcome

a

as

as

long

continuation
those

who

of
had

been

sponsoring it in the past would also pay the bills in the
future.

Needless to say that the institute closed its doors

for good in 1955.101
Despite these disappointments American initiatives on
the whole were quite successful.

The American programs

provided the framework and the skills for many Germans to
develop their own initiatives.

They also helped them to

carry projects on once American money would not be available
for them anymore.

Nuremberg was no exception to that rule.

10,Minutes of a meeting of the committee for school and
cultural affairs, 10 Dec. 1954; NCA C7/IX no. 1320; Chronik
der Stadt Ntirnberg 1955; NCA F2 no. 51.
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CHAPTER XXII
Joint Ventures: German Initiatives at the Grass Roots
1948-1955

1948 marked the beginning of a new era in youth work in
the Federal Republic.

Although currency reform had crippled

public finances in the short run, it provided the basis for
long term planning.

Progressive planners in communities such

as Nuremberg were looking for ways to improve the lot of
young people in many ways.

Relying on German traditions as

well as on new American ideas,

they targeted health care,

school counseling, providing young people with jobs or places
to stay, and last, but not least, continued the concept of
open youth work which GYA had initiated and HICOG had come to
endorse

as

well.

The

extensive

network

of

exchanges,

material help, professional advice, and leadership training
which

OMGUS

and

HICOG

had

created

helped

the

Germans

considerably at a time when want was still very visible in
the Federal Republic.

Through this type of cooperation many

American concepts and ideas showed results long after HICOG
and GYA had ceased to exist.
Youth Welfare
1949 provided Theodor Marx with the opportunity to make
Nuremberg one of the most progressive cities in caring for
its children.

In June of that year OMGBY invited him to name

capable social workers who had to be under thirty years old

678
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and had to be "receptive to new ways of thinking".

English

was another requirement for those who would be chosen.

One

month later Marx had selected four city employees, one of
them a former POW in the United States.1
In

December

1949

Marx

approached

HICOG

about

the

possibility of supporting a new kind of counselling service.
Nuremberg had pioneered the idea of psychiatric help for
young people in Germany during the Weimar Republic.

After

the war Marx and his coworkers recognized that Germany had
completely missed out on vital developments in the field
between 1933 and 1945, while researchers in the United States
had done pathbreaking work.

One first step to help young

people was the Kreis Youth Committee's counselling service,
which, according to him, the Youth Office in fact operated
and staffed.
initiated

To pool resources and assure cooperation, Marx

the

formation

of

the

Association

for

the

Cultivation of Welfare in Nuremberg (Verein der Niirnberger
Wohlfahrtspflege
organizations

e.V.)

within

in
the

which
city

the
as

leading

well

as

welfare
the

city

administration came together to promote especially youth
welfare.

Marx found open ears

at HICOG which tried to

introduce these new concepts in child guidance to German

‘Albert Schweizer, CAD, OMGBY, to Welfare Administra
tion, Nuremberg, 10 June 1949; Marx to Schweizer, 13 July, 27
Sept. 1949; Interoffice memorandum from Erna to Mrs. Groves,
12 Nov. 1949, re.: telephone conversation with Theodor Marx;
NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 40, 10/433/21.
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communities at about the same time.

German emigres had

played a leading role in developing new approaches to social
work and welfare in the United States.

We have seen that a

number of them returned to Germany to work for OMGUS and
HICOG.

Hertha Krauss and Hedwig Wachenheim,

for example,

were important voices in HICOG's Welfare Division.

They

could rely on the support of many other emigres who were
willing to lend a helping hand and came for shorter periods
of time as advisers and specialists.2
In view of the favorable disposition on both sides it
was no surprise that HICOG reacted promptly and favorably to
Marx's request.

Just six months after Marx had sent his

letter the Nuremberg Child Guidance Clinic opened its doors.
HICOG

had

arranged

for

Gisela

Konopka

to

come

from

Minneapolis to lend her support during the initial phase of
the

operation.

welfare

officer

She

discussed

and

others

with

the

Nuremberg's

necessary

leading

details

for

introducing the American model of child guidance— especially
the new concept of case work and operating in teams— and
provided many practical solutions to initial problems.3

2Theodor
Marx,
Sozialer
Beratungsdienst
Niirnberg
(Niirnberg [Nuremberg], Ortsverband der Niirnberger Wohlfahrtspflege e.V., 1954) 5-12; Marx to Hedwig Wachenheim, HICOG, 14
Dec. 1949; NCA C7/IX no. 1235.
Interestingly, the emigres
working for OMGUS and HICOG enjoyed an exceptional degree of
authority and respect.
3Marx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 11.
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One of the greatest handicaps at the start was the lack
of suitable facilities in the still largely destroyed city.
Marx

and the Welfare Association

situation quickly.
welfare

Center

set out to

remedy the

In November 1950 Nuremberg had a new

which

bright, and cheerful."

American

observers

found

"simple,

The only problem was that it soon

proved to be too small for the growing numbers of people who
desired welfare services.4
The clinic turned out to be such a success that the
association expanded it considerably after its first year of
operation.

Once again Marx's call for financialsupport

found receptive ears at HICOG headquarters which provided
almost half of the clinic's operating budget.5
Gisela Konopka was not the only American specialist who
provided support

and guidance to the German

teams.Three

other German and

Austrian emigres took time off from their

faculty positions in the United States to come to Nuremberg.
Psychiatrist George Frankl stayed several months and played
a crucial role in reorganizing the clinic and making sure
that the workers remained focused on their most essential
tasks.

Kurt Reichers spent a summer explaining the concept

4Marx,
Sozialer Beratungsdienst
9; for
a
brief
description of the child guidance clinic see also Dept, of
State, Young Germany: Apprentice to Democracy, European and
British Commonwealth Series 24 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1951) 56-58; the quote is on 56.
sMarx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 9-10; Jahresbericht des
Sozialen Beratungsdienstes, l Apr. 1951-31 Mar. 1952; NCA C74
no. 3.
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of case work to Nurembergers in 1952, while Susanne Schulz
arrived from Chicago in 1953 to hold a seminar at Nuremberg's
college of Economics and Social Science which dealt with the
training of new social workers.6
The clinic became an

immediate success.

Its staff

registered rapidly rising attendance numbers which included
more and more young people who came on their own initiative
seeking advice.

From 1953 on the clinic had to deal with an

additional task it had not expected.

Experts from all over

the Federal Republic descended on Nuremberg to seek advice
for launching their own clinics or to participate in formal
seminars the city had set up with American support to prepare
social workers, psychiatrists and other people involved in
the teams for the task.

Since the clinic was unable to

expand its staff and the numbers of people seeking help
exceeded even the wildest expectations the clinic's employees
were booked to the limits of their capacities.
other

clinics

in

place

across

conditions normalized after 1953.

the

With several

country,

however,

Child guidance clinics

became permanent institutions in Nuremberg and many other
communities.7
^arx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 11.
7Marx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 10-11; see also a report
on the visit of the students and faculty of the Women's
School for Social Work in Stuttgart of June 1951. The group
stayed at the American Institute of Education which had moved
to the former witness house of the Nuremberg trials in 1949
and had much space to offer. Its members did not just visit
the child guidance clinic but also a number of other new
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Marx was not content with creating a clinic.

As early

as 1946 he had suggested to hold conferences to prepare
curricula for courses designed to train social workers, a
task he considered to be essential for securing the supply of
trained social workers which would be much needed in light of
the social disruption the war and Hitler's regime had caused.
With the help of Andreas Staudt, the director of the city's
Youth Office, Marx developed a curriculum for a two year
evening course which would end in a state examination and
certify the participants as social workers.

Marx received

the approval of the Bavarian authorities and in November 1947
the first course began.

The curriculum was highly technical

with an overwhelming emphasis on legal and administrative
matters.

It also introduced the students to all fields of

social work, but focused especially on youth welfare.

The

course was not easy for the participants who had a demanding
workload apart from their day jobs and life in a devastated
city

in

which

survival

still

was

high

on

the

agenda.

Nevertheless most of them came through and were the first
social workers in Nuremberg to successfully pass their state
examinations in 1949.8

institutions in Nuremberg such as the Peace Village, but they
were particularly impressed with the Child Guidance Clinic.
(NCA C74 no. 137).
8Auszug aus einem AbschluSbericht iiber einen Sonderlehrgang fur Sozialbeamte, city of Nuremberg to OMGBY, 1 Aug.
1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 40,
10/43-3/21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

684
The
Bavarian

course was

just a

first

authorities that he was

step.

Marx

informed

thinking

about

ways to

replace Nuremberg's School for Female Social Workers with a
more modern institution which would also admit men into the
ranks of

social workers.

He discussed the idea

later with M s. Wachenheim and Krauss when

one year

he attended a

seminar they held on basic problems of training for social
workers.9
Once again the Nuremberg city councilman struck a nerve
with the OMGUS representatives.
year

later

overlooked

that
the

Hertha Krauss reported one

the

Education

aspect

of social

training program.

Branch
work

had

completely

in its

leadership

The exchange program could do much to

remedy the situation, but clearly Germans and Americans would
have to do something more in this realm.10
Marx,

by

then

the

representative

of

municipal

organizations in the executive committee of the newly founded
German Working Association for Youth Welfare and Youth Work
(Deutsche

Arbeitsgemeinschaft

Jugendfiirsorge) ,
Nuremberg.

continued

to

fur
push

Jugendpflege
for

his

plans

und
in

He approached the problem on several tracks.

^ ar x to Bavarian Youth Office, 6 Feb. 1947; memorandum
by Marx about his participation in an OMGUS seminar on basic
questions of training in social work on 10-12 Sept. 1948
which he pursued further with local MG officials; NCA C74 no.
137.
I0Report on Education for Social Work in Germany by
Hertha Krauss [Summer 1949]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 40, 10/43-3/21.
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Since Nuremberg already had a college for Economics and
Social Sciences

it appeared to be easiest to develop

curriculum for social workers within its framework.

a

Although

American specialists came to teach at this institution, the
entirely theoretical approach of the college and a lack of
qualified faculty made this approach unfeasible.11
Marx also had to fight against intrigues within the city
administration.

In a memorandum he described the rather

unpleasant situation which he was confronting
1950.

in January

On the one hand it seemed that the men in charge of

schools in Nuremberg did not appreciate Marx's intrusion into
what they considered to be their realm.

Marx also found out

that the director of the Woman's School of Social Work in
Nuremberg

was

conspiring

institution and her job.

to

unseat

him

and

save

her

Should she be successful, Marx

warned his superiors, many of the pledges of support he had
obtained for the new undertaking had been given to him
personally and would not be binding if somebody else took
over his post.12
Obviously Marx won the struggle and went on with his
plans.

By January

1951 he had secured HICOG

support for the project which he wanted to use

financial
for the

development of a library as well as payment of an assistant
"Report A.S. Wheelan, OLCB, PAD to Florence Black,
HICOG, PAD, 12 Dec. 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, Central Files, Box
29.
l2Memorandum Theodor Marx, 25 Jan. 1950; NCA C74 no. 137.
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and a professor for two years, but had not been able to solve
the space problem.

An attempt to house the school in the

American

Center

Education

did

not

succeed

because

the

Americans had actually withdrawn most of their support from
the

institution

which

continued

to

operate

as

an

international institute on a much reduced scale.13
It was not until the next year that Marx finally was
able to bring all the parts together.

In January of that

year Dora von Caemmerer accepted a call as director of the
institute from Nuremberg.

Caemmerer had studied in England

and had been to the United States after the war to become
acquainted with American methods of social work.

She came

from West Berlin where she had trained social workers in the
American methods in a program financed by HICOG

and was

probably the best expert in the field at the time.

Von

Caemmerer insisted that she would only come if her assistant,
Heinrich Schiller, would be given a full time position as
tutor or supervisor.

The future director regarded Schiller's

role as essential since German schools of social work so far
had completely neglected the individual development of their
students.

Schiller would supervise their work on a one on

I3Memo of a conference between Marx, Staudt, directors of
schools of social work, and HICOG representatives about
possibilities of obtaining financial support for their
institutions; application for a HICOG grant for the planned
institute for practical social work [1950]; memo re. : support
of School of Social work from HICOG, 23 Jan. 1951; Marx to
Dr. Ackermann, Director Education Center, Nuremberg, 15 May
1952; Ackermann to Marx, 6 June 1952; NCA C74 no. 137.
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one basis and would also pay attention to developing mature
personalities.

A few days later the city's welfare committee

approved the school.

Marx also obtained the promise from the

Bavarian Ministry of Education to fully support the measure.
The Ministry requested in its letter that Marx cooperate in
developing similar curricula for the entire state.
day later it officially accredited the school,

Just one
explicitly

welcoming the new teaching methods and curricula which were
based

on American

involved.

models

in

spite

of

the

higher

costs

On 21 January 1953 the Nuremberg city council

voted unanimously

in

favor

of the new school

of

social

work.14
In April 1953 Marx was finally able to officially open
the new school.

Proudly he declared that

the second full time lecturer, Mr. Schiller, is one of
the few and possibly the only active teacher in Germany
with a degree in social work from an American
university.
Therefore we find ourselves in the
fortunate position— without Americanizing— to transfer
the many experiences from the other side of the Atlantic
to our German conditions just as we did it with
recognized success in our Child Guidance Clinic.15

14Dora von Caemmerer to Marx, 11 Jan. 1953; Marx to
Bavarian Youth Ministry, 14 Jan. 1951; minutes of a welfare
committee meeting, 15 Jan. 1953; memorandum of conference
with Ministry of Education, 16 Jan. 1953; memorandum of a
telephone conversation with Min. Dir. Ritter, Munich, 19 Jan.
1951; minutes of city council session, 21 Jan. 1953; NCA C74
no. 137; for von Caemmerer's previous experiences see "German
Social Work," HICOG Information Bulletin (November 1952) : 26.
150pening speech by Theodor Marx, 27 Apr. 1953; NCA C74
no. 137.
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Marx was right, but neither von Caemmerer nor Schiller
were quite happy with the arrangement.
curious

mixture

between

old

and

The curriculum was a

new,

still

emphasizing

heavily the administrative and legal aspects of social work.
The city fathers also did not want to spend too much money on
the enterprise which remained a point of friction throughout
von Caemmerer's and Schiller's tenure.

With the exception of

the two

the

full

time

employees all

of

school's

teachers came from the city administration.

eleven

The only other

lecturer trained in American social work concepts was the
director

of

the

child

guidance

clinic

who

taught

psychology.16
In spite of these handicaps the students immediately
recognized the dramatic departure in teaching methods.

Von

l6List of lecturers at School of Socila Work, April 1953;
NCA C74 no. 137; Heinrich Schiller, personal interview, 26
July 1995.
Schiller recalled that the school was fairly
protected from cuts and outside interference as long as Marx
was in office.
After his death, however, the situation
deteriorated steadily because the new head of the Welfare
Office did not have his predecessor's imposing personality
and was unable to defend the institution. When Schiller was
appointed director, he found the situation far from
satisfactory.
At that time the Lutheran Church in Bavaria
had decided to thoroughly reform its own training for social
workers and asked Schiller to take over the task in 1967.
Schiller was granted a free hand and a considerably larger
budget.
Since the school opened in Nuremberg, he did not
even have to move. He remained there until he retired. See
also "Dr. Schiller leitet evangelisches Sozialinstitut: Einem
neuen Ruf gefolgt: Der anerkannte Fachmann ging von der
Sozialen Schule an die neue Bildungsstatte,11 [Dr. Schiller
Head of Lutheran Social Institute: Followed a New Call: the
Recognized Expert Went from the School of Social Work to the
New Educational Institution] NN, 7 Sept. 1967: [n.p.];
Newspaper clipping, NCA C74 no. 138.
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Caemmerer

remained

a

rather

authoritarian

instilled respect in the students.
were

impressed

with

and

person

who

In contrast, most of them

thoroughly

enjoyed

Schiller's

tutorial style which was easy going, very personal, but at
the same time remained demanding.

Of course it helped that

Schiller was not much older than many of his students who
were thrilled to go out and do actual casework and discuss
their experiences

in class.

These practical experiences

seemed to make up for the dryness and drudgery of some of the
other courses which emphasized the traditional
administrative

issues.

With

the

opening of

legal and
the

school

teaching social work had entered a new era in Germany.

The

first class of graduates found work in Nuremberg and the
surrounding region, but also went to far off places such as
Hamburg, Liibeck, Kassel, and Wuppertal.17
The new breed of social workers did not have an easy
time in the field.

Horst Volk, for example, found a job with

the city of Nuremberg and was assigned to one of its homes
where difficult young people were literally kept under lock

17For the student's experiences see "Unsere Soziale Welt:
Eine Festschrift iiber den Galgenhumor der 13 Priifungskandidaten, Ostern 1958;"
NCA C74 no. 136; Heinrich
Schiller, personal interview, 26 July 1995; Horst Volk,
personal interview, 2 Aug. 1995. Volk belonged to the first
class to graduate from the school.
Frederike Noetel,
personal interview, 14 Aug. 1995. Ms. Noetel had previously
done social work for the Lutheran Church and described her
experiences at the school in the 1950s as a revelation.
According to her, the difference between her schooling at the
church institutions and the new school were "like day and
night."
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and key.

Volk remembered that none of the older social

workers there thought that one could or should do anything
with

those

hopeless.

hardened

cases

whom

they

considered

to

be

Volk met ridicule when he began to work with the

worst offenders,
school wrong.

but did not need long to prove the old
He did not spend much time at his

first

assignment because of the intransigence of his colleagues,
but Volk continued a lifelong commitment to the new brand of
social work he had studied and put it to good use.

His

career culminated in the construction and management of one
of the most successful enterprises

employing handicapped

people in Germany.18
Although American support was most visible in the city's
welfare department, others also tried to embrace the new age,
although it seemed to be harder for some than for others.
Nuremberg's educators, for example, had to deal with one of
18Horst Volk,
personal
interview,
2 Aug.
1995.
Interestingly Volk made no bones about his rather negative
feelings towards the United States, a common feature among
intellectuals in a city that up to last year was a Social
Democratic stronghold where it was not fashionable to show
much sympathy for American policies. When I interviewed him,
however, I had the impression that he had many features which
one finds more in the United States than in Germany.
Volk
was very easy going and informal in spite of his position
when I visited him in his office.
Since he was one of
Schiller's
most
successful
students,
he
certainly
internalized the American models and the practice oriented
approach Schiller taught at the school. Volk did not seem to
have much patience for the all powerful and cumbersome German
bureaucracy, looking rather for practical and pragmatic
solutions to problems.
So in fact I found a person who
seemed to be very American in outlook and behavior but at the
same time was convinced that not much good could come from
the other side of the Atlantic in the political realm.
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the few emigres who
former work places.

actually decided to return to their

Pauline Schwickert had been in a leading

position in the city's school administration when the Nazis
dismissed her in 1933.

She emigrated to the United States in

1936 and became professor at Ohio State University.

She

returned to Nuremberg in 1949 to resume her work there, but
found

considerable

resistance

from members

of

the

city

administration who argued that her twelve years in exile had
"alienated" her and accused her of wanting to experiment too
much with

influences

of

the

American

education

system.

Schwickert took these charges head on and said that indeed
she wanted to fight for changes in the vocational school
system which should also teach some theoretical subjects to
its apprentice students.
economics

and

social

She planned to support especially

sciences

since

the

United

States

demonstrated that people who were educated in these subjects
were able to make independent decisions.

Apparently she won

the argument and was reinstated.19
In 1951 Schwickert took the initiative and proposed to
offer English as an
students.

optional

subject for all vocational

Nuremberg's school committee had no objections as

long as enough rooms could be found and a certain academic
standard could be maintained, but it rejected Schwickert's
suggestion to introduce a fee for the course to insure the

19Minutes of of a school committee meeting, 1 Apr. 1949;
NCA C7/IX no. 1285.
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participating students' motivation.
dilemma in American efforts.

This case revealed a

Schwickert wanted to introduce

an idea with which she had probably become acquainted in the
United States, but it ran against the intentions of OMGUS and
HICOG officials who had been working hard to abolish school
fees.

In this case the city of Nuremberg had long advocated

such a policy

so that the council members

rejected

one

American idea while at the same time supporting another which
had long been on their reform agenda anyway.20
The committee demonstrated that it was willing to act on
new ideas from the United States in another case.

It adopted

a welfare measure at scyhools which was in common use in the
United States but had not been found necessary in German
institutions.

In 1951 HICOG approached the city to create

positions of psychologically trained counsellors at all of
its schools.
agreed

to

counsellors.

In the spring of 1952 the school committee had
introduce

two

year

training

courses

for

The American director of the International

Institute, the former Education Center, agreed to support the
project with rooms and his own expertise in August.

In

January 1953 the State Department granted 10,000 marks for
the project and sent a psychologist who gave a number of
presentations

and

helped

set

the

program

up.

The

International Center arranged for a conference with foreign

20Minutes of a school committee meeting, 20 Apr. 1951;
NCA C7/IX no. 1285.
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experts in Nuremberg that dealt with the topic.
1954

the

first

participants

had

passed

By October
the

course

successfully and began their work in Nuremberg's schools.
With the first results in, the Committee for Cultural Affairs
decided to

recommend the continuation of the program in

November 1954.

The city council had supplemented it earlier

that year with a small
themselves

in

the

library

latest

to help

trends

teachers

in

orient

education

and

psychology.21
Children of the Occupiers
The Americans did not always provide support for welfare
agencies but sometimes also created problems for them.

Not

surprisingly relations between GIs and German women often had
rather undesired consequences.

In 1952 an estimated 94,000

children had fathers who belonged to the occupying forces.
Nuremberg's statistics in the 1950s reveal that between 10
and 20% of all children under the city's guardianship had an
American

father.

Of those

less

than

10%

relationship with an African-American GI.

came

from a

Most soldiers

accepted their fatherhood and supported the mothers even if
the couples did not get married but many others did not.
German authorities or civilians could not expect any help
from the Army

in these cases,

since

Americans were not

2lMinutes of meetings of the committee for schools and
cultural affairs, 6 Feb. 1953; NCA C7/IX no. 1306; 20 Feb.
1953; NCA C7/IX no. 1307; 12 Mar. 1954, 26 N O V . 1954; NCA
C7/IX no. 1320.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

694
legally obliged to provide child support for their offspring
in Germany.22
Although the numbers were minute, children from AfricanAmerican

soldiers

provided a special

and highly

visible

challenge for Nuremberg's society and welfare authorities.
In May 1952 fifty-two of the 3758 first graders registered
for school had an African-American father.

Most of them

lived with their families and tried to lead normal lives,
although all had to cope with the problem of being physically
different which meant that they were stared at in public
places and often became targets of other children as well as
of discrimination by adults.

A sympathetic social worker

observed that they developed a strong sense of independence
and

pride

which

many

were

willing

to

defend

anytime

anywhere.23
Interestingly, the presence of African-American soldiers
had done much to improve their image in Germany.

We have

seen evidence that many of them felt more comfortable in
Germany than in the United States because they did not have
to live with the open racism and discrimination they were
^"Eine Umfrage
der 'NN':Tausendevon Kindern ohne
Vater," [A Survey by "NN": Thousands of Children Without
Father] NN, 21 Sept. 1949: 10.
^"Eine Umfrageder
'NN':
Tausende von Kindern ohne
Vater," [A Survey by "NN": Thousands of Children Without
Father] NN, 21 Sept. 1949: 10; Helmut Stiihler, personal
interview, 12 Aug. 1994.
Thecity administration asked
Stiihler on several occasions to accompany these children on
special trips to Denmark.
He also seemed to have some of
them as guests in his youth center.
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still facing at home, but the Germans' apparent tolerance
towards African Americans should not be overestimated.

A

look at the welfare administration in the 1950s demonstrates
that many Nurembergers were unable to shed prejudice and
racial

stereotypes.

Welfare officers usually segregated

children of African-American fathers who came under foster
care into special homes.

One lady in a small village near

Nuremberg, for example, provided a foster home for five mixed
children.

In November 1953 she requested extra support for

heating materials and clothing from the welfare authorities.
According to her, it was a well known fact that children of
African-American descent were extremely susceptible to colds
so that it was necessary to maintain the entire house well
heated.24
Her reasoning was by no means unique.

In 1955 the

Nuremberg welfare office wrote an extensive report to the
regional government of Middle Franconia.

The author of the

report argued that the city of Nuremberg had to take care of
the

development

American

of

fathers.

about

260

According

children who
to

the

had African-

author,

extensive

analyses had revealed that about half of those children had
developed "their characters and sentiments in an incorrect
way".

The office detected the reason for this trend in the

fact that these children, "even if the environment does not

24Letter from Ms. S. to Nuremberg Welfare Office, 26 Nov.
1953; NCA C25/I no. 489.
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reject them", were developing an inferiority complex because
they felt their physical difference strongly.

The author

thought that this complex pushed the children towards being
violent

or

intimidated,

insidious,

while

"in one word:

others

became

unfit for life".

shy

and

The welfare

officer argued that this development took place regardless of
the place in which the children lived.

He continued that the

children in foster care suffered more from belonging to an
"alien race" than those who lived in families.

With those

alarming signs on the wall the Nuremberg welfare office
thought

it necessary to

take

steps

early so that

these

children would not become a burden to society or failures
later in their lives.
The office's cases to support its argument once more
reveal the deep seated prejudices which foster parents and
the welfare officials shared.

The reports stressed that the

children in general suffered considerably from their "alien
heritage" and sometimes tried to take revenge for belonging
to a different race on white children.

Most of the reports

described children of an African-American heritage in foster
homes as wild and hard to control.

Many only seemed to be

happy when they were together with other mixed children.
welfare

authorities

thought

that

all

of

these

The

features

clearly had their roots in the different race to which those
children belonged.

With this racial explanation it was not
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necessary to examine the causes of the young boys's and
girls' feelings of alienation in any depth.
The welfare

officer

in charge

accumulated

all this

evidence to convince the authorities in Middle Franconia that
more money was necessary to provide the children of black
soldiers with the means to master their later lives.
achieve this goal,
especially

To

Nuremberg wanted to send a number of

difficult

children

to

international

camps

in

Switzerland to provide them with a more suitable environment.
While the intention was laudable, the ultimate reason for
sending them abroad revealed the unwillingness of Nuremberg's
authorities to actually deal with this new phenomenon and to
integrate these children into the community.

Their reason

for sending the children abroad was to accustom them to a
foreign country and to provide them with an education in such
an

environment.

The welfare

officers

expected

them to

emigrate from Germany later in life.
Middle Franconia's welfare officials did not share these
opinions.

They reminded their colleagues in Nuremberg that

the children indeed were Germans and would have to decide by
themselves if they would want to emigrate or not.
not

expect

such

a move

and preparing

them

One should

for

such

an

unlikely eventuality early on in life would simply be a waste
of money.25
^Nuremberg
Welfare
Office
to
Bavarian
Welfare
Association in Middle Franconia, 28 March 1955; Middle
Bavarian Welfare Association in Middle Franconia to Nuremberg
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Nuremberg's welfare officials did not yet realize that
their own evaluations actually were the largest part of the
problem.
"foreign"
Nuremberg

The

frequency

appear

in

in which

all

reports

authorities— and

Nurembergers— were

not

the words
clearly

with

prepared

to

them

"alien"

or

indicated

that

probably

many

accept

that

being

a

Nuremberger or a German did not depend on the color of your
skin or your race, but was determined by your environment.
No attempt was made to integrate the children into the rest
of the community.

The authorities did not seem to be aware

that their segregation policies contributed to the childrens'
psychological problems.

Treating these children differently

and regarding them as strangers only aggravated the problems
which many of them had growing up in unstable homes.

They

felt that they did not belong and were not welcome anywhere
except among their peers.
lead

to

documented.
solve

the

the

This constellation certainly could

behavioral

deviations

which

authorities

The projected remedies were not designed to
problem.

preconceptions

and

Instead

of

prejudices

of

trying
the

to

change

community,

the
the

administrators thought that the only solution would be to
provide the children with
preconceived fates.

some help to cope with their

Since they were perceived as "aliens",

it was just logical to assume that they would certainly want
to leave Germany sooner or later.
[n.d.]; NCA C25/I no. 489.
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Mixed
however.

children

could

look

to

a

few

bright

spots,

The largest local newspaper tried its best to

disseminate the message of tolerance and understanding.

The

authors of articles dealing with the subject made clear that
the children who had black fathers were no different from
others:

they

spoke the same easily detectable Nuremberg

dialect and for the most part had the same names as other
children of their age group.
came

in the

form

of

vacations in Denmark.

Some relief for these children

invitations

to

spend their

summer

The Danes had proven their integrity

and tolerance during World War II and they demonstrated once
again an exceptional sensitivity.

In 1955 Stig Guldberg, who

had pioneered the idea of integrating handicapped people into
society, invited sixty children of African-American descent
to Denmark.

Many other families followed his example so that

almost half of the 260 school children were able to spend a
vacation abroad,
or

foster

homes,

since all of them came from poor families
the welfare

office

tickets for the eighteen hour ride.

provided the

train

The newspaper reported

that many Danish families had indicated their desire to adopt
the young outsiders.

They would provide them with homes in

a society which seemed to be more ready for them than the one
into which they had been born.26
26Minutes of the Welfare Committee meeting of 21 Apr.
1955; NCA C7/IX no. 1354; "44 Mischlingskinder fuhren gestern
von Niirnberg zu danischen Familien: Ferienwochen im 'Land des
Specks'," [44 Mulatto Children Left Nuremberg Yesterday to Go
to Danish Families: Weeks of Vacation in the "Country of
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Taking Care of Homeless Youth: The Peace Village
Children of American soldiers often had at least their
mother's family to fall back on, but the war had left many
others without parents and homes.
promoted

the

idea

of

Boys'

Americans successfully

Towns

modeled

after

Father

Flanagan's self-help institutions which not only took care of
the

boys'

physical

needs

democratic procedures,
education.

but

also

introduced

them

taking up responsibilities,

Nuremberg's

Peace

Village

was

one

of

to

and an
these

communities and recognized the debt to Flanagan— who had died
in Berlin while promoting his idea in Germany— by naming the
main square of the future settlement after him.27
With supporters from all over Europe, the local GYA and
MG officers, and the city of Nuremberg the undertaking seemed
to rest on a solid foundation and enjoyed much attention in
the press as well as by international authorities.

The State

Department also reported favorably about this new experiment

Bacon"] NN, 20 July 1955: 9; "Die kleine 'Toxi' erobert die
Herzen: Ein Film von R.A. Stemmle um ein Mischlingskind,"
[Little "Toxi" Conquers Hearts: A Film by R.A. Stemmle About
a Colored Child] NN, 15. Oct. 1952: 9.
It would be
interesting to investigate this issue further, but most
welfare records of the time in Nuremberg are still closed to
the researcher. One also has to take into consideration that
the welfare offices only dealt with problem cases.
The
children who grew up under more normal conditions never
attracted the attention of the authorities.
^Chronik der Stadt Niirnberg 1945-49, 19 June 1949: 457.
NCA F2 no. 48; see also "Cornerstone for Peace Village Laid,"
YW, 1 July 1948: 1. One of the first American feature movies
OMGUS brought from the United States was Boys' Town with Kirk
Douglas as Father Flanagan.
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in which young people were building and administering their
own homes and workshops.28
During

the

first

years

of

its

operation

the Peace

Village seemed to be on the right path.

Nuremberg's welfare

administration watched with interest.

Apparently the city

fathers were sufficiently impressed with its work that they
decided to merge their own plans for a youth home at the
location with those of the Peace Village.

In February 1949

about fifty young men between the ages

of

fourteen and

eighteen had decided to try it out; eight months later their
number had almost doubled.

By 1951 115 homeless young people

had decided to make the Peace Village their home.29
In

spite

of

the

publicity

financial trouble from the start.
commented as early
considerable

as

support

1949
from

the

experiment

was

in

A Nuremberg newspaper

that the village would need
German

authorities

and

28Chronik der Stadt Nurnberg 1945-49, 19 June 1949: 457.
NCA F2 no. 48.
OMGUS had sponsored the international
conference from which prominent participants, among them Carl
Zuckmayer who had emigrated from Germany to the United States
and Elisabeth Rotten, the director of one of the leading
Swiss international welfare organizations, went to Nuremberg
for laying the cornerstone of the future peace village. For
press coverage see "'Das Experiment scheint zu glucken',"
["The Experiment Seems to Succeed] NN, 29 July 1950: 10; the
State Department's evaluation is in Young Germany 53-56.
29Minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 12 Aug. 1948.
NCA C7/IX no. 1234; for the numbers see "Das Friedensdorf in
Wiirnberg: Eine zeitgemSBe Jugendhilfe," [The Peace Village in
Nuremberg: A Modern Way of Helping Youth] NN, 26 Feb. 1949:
6; Report on Institutions supported by the Bavarian
Association for Youth Welfare Work; NCA Ref X no. 113/1;
Young Germany 54.
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organizations in addition to the help the Friends and other
international institutions provided to be able to survive,
but the project continued to suffer considerably from the
lack of funds.

The frugal city fathers decided to support

the venture only after serious admonitions from Marx with a
one time shot in the arm of 10,000 marks in November 1950.
Construction contracts between the city and the bricklayer
apprentices of the institution in the city's projects for
young people secured additional funding.
provided

much

of

the

professional

Peace Villagers
work

force

in

reconstructing Hoheneck Castle, the city's youth retreat and
training

center,

and

participated

in

the

ambitious

reconstruction of a part of the old imperial fortress which
became the Nuremberg's new youth home.

The city saved a

considerable amount of money since the apprentices were much
cheaper

than

private

contractors,

but

when

the

local

construction industry complained about the competition, the
cooperation came to an end in 1953.30
The material support from the city was not enough to
maintain the project afloat.

In March 1951 John McCloy

rescued the village from bankruptcy with a check over 82,000
marks to finish the construction at least of the first two
30|,Das
Friedensdorf
in Nurnberg:
Eine
zeitgemaBe
Jugendhilfe," [The Peace Village in Nuremberg: A Modern Way
of Helping Youth] NN, 26 Feb. 1949: 6; minutes of a welfare
committee meeting, 23 Nov. 1950; NCA C7/IX no. 1237; minutes
of a welfare committee meeting, 18 Apr. 1951; NCA C7/IX no.
1238; minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 17 Dec. 1953.
NCA C l f i x no. 1325.
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houses which had been dedicated the year before.

Two years

later the director of a British organization dedicated to
help European refugees decided to support the Peace Village
with finances and machinery since it not only housed refugees
who by then largely came from the Soviet Zone,

but also

provided Czech and other Eastern European Youth who were
living in the nearby refugee camp with opportunities to learn
a trade.31
Although the village
decade,

survived until the end of the

it never became the Boys'

envisioned.

Town its founders had

By 1959 its situation had not changed.

An

inspection by the city's welfare committee revealed that
nothing had changed since 1953.

About 120 young men, 80% of

whom had fled from the Soviet Zone, were still living in
unfinished facilities and did not have the money to carry the
project through, but by then the Boys' Town was not necessary
anymore.

Those whom the war had orphaned had grown up.

In

1961 the East German government decided to effectively lock
up

its

citizens.

With

typical

German

thoroughness

it

constructed an extremely sophisticated and deadly system of
border fortifications which ended the influx of refugees from
the east for good.

This action eliminated the last group of

31"Die Mittel erschopft— Halbfertige Bauten verfalien:
Ein Scheck rettet das Friedensdorf," [Funds Exhausted— Half
Finished Buildings Deteriorate: A Check Saves Peace Village]
NN, 17 Mar. 1951: 5; "Niirnberg Besuch zeitigt schon Friichte:
10,000 Pfund fur 'Friedensdorf'," [Visit in Nuremberg Shows
First Fruits: 10,000 Pounds for "Peace Village"] NN, 6 Nov.
1953: 1.
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young people who had come to live at the Peace Village and
the experiment came to an end in Nuremberg.32
Youth Work
While
looking

Nuremberg's

for

American

city

administration

cooperation

in the

was

field

actively
of

youth

welfare, the Nuremberg Kreis Youth Ring took the lead in
promoting and implementing the new ideas in youth work the
Americans had introduced.

Le Van Roberts, the local Resident

Officer reported to Munich in October 1950 that the mood of
people in Nuremberg in general was quite gloomy.

According

to him, Nurembergers regarded the current economic upswing as
only temporary.

The dire housing situation remained the most

popular topic in the city, while people did not seem to be
interested at all in occupation costs or cultural matters.
In spite of their proximity to the Iron Curtain and the
Korean war,

Nurembergers also did not seem to be worried

about the outbreak of a war in Germany.

Roberts noted that

Nuremberg's

the

young
the

people

as

notable

well

as

exception

to

city's

the

youth

officials

were

rather

sad

picture.

The expulsion of the Free German Youth from the

Youth Ring for "lack of cooperation" demonstrated to Roberts

32Chronik der Stadt Niirnberg, 1958: 478; 1959: 356; NCA
F2 no. 52, 53.
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that

they

certainly

took

a

stand

against

totalitarian

ideas.33
Nuremberg's

Kreis

Youth

Ring

gave

evidence

democratic convictions in other ways as well.

of

its

Combining the

ideas of a youth parliament and permitting young people to
"run" a community for a day, the Kreis Youth Ring came up
with the concept of "Political Education in the Community"
(Gemeindepolitische

Erziehung).

Together

with

the

city

administration the committee started a program in 1949 which
was designed to help young people understand the function of
city government and the possibilities it offered for help and
employment.

For several weeks all departments of the city

administration

opened

their

offices

to

young

people.

Prominent administrators and politicians gave presentations
on topics of interest.

Not surprisingly, the job situation

remained high on young people's agendas.
were

impressed

with

this

new

American observers

approach

of

introducing

democracy to the younger generation.34
33From Le Van Roberts, Resident Officer, Nuremberg, to
George N. Shuster, Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Report on
the Mood in Nuremberg, 13 Oct. 1950; NA RG 466 OLCB, District
Land Office Activity Reports, Box 2, 120.5/2 0.
^Circular from Nuremberg Kreis Youth Committee to all
schools in minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 10 Mar.
1949; NCA C7/IX no. 1235; "Jugend hat wertvolle Arbeit
geleistet: Der Kreisjugendring Niirnberg berichtet iiber seine
Tatigkeit im vergangenen Jahr," [Youth Has Done Valuable
Work: Kreis Youth Committee Reports About its Work During the
Previous Year] NN, 21 Sept. 1949: 10; Le Van Roberts, RO
Nuremberg, to K. Van Buskirk, Chief, FOD, 25 July 1950; NA RG
466 OLCB, Central Files, Box 28; see also Chronik der Stadt
Niirnberg, 17 Mar.-17 May 1952; NCA F2 no.49.
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The

Youth Ring's

commitment

to

democracy and peace

manifested itself in other ways as well.

In December 1949

the committee targeted the famous Nuremberg Christmas market
to protest the reappearance of militaristic toys on the
stands.

Eric Feiler

reported

that

about

eighty youths

marched from city hall to the trade union building while
about forty others marched to the market and picketed the
market lanes.

According to Feiler, some middle aged people

tried to interfere with the demonstration while the older
generation

"expressed their approval".

The Intelligence

Officer also noted that the police did not interfere with the
demonstrators in spite of complaints of the stand owners.
Although the demonstration never reached large proportions,
it was successful.

A city ordinance which is still in effect

today banned the sale of militaristic toys in the future.35
Although Americans certainly could be pleased with their
efforts of demilitarizing German youth, their previous policy
of demilitarization had some unwelcome side effects.

The

Kreis Youth Ring did not stop with protesting military toys
at the Christmas Market.

Two days before Christmas of 1949

Andreas Staudt, acting as chairman of the Kreis Youth Ring,
sent a resolution the committee had adopted to the American
High Commissioner.

In this resolution Nuremberg's youth

35Intelligence Report by E. Feiler, 3 Jan. 1950; NA RG
466 OLCB, ID, Bi-Weekly Reports of the Nurnberg Field Office,
1949-50, Box 1, 1; Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10
Aug. 1995; Karl Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 Aug. 1995.
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representatives protested all attempts of German political
parties

and

government

rearmament of Germany.

representatives

to

promote

the

The members of the Nuremberg Youth

Ring thought that it would be wiser to concentrate on vital
issues such as unemployment which was especially high among
young people.36
The

Youth Ring

did

not

shrink

back

from political

issues, but it did not neglect the practical work for its
constituents either.

The employment of a professional youth

worker was just one of the steps to improve the situation
especially for those who were not organized.

In January 1950

Trade Union Youth Secretary Loni Burger and Karl Maly decided
to explore the possibilities for erecting centers for young
people throughout Nuremberg.

Apparently they had taken a

close look at GYA center no. 1 and kept in mind that many of
their constituents came from the working class.

Maly and

Burger thought that it would be best to combine open youth
36Letter from Kreis Youth Ring Nuremberg to John McCloy,
22 Dec. 1949; NA RG 466 HICOM, Security-Segregated General
Records 1949-52, Box 136.
McCloy had to deal with this
attitude constantly. He had to walk a diplomatic tightrope
in this respect.
On the one hand he had to reassure
Germany's neighbors that Americans did not want to
reestablish Germany's military might unchecked. On the other
hand he needed to convince Germans about the necessity of
rearmament for defensive purposes.
Americans expected
Germans to contribute to the defense of the free world.
McCloy told Germans that nobody would force them to take up
arms for the democratic cause if they did not want to, but he
also made clear that there probably would be dire
consequences for a free Europe if they decided against
rearmament. See, for example, his speech to trade unionists
in Hamburg, 25 Nov. 1950 in Fischer and Fischer, eds. 127135. See also Schwartz, chapter V.
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work with dormitories and workshops for apprentices.

They

contacted the Bavarian Association for Youth Welfare to find
out about the possibility of funding such a project.

The

association's representative promised that he would sit down
with them to discuss the issue but also thought that it would
be more

fruitful to assemble all

interested parties

and

discuss the issue in depth.37
By July 1950 the strategy for implementing the plan was
set.

The Nuremberg Kreis Youth Ring solicited 7,000 marks

from the McCloy funds for the erection and maintenance of
Nuremberg's first "home of the open door".

One professional

youth worker and several volunteers would be in charge of the
center which would render its services free of charge.

Karl

Maly, the author of the application, emphasized the need for
supporting

unorganized

young

people.

The

Kreis

Youth

Committee had already located a suitable building part of
which

the

city

administration had

repaired.

The

Peace

Village had submitted an estimate of about 9,000 marks for
making the other part of the building suitable for a youth
center.

Maly also reminded the HICOG administrators that

Resident Officer

in Munich,

Harold

Patrick,

had

already

assured the committee of HICOG support informally in March.38

37Memo of a telephone conversation with the Chairman of
the Bavarian Association for Youth Welfare, 3 Jan. 1950; NCA
C74 Vorakt Ref. X, no. 113.
38Kreis Youth Ring to HICOG, Application for a grant from
McCloy Funds, 15 July 1950; BSA Kreisjugendring 1/1.
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The application was successful.
the whole bill.

Actually HICOG footed

It provided the Bavarian Youth Ring who

officially funded the facilities as well as the personnel
with the money for the enterprise.

In October 1950 the Kreis

Youth Ring opened Nuremberg's and Bavaria's first of five
planned youth centers under German control.

The new center

was unable to compete with GYA's luxurious accommodations but
it functioned along the same lines.

The center's three rooms

were open to all young people and functioned as library,
discussion rooms or as movie theaters.

The center also

planned to install a small workshop in which, according to
the newspaper, working youth would be able to deepen their
vocational

education.

A

large playground

completed the

picture.39
The new director of the center, Eberhard Schmall, had
his hands full from the start.
to come and stay

So many young people wanted

that initially he had to limit access to

the facilities to those who needed it most.

Schmall tried to

establish

and with

contact

with the

young

people

their

parents.40

39|,Das erste von funfen: 'Heim der offenen Tiir' am
Herschelplatz," [the First of Five: "Home of the Open Door at
Herschel Square] NN, 7 Oct. 1950: 9.
40,1'Das Haus soil zu einer kulturellen Bindung fiir die
Jugendlichen werden': Eine Tiir ist jeden Tag fiir alle Kinder
offen,"
["The House is Planned to Foster a Cultural
Connection for Young People": Every Day a Door is Open to All
Children] NN, 29 Dec. 1950: 9.
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While the center at the Herschelplatz had received all
of the press's attention, the Kreis Youth Ring had created
two additional youth centers which were located in refugee
camps to provide those young people who were still there with
opportunities to spend their leisure time in a meaningful way
and to escape the drab and crowded living conditions and were
financed by HICOG through Munich.

Interestingly, the Germans

justified their actions in the same way the Army had done:
since young people in the refugee camps tended to become
frustrated and angry, one had to do something to keep them
out of trouble and away from the streets.41
As we have seen, the Germans had solicited the help of
an American specialist to develop an all encompassing plan
for Nuremberg's youth work in the future, but before Jay Ver
Lee began working on his project Theodor Marx introduced his
own plan.

Although the city had a long standing tradition of

supporting youth organizations with club rooms in its own
city youth house, Marx envisioned a completely new approach
to youth work

for the future

which would

intensify

and

professionalize youth work and at the same time try to reach
out to that part of Nuremberg's youth who in all probability
would never

join any youth

organization

in their

lives.

According to him, the post war years had clearly demonstrated
that youth organizations only had a limited appeal to the
41Theodor Marx, "Aufbau und Ausbau der Jugendarbeit in
Niirnberg: Entwurf zu einem neuen Plan" [hereinafter Marx,
Entwurf]: 4; NCA C74 no. 3.
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city's young people and would never be able to attract more
than about one third of all youth in the city.
therefore

urgently

necessary

to

recognize

the

It was
needs

of

unorganized young people and to devote a considerable part of
the resources available for youth work to them.

The city

councilman thanked the Kreis Youth Ring for its valuable
contribution, but he wanted more.
in the

United

States

Marx

Although he had not been

apparently was

determined

to

introduce the idea of voluntarism in Nuremberg. He wanted to
introduce youth councils

in every district of the city.

These councils would consist of volunteers who would become
the liaison between those people in need and the authorities
who often did not understand the realities of the world
outside their offices.

Marx proposed that the councils

should work hand in hand with professional youth workers.42
Marx did not want those workers to operate in a vacuum.
He thought that they should also be in charge of a center
which would be open to everyone.

Marx found the idea of open

youth work which GYA practiced successfully in its center no.
1 was very good, but thought that the Americans were doing
too much of a good thing.

According to him, the costs for

running a center of this type were prohibitive and German
authorities would never be able to take it over from GYA in
its present form.

Marx suggested open youth work on a far

more moderate basis: the city would need six small homes of
42Marx, Entwurf: 1-7.
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the open door: five in the more outlying districts and one in
the city's new and very generous youth facility which Marx
had been
Fortress.

planning since March

1950 at the old Imperial

He maintained that such homes of the open door

were certainly affordable.

Since three existed already and

the city would certainly be able to reach an agreement with
the Army about taking over GYA Youth Center no. 1, Nuremberg
would only have to finance two more centers.

One could be

sponsored somehow while the sixth would be incorporated into
the new facilities where Marx sought to bring the traditional
and the new together.

The city youth house would include a

youth

for

hostel,

rooms

the

existing

organizations,

a

dormitory for apprentices, facilities for meetings and movies
as well as a home of the open door.

It would serve as the

nerve center of Nuremberg's youth work and replace the Bunker
which youth organizations were still occupying at the time.
Nuremberg's welfare committee agreed to make the plan the
basis for the future youth work of the city in October 1950,
one month before Jay Ver Lee began his evaluation of the
situation in Nuremberg.43

43Marx, Entwurf: 1-7; minutes of a meeting of the welfare
committee, 19 Oct. 1950; NCA C7/IX no. 1237; Marx introduced
his plans for the city youth house in March 1950 (see
"Finanzierung des Stadtjugendhauses," [Financing the City
Youth House] NN, 6 Mar 1950: n.p. (newspaper clipping, NCA
C74 no. 4)); for Marx's opinion about the GYA center see
minutes of conference between Mr. Textor, Marx, Staudt, and
Maly, 23 Aug. 1950; BSA Kreisjugendring 1/2.
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Ver Lee agreed with the concept of youth work Marx had
developed, but neither the new concept nor Marx's plans for
an admittedly expensive youth house met with general approval
in Nuremberg.

The Kreis Youth Ring was not happy with the

city's sudden emphasis on open youth work.

As long as the

Americans were paying for the enterprise, the youth leaders
apparently were willing to support open youth work, but as
soon as the interests of their youth organizations were in
jeopardy their attitude changed.

The majority of the Kreis

Youth

happy

Ring

competition.

members

were

not

at

all

with

the

They questioned the value of this type of youth

work and argued that only a minority of all young people
would benefit from the youth centers for which the city was
planning to spend ten times the money it had allocated for
the

youth

organizations,

although

the

members

of

the

organizations felt that they were doing the most valuable
youth work.

Marx countered that youth organizations would

never be able to attract more than just one third of all
young people and that international experiences had amply
demonstrated the value of homes of the open door.44
Some people also were not happy with the new project at
the castle.

Willy Gensmantel was one of the youth house's

most outspoken opponents.

He thought that the city would be

‘“Minutes of a meeting of the Youth Welfare Committee, 15
Mar. 1951; NCA C74 no. 3; "Acht neue 'Heime der offenen Tiir':
Der Ver Lee Plan wurde beraten," [Eight New Homes of the Open
Door: Ver Lee Plan Was Discussed] NN, 16 Mar. 1951: 10.
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much

better advised to

invest the enormous

sums

it was

planning to spend on this prestige object in practical youth
work

or

in help

for unemployed young people,

but youth

representatives had no chance against the energetic and quite
authoritarian Marx.45
Although the city's leading welfare official and the
American

expert

important issues.

agreed

in

principle,

Ver Lee's

they

differed

evaluation of the

called for eight youth centers in Nuremberg.

on

situation

The one in the

inner city was last in priority since the American did not
expect its reconstruction to take place any time soon.

None

of the youth centers would be located at or near the castle.
Ver Lee suggested that the Nuremberg youth house at the
fortress probably would serve its purpose as youth hostel and
administrative center for the city's youth work well, but
that he doubted that the planners would be able to provide
adequate facilities for a modern youth center.46
Marx was not happy with Ver Lee's report.

Throughout

1950 he had carefully enlisted all Americans within his reach
such as Major Selsor and Hedwig Wachenheim to support the
project.

Wachenheim alerted him to the McCloy Funds even

45Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug 1995.
‘‘V e r Lee Plan: 4; BSA Kreisjugendring Niirnberg Stadt
1/1. The State Department included Ver Lee's evaluation in
its booklet Young Germany: Apprentice to Democracy. Marx was
seriously offended when he became acquainted with
its
contents in 1952 (Marx to Lowell Bennett, Foreign Service of
the US, Public Affairs Regional Center, Nuremberg, 20 May
1952; NCA C74 no. 7).
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before application procedures were established and Marx had
not lost any time in sending his application.47

Since he

expected the McCloy Funds to provide about a quarter of the
construction

costs

for

the

new

youth

house,

he

called

conferences with American officials in February and March
1951 to point out the flaws in Ver Lee's argument, set the
record straight, and to explain to them once again what he
hoped HICOG and GYA would do for him and the city.

Harold

Patrick,

had to

dampen

OLCB's youth officer in Munich,
his

enthusiasm.

While

he

however,

pointed

out

that

he

personally supported the project, he alerted Marx to the fact
that the competition was keen and that the city of Nuremberg
would have to lower its expectations at least by two thirds
of the targetted sum.

Even then it was not certain if it was

going to receive any money at all.48
Apparently
Clearly

Marx

could

not

irritated he enlisted

take
the

no

help

for
of

an

answer.

everyone who

possibly could help from Hans Lamm to Franz-Josef Strauss who
had moved to Bonn in the meantime.

The fight for the money

dragged on throughout 1951 and a good part of 1952.

Neither

Marx's persistence nor his obvious opinion that the Americans
had a moral obligation to help him and Nuremberg's young

47Application for a grant for Nuremberg's youth house,
Marx to Le Van Roberts, OLCB, 2 May 1950; NCA C74 no. 7.
48Minutes of a meeting of the youth-welfare committee, 15
Mar. 1951; minutes of a conference with Le Van Roberts on 16
Feb. 1951; NCA C74 no. 3.
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people

out after

supposedly promising their

anything to advance his cause.

support

did

In April 1952 the Americans

informed the welfare specialist in no uncertain terms that he
should not have counted on money for which he had applied but
never received a written agreement.

The author of the letter

also reminded Marx that the McCloy Funds had already provided
the

city

with

close

to

one

million

marks.

Nuremberg

apparently had gotten far more than its share.

In spite of

this slap in the face Marx still was not willing to give up.
When John McCloy visited Nuremberg on his farewell tour Marx
took the last opportunity to ask for American help.

In a

detailed letter which included all of the evidence in the
case Marx expressed his disappointment at the runaround and
the final denial of support.
attitude

and

actions

in

According to Marx, the American
this

case

were

not

just

very

unpleasant for him and the city administration but also were
undermining American prestige among young people, a statement
that probably would not have held up under close scrutiny.49
Even without American support the new facilities grew
rapidly.

In August 1952 Marx presided over the inauguration

of the youth hostel,

the dormitory

for apprentices,

and

49Marx to Strauss, 26 Sept. 1951; NCA C74 no. 4; Marx to
Lamm, 20 May 1952; Lowell Bennett, Public Affairs Officer,
American Consulate General, Public Affairs Regional Center,
to Marx, 8 Apr. 1952; Marx to McCloy, 25 June 1952; NCA C74
no. 7. No answer is recorded, but McCloy clearly signalled
that he did not like the quarrelsome city on his farewell
tour. He spent just enough time to satisfy the protocol in
Nuremberg before he went on to the small town of Rothenburg
to spend the night there.
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facilities

for

conferences

and

concerts.

In

1953

an

expensive film studio followed which carried on the tradition
of the GYA film hour as well as Nuremberg's own youth film
stage which the city had constructed in 1924 and lost in 1942
through Allied bombs.

This time a committee made sure that

young people only saw approved movies, but even under this
close

scrutiny

documentaries
distributed.

young Germans
which

a

continued

newly

to

established

see American
film

service

The city's oldest structure, a tower adjacent

to the reconstructed youth buildings,
Nuremberg's youth groups in 1954.
able to complete the project.
terminate the city's contract

became the home for

In 1955 Marx finally was
When the Army decided to

at the old

location,

Hans

Werner and the former GYA youth center no. 1 found a new home
in another of the Imperial Castle's old towers.50
While Marx obviously was disappointed with the American
contribution to Nuremberg's youth house, he demonstrated that
he had not developed his youth plan just to receive money for
his prestige project.

In November 1951 the Bavarian Youth

S0Theodor Marx, 5 Jahre Ortsverband der Niirnberger
Wohlfahrtspflege e.V. (Nurnberg [Nuremberg]: Ortsverband der
Niirnberger Wohlfahrtspflege e.V., 1954) 13-25; "Im Turm der
Niirnberger Burg zog das 'Heim der offenen Tiir' ein: Freizeit
im 'Luginsland',11 [Home of the Open Door Moved to Tower in
the Nuremberg Castle: Recreation at the "Luginsland"] NN, 20
Oct. 1955: 9; for the youth film program see report of
Nuremberg's Association for the Cultivation of Welfare, Feb.
1954 (NCA C74 Vorakt Ref VI no. 120a) and an invitation to
the showing of six short movies by the Film Service for Youth
and Public Education (NCA C 74 Vorakt Ref. X no. 113/1) .
Three of the six were American and, according to the
invitation, popular with audiences.
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Ring informed the city that HICOG had suddenly cut its grants
for the youth centers.

Without the American funds the Youth

Ring would not be able to keep the centers open.
immediately

stepped

in.

In

spite

of

some

Marx

continuing

resistance from committee members who did not want to see
more competition for Nuremberg's youth organizations, Marx,
Staudt, and Maly were able to convince the welfare committee
to include the support of the three homes of the open door in
the city's budget and assure their survival.

One year later

the city also took over youth center no. 1, but it never
carried out plans for further expansion.

The city fathers

had considered the erection of a special youth center for the
Eastern European refugees
beyond the planning

stage.

in camp Valka,
Helmut

but never went

Stuhler,

whose youth

center was not far from the camp, would also have to take
care of those young people who came to visit his house of the
open door from the camp.51
Although the city

fathers

never

provided the

youth

centers with the luxurious equipment and personnel that GYA
had been able to afford, the homes of the open door had
extremely dedicated staff who devoted their lives to the
centers and the young people who visited them in spite of a

slMinutes of a meeting of the welfare committee, 29 Nov.
1951; NCA C7/IX no. 1239; minutes of meetings of the welfare
committee, 11 Feb. 1952, 17 Apr. 1952; NCA C7/IX no. 1299;
minutes of a meeting of the welfare committee, 10 July 1952;
NCA C7/IX no. 1300; Helmut Stuhler, personal interview, 12
Aug. 1994 and 12 Aug. 1995.
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constant battle over allocations and priorities.

Over the

years the barracks at the refugee camps gave way to permanent
structures.

They remain open to young people to this day.52

Although relations between Americans and Germans were
not

always

without

misunderstandings

at

the

grassroots,

Nuremberg city officials and youth leaders demonstrated that
they were quite willing to adopt American ideas and concepts
and incorporate them into their own youth work and welfare
activities.

American material support as well as HICOG's

extensive reorientation programs created the framework and
educational possibilities
learn.
initiate

for those who were

willing to

With HICOG financial support Germans were able to
many

programs

for

which

they

assumed

the

responsibility when HICOG withdrew and the economic situation
had improved.

52Helmut Stuhler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994 and 12
Aug. 1995; Karl Kleyer, personal interview, 22 Aug. 1995;
Hans Werner, personal interview, 21 Aug. 1995.
The city actually ventured into the realm of selfdetermination for young people in the sixties when Hermann
Glaser— then in charge of cultural affairs in Nuremberg—
invited Nuremberg's youth basically to run their own center
in a building the Americans had requisitioned until 1955 and
for which the city did not have any other use. In theory the
center came closest to the ideal which GYA had promoted in
the forties and fifties, but it caused much controversy from
the start because of alleged drug trafficking, violence, and
the inability by young people to manage the center. Nobody
seems quite to know what to do with it today (Kett 115-143) .
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CONCLUSION

Forty years after the official end of the occupation,
the question remains what long-term effects the American
presence may have had in Germany after World War II and how
successful American re-education efforts towards young people
actually were.

Washington needed a long time to define a

clear re-education mission for the American zone, but those
in charge of the field work developed a remarkable degree of
initiative to help the Germans in their communities back on
their feet and to start the process of re-education at the
earliest

possible

programs

which Washington's

approved.

moment.

They

actually

developed

policy statements

the

officially

While this approach took time to evolve, often led

to confusion,

duplication,

and much waste,

it also kept

American programs practice-oriented and in close touch with
the needs of German communities.

The occupiers reached a

surprising number of young people from all classes in many
different ways.
Americans who did not try to impose their will were most
successful in implementing their policies.

Although Germany

had lost the war, the occupiers had to rely on the German
administrative apparatus to carry out their policies and
consequently provided them with leverage to negotiate which
enabled them to resist drastic reforms.

The fight over

Bavaria's school system is symptomatic for this struggle.
720
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Field officers recognized the problem much earlier than OMGUS
headquarters did.

They looked for ways to cooperate with the

Germans and to open up a dialogue which would help them to
implement

their

dialogue

re-educational

proved

strategy.

to

be

the

goals.

Americans'

Establishing
most

a

successful

They did not become preachers in the desert but

found many Germans ready to cooperate who regarded change was
inevitable and necessary.
to

take

up

offers

occupiers as

and

These Germans were quite willing
suggestions

which

came

from

the

long as they were permitted to participate

actively in the decision-making process which enabled them to
adapt new models to the situation in their community.

As a

result many American ideas successfully took root in German
thought and actions,

sometimes

German

which

traditions

indiscernible.

in

forming a symbiosis with

the American

origins

became

This process in youth work suggests that

American re-education and reorientation efforts could have a
profound and lasting impact which went far beyond the end of
the occupation.

Youth administrations, welfare agencies, and

youth organizations adopted organizational models but also
new views of treating young persons which emphasized the
individual

and

personalities.

tried

to

develop

independent,

creative

For the first time an individual did not have

to join youth organizations for his leisure time activities,
while welfare workers,

many youth groups,

and government

agencies began to rethink their traditionally authoritarian
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approaches.
in

this

Undoubtedly, the American re-education efforts

realm

had

a

considerable

impact

which

spread

throughout the Federal Republic as time went by.
Contrary
observers

to

the

and some

assertions

scholars,

of

many

contemporary

the American personnel who

occupied key positions in youth work in the American zone and
in Nuremberg generally were qualified for doing their job
well and dedicated to their tasks.

When the American YMCA

refused to grant Lawrence Norrie another year of absence, he
resigned from a job which undoubtedly was financially more
lucrative and burdened with less controversy and frustrations
to remain in charge of youth activities in Germany.
joined the State Department.

He later

Equally Mark Selsor probably

would have been able to find assignments in the Army which
would have advanced his career.

Both men, as well as many

others in youth work, stayed on their posts because they felt
that they had an important mission in Germany which needed
time to accomplish its re-educational goals.

These goals

remained a constant in American policy in the field from 1945
on to the end of the occupation.

OMGUS and HICOG officers

came

just

to

regard

communism

as

another

brand

of

totalitarianism, very similar in its appearance and goals to
National Socialism.

Consequently they just added the new

threat to their list of enemies, but did not have to modify
their agenda,

since reorientation would provide the best

results against either system.
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Interestingly, the only program which neither Military
Government nor the Germans were able to control provided the
most

radical

activities.

departure

from

traditional

German

youth

The Army's GYA introduced the Germans to a model

for open youth work which initially neither German officials
nor the members of traditional youth groups nor Military
Government

youth

specialists

regarded

as

necessary

or

desirable.

Luckily for them, the Army maintained the program

until some Germans and Military Government officials began to
recognize its value.
While it is possible to trace American influences within
Nuremberg's youth work and welfare administration, the impact
of the American presence on young Germans themselves
harder to assess.

is

Interviews and documents revealed that

many Germans in Nuremberg had contacts with Americans during
the immediate postwar period.

People wore American clothes,

ate American food, smoked American cigarettes, or landed a
job with

the

occupiers.

Undoubtedly

some

Germans

took

American aid and generosity after the war for granted or
regarded it as a kind of compensation for the destruction the
occupiers had brought on Nuremberg and for the problems the
occupation was causing, but many others genuinely appreciated
American aid.

Through their generosity, American authorities

and individuals opened an avenue of communication and evoked
in many people a respect or at least a benevolent attitude
towards the United States.

When the hard times were over,
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most

Germans

returned

to

their

normal

lives

in

which

Americans generally did not occupy any significant role, but
looking back after fifty years, many of them still maintained
a positive attitude towards the American people— although
they often voiced criticism of American domestic and foreign
policy over the last five decades.

This might explain in

part why a majority of politicians from the left and from the
right as well as their constituents supported the Federal
Republic's integration in the Western Alliance under American
leadership even beyond the end of the Cold War.1
Young Germans increasingly looked to the United States
for their role models, copied American fashion trends, and
listened to American music, a behavior which many observers
interpreted as "Americanization."

Kaspar Haase's intriguing

study on young people's behavior and attitudes during the
second part of the 1950s,

however,

direction.

him,

According

to

leads

this

in a different

generation

adapted

American ideas and American fashions to their own needs and
environment,
process,

often changing the original meaning

just

like

their

grandparents

had

done

in the
in

the

•interestingly, the only serious critic of the Federal
Republic's western integration was Oskar Lafontaine, a
younger Social Democratic politician from the Saarland, the
only region which had not been exposed to American post-war
policies and programs.
Although Lafontaine remained very
popular in the Saar region, his ideas regarding the Federal
Republic's place in the international community never found
much public favor even in his own party.
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political realm.2 What is interesting about this behavior is
not that it was exceptional (it took place in very similar
fashion in France, Great Britain and elsewhere), but that
young Germans for the first time did not remain outside a
general current.

They embraced it like their peers in other

countries.
Their older brothers and sisters, the members of the
Hitler

Youth

generation,

probably

had

a

harder

reconcile their old values and with the new.

time

to

They needed to

make a conscious effort to replace Nazi ideas with new ones
about which they were learning in schools,

in their youth

organizations, or from the Americans directly.

We have seen

that a much larger number of young people than had previously
been thought actually took advantage of the many different
opportunities to have a look at the outside world and to
break out of the intellectual and spiritual isolation they
had experienced during the Third Reich.

Here, as with their

younger siblings, a majority most likely would have correctly
rejected

claims

that

their

activities

led

to

an

Americanization, but that would not have meant that American
programs had no impact on them.

Many of them seemed to

accept the new political system and to embrace the basic
values of a democratic culture:

freedom of expression,

a

higher degree of tolerance, and at least participation in the
2Kaspar
Maase,
BRAVO
A m e r ik a :
E rk u n d u n g e n
zur
Jugendkultur der Bundesrepublik in den funfziger Jahren
(Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 1992).
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electoral

process.

West

Germany's

voter

participation

throughout the 1950s and 1960s remained at very high levels.
This generation also was the first one to travel to foreign
lands

(in the 1950s Italy was the preferred spot)

and in

general did not have problems accepting other European guestworkers in their midst.3 But many also retained a feeling of
national

pride

which

even

today

expresses

itself

in

surprising ways.4
To what extent Americans succeeded in introducing not
just

a

democratic

political

system

in

their

zone

of

3Interestingly, the arrival of Turkish guest-workers
changed some of their attitudes.
Throughout the 1970s and
1980s negative feelings towards foreigners living in Germany
seemed to be directed exclusively against Turkish guestworkers.
While working on the shop floor in a major car
factory in the middle of the 1980s, I had the impression that
Germans and other Europeans from Spain, Italy, Greece, and
Yugoslavia, most of them skilled workers, got along with each
other well.
All of them seemed to regard Turks, who
generally were unskilled and whose different religion had
many implications for their dress and behavior, as outsiders.
The most vivid and probably honest expression of this current
was graffiti in the bathrooms, which almost exclusively
depicted tensions between Turkish and German workers.
4See, for example, "Marlene's Street of Dreams? To the
Barricades!" New York Times, 16 Dec. 1996: CF 258. Just as
Times correspondent Alan Cowell did, many observers even
within Germany interpret this occasional appearance of a very
strong patriotism among this generation of Germans as an
indicator for the survival of Nazi attitudes. Given what we
have
seen
in this dissertation
this view
probably
oversimplifies the rather complex adaptation process that
took place within young Germans after the war. The curiosity
and desire of so many to break out of the Nazi imposed
isolation certainly documents a widespread search for new
ideas.
To expect young people to throw all of their
sentiments overboard, especially regarding the sacrifices
they had made and witnessed during the war, would be as
unrealistic as maintaining that most of them refused to
change at all.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

727
occupation but also in instilling democratic convictions in
the

Federal

Republic's

young

constituents

is

almost

impossible to answer, but five decades later there are some
indicators that Americans helped West Germany's citizens on
their way towards changing fundamental attitudes.

Hildegard

Hamm-Briicher, one of Germany's most prominent politicians
after the war, had been among the first young Germans who had
travelled to the United States.

Many years after her journey

she stated that
unlike a constitution, one cannot develop a democratic
culture on the drawing-board,
proclaim
it,
and
promulgate it.
It is something like an inner
constitution— which takes shape from unconscious,
possibly subconscious, historical preconditions and
vibrations of a community [Gemeinwesen] and determines
the political climate5
If she is correct, there is good reason to believe that the
American presence and American re-education programs did
contribute to changes in the shape of that inner constitution
of many young Germans in the American zone.

Since large

numbers of them took advantage of American offers to widen
their horizons

or

simply

experience

a different

way

of

dealing with each other, the exposure to American behavior
and programs provided them with food for thought and new
perspectives.
blocks

These experiences could serve as building

for changing young people's outlook on their own

lives, on the world around them, and also on their political
convictions.

It seemed that Senator William Fulbright had

sQuoted in Eckart 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

728
assessed the situation correctly: American ideas and society
had something to offer for many people.

If others had the

chance to observe American society first hand, they would
come to

understand

the United

States

but also

the very

principles of a democratic society better and might cast
their lots with the western world.
Those who expected young Germans to completely adopt and
copy American society and institutions certainly went home
disappointed.

An Americanization of this generation and

those which followed never took place.

This undoubtedly

disappointed many Americans and led to the conclusion that
American policy had failed.

For the same reason it must have

delighted the older Germans who remained on the watch against
this kind of foreign influence.

Even those who went to the

United States or harbored a positive attitude towards the
occupiers, maintained some reservations.

In fact, most young

Germans probably did not become enthusiastic fans of the
United States.

They often remained critical observers of

American policy and American institutions.
mean,

however,

succeeded.

The

that
very

the

re-education

process

of

This did not

mission

choosing,

had

not

criticizing,

arriving at one's own conclusions, and expressing them freely
are strong indicators for the presence of a truly democratic
thought process.

Many of the young Germans who had spent

some time in the United States in the late 1940s and early
1950s assumed leadership positions in political parties on
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the federal, state, and local levels, in the trade unions, in
schools, in higher education, and in administrations.

Having

been overseas at that time opened doors because it provided
an experience which was apparently much in demand.

This

generation took over the political reins from those who had
still known Weimar.

It helped to manage the economic and

political crises of the 1970s and 1980s and successfully
negotiated the re-unification of Germany at the end of the
Cold War without giving up the country's integration into the
West.
Many

of

their

younger

brothers

and

sisters

also

demonstrated an unequivocal commitment to democracy.

The

students of West Berlin's Free University, the very symbol of
a joint American and German commitment to American ideas and
ideals, assumed the leadership in the student protests of the
1960s.

Those who took to the streets to demonstrate for

education reform,
America's

war

in

but also against the Shah of Persia or
Vietnam,

were

not

directed

by

any

government, but did so defying their representatives' wishes.
The demonstrators had internalized American values.

They

used democratic means to protest against a policy which must
have struck many as going against the very grain of American
culture and the rhetoric with which they had grown up.

The

behavior of both generations over the last forty years is
probably the clearest indicator for the success of American
reorientation efforts among them between 1945 and 1955.
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